MA
Mete Şeref Ahunbay
cs.GTecon.TH
On Valency
published · living versionsW_ummhdspt·v1 · currentpublished
Simultaneous Gradient Learning in First-Price Auctions
with Janik Bürgermeister, Julius Durmann, Martin Bichler, Bary Pradelski +1
1 version
Preprints & journals
10 papers in the corpus · 2020–2026Gradient Dynamics in First-Price Auctions: Iterative Strategy Elimination via Cubic Potentials2606.05108v1 · Mete Seref Ahunbay, Weiqiang Zheng, Tao Lin2026 · 0 citationsarXiv
Avoiding the Worst: The Computational Complexity of Not Worst-Responding2602.10966v2 · Mete Seref Ahunbay, Paul W. Goldberg, Edwin Lock et al.2026 · 0 citationsarXiv
Semicoarse Correlated Equilibria and LP-Based Guarantees for Gradient Dynamics in Normal-Form Games2502.20466v3 · Mete Seref Ahunbay, Martin Bichler2025 · 0 citationsarXiv
First-order (coarse) correlated equilibria in non-concave games2403.18174v6 · Mete Seref Ahunbay2024 · 0 citationsarXiv
On the Uniqueness of Bayesian Coarse Correlated Equilibria in Standard First-Price and All-Pay Auctions2401.01185v4 · Mete Seref Ahunbay, Martin Bichler2024 · 5 citationsarXiv
Solving Large-Scale Electricity Market Pricing Problems in Polynomial Time2312.07071v1 · Mete Seref Ahunbay, Martin Bichler, Teodora Dobos et al.2023 · 5 citationsarXiv
Pricing Optimal Outcomes in Coupled and Non-Convex Markets: Theory and Applications to Electricity Markets2209.07386v2 · Mete Seref Ahunbay, Martin Bichler, Johannes Knorr2022 · 19 citationsarXiv
Improved Two Sample Revenue Guarantees via Mixed-Integer Linear Programming2103.00235v1 · Mete Seref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta2021 · 0 citationsarXiv
The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions2007.10131v1 · Mete Seref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta2020 · 3 citationsarXiv
Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions with No Overbidding2006.03142v1 · Mete Seref Ahunbay, Brendan Lucier, Adrian Vetta2020 · 4 citationsarXiv
Career total: 16 works. 10 are in this corpus.
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