MF
Michal Feldman
cs.GTcs.DSecon.THcs.AIcs.MAcs.CCcs.LGcs.SI
On Valency
published · living versionsW_zpqarwaj·v1 · currentpublished
A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes
with Uriel Feige, Nicole Immorlica, Rani Izsak, Brendan Lucier +1
1 version
Preprints & journals
92 papers in the corpus · 2009–2026Optimal Online Stochastic Matching2610.19866v1 · Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Mathieu Molina2026 · 0 citationsarXiv
An Introduction to Contract Theory for Computer Scientists2610.17336v1 · Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen2026 · 0 citationsACM SIGecom Exchanges, Vol. 24, No. 1, June 2026, Pages 31-46
Settling the Complexity Landscape of Multi-Agent Contracts with Binary Actions2609.34665v1 · Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger, Shay Shani2026 · 0 citationsarXiv
Online Multi-Agent Contracts2608.18241v1 · Paul Dutting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur et al.2026 · 0 citationsarXiv
Epistemic Pairwise Maximin Share2606.18921v1 · Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Yael Nissan et al.2026 · 0 citationsarXiv
Combinatorial Contracts Through Demand Types2604.15125v1 · Elizabeth Baldwin, Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman et al.2026 · 0 citationsarXiv
Equal-Pay Contracts2601.15478v2 · Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka et al.2026 · 0 citationsarXiv
One Action Too Many: Inapproximability of Budgeted Combinatorial Contracts2511.20110v1 · Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka et al.2025 · 0 citationsarXiv
Combinatorial Contract Design: Recent Progress and Emerging Frontiers2510.15065v1 · Michal Feldman2025 · 0 citationsarXiv
Online Combinatorial Allocation with Interdependent Values2507.23500v1 · Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan et al.2025 · 0 citationsarXiv
Ultra Efficient Contracts: Pushing the Boundaries of Tractable Contract Design2506.18008v2 · Michal Feldman, Liat Yashin2025 · 0 citationsarXiv
Budget-Feasible Contracts2504.01773v2 · Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka et al.2025 · 0 citationsarXiv
Succinct Ambiguous Contracts2503.02592v2 · Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Yarden Rashti2025 · 0 citationsarXiv
Fair Division via Resource Augmentation2502.09377v3 · Hannaneh Akrami, Siddharth Barman, Alon Eden et al.2025 · 0 citationsarXiv
The Pseudo-Dimension of Contracts2501.14474v1 · Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Tomasz Ponitka et al.2025 · 1 citationarXiv
Algorithmic Contract Theory: A Survey2412.16384v1 · Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen2024 · 9 citationsarXiv
Proportionally Fair Makespan Approximation2412.08572v2 · Michal Feldman, Jugal Garg, Vishnu V. Narayan et al.2024 · 2 citationsarXiv
Multi-Agent Combinatorial Contracts2405.08260v1 · Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman et al.2024 · 1 citationarXiv
Contract Design for Sequential Actions2403.09545v2 · Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger2024 · 0 citationsarXiv
When Contracts Get Complex: Information-Theoretic Barriers2403.09794v2 · Paul Dutting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur et al.2024 · 1 citationarXiv
Choosing Behind the Veil: Tight Bounds for Identity-Blind Online Algorithms2402.17160v1 · Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Zhihao Gavin Tang2024 · 2 citationsarXiv
Private Interdependent Valuations: New Bounds for Single-Item Auctions and Matroids2402.12017v1 · Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras et al.2024 · 3 citationsarXiv
The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities2402.11084v2 · Johannes Brustle, Jos'e Correa, Paul Dutting et al.2024 · 2 citationsarXiv
Fair Division via Quantile Shares2312.01874v1 · Yakov Babichenko, Michal Feldman, Ron Holzman et al.2023 · 2 citationsarXiv
On the (In)approximability of Combinatorial Contracts2311.18425v1 · Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger2023 · 2 citationsarXiv
Constant Approximation for Private Interdependent Valuations2310.00958v1 · Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Kira Goldner et al.2023 · 6 citationsarXiv
Combinatorial Contracts Beyond Gross Substitutes2309.10766v1 · Paul Dutting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur2023 · 7 citationsarXiv
Learning-Augmented Metric Distortion via -Veto Core2307.07495v3 · Ben Berger, Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis et al.2023 · 0 citationsarXiv
Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations2304.03706v1 · Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Vishnu V. Narayan et al.2023 · 8 citationsarXiv
Pandora's Problem with Combinatorial Cost2303.01078v1 · Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman et al.2023 · 5 citationsEC '23: Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023
On Optimal Tradeoffs between EFX and Nash Welfare2302.09633v2 · Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Tomasz Ponitka2023 · 13 citationsarXiv
Ambiguous Contracts2302.07621v5 · Paul Dutting, Michal Feldman, Daniel Peretz et al.2023 · 7 citationsarXiv
Multi-Agent Contracts2211.05434v2 · Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman et al.2022 · 1 citationarXiv
Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents2211.02004v1 · Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Stefano Leonardi et al.2022 · 3 citations50th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2023)
Lookahead Auctions with Pooling2209.12934v1 · Almog Wald, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin et al.2022 · 2 citationsSAGT (2022) Algorithmic Game Theory 60-77
Interdependent Public Projects2204.08044v2 · Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Divyarthi Mohan et al.2022 · 3 citationsarXiv
"Who Is Next in Line?'' On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Bayesian Online Settings2202.09215v2 · Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin et al.2022 · 7 citationsarXiv
Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions2202.09291v1 · Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin et al.2022 · 8 citationsarXiv
Combinatorial Contracts2109.14260v2 · Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman et al.2021 · 2 citationsarXiv
Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents2107.00357v1 · Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer2021 · 1 citationarXiv
Competitive Equilibria with Unequal Budgets: Supporting Arbitrary Pareto Optimal Allocations2103.08634v1 · Nir Andelman, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat et al.2021 · 0 citationsarXiv
Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations?2102.13343v3 · Shahar Dobzinski, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman et al.2021 · 4 citationsarXiv
(Almost Full) EFX Exists for Four Agents (and Beyond)2102.10654v2 · Ben Berger, Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman et al.2021 · 16 citationsarXiv
Secretary Matching with General Arrivals2011.01559v1 · Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin et al.2020 · 2 citationsarXiv
Price of Anarchy of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values2011.00498v2 · Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen et al.2020 · 3 citationsarXiv
On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints2010.07280v4 · Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman, Erel Segal-Halevi2020 · 13 citationsarXiv
On a Competitive Secretary Problem with Deferred Selections2007.07216v1 · Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer2020 · 4 citationsarXiv
Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding2003.11857v2 · Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai2020 · 2 citationsarXiv
Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer2003.05913v2 · Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Yannai A. Gonczarowski et al.2020 · 5 citationsarXiv
The Efficiency of Best-Response Dynamics2002.11461v1 · Michal Feldman, Yuval Snappir, Tami Tamir2020 · 21 citationsarXiv
Career total: 228 works. 92 are in this corpus.Showing the 50 most recent.
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