betaFeedback

WorksComputer Science

Anticipating or Speculating? Making Futures Pay in AI Ethics

Abstract

Philosophers have recently been trying to develop uniform decision rules for instances in which physicians' judgments diverge from the recommendations of medical artificial intelligence (AI) systems. I argue that this effort is fatally flawed because the performance and appropriate use of algorithmic recommendation systems by physicians are highly context-specific, empirical medical matters rather than epistemological ones. In such instances, general decision rules can be stipulated only to the extent that they abstract away from relevant, indeed determinative, contextual circumstances. The alleged problem of physician-AI disagreement, and others like it, play into longstanding disputes in technology ethics about the viability and utility of envisioning possible futures: is this useful "anticipation" or wasteful "speculation"? I suggest that the two may be distinguished. Anticipation explores plausible futures to help inform present actions under irreducible uncertainty. Speculation abstracts away uncertainty, developing formal solutions to stipulated circumstances whose relationship to the real present is often quite unclear. Efforts to develop crisp philosophical solutions to physician-AI disagreement, among other problems, fall into the latter category. Technology ethics should remember that fruitful futures thinking must both begin from and return to the messy, uncertain present.

Paper details

vlnc:W_3ebng4eg
Version
v1 · latest
Published
Fresh — added to the Hub within the last 30 days
Added
License
CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
Usage

views · 7

downloads · 0

A view counts once per browser per day, a download each time the PDF is requested.

  • Computer Science

Not recorded for this paper

View statement
Looking for related papers…