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Deployed entanglement-based BBM92 quantum key distribution using frequency-converted photons emitted by a quantum dot

Abstract

Establishing secure communication is an important requirement in existing and future networks. Although current solutions rely on classical approaches, quantum mechanics offers the possibility of moving from computational to information-theoretic security. Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been extensively studied as a means of achieving such security. Recently, epitaxial quantum dots started to be studied and employed in quantum cryptography, because of their rapid development that made them one of the brightest sources of quantum light to date. In particular, they are known to be excellent sources of polarization-entangled photon pairs, especially droplet-etched dots operating at ∼\sim780 nm. Here, we employ such a quantum dot to generate entangled photon pairs under 1 GHz excitation rate. Using quantum frequency conversion, we interface the emitted photons with the telecommunication wavelength range while preserving their polarization entanglement. This enables quantum key distribution over a 1.59 km field-deployed fibre link across the University of Stuttgart - campus Vaihingen, using the BBM92 protocol: we achieve a secure key rate of 206 Hz over 19 h of stable operation, resulting in a total secure key length of 14.2 Mbit. This key enables the safe encryption and decryption of a colour image with further implementation of error correction and privacy amplification. These results demonstrate important steps towards hybrid quantum networks by combining high-quality entangled-photon sources operated at high excitation rates, efficient frequency conversion module, and picosecond-level time synchronization in a realistic deployed network.

Quantum cryptography employs laws of quantum theory, such as the no-cloning theorem and the uncertainty principle, to design cryptographic protocols that guarantee security against an adversary with unlimited computational power.[1, 2] Over the last decade, many quantum cryptographic primitives, basic building blocks of more complex quantum cryptographic protocols, have been theoretically described and experimentally demonstrated[3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. The most mature one, quantum key distribution, has been many times implemented on deployed optical fiber networks and is almost routinely used in scenarios which require highly secure communication[3, 8, 9]. These advances are the main driving forces for realizing a universal long-distance quantum communication network, so-called quantum internet[10, 11], which allows implementation of quantum cryptographic protocols in real-life scenarios.

These days, most deployed quantum cryptographic implementations are based on photons emitted by Poisson-distributed sources (PDSs), such as spontaneous parametric down-conversion sources and attenuated lasers[2, 3]. These single-photon sources demonstrate high technological readiness, robustness to environmental fluctuations, room-temperature operation, and low-cost, high-yield production. This makes them the leading sources in modern quantum cryptography, despite not being ideal single-photon sources. The main limitation of these sources comes from the trade-off between the multi-photon contribution and the source brightness, which limits their performance at long-distance quantum communication[1, 2], lowering the efficiency of possible quantum repeaters and making the implementation of mistrustful quantum cryptographic protocols challenging[2, 13].

This limitation can be overcome by employing quantum dot single-photon sources (QDs) in quantum cryptographic protocols, as QDs have demonstrated both high brightness and high single-photon purity[14, 15]. Moreover, multiple excitation schemes allow QDs to emit photons without photon-number coherence[16, 17, 18] or entangled photon pairs with high fidelity[19, 20]. The combination of these tunable parameters makes QDs promising candidates as quantum light sources for quantum cryptography applications, with the potential to surpass the performance of currently used PDSs[16, 21]. Indeed, quantum dots have been employed in a variety of quantum communication protocols, ranging from deployed QKD employing single-[22, 23] or entangled photons[24, 25, 26], to quantum random number generation[27], decoy-state protocols over long fibres[28], and, more recently, strong coin flipping[29].

The future global quantum internet will comprise numerous building blocks, including quantum memories, quantum repeaters, and interfaces to quantum computing nodes[30]. These components may rely on a variety of physical platforms, such as quantum dots[31], spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC) sources[32, 33], trapped atoms[34], nitrogen-vacancy centers[35], or other quantum systems. Interconnecting these heterogeneous platforms into a unified quantum network remains one of the major scientific and technological challenges in developing the quantum internet[36].

To establish photonic interconnections between different quantum platforms, the wavelengths of the exchanged photons must be matched[36]. In contrast to photons generated by spontaneous parametric down-conversion sources[37], the emission wavelength of a quantum dot can only be tuned over a relatively limited spectral range[22, 38, 39]. Quantum frequency converters represent an appealing approach to bridge the wavelength mismatch between different quantum platforms and to match the target quantum system’s acceptance wavelength[40, 41, 42, 43].

In this work, we combine a droplet-etched epitaxially grown GaAs quantum dot with a low fine-structure splitting (FSS), emitting highly entangled photon pairs at approximately 780 nm, with a polarization-maintaining quantum frequency converter (QFC) that converts one photon of each entangled pair to 1515 nm close to the telecommunication C-band. This wavelength conversion makes the photon suitable for long-distance quantum communication over standard single-mode silica optical fibres while preserving its entanglement44.

To demonstrate the performance of this hybrid quantum interface, combining a high-performance entangled-photon source with a QFC, we implemented the entanglement-based quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol BBM92[45] over an existing deployed fibre network on the Vaihingen campus of the University of Stuttgart. The communicating parties, Alice and Bob, were physically separated by approximately 700 m as the crow flies and connected through 1.59 km of deployed optical fibre with total losses of 1.09 dB, for characterization of the deployed fibre link, see the Supplementary Material. Alice’s setup consisted of standard laboratory-based optical components located in the stable laboratory environment of the Institute of Semiconductor Optics and Functional Interfaces (IHFG), whereas Bob’s setup, including the projective measurement apparatus, control electronics, and single-photon detectors, was integrated into a standard 19-inch rack and placed in an office space of the Technical Information and Communication Services (TIK) department of the University of Stuttgart.

The layout of the Stuttgart-Vaihingen campus quantum network testbed used for the entanglement-based QKD implementation is shown in Figure 1a. The first communication party, Alice, comprises an optically pumped GaAs QD that emits polarization-entangled photon pairs under pulsed resonant two-photon excitation (TPE). To generate entangled photon pairs, we implemented a GaAs QD obtained by droplet epitaxy, embedded in a broadband optical antenna design to enhance photon-pair extraction and fibre-coupling efficiencies over bulk samples44. The entangled photon-pair state generated by the biexciton-exciton cascade decay has the form ∣ψ(t)⟩=12(∣HXXHX⟩+e−iδt/ℏ∣VXXVX⟩)\lvert\psi(t)\rangle= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\left(\lvert H_{XX}H_X\rangle+ e^{-i\delta t/\hbar}\lvert V_{XX}V_X\rangle\right), where δ\delta is the FSS, which causes the relative phase between the two components of the entangled state to evolve with the time difference between the emissions of the XX and X photons. The QD used in this work exhibits an FSS of δ=2.1(3)\delta=2.1(3) µeV which, for a coincidence time window of 275 ps, results in a state close to the Bell state ∣ϕ+⟩\lvert\phi^{+}\rangle with a fidelity of 91.4 %, the corresponding density matrix is shown in the Supplementary Material.

Figure 1. Experimental setup and measurement configuration. a) Map of the Vaihingen campus of the University of Stuttgart, showing the two experimental locations: Alice, at the IHFG (Allmandring 3), and Bob, at the TIK (Allmandring 30), connected by 1.59 km of deployed optical fibre. At the Alice location (see inset), the source configuration is schematically illustrated: the quantum dot emits entangled photon pairs, one of which is sent to the BB84 state-preparation unit, while the second photon is first frequency-converted to the telecom C-band and subsequently transmitted through the deployed fibre link. An automated polarization-compensation unit provides active control of the polarization state of the deployed fiber link. An optical clock provides the time reference for synchronization between the two locations. Bob (see inset) contains the BB84 state-measurement setup. The deployed fibre link (see insert) comprises three fibers: one for the quantum channel, one for classical communication, and one for optical time synchronization. b) Schematic of the key-sifting procedure between Alice and Bob, measurement outcomes are retained when Alice and Bob select the same measurement basis and discarded otherwise. c) Energy-level diagram of the biexciton–exciton–ground-state cascade in the semiconductor quantum dot generating two entangled photons with a spectral separation of 1.85 nm.

The QD was excited via a two-photon excitation (TPE) scheme at 779 nm. For this, second-harmonic generation of telecom C-band laser pulses by a fibre-coupled periodically poled lithium niobate (PPLN) waveguide was used. The fundamental wave was generated by a fibre-based pulsed laser, emitting optical pulses with a central wavelength of 1557.73 nm, a pulse width of 10 ps, corresponding to a spectral FWHM of 400 pm, and operating at a repetition rate of 1 GHz. This excitation setup was chosen to enable a high repetition rate with stable pulse-to-pulse operation within a compact footprint and without requiring additional repetition-rate multipliers. The biexciton photon (XX), emitted at a wavelength of 779.79 nm, is frequency-converted to 1515 nm using a QFC module based on a Sagnac interferometer[40, 41]. The Sagnac configuration preserves the polarization state and, consequently, the entanglement during the conversion process. The QFC module achieves a conversion efficiency of up to 50 %. The converted XX photon, now at a wavelength suitable for long-distance transmission through standard single-mode silica optical fibre, is transmitted through the deployed fibre link to the second communication party, Bob, located on the opposite side of the university campus.

Polarization drifts in the deployed fibre link, caused by environmental fluctuations such as temperature variations over the day, are compensated using an automated polarization-control unit based on multiple motorized wave plates. The compensation algorithm probes the fibre link using well-defined input polarization states encoded using a CW alignment laser and optimizes the corresponding Stokes parameters by adjusting the wave plates in the polarization-control module.

The temporal synchronization between Alice and Bob is established by sharing an optical frequency reference distributed through the fibre network and generated by an ultrafast optical clock. Classical communication between the two parties is performed over the university’s local area network (LAN). A detailed description of the individual modules of the quantum network testbed is provided in the Supplementary Material.

The implemented QKD protocol is the entanglement-based BBM92 protocol, in which the BB84 states are established through remote state preparation. Before the XX photon is transmitted to Bob, the exciton photon (X), is measured by Alice in one of two mutually unbiased conjugate bases, here chosen as the (Z)- and (X)-bases. The choice of measurement basis is implemented passively using only a 50:50 beam splitter, thereby limiting the communication rate primarily by the photon-detection jitter and the QD excitation repetition rate, and not by the speed of active elements needed in non-entanglement based protocols. The measurement of the X photon projects the XX photon of the entangled pair onto the corresponding polarization state determined by Alice’s measurement outcome. Consequently, Alice and Bob share correlated states from the set ({H,V,D,A}\{H,V,D,A\}), corresponding to horizontal, vertical, diagonal, and antidiagonal polarization, respectively. These four states constitute the BB84 state set used for the subsequent QKD protocol, with Bob performing an analogous measurement on the received XX photon, randomly selecting between the (Z)- and (X)-bases.

When Alice and Bob choose the same measurement basis, their measurement outcomes are ideally correlated. In practice, limited fidelity of the entangled state, fluctuations of transmission channel, and imperfections of measurement systems result in a finite error probability, so-called quantum bit error rate (QBER). Events for which Alice and Bob selected the same basis are therefore retained during the sifting phase of the protocol, and their corresponding measurement outcomes form the raw key, as illustrated in Figure 1b.

To mitigate the security threat posed by multiphoton emission, we implemented a squashing model in which Bob assigns a randomly selected measurement outcome corresponding to a single-click event whenever both detectors click[46].

This approach increases the QBER as the multiphoton-emission probability increases. In the first step, we optimized the coincidence window between the two photons detection events to maximize the secure key rate (SKR) of the implemented QKD protocol, see Figure 2a. Increasing the coincidence window results in a higher number of detected photon pairs and, consequently, a higher raw key rate (RKR), as a larger fraction of photon pairs emitted within the finite radiative lifetime of the QD is captured. However, in contrast, the QBER also increases steadily as the fidelity to the initial Bell state ∣ϕ+⟩\lvert\phi^{+}\rangle decreases due to FSS-induced state oscillations and decoherence. In addition, a larger contribution from uncorrelated continuous-wave noise generated by the QFC leads to more false coincidences and increases the probability of both detectors clicking, thereby increasing the frequency of squashing events. The SKR can be calculated as SKR=RKR(1−H2(QBER))−leakECSKR=RKR(1-H_{2}(QBER))-leak_{EC}, where H2(x)=−xlog⁡2(x)−(1−x)log⁡2(1−x)H_{2}(x)=-x\log_{2}(x)-(1-x)\log_{2}(1-x) is the binary Shannon entropy and leakECleak_{EC} is the rate of bits leaked during error correction[47, 48]. Therefore, the optimal coincidence window for maximizing the SKR represents a trade-off between the increasing raw key rate and the increasing QBER.

Figure 2. Key experimental figures: Key rate, secure key rate, and QBER. a) Observed raw key rate (RKR) (left scale) and QBER (right scale) as a function of the coincidence window used for the detection of the two photons. For a coincidence window of 275 ps, the secure key rate (SKR) reaches its maximum of 204 Hz, with an RKR of 502 Hz, while maintaining a QBER of 4.71 %, well below the theoretical security threshold of 11 % for the present protocol. b) Raw key rate (left scale) and QBER (right scale) as a function of time during the 19 h-long measurement. The plotted values are hourly averages. The QBER remains well below the 11 % security threshold (gray dashed line) for this protocol.

To estimate leakECleak_{EC}, we implemented an error-correction code based on the low-density parity-check (LDPC) algorithm, in which Alice and Bob share a parity-check matrix. Alice sends the syndrome of her raw key over the public channel, allowing Bob to correct mismatched bits of his noisy copy of the key, at the cost of leaking a known amount, leakECleak_{EC}, of information to the public channel that is subsequently suppressed during privacy amplification.[48, 49, 50] The raw key was split into finite blocks for error correction, with a block length of 5000 bits, determined from optimization tests aimed at minimizing leakECleak_{EC} for QBER values between 4.5% and 7.0%, see Supplementary Material. For each coincidence window shown in Figure 2a, we extracted a 5000 bit raw-key block, performed error correction, and calculated the corresponding SKR. The resulting SKR reaches a maximum of 204 Hz at a coincidence window of 275 ps.

The QKD protocol was realized over an 19 h-long measurement period, during which the natural polarization drift of the deployed fibre was found to be minor (see the Supplementary Material). Therefore, the polarization drift was monitored only once per hour, when Alice sent either HH- or DD-polarized CW alignment light to Bob, who measured the corresponding Stokes parameter. If this parameter was lower than the threshold value of 0.985, the polarization compensation algorithm was initiated to restore the Stokes parameter to a value above 0.995.

The long-term stability of the raw key rate (RKR) and QBER for the optimal coincidence window is shown in Figure 2b. The gradual decrease in the RKR can be attributed to small changes in the wavelength of the converted photons, resulting in their increased loss in a volume Bragg grating (VBG)-based spectral filter with a bandwidth of 25 GHz: this is placed directly after the QFC unit to filter out the spectrally broad noise generated during the conversion process. These small changes in the photon wavelength are caused mostly by temperature fluctuations of the conversion crystal and, on a small part, of the quantum-dot cryostat. Despite that, the QBER shows good stability throughout the entire measurement period, demonstrating the high stability of the deployed setup.

The average RKR over the measurement period was 504 Hz, and the total length of the raw key was over 34.5 Mbit. The entire raw-key string was divided into 5000 bit-long blocks, on which error correction was performed. The SKR was calculated for each block based on the measured QBER and the corresponding number of leaked bits, leakECleakEC. The raw-key string was then converted into a secure-key string through privacy amplification using a standard Toeplitz-matrix hash function; see the Supplementary Information for further details. This resulted in an average SKR of 206 Hz, with a total secure-key length of 14.2 Mbit, corresponding to an overall efficiency of error correction and privacy amplification of 40.87 % at an average QBER of 4.7 %.

To further benchmark the protocol and demonstrate its practical usability, the exchanged key was employed to encrypt and decrypt a 24-bit colour image with a resolution of 943×620943 \times620 pixels using a one-time pad (see Figure 3, top centre). On the left side (orange pattern), the raw key was used for encryption and decryption, whereas on the right side (green pattern), the secure key obtained after error correction and privacy amplification was used. A closer inspection of the recovered images shows that the error-correction process successfully removed all protocol errors. Further experimental parameters and results are reported in the figure.

Encryption and decryption of a colour image by one-time pad

Figure 3. Encryption and decryption of a colour image by one-time pad. (top) The original 24-bit colour image with a resolution of 943 × 620 pixels (shown under the gray box indicating the quantum-channel characteristics, including the measurement time and QBER) is encrypted with the raw key (left side, orange) or with the secure key (right side, green). Decryption using the raw key (bottom left) or the secure key (bottom right), after error correction and privacy amplification with an effective retention ratio of PAeff=40.48%PA_{\mathrm{eff}}=40.48\%. For both decrypted images, a zoom of the same respective areas highlights the removal of corrupted pixels after decryption with the secure key.

The present results demonstrate the maturity of quantum-dot-based sources for hybrid, field-deployed fibre networks incorporating quantum interconnects, such as quantum frequency converters. Effective time synchronization between the two distant locations was achieved by distributing an optical frequency reference through the network, enabling a timing uncertainty below 25 ps. Classical communication was established using commercial LAN equipment, demonstrating the possibility of integrating quantum channels with existing classical communication infrastructure. Over a measurement period of 19 h, an average secure key rate of 206 Hz was achieved, resulting in a total secure-key length of 14.2 Mbit. This performance was enabled by the bright polarization-entangled photon-pair source and its operation at a repetition rate of 1 GHz. Together, these results demonstrate the feasibility of operating an entanglement-based QKD system continuously in a field-deployed environment while combining quantum-dot photon sources with quantum frequency conversion.

Interestingly, even brighter sources of entangled photons have already been demonstrated, both at shorter wavelengths[51], as in the present study, and directly in the telecommunication C-band[52]. These advances provide a pathway towards higher key rates and longer-distance deployed experiments, as well as towards more advanced quantum-network protocols. Together with the demonstrated hybrid quantum interface and deployed-network operation, they represent an important step towards the realization of future large-scale quantum communication networks and, ultimately, a global quantum internet.

Acknowledgments

The authors acknowledge K.V. Reddy from PriTel, Inc. for providing fast photodiodes used in the time synchronization protocol. M. V., R. J., P. V., M. J., S. L. P. and P. M. acknowledge funding by the German Federal Ministry of Research, Technology and Space (BMFTR) via project QR.X (16KISQ013) and QR.N (16KIS2207). Additional funding was also provided via the project EQSOTIC. This project was funded within the QuantERA II Programme that has received funding from the EU’s H2020 research and innovation programme under the GA No 101017733, and with funding organization BMFTR (with project number 16KIS2060K).

Supplementary Material

See Supplementary Material for a detailed description of the experimental setup and the data processing methods.

Data Availability Statement

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

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