IT
Inbal Talgam-Cohen
cs.GTcs.LGcs.DSecon.THcs.AIcs.CCcs.CYcs.MA
On Valency
published · living versionsW_wwvq4thr·v1 · currentpublished
Revenue Guarantee Equivalence between Dominant-Strategy and Bayesian Mechanisms
with Nir Bachrach, Yi-Chun Chen, Xiangqian Yang, Wanchang Zhang
1 version
Preprints & journals
50 papers in the corpus · 2010–2026Revenue Guarantee Equivalence between Dominant-Strategy and Bayesian Mechanisms2610.29208v1 · Nir Bachrach, Yi-Chun Chen, Inbal Talgam-Cohen et al.2026 · 0 citationsarXivon Valency
An Introduction to Contract Theory for Computer Scientists2610.17336v1 · Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen2026 · 0 citationsACM SIGecom Exchanges, Vol. 24, No. 1, June 2026, Pages 31-46
Ex-ante versus Ex-post: Egalitarian Facility Location Mechanism Design2608.14499v2 · Zohar Barak, Inbal Talgam-Cohen2026 · 0 citationsarXiv
Teaming Up with AI: Coordination and Cooperation2607.03181v1 · Nicole Immorlica, Inbal Talgam-Cohen2026 · 0 citationsarXiv
ZEBRA: Zero-shot Budgeted Resource Allocation for LLM Orchestration2605.20485v1 · May Hamri, Inbal Talgam-Cohen2026 · 0 citationsarXiv
Adaptive Contracts for Cost-Effective AI Delegation2603.17212v2 · Eden Saig, Tamar Garbuz, Ariel D. Procaccia et al.2026 · 0 citationsarXiv
Stochastic Knapsack: Semi-Adaptivity Gaps and Improved Approximation2602.24042v2 · Zohar Barak, Inbal Talgam-Cohen2026 · 0 citationsarXiv
Online Contract Design2602.07385v1 · Elad Lavi, Hadas Shachnai, Inbal Talgam-Cohen2026 · 0 citationsarXiv
Approximating Pandora's Knapsack via Simple Policies2509.05956v4 · Zohar Barak, Asnat Berlin, Ilan Reuven Cohen et al.2025 · 0 citationsarXiv
An Algorithm-to-Contract Framework without Demand Queries2507.20038v3 · Ilan Doron-Arad, Hadas Shachnai, Gilad Shmerler et al.2025 · 0 citationsarXiv
Multi-Project Contracts2506.05705v1 · Tal Alon, Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen et al.2025 · 0 citationsarXiv
Dynamic Rental Games with Stagewise Individual Rationality2505.07579v2 · Batya Berzack, Rotem Oshman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen2025 · 0 citationsarXiv
Welfare and Beyond in Multi-Agent Contracts2504.18876v1 · Gil Aharoni, Martin Hoefer, Inbal Talgam-Cohen2025 · 0 citationsarXiv
Algorithmic Contract Theory: A Survey2412.16384v1 · Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen2024 · 9 citationsarXiv
Principal-Agent Reinforcement Learning: Orchestrating AI Agents with Contracts2407.18074v2 · Dima Ivanov, Paul Dutting, Inbal Talgam-Cohen et al.2024 · 0 citationsarXiv
Incentivizing Quality Text Generation via Statistical Contracts2406.11118v2 · Eden Saig, Ohad Einav, Inbal Talgam-Cohen2024 · 1 citationarXiv
Statistically Truthful Auctions via Acceptance Rule2405.12016v5 · Roy Maor Lotan, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Yaniv Romano2024 · 0 citationsarXiv
MAC Advice for Facility Location Mechanism Design2403.12181v1 · Zohar Barak, Anupam Gupta, Inbal Talgam-Cohen2024 · 3 citationsarXiv
Contracting with a Learning Agent2401.16198v1 · Guru Guruganesh, Yoav Kolumbus, Jon Schneider et al.2024 · 6 citationsarXiv
Algorithmic Cheap Talk2311.09011v2 · Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu et al.2023 · 0 citationsarXiv
Deep Contract Design via Discontinuous Networks2307.02318v2 · Tonghan Wang, Paul Dutting, Dmitry Ivanov et al.2023 · 2 citationsNeurIPS 2023
Delegated Classification2306.11475v2 · Eden Saig, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Nir Rosenfeld2023 · 0 citationsarXiv
A Random Dictator Is All You Need2302.03667v2 · Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen et al.2023 · 1 citationarXiv
Approximate Optimality of Linear Contracts Under Uncertainty2211.06850v3 · Tal Alon, Paul Dutting, Yingkai Li et al.2022 · 0 citationsarXiv
Information Design in the Principal-Agent Problem2209.13688v2 · Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu et al.2022 · 3 citationsarXiv
Strategic Representation2206.08542v1 · Vineet Nair, Ganesh Ghalme, Inbal Talgam-Cohen et al.2022 · 1 citationarXiv
Distributional Robustness: From Pricing to Auctions2205.09008v2 · Nir Bachrach, Inbal Talgam-Cohen2022 · 4 citationsarXiv
Interdependent Public Projects2204.08044v2 · Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Divyarthi Mohan et al.2022 · 3 citationsarXiv
Multi-Channel Bayesian Persuasion2111.09789v2 · Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu et al.2021 · 4 citationsarXiv
Contracts with Private Cost per Unit-of-Effort2111.09179v2 · Tal Alon, Paul Dutting, Inbal Talgam-Cohen2021 · 17 citationsarXiv
Unified Fair Allocation of Goods and Chores via Copies2109.08671v2 · Yotam Gafni, Xin Huang, Ron Lavi et al.2021 · 11 citationsarXiv
Auctions with Interdependence and SOS: Improved Approximation2107.08806v1 · Ameer Amer, Inbal Talgam-Cohen2021 · 6 citationsarXiv
Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency2105.14998v1 · Tal Alon, Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash et al.2021 · 0 citationsarXiv
Regret-Minimizing Bayesian Persuasion2105.13870v1 · Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu et al.2021 · 0 citationsarXiv
Strategic Classification in the Dark2102.11592v3 · Ganesh Ghalme, Vineet Nair, Itay Eilat et al.2021 · 8 citationsarXiv
Bayesian Persuasion under Ex Ante and Ex Post Constraints2012.03272v2 · Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Konstantin Zabarnyi2020 · 11 citationsarXiv
Price of Anarchy of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values2011.00498v2 · Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen et al.2020 · 3 citationsarXiv
Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer2003.05913v2 · Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Yannai A. Gonczarowski et al.2020 · 5 citationsarXiv
Competitive Equilibrium with Generic Budgets: Beyond Additive1911.09992v1 · Moshe Babaioff, Noam Nisan, Inbal Talgam-Cohen2019 · 3 citationsarXiv
Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design1812.11896v2 · Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen2018 · 24 citationsarXiv
Complement-Free Couples Must Communicate: A Hardness Result for Two-Player Combinatorial Auctions1811.09871v1 · Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman et al.2018 · 3 citationsarXiv
Simple versus Optimal Contracts1808.03713v3 · Paul Dutting, Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen2018 · 0 citationsarXiv
Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets1703.08150v2 · Moshe Babaioff, Noam Nisan, Inbal Talgam-Cohen2017 · 49 citationsarXiv
The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders1612.08821v1 · Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler et al.2016 · 3 citationsarXiv
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements1612.04746v2 · Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler et al.2016 · 34 citationsarXiv
Approximate Modularity Revisited1612.02034v2 · Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen2016 · 1 citationarXiv
When Are Welfare Guarantees Robust?1608.02402v1 · Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Jan Vondr'ak2016 · 4 citationsarXiv
Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium1406.0576v1 · Shahar Dobzinski, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen et al.2014 · 7 citationsarXiv
Refine Predictions Ad Infinitum?1302.6700v1 · Mukund Sundararajan, Inbal Talgam-Cohen2013 · 2 citationsarXiv
A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium1007.3886v1 · Uriel Feige, Inbal Talgam-Cohen2010 · 8 citationsarXiv
Career total: 114 works. 50 are in this corpus.
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