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WorksEconomics, Econometrics and Finance

Trading Before a Committed Rebalance

Abstract

An institution must complete a portfolio adjustment, but traders who prepare inventory for it can choose whether to participate. We study how public forecasts affect the institution's cost in a Bayesian execution game with optional activation, transient impact, and uniform-price terminal completion. The curvature of equilibrium cost as a function of the posterior target mean determines the value of information. In the scalar model, information benefits every fixed participation roster. Optional supply can reverse this ranking at entry, at full participation, and in a smooth interior with lognormal activation costs. For centered scalar targets, information weakly lowers cost relative to no information, strictly when the posterior mean is nonzero with positive probability. Centered Gaussian precision gains are always beneficial. An exact symmetric finite-population equilibrium identifies how information resolution and individual strategic size interact near entry. A portfolio extension gives a matrix criterion for the fixed-roster ranking, which can fail under general cross-impact. Even with isotropic execution, shared activation allows equally accurate signals about target magnitude and composition to have opposite execution values under one unchanged prior. Intraday ETF price data is used to characterize target uncertainty and trading conditions without identifying activation or institutional costs.

Main paper

Introduction

An institution that must complete a portfolio adjustment can use a public forecast to prepare its position. Other traders can use the same forecast to acquire inventory for the event. Their commitment is different: they participate only when expected liquidation proceeds cover trading and activation costs. Better information therefore changes both the institution’s preparation and the inventory available to it. The resulting execution bill can rise even as the target becomes easier to predict.

We study this interaction in a simultaneous Bayesian quantity game. After a common public signal, the institution chooses its pre-event quantity and other traders decide whether to activate an inventory allocation and how much to trade. All quantities follow a prescribed common schedule with transient impact. At a uniform-price terminal auction, the institution completes its target and suppliers liquidate. Fixing the schedule permits an exact equilibrium calculation with private activation costs and explicit terminal cash payments. The institution chooses before observing realized entry, and its target does not depend on affected execution prices.

The paper makes three contributions.

C1. A classification of institutional information value. In the scalar model, every refinement benefits an institution when the participation roster is committed before the signal. Optional activation changes the comparison. At entry, a more precise forecast can attract inventory whose price impact persists into the auction. Near full participation, it can withdraw helpful inventory asymmetrically, even without pre-event impact. In a smooth interior, harm occurs when the curvature of inventory supply interacts sufficiently strongly with its marginal effect on institutional cost. A full-support lognormal construction proves that a participation boundary is not necessary. We also identify favorable scalar comparisons: any centered target benefits from a nonzero posterior mean relative to no information, and every precision gain in the centered Gaussian family is beneficial. An exact cash decomposition explains why helpful inventory and helpful information are different claims.

C2. An exact finite-size qualification. We solve the symmetric Bayesian equilibrium for every population size N≥2N \ge2. Each trader’s own impact raises the entry threshold. As a result, the same refinement under the same target law can be harmful in the continuum and beneficial in a finite game. A joint limit identifies NN times posterior-mean displacement as the relevant scale near entry. Distributional stability and diffuse-forecast expansions show which comparisons survive perturbations. Fixed-prior precision paths and an outside completion facility distinguish the effects of the target law from those of execution technology.

C3. The direction of portfolio information. § 2.7 and Appendix § 7 extend equilibrium to basket activation with cross-market impact. Participation still solves one scalar equation, but the favorable scalar information rankings need not survive. We give an exact matrix criterion for the fixed-roster ranking, a sufficient commuting class, and an admissible counterexample verified from the original cash payments. Even with isotropic execution, shared activation makes the direction of information matter. Under one unchanged target law, two feasible signals reduce ordinary and execution-weighted target-forecast error by exactly the same amount. Yet information about basket magnitude raises institutional cost, while information about composition lowers it. Forecast accuracy alone therefore does not rank the execution value of portfolio information.

Daily-reset leveraged funds motivate the committed-target problem. Announced index adjustments provide another setting in which traders prepare inventory for an institutional event. The empirical application studies target-mean forecasts, conditional uncertainty, and close-related prices. Related-market, volume, and factor analyses assess the benchmark approximation. Impact and activation parameters remain illustrative because historical fund balance sheets and institutional orders are unobserved. § 1.2 develops the motivation and related literature. § 2–§ 2.5 establish the scalar results, § 2.6 gives numerical implications, § 2.7 presents the portfolio comparison, and § 3 reports price evidence. The internet appendix contains supporting scalar theory, portfolio information, and empirical methods.

Institutional motivation and related literature

A target at the daily valuation time

Daily leveraged and inverse ETFs state an objective relative to one benchmark calculation day, generally measured from one NAV determination to the next. Changes in benchmark value and fund wealth require the manager to restore the stated exposure. This creates a committed portfolio target, but does not require an exact cash-equity order at the closing print. Derivatives, investor flows, tracking tolerances, and prior trades determine the residual implementation. We model exact completion in fixed benchmark units as an idealization of that commitment.

Under a no-flow, no-fee one-period balance sheet, starting assets A0A_0 and exposure βA0\beta A_0 become wealth A0(1+βR)A_0(1+\beta R) and pre-reset exposure βA0(1+R)\beta A_0(1+R). Restoring leverage therefore requires

ΔE=A0β(β−1)R.(1)\Delta E = A_0\beta(\beta-1)R. \tag*{(1)}

The coefficients are 12, 6, 2, 0, 2, 6 for leverage objectives −3-3, −2-2, −1-1, 1, 2, 3, so a one-percent benchmark rise implies these numbers of cents of exposure adjustment per initial dollar. Carrying cost CC and net flow Φ\Phi under a terminal marking convention add −βC+βΦ-\beta C+\beta\Phi, while earlier flows need their own marking convention. The flow evidence in Ivanov and Lenkey [23] makes that distinction material. A current AUM snapshot cannot reconstruct those historical quantities.

The target in our game is external to affected execution prices. Converting (1) from dollar exposure into fixed benchmark units also requires a reference price and the appropriate marking terms, so the accounting identity motivates target uncertainty without identifying the institution’s residual order. The reset clock matters for returns as well: an ideal daily reset has log residual

log⁡(1+βRd)−βlog⁡(1+Rd)=−12β(β−1)Rd2+O(Rd3),(2)\log(1+\beta R_d)-\beta\log(1+R_d)=-\frac{1}{2}\beta(\beta-1)R_d^2+O(R_d^3), \tag*{(2)}

whereas resetting at every intraday mark gives the sum of these residuals over intraday returns. The continuous-leverage identity of Avellaneda and Zhang [2] concerns the latter clock in a continuous-time limit. Appendix § 8 illustrates the distinction on matched paths. Current issuer documents support the daily mandate interpretation [31] (ProShares 2026).

Information, participation, and execution

Public information can change participation and worsen financial outcomes. In Crego [10], news encourages informed risk-averse investors to trade and worsens adverse selection. In Diamond and Verrecchia [12], disclosure can induce market-maker exit and reduce risk-bearing capacity. Admati and Pfleiderer [1] study how preannounced liquidity trades affect information asymmetry and coordination. Our participants are risk neutral and share target information. Private activation costs make inventory supply optional, while the committed institution adjusts its pretrade and pays the resulting execution bill.

The comparison uses Blackwell [5] and the posterior-mean geometry of Gentzkow and Kamenica [20]. Persuasion provides a related framework [24] Dworczak and Martini, 2019), but the institution has no disclosure instrument here. Ignoring a public forecast would not stop other traders from responding. Quadratic public-information objectives also admit matrix and spectral characterizations, as in Miyashita and Ui [28]. We derive the relevant matrix from institutional execution payments. Optional basket activation then creates the nonlinear comparison between information about magnitude and composition. The contribution is this financial classification and its finite-size qualification, rather than a new general information-design method.

Execution models allow substantially richer decisions than our prescribed schedule. Stochastic targets and terminal constraints appear in Dai et al. [11]; Bank and Voß [3], and endogenous timing and dropout in Fu et al. [18, 17]. Major-minor interaction and anticipation are studied by Chen et al. [8]; Cheng et al. [9]; Neuman and Voß [32]. Institutional trades reveal information in Moallemi et al. [29], while Campbell and Nutz [7]; Strehle [37] analyze execution equilibria with rate, boundary, or transient-impact costs. The common signal and fixed schedule here isolate information value when activation remains avoidable and terminal settlement is uniform-price.

Table 1 records the closest economic distinctions. Information and entry already interact in quantity competition (Do and Kettering, [14]), and prepared inventory is central to index execution in Pegoraro et al. [34]. Zhao [38] studies an affected-price leveraged-fund reset with capacity entry, auction mobilization, and finite speculators. In that paper’s October 15 version, capacity in Appendix § 5.4.1.2 is committed before the open, while the fringe in Appendix § 5.3.§ 2.7 enters within the auction. Here activation follows the common target forecast, and the target is external to affected execution prices. Entry and finite players alone are not the novelty claims.

The closest empirical comparison is Barbon et al. [4]. Using historical assets and constituent weights, they connect leveraged-ETF and option rebalancing to end-of-day liquidity provision and subsequent dissipation. Brøgger [6] finds smaller impact coefficients for larger and more predictable leveraged-volatility flows. These findings motivate favorable-information benchmarks alongside the adverse regions. Our price panel characterizes target uncertainty without identifying historical reset orders or institutional costs. Intraday predictability also has competing explanations (Gao et al., [19]). The model ranks the institutional payments induced by information. Directional ETF returns alone cannot identify that comparison.

A game with pre-event trading and terminal completion

Information, timing, and admissible positions

The pre-event interval is [0,1][0,1], with one public signal YY observed at time zero and the terminal target DD revealed at time one. Conditional moments are

μ=E[D∣Y],ν=E[(D−μ)2∣Y],\mu= \mathbb{E}[D \mid Y], \qquad\nu= \mathbb{E}[(D-\mu)^2 \mid Y],

where D∈L2D \in L^2 and the signal experiment is independent of trading decisions. The institution and all prospective anticipators observe YY. Each anticipator also observes a private nonnegative entry cost ff, drawn independently of the target and the entire family of compared public experiments. Its distribution has continuous CDF FF and F(0)=0F(0)=0. The limiting population has total mass one, with its private types distributed according to FF in every public state. There is no additional information before terminal revelation on which strategies can be conditioned.

The charge ff is avoidable after observing the signal, for example a fixed cost of opening an event-specific inventory program or allocating an operational slot. Infrastructure or staffing already paid for before the signal belongs instead to the fixed-roster comparison. Price and volume observations do not identify these activation costs.

The institution chooses a signed pre-event quantity z∈Rz \in\mathbb{R}. A type ff either remains inactive or pays ff and chooses a signed inventory qf∈Rq_f \in\mathbb{R}. Pre-event trades use a common deterministic schedule ϕ∈L2[0,1]\phi\in L^2[0,1], with ϕ≥0\phi\ge0 and ∫01ϕt dt=1\int_0^1 \phi_t\,dt = 1. Thus the institution trades at rate zϕtz\phi_t, and an entrant at rate qfϕtq_f\phi_t. Aggregate anticipator inventory is m=∫qf1{f enters} dF(f)m = \int q_f\mathbf{1}_{\{f\ \mathrm{enters}\}}\,dF(f), so aggregate pre-event rate is (z+m)ϕt(z+m)\phi_t. All positions are chosen simultaneously after the signal, in the Nash sense that the institution holds the anticipator strategy fixed when it deviates. The institution is not a Stackelberg leader that commits first and internalizes subsequent re-entry decisions.

The common schedule may represent a prescribed execution window or an operational schedule whose size can be changed at a decision time. The game optimizes quantities along that schedule. Information comparisons hold the decision time and execution opportunity fixed. Waiting would shorten the horizon and change the schedule or integrated costs, requiring a different optimization problem. Once a trader enters, its entry status remains fixed until the event. Inventory follows qf∫0tϕs dsq_f \int_0^t \phi_s \, \mathrm{d}s and becomes zero at terminal liquidation. Even in an extension allowing intermediate trading, flattening the position would not undo the entry decision.

Transient impact and the terminal price

Take the unaffected benchmark price as the numeraire and initially constant, so only execution-price deviations need be recorded. The pre-event impact process satisfies

I˙t=−ρIt+κ(z+m)ϕt,I0=0,(3)\dot{I}_t=-\rho I_t+\kappa(z+m)\phi_t,\qquad I_0=0, \tag*{(3)}

with ρ≥0\rho\ge0 and κ≥0\kappa\ge0. Define the average execution loading and the terminal carryover loading by

K=κ∫01∫0tϕte−ρ(t−s)ϕs ds dt,(4)K=\kappa\int_0^1\int_0^t \phi_t e^{-\rho(t-s)}\phi_s\,\mathrm{d}s\,\mathrm{d}t, \tag*{(4)}
H=κ∫01e−ρ(1−s)ϕs ds.(5)H=\kappa\int_0^1 e^{-\rho(1-s)}\phi_s\,\mathrm{d}s. \tag*{(5)}

The common pre-event price component paid per unit is K(z+m)K(z+m). The displacement still present just before the auction is H(z+m)H(z+m). The institution also pays a temporary execution charge η0z2/2\eta_0 z^2/2, and each entrant pays ηqf2/2\eta q_f^2/2, where η0,η>0\eta_0,\eta>0. These coefficients include the schedule’s squared-rate integral and use the same normalized cash units as price impact.

At the event, the institutional order is J=D−zJ=D-z, the aggregate anticipator order is −m-m, and net outside demand is n=D−z−mn=D-z-m. An outside liquidity supplier has the linear inverse supply rule

pA=H(z+m)+λn,λ>0,(6)p_A=H(z+m)+\lambda n,\qquad\lambda>0, \tag*{(6)}

and every event trade executes at this uniform price relative to the unaffected benchmark. The institution pays (D−z)pA(D-z)p_A, anticipators collectively receive mpAmp_A, and the outside supplier receives npAnp_A. The institution finishes with z+J=Dz+J=D, each anticipator finishes flat, and the supplier absorbs the residual inventory. Any remaining supplier inventory is valued at the unaffected benchmark immediately after the accounting horizon. This convention completes the cash account without introducing a second market-clearing problem.

Equation (6) specifies an elastic supply schedule. It is not derived from a strategic dealer equilibrium. Net demand can have either sign, and the model imposes no auction capacity constraint or additional post-auction manipulation opportunity. The institution internalizes its price effect because its order is large. An individual trader in the continuum takes the uniform auction price as given. The finite-player version below restores each minor trader’s own price effect at its population scale.

Assumption 1. The execution coefficients satisfy λ>0\lambda> 0, 0≤H<λ0 \le H < \lambda, K≥0K \ge0, and η0,η>0\eta_0, \eta> 0. Private costs have a continuous CDF FF on [0,∞)[0,\infty) with F(0)=0F(0) = 0, are independent of the target and the entire family of compared public signals taken jointly, and the target has finite second moment.

The restriction on HH is sufficient rather than necessary, and compares inherited displacement per pre-event unit with the auction price response per unit of net terminal demand. Here λ\lambda is inverse depth, so a larger value means less terminal liquidity for a given price change. It is checked for every reported numerical scenario. The associated coefficient b=λ+K−Hb = \lambda+ K - H is positive, which also excludes profitable zero-target round trips within the stipulated strategy class.

Cash objectives and their curvature

Conditional expected institutional expenditure relative to the unaffected target value is

C0(z,m;μ,v)=Kz(z+m)+η02z2+E[(D−z){H(z+m)+λ(D−z−m)}∣Y]=A2z2+bzm−dμz−(λ−H)μm+λ(μ2+v),(7)\begin{aligned} C_0(z,m;\mu,v) &= Kz(z+m) + \frac{\eta_0}{2}z^2 + \mathbb{E}[(D-z)\{H(z+m)+\lambda(D-z-m)\}\mid Y] \\ &= \frac{A}{2}z^2 + bzm - d\mu z - (\lambda-H)\mu m + \lambda(\mu^2+v), \tag*{(7)} \end{aligned}

where

b=λ+K−H,A=η0+2b,d=2λ−H.(8)b = \lambda+ K - H,\qquad A = \eta_0 + 2b,\qquad d = 2\lambda- H. \tag*{(8)}

An entrant’s conditional expected profit before its fixed cost is

π(q;z,m,μ)=q{λμ−b(z+m)}−η2q2.(9)\pi(q;z,m,\mu) = q\{\lambda\mu-b(z+m)\} - \frac{\eta}{2}q^2. \tag*{(9)}

These expressions follow by subtracting pre-event purchases and temporary charges from terminal liquidation receipts. The variance term λv\lambda v is retained in (7), even though it does not affect the pre-event best response under risk neutrality, because it changes when information changes.

Both optimization problems are globally well posed in their own controls. The major’s objective has curvature A>0A > 0, and the entrant’s profit has curvature −η<0-\eta< 0. These conditions do not require a positive joint signal-inventory state matrix. Completing the square in the actual control bounds the economically necessary linear signal-profit term. Every equilibrium position is bounded by a constant times ∣μ∣|\mu|, so finite second moments suffice for ex ante integrability.

An unaffected square-integrable price martingale SS can be restored in a filtration (Ft)(\mathcal{F}_t) with σ(Y)⊆F0\sigma(Y) \subseteq\mathcal{F}_0, provided it remains a martingale in that enlarged filtration and the positions retain the stated deterministic schedule. Its conditional expected contribution z∫ϕt(St−S1) dtz\int\phi_t(S_t-S_1)\,\mathrm{d}t to institutional shortfall is zero, and the corresponding inventory profit has the opposite zero expectation. The target may be correlated with the terminal martingale innovation without changing that calculation, since the institution’s terminal fundamental payment cancels against the value of its mandated final inventory. The present analysis therefore concerns the execution component of the target rather than a fundamental-return alpha.

Equilibrium and cost incidence

Define

s=λ−bdA=λη0+bHA>0,c=b(1−bA)=b(η0+b)A>0.(10)s = \lambda-\frac{bd}{A}=\frac{\lambda\eta_0+bH}{A}>0,\qquad c=b\left(1-\frac{b}{A}\right)=\frac{b(\eta_0+b)}{A}>0. \tag*{(10)}

The institutional best response to mm is (dμ−bm)/A(d\mu-bm)/A. Substituting it into the entrant’s first-order condition gives ηq=sμ−cm\eta q=s\mu-cm. This is an algebraic solution of simultaneous best responses. It does not give the institution an earlier commitment opportunity.

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