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Every obstruction to noncontextual hidden variables is finite: well-founded refutations in infinitary real-valued logic

Abstract

We study the obstructions to noncontextual hidden variables when quantum probability is described in full, by the complete lattice of closed subspaces of a separable infinite-dimensional Hilbert space together with its countably additive measures. We give such a description in infinitary real-valued logic, the infinitary extension of Keisler's model theory of general structures; the countable suprema and infima of this logic express the completeness of the lattice and the countable additivity of the measures. The standard models of our axioms represent exactly the density-operator measures of Gleason's theorem. The axioms are closed conditions, non-strict inequalities between the values of sentences and rational numbers. The expressive power afforded by infinitary sentences comes at the price of compactness. The hypothesis that at each hidden state every event receives the value 0 or 1, whatever the context of measurement, contradicts the axioms, yet it is consistent with every finite subset of them. The obstructions nevertheless remain finite. We prove that in this logic a countable set of closed conditions is inconsistent if and only if a well-founded tree whose branches end in finite contradictions refutes it; for the hypothesis above, every such tree has an infinitely branching node. The finiteness theorem is therefore maximal: a hidden-variable hypothesis expressed by countably many closed conditions is inconsistent with the axioms, and thus an obstruction, exactly when such a tree refutes the hypothesis together with the axioms. The same language defines, uniformly across standard models, exactly the σσ-projective sets of probabilities, and all these results are proved in ZFC.

Overview

We study the obstructions to noncontextual hidden variables when quantum probability is described in full. An outcome-deterministic noncontextual hidden-variable model assigns to every event the value 0 or 1 at each hidden state, whatever the context in which the event is measured. An obstruction is a hypothesis about hidden variables, expressed by countably many closed conditions, that has no model together with the axioms of quantum probability, standard or not. The full description is the setting of Gleason’s theorem: the complete lattice of closed subspaces of a separable infinite-dimensional Hilbert space, with its countably additive probability measures.

Our description is infinitary. In infinite dimension the lattice of closed subspaces is complete and probability is countably additive, and our axioms, in infinitary real-valued logic, describe both through countable suprema and infima and through a sort of square-summable sequences of vectors. The logic is interpreted in general structures, which prescribe neither a metric nor a modulus of uniform continuity; the lattice operations can therefore be interpreted as they are, although the meet of two distinct rays is the zero subspace however close the rays are. In the standard models, those built on full Hilbert spaces, the complete lattice is recovered and the axioms single out exactly the density-operator measures of Gleason’s theorem; the axioms also have nonstandard models, among them countable ones.

The infinitary sentences come at the price of compactness. The dispersion-free hypothesis, that every probability is 0 or 1, is a single closed condition. Adjoined to the axioms, it yields a theory with no models, by a proof that uses neither Gleason’s theorem nor standardness, and yet every finite subset of the axioms of that theory has a model.

The obstructions nevertheless remain finite. Our refutation theorem applies to countable theories of closed conditions, whose axioms bound the value of a sentence above or below by a rational number: such a theory is inconsistent exactly when it is refuted by a well-founded tree whose leaves are finite sets of interval commitments that no structure satisfies together. The commitments concern sentences that may themselves be infinitary, and for the axioms as presented the finiteness resides in the commitments rather than in finite subsets of the axioms. The trees are winning strategies in a topological game of model existence, which open determinacy decides; a tree branches infinitely only at countable suprema and infima, and for the dispersion-free theory every refuting tree has such a node.

The resulting finiteness theorem is maximal. A hidden-variable hypothesis given by countably many closed conditions has no model together with the axioms, standard or not, if and only if such a tree refutes the two together; the certified hypotheses are therefore exactly the obstructions, and no sound method of refutation certifies more.

The refutations are explicit. In the refutation we construct for the dispersion-free hypothesis, countable additivity compels a commitment that some ray has probability close to 1, and the ray selects a four-dimensional subspace in which a parity argument closes every branch. Geometric axioms identify the occurrences of a ray in different contexts, while a separate measure axiom carries the probability across that identity; the refutation thus isolates each use of noncontextuality, and its contradiction survives explicit numerical tolerances.

The earlier logical formulations of contextuality derive their finite results from compactness, in finite dimension. In J. L. Bell’s propositional formulation, which records the values 0 and 1 of a noncontextual assignment, compactness extracts from Gleason’s theorem the finite configurations of Kochen and Specker in each finite dimension at least three. Hrushovski and Pitowsky, working in classical two-valued first-order logic with probabilities as elements of a sort of scalars, obtain from compactness and the decidability of real closed and algebraically closed fields effective finite approximations to the predictions of a quantum state. The infinite-dimensional setting of Gleason’s theorem lies beyond propositional and first-order logic, and compactness is no longer available in it. The refutation theorem takes its place, and by the maximality described above its well-founded trees of finite contradictions certify every obstruction.

The expressive power of our infinitary language, which describes the complete lattice together with its countably additive measures, also determines which sets of probabilities are definable: uniformly across standard models, the sets definable through countable suprema and infima and quantification over events are exactly the σ\sigma-projective subsets of the unit interval. All our results are proved in ZFC.

Introduction

We study the obstructions to noncontextual hidden variables when quantum probability is described in full, by the complete lattice of closed subspaces of a separable infinite-dimensional Hilbert space together with its countably additive measures. By an obstruction we mean a hypothesis about hidden variables that has no model together with our axioms for quantum probability, standard or nonstandard1. We show that every obstruction is finite: a well-founded tree refutes the hypothesis together with the axioms, and the terminal contradictions of the tree are finite sets of commitments.

The mathematical setting is that of Gleason’s theorem. For a Hilbert space HH, the closed subspaces form a lattice L(H)L(H), and each closed subspace is an event, identified with the orthogonal projection onto it. A density operator on HH is a positive operator of trace 1 and represents a quantum state. When HH is separable and of dimension at least three, Gleason’s theorem [33] identifies the countably additive probability measures on L(H)L(H) with the maps P↦Tr⁡(ρP)P \mapsto\operatorname{Tr}(\rho P) given by density operators ρ\rho, none of which takes only the values 0 and 1. An outcome-deterministic noncontextual hidden-variable model assigns to every event, at each hidden state, a value 0 or 1; in every complete set of mutually orthogonal events exactly one event receives the value 1, and the value of an event does not depend on which compatible events are measured together with it [8]. Specker announced the impossibility of such assignments in dimension three [104]. J. S. Bell observed that such an assignment is a {0,1}\{0,1\}-valued measure on L(H)L(H), which Gleason’s theorem excludes [10]. Kochen and Specker then exhibited a finite configuration of rays that no such assignment respects [66].

We work in infinitary real-valued logic [4], which we denote Lω1ω(R)L_{\omega_1\omega}(\mathbb{R}): the infinitary extension of Keisler’s model theory of general structures [59 Section 2.1]. In this logic the truth values of formulas are real numbers, and the probability of an event is the value of a predicate. The countable suprema and infima of Lω1ω(R)L_{\omega_1\omega}(\mathbb{R}) express two features of the full setting: the completeness of the lattice of closed subspaces and the countable additivity of probability. Completeness is not expressible in first-order logic, and we show that among pre-Solèr lattices it is not expressible by any sentence of classical two-valued Lω1ωL_{\omega_1\omega} in the language of ortholattices expanded by constants for countably many atoms (Proposition A.24). Countable additivity is not implied by finite additivity: on the finite-dimensional subspaces of an infinite-dimensional space and their orthogonal complements, the assignment of 0 to every finite-dimensional subspace and of 1 to every complement is a finitely additive probability measure (Proposition 9.1), which only countable additivity excludes. In general structures, a vocabulary assigns to each predicate symbol an a priori bound, and a structure interprets function and predicate symbols by arbitrary maps that respect these bounds. There is no equality symbol, no metric is prescribed, the a priori bounds need not have a common upper bound, and no modulus of uniform continuity is required, in contrast with the metric structures of continuous logic [BYBHU08]; the two-valued counterpart is the logic without equality studied by Keisler and Miller [KM01, Section 4]. General structures admit the lattice operations with their natural interpretation, although these operations are not continuous for the operator-norm distance between projections: the meet of two distinct rays is the zero subspace however close the rays are (Remark 10.2).

Our theory TT gives the full description. The theory has sorts for vectors, for events and for square-summable sequences of vectors, and a predicate μ\mu for the probability of an event (§ 6 and § 7). Countable suprema and infima express the projection onto the meet of two events, the closed span of a sequence, the spanning of the space by a named orthonormal sequence, and the countable additivity of μ\mu. The standard models of T2T^2 represent exactly the density-operator measures on the lattice of closed subspaces of a separable infinite-dimensional complex Hilbert space (Theorem B).

The increased expressive power afforded by infinitary sentences comes at a price: compactness is no longer available. The dispersion-free hypothesis, the single closed condition that every probability is 0 or 1, yields together with TT a theory T01T^{01} with no models, standard or not, by a proof that uses neither Gleason’s theorem nor standardness (Theorem C). Yet every finite subset of the axioms of T01T^{01} has a model (Proposition 8.3).

Our refutation theorem shows that the obstructions nevertheless remain finite. A countable theory of closed conditions, each of which asserts that the value of a sentence is at most or at least a given rational number, is inconsistent exactly when a well-founded tree refutes it; the leaves of the tree are finite sets of commitments, placing the values of sentences in closed intervals with rational endpoints, that no structure satisfies together (Theorem A).

Completeness theorems are known for deductive calculi with infinitary rules, in two-valued Lω1ωL_{\omega_1\omega} [53, 72] and in Keisler’s probability logic LAPL_{AP} [46, 58]. Our refutation theorem is of a different kind: it concerns real-valued sentences interpreted in general structures, and its certificates are winning strategies in a game, whose plays end in finite contradictions.

The trees arise from a topological game of model existence for real-valued logic (Section 3); for two-valued logic, Väänänen’s model existence game plays the corresponding role [Vää11].

Olivia maintains that the theory has no model, while Josh attempts to build one, committing the values of sentences to closed intervals with rational endpoints and answering Olivia’s challenges about witnesses, function values, and countable suprema and infima. Models are built from Henkin types [4 Lemma 3] along fair plays, in which every challenge that becomes available is eventually made, and the plays that Olivia wins form an open set in the topology generated by finite positions. The theorem of Gale and Stewart [35] therefore gives Olivia a winning strategy exactly when the theory is inconsistent, and the plays that follow her strategy form the refuting tree. Only challenges about countable suprema and infima give Josh infinitely many answers, and a well-founded tree that branches only finitely is finite by König’s lemma, in which case some finite set of axioms is already inconsistent. For T01T^{01}, every refuting tree therefore has an infinitely branching node (Corollary 8.4); for the axioms of TT as presented, the finiteness resides in the terminal contradictions, whose commitments concern sentences that may themselves be infinitary. In the Polish space of plays that follow a winning strategy of Josh, the fair plays form a dense GδG_\delta set, and Olivia’s bookkeeping is a winning strategy for the second player in the associated Banach–Mazur game (Section B). The category argument is distinct from the one for omitting types, which goes back to Morley [84] and takes place in the Čech-complete space of Henkin types [4]; Section B also relates the game to the Henkin Realizability theorem [4 Proposition 5] and to Keisler’s model-theoretic forcing [56, 57].

The resulting finiteness theorem is maximal in a precise sense. A hypothesis about hidden variables expressed by countably many closed conditions has no model together with TT, standard or not, if and only if a well-founded tree of finite contradictions refutes the two together (Theorem A). The certified hypotheses are therefore exactly the obstructions, and no sound method of refutation can certify more. The criterion concerns all models of TT: a hypothesis that fails in every standard model but holds in some nonstandard model is not an obstruction in this sense.

The certificates are explicit. Whereas a configuration of Kochen and Specker is chosen in advance and serves against every assignment, in the strategy we construct (Proposition 8.6) the hypothetical measure selects its own configuration. Countable additivity along an orthonormal basis compels Josh to commit some ray to a probability close to 1; the ray determines a four-dimensional subspace, and a parity argument on the eighteen rays of Cabello, Estebaranz and García-Alcaine [CEGA96] closes every branch. The occurrences of a ray in different contexts are distinct terms. Axioms that do not mention μ\mu prove that the terms denote the same projection, and only then does the substitutivity axiom (M3) of § 7 carry the probability across the identity. The certificate thus records separately the geometric identities and each use of noncontextuality, and its parity contradiction survives explicit numerical tolerances (Theorem 9.2). Whether the least rank of a refuting strategy for T01T^{01} is finite remains open (Question 8.7).

The earlier logical formulations of contextuality obtain their finite results from compactness. J. L. Bell gave the argument of Kochen and Specker its logical form [11 Theorem 1]. Events become propositional variables, the Boolean operations within a context become connectives, and a noncontextual assignment becomes a satisfying truth assignment. Propositional logic is compact and the constraints on an assignment are closed; Gleason’s theorem therefore yields, in every finite dimension at least three, a finite inconsistent set of constraints, and the existence of configurations of Kochen and Specker becomes a consequence of compactness. Propositional logic records only the values 0 and 1, and the probabilities of quantum theory lie outside its language.

Hrushovski and Pitowsky gave a formulation in classical two-valued first-order logic [48], in which probabilities are elements of a sort of scalars: their theory has variables for directions and for scalars, and it yields quantitative constraints on quantum probabilities, among them Pitowsky’s logical indeterminacy principle [93], together with finite approximations to the predictions of a quantum state. Their formulation rests on the first-order theories of the real and complex fields: compactness yields finite sets of rays on which the probabilities specifying a state constrain further probabilities to any prescribed accuracy, and the decidability of real closed and algebraically closed fields makes the construction effective. The formulation remains within finite dimension, where orthonormal bases are finite.

In the formulations of J. L. Bell and of Hrushovski and Pitowsky, compactness reduces an infinite family of constraints to a finite one, which concerns finitely many rays in finite dimension. Gleason’s setting lies beyond propositional and first-order logic: neither expresses the two features of the full setting recalled above, the completeness of L(H)L(H) and the countable additivity of the measure. Fixed finite configurations reach the finitely additive part of the subject: infinite-rank projections built from a configuration of Kochen and Specker refute every finitely additive {0,1}\{0,1\}-valued measure on L(H)L(H), and Döring extended the Kochen–Specker theorem in this form to von Neumann algebras [Dör05]. For obstructions that rest on countable additivity, no certificate made of finite contradictions had, to our knowledge, been given.

In our setting the refutation theorem takes the place of compactness. The axioms of TT express, through countable suprema and infima, the closed span of a sequence of vectors and the countable additivity of the measure, and in the standard models the events form the complete lattice L(H)L(H). Every obstruction is refuted, together with TT, by a well-founded tree whose terminal contradictions are finite (Theorem A), whereas for T01T^{01} no finite subset of the axioms is inconsistent and every refuting tree branches infinitely (Proposition 8.3 and Corollary 8.4); the finiteness resides in the terminal contradictions and cannot be transferred to the axioms. Where Hrushovski and Pitowsky derive finite results from compactness in finite dimension, finite contradictions here certify every obstruction in the infinite-dimensional setting of Gleason’s theorem.

We also determine exactly which sets of probabilities the language defines. The measure takes every value in [0,1][0,1] in every standard model, and the sets of probabilities uniformly definable across standard models are exactly the σ\sigma-projective subsets of [0,1][0,1] (Theorem 7.7). The classification of definable sets connects the formalism with a classical chapter of descriptive set theory. The σ\sigma-projective sets form the least class that contains the Borel sets and is closed under complements, countable unions and projections, and the class properly contains the projective sets of Lusin and Sierpiński [73, 101]. Lusin proved Suslin’s analytic sets Lebesgue measurable and observed that the methods did not reach the next projective level [73]. Gödel announced in 1938 that in the constructible universe a projective set of the second level is not Lebesgue measurable [Gö d38], whereas under large cardinal hypotheses every σ\sigma-projective set is Lebesgue measurable, through the determinacy of the associated games [87, 5] and the theorem of Mycielski and Świerczkowski [MS64]. Our classification is a theorem of ZFC; whether every set of probabilities definable over TT is measurable is a question that ZFC does not settle, granted the consistency of the large cardinals involved.

Main results of the paper

We first state the refutation theorem, which concerns every countable theory of closed conditions, and then the theorems on the theory TT of quantum probability. The refutation theorem applies to every theory whose axioms are closed conditions, that is, assertions φ≤r\varphi\le r or φ≥r\varphi\ge r about sentences φ\varphi, with rr rational; an axiom with free variables takes this form once its variables are bound by suprema or infima, and the axioms of the theory TT described below are all of this kind.

Theorem A (Finite obstructions). Let T′T' be a nonempty countable theory of real-valued Lω1ωL_{\omega_1\omega} consisting of closed conditions. Then T′T' has no models if and only if, in the model existence game of § 5, the player who claims that T′T' has no models has a winning strategy. In that case, for every such strategy, the tree of plays in which the same player follows it is well-founded; at each leaf, the commitments made along the play, each of which says that the value of a sentence lies in a closed interval with rational endpoints, form a finite set that is satisfied in no structure. The tree branches infinitely only at the moves that concern countable suprema and infima; once the other player’s answers to them are fixed, the plays have bounded length. If the tree branches only finitely, the tree is finite and some finite subset of T′T' has no models; this is the case when no axiom of T′T' contains a countable supremum or infimum.

Each play that follows a winning strategy ends after finitely many rounds, at a finite contradiction, although the theorem supplies no uniform bound on the lengths of the plays. The trees are countable and well-founded, so every winning strategy has a countable ordinal rank, which is finite exactly when the plays that follow the strategy have bounded length; the least rank of a winning strategy measures the complexity of refuting the given theory in the game (§ 5).

The theory TT speaks of three kinds of objects, which the logic keeps apart as sorts. The elements of the Hilbert sort are vectors. The Solér sort carries the operations of an ortholattice; in the intended interpretation its elements are closed subspaces, each identified, as above, with the orthogonal projection onto it. The elements of the sequence sort are sequences of vectors, through which the completeness of the lattice becomes expressible. A function symbol names the orthogonal projection of a vector onto an element of the Solèr sort, and a vector belongs to such an element when the projection leaves it fixed. The predicate μ\mu assigns a probability to every element of the Solèr sort.

We call a model standard when its Hilbert and sequence sorts are full closed unit balls of complex Hilbert spaces with their own operations, inner products and norms (see Definition 4.2 below). The theory TT has standard models, and, like every countable theory that has a model, it also has models whose sorts are countable, which are not standard. The Hilbert sort of every model of TT is mapped into the closed unit ball of a complex Hilbert space by a map that preserves the named affine operations, the inner product and the norm (see Lemma 5.3). In a nonstandard model, the image of this map may omit vectors of the ball, distinct elements may have the same image, and the sequence sort may fail to be a full Hilbert ball. The term “nonstandard” is here unrelated to nonstandard analysis. Our theorems distinguish the conclusions that hold in every model from those that require standardness.

To state how TT captures the setting of Gleason’s theorem, consider a standard model, whose Hilbert sort is the closed unit ball of a complex Hilbert space HH. For an element aa of its Solèr sort, let SaS_a be the closed subspace of HH spanned by the vectors of the Hilbert sort that belong to aa, and let PaP_a be the orthogonal projection onto SaS_a; for a closed subspace aa of HH, we likewise write PaP_a for the orthogonal projection onto aa. Equality on the Solèr sort is the relation [a=b]=1[a=b]=1 of § 6, which holds exactly when Sa=SbS_a=S_b (see Lemma 5.4).

Theorem B (Gleason’s theorem in real-valued Lω1ωL_{\omega_1\omega}). There is a countable theory TT of real-valued Lω1ωL_{\omega_1\omega} with the following two properties.

(1) In every standard model of TT, the Hilbert sort is the closed unit ball of a separable infinite-dimensional complex Hilbert space HH, and the map a↦Saa \mapsto S_a induces an isomorphism of ortholattices from the quotient of the Solèr sort by its equality onto the lattice L(H)L(H) of closed subspaces of HH; moreover, there is a unique density operator ρ\rho on HH such that μ(a)=Tr⁡(ρPa)\mu(a)=\operatorname{Tr}(\rho P_a) for every element aa of the Solèr sort.

(2) Conversely, for every separable infinite-dimensional complex Hilbert space HH and every density operator ρ\rho on HH, there is a standard model of TT whose Hilbert sort is the closed unit ball of HH, whose Solèr sort is L(H)L(H), and in which μ(a)=Tr⁡(ρPa)\mu(a)=\operatorname{Tr}(\rho P_a) for every a∈L(H)a \in L(H).

In a separable infinite-dimensional Hilbert space, the probabilities that a quantum state assigns to the closed subspaces fill the interval [0,1][0,1], even when the state is pure, that is, when its density operator is the orthogonal projection onto a ray (see Lemma 7.4 below). Thus the range of μ\mu in every standard model of TT is [0,1][0,1] (Proposition 7.5). If a Borel set B⊆RB \subseteq\mathbb{R} meets [0,1][0,1], adjoining an axiom that excludes BB from the range of μ\mu therefore gives a theory with no standard models.

The hypothesis that every probability is 0 or 1 can be written as a single axiom of the logic,

μ(a)∧(1−μ(a))≤0.\mu(a) \land(1-\mu(a)) \leq0.

In this axiom, the symbol 1\mathbf{1} denotes the sentence whose value is 1 in every structure, and for formulas φ\varphi and ψ\psi the expression φ∧ψ\varphi\land\psi denotes the minimum of their values. Since the axioms of TT confine μ\mu to [0,1][0,1], the axiom says that μ\mu takes only the values 0 and 1. We write T01T^{01} for the theory TT together with this axiom. Our next theorem shows that the axiom fails not only in the standard models but in every model of TT.

Theorem C (The Bell–Kochen–Specker theorem in real-valued Lω1ωL_{\omega_1\omega}). The theory T01T^{01} has no models, standard or not.

The proof of Theorem C, given in § 10, uses neither Gleason’s theorem nor the standardness of a model. Every finite set of axioms of T01T^{01} has a model (Proposition 8.3), so every winning strategy for T01T^{01} has an infinitely branching node (Corollary 8.4), and no finite set of axioms is a certificate. Whether the least rank of a winning strategy for T01T^{01} is finite is asked in Question 8.7.

The general theorem applies to every winning strategy; the configuration of rays and the selection of a four-dimensional subspace described above come from the strategy of § 10.1. In the plays of this strategy that reach the parity argument, the rays are those of the eighteen-ray configuration of Cabello, Estebaranz and García-Alcaine [CEGA96], each of which occurs in exactly two of its nine bases. In the Boolean system that has one Boolean variable for each occurrence of a ray and requires exactly one variable of each basis to be true, the parity contradiction needs all eighteen identities, one between the two occurrences of each ray. No finite set of axioms of T01T^{01} forces this localization: in the models of finite sets of axioms constructed in the proof of Proposition 8.3, the measure vanishes on every finite-dimensional subspace, as in Proposition 9.1.

In § 11, after the mathematical development, we give the foundational interpretation. There we distinguish quantum probabilities from the responses of a hidden-variable model, explain why the geometric identities of projection events and the probabilistic requirements on a dispersion-free valuation enter the game through separate axioms, and relate the contextual presentations to earlier approaches.

The full range of the measure also reveals the expressive power of the logic. A subset of [0,1][0,1] is definable over TT when some formula of the logic, with one free variable aa of the Solèr sort, singles it out as follows (see Definition 7.6 below). In every standard model of TT and at every element aa of its Solèr sort, the formula takes the value 11 if μ(a)\mu(a) lies in the set and the value −1-1 otherwise. Because formulas may quantify over the Solèr sort, and because the measure takes every value in [0,1][0,1], the definable sets form a much larger class than the Borel sets. The σ\sigma-projective sets, studied by Aguilera, Müller and Schlicht [5], are the members of the least class of subsets of Polish spaces that contains the Borel sets and is closed under complements, countable unions and projections along NN\mathbb{N}^{\mathbb{N}}. This class contains every projective set, and the example following Theorem 7.7 shows that the containment is strict.

Theorem D (Definable sets of probabilities). A subset of [0,1][0,1] is definable over TT if and only if it is σ\sigma-projective (see Theorem 7.7).

Its proof uses both the full range of the measure (Proposition 7.5) and a standard model whose symbols are interpreted by Borel functions on Polish spaces. In that model, a formula of finite quantifier depth kk defines a Δk+11\Delta^{1}_{k+1} set; the nonprojective sets therefore require countable joins of formulas of unbounded quantifier depth (Proposition 7.8). The uniformity over standard models is essential: a single formula defines an arbitrary subset of (0,1)(0,1) in a suitably chosen standard model (Proposition 7.9). By Theorem D, the hypothesis that the probabilities avoid a given nonempty σ\sigma-projective subset of [0,1][0,1] can be written as an axiom of the logic, and, by Proposition 7.5, the theory TT together with this axiom has no standard models. The exact σ\sigma-projective classification, including the strict extension beyond the projective sets, is proved in ZFC.

The classification has a consequence beyond the reach of ZFC. Every σ\sigma-projective set belongs to the model L(R)L(\mathbb{R}), so under large cardinal hypotheses, for instance infinitely many Woodin cardinals with a measurable cardinal above them, every subset of [0,1][0,1] definable over TT is Lebesgue measurable, has the property of Baire and, if uncountable, contains a perfect set [70, 55]. In Gödel’s constructible universe, by contrast, some Δ21\Delta^1_2 subset of [0,1][0,1] is not Lebesgue measurable [85], and this set is definable over TT. Whether every set of probabilities that the logic of quantum probability can define is Lebesgue measurable is therefore not decided by ZFC, and large cardinals decide it. The countable joins and the quantifiers over the Solèr sort produce this expressive power together; whether formulas without countable joins can define any set other than ∅\varnothing and [0,1][0,1] we do not know (see Remark 10.2).

The principal dependencies among the results are displayed in Figure 1. The representation and definability results concern standard models, whereas the dispersion-free inconsistency holds in every model. The general model existence theorem supplies the passage from this inconsistency to well-founded trees of finite obstructions.

Figure 1. Selected direct dependencies among the results; an arrow points from a result to a result that uses it.

Organization of the paper

In Section 1 we describe the events represented by the theory TT and explain, through the obstruction to expressing completeness over the lattice alone (Proposition 1.1), why its vocabulary includes a sort of sequences of vectors. The detailed lattice-theoretic definitions, geometric representation results and their proofs are collected in Section A; their principal sources are MacNeille completions [75], the coordinatization of projective geometries [6 MM70, 45], and the theorems on orthomodular spaces due to Amemiya and Araki [1] and to Solèr [103]. The logic is presented in Section 2. In Section 3 we organize the model existence theorem as a game, whose analysis rests on the determinacy theorem of Gale and Stewart [35], and obtain the well-founded trees of finite obstructions for every countable theory of closed conditions without models, proving Theorem A; that section uses only Section 2. The vocabulary and the axioms of TT follow in Sections 4 and 5. The standard models are studied in Sections 6 and 7, which contain the proofs of Theorem B and Proposition 7.5 and of the classification of definable sets of probabilities, Theorem D. In Section 8 we prove Theorem C, that no model of TT satisfies the dispersion-free axiom, and follow the proof in the game, where every winning strategy branches infinitely (Corollary 8.4). In Section 9 we compare the finite obstructions with the configurations of Kochen and Specker: what a vertex is, which identifications are made and from which axioms they follow, the tolerances of the intervals, the location of the configuration, the role of σ\sigma-additivity for configurations of rays in infinite dimension, and the topological property of the logic behind each kind of certificate. The remarks of Section 10 may be omitted on a first reading. In Section B we relate the game to Keisler’s model-theoretic forcing [57] and compare it with the space of Henkin types [4].

The geometric setting

The events of a quantum system whose Hilbert space is HH are the closed subspaces of HH, each determined by the orthogonal projection onto it. Ordered by inclusion, they form the lattice L(H)L(H), in which the meet of two subspaces is their intersection, their join is the closed linear span of their union, and the orthocomplement of a subspace is its orthogonal complement. Countable additivity, the hypothesis of Gleason’s theorem, concerns countable orthogonal families of events, and a formalization of quantum probability must therefore describe not only the subspaces but also the closed spans of countable families of vectors, on which the hypothesis depends.

An ortholattice is a bounded lattice with an order-reversing involution a↦a⊥a \mapsto a^\perp such that a∧a⊥=0a \wedge a^\perp= 0 and a∨a⊥=1a \vee a^\perp= 1. Two elements aa and bb are orthogonal when a≤b⊥a \le b^\perp. An atom is a nonzero element with no element strictly between it and 00; in L(H)L(H) the atoms are the one-dimensional subspaces, or rays. A lattice is complete when every subset has a join. The lattice L(H)L(H) is complete, but a subset of L(H)L(H) that is closed under the ortholattice operations can contain every ray without containing every closed subspace. For example, in an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space the finite-dimensional subspaces and their orthogonal complements form such a subset (see Example 6.5).

The theory TT keeps vectors, events and sequences of vectors in three sorts. A function symbol describes the projection of a vector onto an event; a vector belongs to an event when this projection leaves it fixed. Since the logic prescribes no equality, two elements of the event sort may represent the same subspace. The geometric axioms define an equality relation on that sort, and the representation statements concern its quotient by this relation. In a standard model of the axioms on vectors and events alone, this quotient is a family of closed subspaces of the given complex Hilbert space, closed under the ortholattice operations and containing every ray, but possibly omitting other closed subspaces (Theorem 6.4). The sequence sort and its axioms supply the missing closed spans: in a standard model of the full theory, the quotient is the whole lattice L(H)L(H) (Theorem 7.3). Standardness specifies the interpretation of the vector sorts and is not a consequence of the axioms.

The event quotients just described are pre-Solèr lattices, whose definition is given in Section A. That appendix gives the coordinatization theorem and the theorem of Piron, Amemiya and Araki, and Solèr that characterizes the complete ones as lattices of closed subspaces of infinite-dimensional real, complex or quaternionic Hilbert spaces (Theorem A.18). It also describes their MacNeille completions and the obstruction to orthomodularity of those completions. The distinction between an incomplete event lattice and the full lattice is needed here for a logical reason: completeness cannot be expressed over the lattice alone.

Proposition 1.1. In the vocabulary of ortholattices expanded by constants pnp_n, for n∈Nn \in\mathbb{N}, no sentence of classical two-valued LωωL_{\omega\omega} is equivalent to completeness among ortholattices in which the pnp_n are mutually orthogonal nonzero elements.

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