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Beyond Model Weights: Sampling-Dependent Fairness in Diffusion Language Models

Abstract

Diffusion language models (DLMs) are emerging as a practical alternative to autoregressive language models (ARLMs), yet their fairness remains largely uncharacterized. DLMs introduce sampling controls with no direct autoregressive counterpart, such as block length and remasking strategy, that directly set their speed–quality operating point. This raises a basic question: does a DLM's measured social bias remain stable across these settings? Across LLaDA, LLaDA-1.5, and Dream on Open-BBQ, we find that all three models exhibit social bias, but both the magnitude of measured bias and the relative ordering of models by bias are highly sensitive to the sampling configuration. This sampling dependence also changes what successful debiasing means. While mitigation strategies established for ARLMs transfer effectively to DLMs and reduce bias without degrading downstream performance, sampling dependence persists even after mitigation. Our results show that fairness in DLMs cannot be characterized independently of the sampling configuration, even after debiasing. Project page is available at https://pakapaka333.github.io/Beyond-Model-Weights/.

Introduction

Diffusion language models (DLMs) have recently emerged as a viable alternative to autoregressive language models (ARLMs), achieving competitive performance while enabling parallel and flexible generation through iterative denoising ([26, 37, 30, 52, 47, 10, 12]). Research on DLMs has rapidly advanced their modeling, training, and inference, with substantial attention to the trade-off between generation quality and sampling speed ([2, 18, 32]). Beyond these conventional dimensions of model quality, however, much less is known about their socially consequential behavior, e.g., safety and fairness. Recent work has only begun to investigate safety issues specific to DLMs ([44, 20, 17]), while fairness perspectives remain largely uncharacterized. As DLMs become increasingly capable and practically deployable, understanding whether they exhibit social bias, and how that bias should be assessed and mitigated, becomes an important open problem.

Evaluating fairness in DLMs, however, is not simply a matter of applying existing bias benchmarks. ARLMs expose decoding controls such as temperature, top-pp, and top-kk, which reshape the next-token distribution and primarily modulate sampling stochasticity ([40]): even these controls are reported to distort safety and fairness evaluations ([16, 1]). DLMs introduce a different class of controls, including block length, remasking strategy, and the number of tokens committed at each denoising step, which change how generation itself unfolds: how many tokens are produced in parallel, which predictions are revisited, and how much iterative refinement is performed (Figure 1). It remains unclear whether these controls affect social bias. If they do, a single sampling configuration can yield misleading fairness conclusions, making it unclear whether an observed bias reflects the model itself or merely the way it was sampled.

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Figure 1. One rollout of a masked diffusion language model. A row is the generation window after a denoising step, a cell is one position and [M] is the mask symbol. Red outlines mark the positions a step commits, and the pale cells are those the current block puts out of reach.

We evaluate three representative DLMs (LLaDA ([30]), LLaDA-1.5 ([52]), and Dream ([47])) on Open-BBQ ([25]) across 24 sampling configurations, showing that all three models exhibit social bias (§ 3). More importantly, the measured degree of bias is not uniquely determined by the model weights: bias scores change by more than 40% across sampling configurations for every model (Figure 2, first two rows), and the relative ranking of models by bias frequently changes with the sampling setting (Figure 2, last row). Fairness conclusions from a single sampling configuration can therefore be misleading, both in absolute bias estimates and relative model comparisons, motivating evaluation across sampling settings.

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Figure 2. Bias varies with the sampling configuration. Disambiguated bias score (first row), ambiguous bias score (second row), box failure rate (third row), and rank of the model by ambiguous bias score (fourth row) for the three models across 24 sampling configurations.

Sampling-dependent fairness raises a second question: what does successful debiasing mean for a DLM? We ask whether mitigation strategies established for ARLMs transfer to DLMs, and whether they also make fairness more stable across sampling settings. To investigate this, we apply bias-reduction data through two general post-training paradigms, supervised fine-tuning and on-policy self-distillation (Zhao et al., [50]; Dat et al., [9]), and further incorporate fairness-aware regularization developed for ARLMs (Qian et al., [34]; Zhao et al., [48]) (§ 4). These approaches all reduce bias on average, confirming that existing mitigation strategies transfer to DLMs. Yet the variation across sampling settings remains largely unchanged. These results reveal that reducing the level of bias and reducing its sensitivity to sampling are distinct objectives, making cross-setting evaluation necessary even after mitigation.

Our contributions are threefold. First, we systematically characterize how social bias in DLMs varies across sampling configurations, showing that both bias magnitude and model rankings depend on sampling. Second, we show that debiasing methods reduce bias on average but do not eliminate its dependence on sampling configurations. Third, we show that debiasing and sampling robustness are distinct objectives, making cross-setting evaluation necessary even after mitigation.

Preliminary

Generation and sampling configurations in diffusion language models

We focus on masked diffusion models (Sahoo et al., [37]), represented by LLaDA (Nie et al., [30]) and Dream (Ye et al., [47]). As Figure 1 illustrates, generation begins with a fully masked window of LL positions and progressively commits tokens over TT denoising steps. Under block-wise sampling, the window is divided into blocks that are processed sequentially.

We consider three sampling controls that determine how tokens are committed, with no direct counterparts in standard autoregressive decoding. 1) The tokens per step (TPS) specifies the average number of positions committed per denoising step, L/TL/T. Increasing TPS reduces the number of denoising steps required to fill the window. However, tokens committed in the same step are predicted in parallel without conditioning on one another, creating a trade-off between generation speed and quality. 2) The remasking strategy decides which masked positions are committed at each step, thereby controlling the generation order. Confidence-based strategies prioritize positions with higher predicted-token probabilities (low-confidence remasking) or lower predictive entropy (entropy remasking). Random remasking instead selects positions uniformly, independently of the model’s confidence estimates (random). 3) The block length BB determines the number of positions processed within each block. With B=1B = 1, generation proceeds sequentially from left to right, whereas larger blocks allow multiple positions to be refined jointly ([2]).

Tuning a diffusion language model

Supervised fine-tuning (SFT). Unlike ARLMs, DLMs do not rely on a fixed left-to-right factorization. Instead, SFT trains the model to predict target tokens from partially masked responses. Following Nie et al. [30], given a target response yy of length LL, we sample a masking ratio tt uniformly from (0,1](0, 1] and obtain y~\tilde{y} by masking a subset of positions M\mathcal{M}. The SFT objective is

LSFT(θ)=−E(x,y)Et∼U(0,1][1tL∑i∈Mlog⁡πθ(yi∣x,y~)i](1)\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{SFT}}(\theta) = -\mathbb{E}_{(x,y)}\mathbb{E}_{t\sim\mathcal{U}(0,1]}\left[\frac{1}{tL}\sum_{i\in\mathcal{M}}\log\pi_\theta(y_i\mid x,\tilde{y})_i\right] \tag*{(1)}

where y~\tilde{y} is yy with the positions in M\mathcal{M} replaced by the mask symbol.

On-policy self-distillation (OPSD). OPSD ([50]) trains an ARLM by distilling predictions conditioned on privileged information (PI), typically a reference solution, into predictions made without that information. The student learns from its own generated completions by matching the teacher’s token distributions, with gradients stopped on the teacher.

OPSD for diffusion language models. dOPSD ([9]) extends OPSD to DLMs by using later denoising states as PI for supervising earlier states. Let s=(s0,…,sT)s = (s_0,\ldots,s_T) denote a student-generated trajectory, where s0s_0 is fully masked and sT=y^s_T = \hat{y} is the final completion. Let Mt\mathcal{M}_t be the positions still masked at step tt, and let kk be sampled uniformly from the steps whose masked fraction exceeds a threshold τ\tau. For each position i∈Mki \in\mathcal{M}_k, let Ti,k={t:k<t≤T,i∈Mt}\mathcal{T}_{i,k} = \{t : k < t \leq T, i \in\mathcal{M}_t\} denote the later steps at which position ii remains masked. The teacher target averages predictions of the frozen policy πθ0\pi_{\theta_0} over these states:

pˉi,k=1∣Ti,k∣∑t∈Ti,kπθ0(⋅∣x,st)i(2)\bar{p}_{i,k} = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{T}_{i,k}|}\sum_{t\in\mathcal{T}_{i,k}}\pi_{\theta_0}(\cdot\mid x,s_t)_i \tag*{(2)}

The student minimizes the forward KL divergence to this target, averaged over masked positions, sampled steps, and rollouts:

LdOPSD(θ)=ExEs∼Pθ(⋅∣x)Ek[1∣Mk∣∑i∈MkKL(sg⁡[pˉi,k] ∥ πθ(⋅∣x,sk)i)](3)\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{dOPSD}}(\theta) = \mathbb{E}_{x}\mathbb{E}_{s\sim P_\theta(\cdot\mid x)}\mathbb{E}_{k}\left[\frac{1}{|\mathcal{M}_k|}\sum_{i\in\mathcal{M}_k}\mathrm{KL}\left(\operatorname{sg}[\bar{p}_{i,k}] \,\|\, \pi_\theta(\cdot\mid x,s_k)_i\right)\right] \tag*{(3)}

where PθP_\theta denotes the distribution over sampling and sg stops the gradient through the teacher. Unlike Dat et al. [9], we retain all rollouts, as filtering by correctness would exclude the biased responses we aim to mitigate.

Social Bias in Diffusion Language Models

Does a DLM’s measured social bias remain stable across the sampling settings? We first confirm that (i) DLMs carry social biases, and then examine (ii) how the sampling settings change that bias.

Evaluation setup

Models. We evaluate three representative DLMs: LLaDA-8B-Instruct ([30]), our primary model throughout this paper, LLaDA-1.5 ([52]), and Dream-7B ([47]).

Benchmark. We evaluate on Open-BBQ ([25]), an open-ended version of BBQ ([33]). Open-BBQ provides three question formats: multiple-choice, fill-in-the-blank, and short-answer. We select the short-answer format as it has the model generate its reasoning before answering, allowing us to observe the impact of different sampling configurations. We draw 10k samples, maintaining the ambiguous-to-disambiguated ratio and the social category proportions of the full dataset. To stabilize evaluation and to examine bias in DLMs directly, we modify the prompt to instruct the model to provide its final answer inside N\boxed{N} (detailed in App. § 9.§ 1).

Bias score. We measure fairness with the bias score from Open-BBQ. Each Open-BBQ sample asks a question about two subjects, and the model answers with one of three options: the subject aligned with a common stereotype (bias), the other subject (anti), or neither (none). Half of the samples are ambiguous, where the context lacks the information to decide and none is correct; the other half are disambiguated, where the context identifies a single subject. With nbiasn_{\mathrm{bias}}, nantin_{\mathrm{anti}}, and nnonen_{\mathrm{none}} the counts of each answer, the bias scores in the two contexts are

sdis=nbias−nantinbias+nanti,samb=nbias−nantinbias+nanti+nnone.(4)s_{\mathrm{dis}} = \frac{n_{\mathrm{bias}} - n_{\mathrm{anti}}}{n_{\mathrm{bias}} + n_{\mathrm{anti}}}, \qquad s_{\mathrm{amb}} = \frac{n_{\mathrm{bias}} - n_{\mathrm{anti}}}{n_{\mathrm{bias}} + n_{\mathrm{anti}} + n_{\mathrm{none}}}. \tag*{(4)}

Both scores are 0 when the model names the two subjects equally often, 1 when it always follows the stereotype, and −1-1 when it always goes against it. In the ambiguous context, the denominator also counts the correct none answers, so the score shrinks as the accuracy (the none ratio) rises.

Box failure rate. As a sanity check on generation quality, we report the box failure rate, the proportion of samples in which the model fails to give its answer in the N\boxed{N} format. Bias scores and accuracy are computed only over the samples that do follow this format.

Sampling configurations. We evaluate all combinations of block length B∈{8,32,128}B \in\{8, 32, 128\}, remasking strategy ∈{low-confidence,random}\in\{\text{low-confidence}, \text{random}\} for LLaDA and {low-entropy,origin}\{\text{low-entropy}, \text{origin}\} for Dream, and TPS ∈{1,2,4,8}\in\{1, 2, 4, 8\}, resulting in 24 configurations in total over a fixed 256-token generation window. Since Dream’s original sampler does not use block-wise generation, we implemented it.

Fairness in diffusion language models

Bias in DLMs. All three models show social bias in ambiguous contexts and little in disambiguated ones (Figure 2, first two rows). In ambiguous contexts, the models tend to favor stereotype-aligned answers, whereas in disambiguated contexts, their bias scores remain close to zero. The same pattern has been reported for ARLMs ([33, 25]), which suggests that DLMs inherit the bias of their training data as ARLMs do, even though they generate text differently. (Full results in Table 14–Table 16 in App. § 12.)

MethodB=128B = 128B=32B = 32B=8B = 8
TPS124812481248
Disambiguated bias score, low-confidence remasking
Base−.008−.010−.018−.009−.010−.010−.011−.018−.013−.009−.014−.005
SFT−.011−.007−.014.006−.006−.001−.009−.011−.006.000−.005−.016
dOPSD−.012−.012−.017−.007−.016−.014−.012−.013−.013−.003.002−.002
dOPSD+log-prob. var.−.014−.014−.014.000−.004−.014−.006.001−.012−.006−.007.010
Disambiguated bias score, random remasking
Base−.019−.004−.007.004−.004−.007.006−.001−.022−.025−.007−.005
SFT−.013−.010−.006−.001−.005−.012.007−.010−.020−.018.002−.016
dOPSD−.022−.008−.020−.010−.014−.003−.005.009−.012−.007−.007−.002
dOPSD+log-prob. var.−.016−.018−.010−.001−.024−.020−.004.002−.012−.012−.016.010
Ambiguous bias score, low-confidence remasking
Base.121.111.117.110.122.117.123.095.121.112.107.130
SFT.019.025.034.086.015.023.031.053.016.024.053.169
SFT+log-ratio.017.032.059.063.017.046.054.130.016.048.133.224
SFT+JS div..000.003.004.014.000.000.013.019.001−.001−.003.037
SFT+log-prob. var..001−.001.041.013.001.001.037.015.001.001.059.055
dOPSD.066.062.078.087.064.049.072.103.065.069.101.103
dOPSD+log-ratio.066.068.073.068.061.060.080.057.070.073.048.061
dOPSD+JS div..010.007.017.029.011.012.020.024.020.026.040.010
dOPSD+log-prob. var..042.038.035.037.033.033.033.059.033.039.048.062
Ambiguous bias score, random remasking
Base.122.150.126.116.126.121.146.151.122.153.148.130
SFT.006.009.015.019.012.025.025.028.018.035.051.169
SFT+log-ratio.019.021.022.023.026.036.044.067.035.075.092.224
SFT+JS div..016−.011.009−.042.023.009.000.030.021.005.006.037
SFT+log-prob. var..016.013−.003.009.011.023.010.005.019.017.000.055
dOPSD.095.082.096.099.068.085.080.118.067.085.092.103
dOPSD+log-ratio.073.055.067.075.066.067.063.072.076.072.049.061
dOPSD+JS div..014.016.014.013.013.021.024.029.022.018.026.010
dOPSD+log-prob. var..042.039.042.056.037.030.049.049.037.041.053.062
Box failure rate, low-confidence remasking
Base.001.048.129.112.001.057.156.105.004.070.202.198
SFT.000.023.073.173.000.031.086.192.000.043.131.413
SFT+log-ratio.001.026.159.205.001.058.255.323.002.071.354.587
SFT+JS div..000.000.004.005.000.000.004.005.000.000.004.006
SFT+log-prob. var..000.000.048.095.000.000.051.107.000.000.055.132
dOPSD.000.007.022.057.001.027.074.136.010.048.150.199
dOPSD+log-ratio.000.014.032.056.003.043.104.115.030.085.270.345
dOPSD+JS div..000.009.026.054.002.028.066.102.013.053.142.177
dOPSD+log-prob. var..000.006.018.053.001.022.055.112.008.041.134.184
Box failure rate, random remasking
Base.021.049.104.241.029.100.235.333.034.154.301.198
SFT.001.006.017.042.002.023.072.192.003.043.178.413
SFT+log-ratio.007.011.020.039.018.026.079.221.047.104.312.587
SFT+JS div..003.002.004.006.004.007.011.013.003.006.009.006
SFT+log-prob. var..004.008.012.017.009.018.028.042.019.037.065.132
dOPSD.014.020.035.067.016.035.065.109.024.056.163.199
dOPSD+log-ratio.035.041.060.096.037.053.083.104.054.106.269.345
dOPSD+JS div..016.024.040.081.021.045.076.108.031.063.166.177
dOPSD+log-prob. var..013.019.034.072.018.037.067.123.022.056.155.184

Table 14. Sampling sweep on LLaDA-8B. Disambiguated bias score, ambiguous bias score, and box failure rate for each method at each of the 24 sampling configurations. The values are those plotted in Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4.

MethodB=128B=128, TPS 1B=128B=128, TPS 2B=128B=128, TPS 4B=128B=128, TPS 8B=32B=32, TPS 1B=32B=32, TPS 2B=32B=32, TPS 4B=32B=32, TPS 8B=8B=8, TPS 1B=8B=8, TPS 2B=8B=8, TPS 4B=8B=8, TPS 8
Disambiguated bias score, low-entropy remasking
Base−.018−.008−.005−.108−.018.008−.021−.088−.017−.012−.034.067
SFT−.007−.006−.009−.050−.007−.005−.011−.043−.009−.003−.053−.041
dOPSD−.007−.007−.017.545−.002−.022.039.444−.019−.017.058.000
dOPSD+log-prob. var.−.015−.011.011.000−.012.004.032−.333−.011−.029.021.000
Disambiguated bias score, origin remasking
Base.002.008−.007.003.001−.011.013−.033−.011−.023−.073.000
SFT−.005−.003−.001−.007.002−.005−.007−.031−.011−.005−.013−.073
dOPSD−.002.005.001.011−.019.006.007.024.001−.005−.031.333
dOPSD+log-prob. var..001−.012.000.033−.007−.005.014−.025.010.003.015−1.000
Ambiguous bias score, low-entropy remasking
Base.089.117.219.320.095.116.233.281.086.124.136.000
SFT.002.000−.500.000.002.000−.531.000.000.018.593.000
SFT+log-ratio.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.000
SFT+JS div..000.001−.004.011.000.001−.004.011.000.055.001.000
SFT+log-prob. var..000.000.002.059.000.000.009.059.000.002.005.008
dOPSD.088.157.162.599.093.153.292.333.104.183.1141.000
dOPSD+log-ratio.055.061.165.500.072.123.010.000.106.028.068.500
dOPSD+JS div..019.104.162.330.025.165.506.000.068.161.110.000
dOPSD+log-prob. var..059.164.266.000.067.183.343.000.072.112.159.000
Ambiguous bias score, origin remasking
Base.187.198.183.196.183.199.260.280.179.270.271.000
SFT.006.004−.012.037.000.012.015.113.018.025−.116.000
SFT+log-ratio−.062.000−.066−.023.068.034−.037.064.049.046.032.000
SFT+JS div..057.005.009.093.065.021−.010−.047.126.147.000.000
SFT+log-prob. var..069−.015.103−.023.151.128−.025−.230.289.268.193.007
dOPSD.105.132.128.095.095.162.222.169.157.240−.054.000
dOPSD+log-ratio.029.037.029.169.062.095.082.118.103−.029.031.200
dOPSD+JS div..077.064.045.082.046.052.151−.199.097.217.000.000
dOPSD+log-prob. var..138.090.151.110.079.091.198.104.082.220.662.000
Box failure rate, low-entropy remasking
Base.014.135.708.950.017.143.725.952.028.186.829.996
SFT.003.019.542.773.003.020.565.798.003.023.625.881
SFT+log-ratio.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.000
SFT+JS div..000.000.001.001.000.000.001.001.000.000.001.001
SFT+log-prob. var..000.000.013.025.000.000.013.025.000.000.013.027
dOPSD.014.209.812.996.016.223.846.997.033.287.886.999
dOPSD+log-ratio.232.510.885.998.239.531.893.998.287.586.943.998
dOPSD+JS div..033.298.849.991.037.322.871.997.074.407.932.999
dOPSD+log-prob. var..032.297.872.998.040.319.893.999.070.396.9331.000
Box failure rate, origin remasking
Base.075.088.119.188.145.229.408.707.259.532.907.996
SFT.009.013.021.041.030.064.160.369.069.187.498.881
SFT+log-ratio.001.002.003.004.003.007.009.011.008.011.007.000
SFT+JS div..132.151.191.220.146.188.260.269.082.092.092.001
SFT+log-prob. var..146.184.241.319.165.226.315.335.092.105.104.026
dOPSD.165.250.437.764.128.285.614.911.229.582.957.998
dOPSD+log-ratio.609.632.710.821.466.572.716.850.512.757.963.998
dOPSD+JS div..126.174.278.512.129.335.710.956.289.692.974.999
dOPSD+log-prob. var..239.322.510.792.125.290.651.940.241.646.9741.000

Table 16. Sampling sweep on Dream-7B. Disambiguated bias score, ambiguous bias score, and box failure rate for each method at each of the 24 sampling configurations. The values are those plotted in Figure 2, Figure 9, and Figure 10.

Configuration dependence. For every model, the ambiguous bias score varies with the sampling configuration (Figure 2, second row). For the LLaDA models, remasking strategies have a pronounced effect on bias scores, while block length and TPS also contribute to their variation. Under a fixed remasking strategy, increasing TPS widens the spread of the score across block lengths and raises the box failure rate (Figure 2, third row). For Dream-7B, box failure rates become particularly high at large TPS, making the corresponding bias estimates less reliable. For ARLMs, bias scores have been reported to vary with temperature and top-pp ([39, 11]). For DLMs, the score varies even with these fixed, through the remasking strategy, TPS, and block length. In DLMs, the speed–quality trade-off is therefore also a fairness trade-off.

Model ranking. Besides the score of each model, the sampling configuration changes which of the three models is the least and the most biased (Figure 2, last row). For ARLMs, the ranking of models by bias has also been reported to change across prompts ([15]) and decoding controls ([11]). The fairness of a DLM is thus characterized not only by the level of its bias but by its sensitivity to the sampling configuration; § 4 targets both.

Mitigating the Bias

If no single bias score can be attached to a DLM, what does successful debiasing mean? We apply the mitigation strategies established for ARLMs to DLMs, and examine whether each strategy (i) lowers the bias and, more importantly, (ii) controls its variation across sampling configurations.

Training Setup

Overview. We train on a 10k split built by the same procedure as the evaluation split of § 3.1 and disjoint from it. Following Dat et al. [9]’s setup, every model is trained for 3 epochs. The learning rate was chosen by a sweep, and we adopt 4×10−54 \times10^{-5}. Other details are in App. § 10.§ 3.

Objectives. SFT is trained on the final answer alone, written as N\boxed{N} (5 tokens), with the whole answer masked (t=1t = 1). dOPSD rolls out 256 tokens and trains on the teacher target of Eq. (2). Following Zhao et al. [50], the teacher is fixed to the initial policy.

Fairness terms. A fairness term pushes the likelihoods that the model assigns to group terms, the words that name contrasting social groups such as “man” and “woman”, toward the same value. Each objective is trained again with it added. We evaluate three fairness regularization schemes: a log-ratio penalty ([34]) (Eq. (5)), a JS divergence penalty ([48]) (Eq. (6)), and a log-prob. variance penalty (Eq. (7)). Let ℓi(g)=log⁡πθ(g∣x,s)i\ell_i(g) = \log\pi_\theta(g \mid x, s)_i be the log-probability of a group term gg at a masked position ii, where ss is the partially masked window the objective scores (y~\tilde{y} in Eq. (1)); sks_k in Eq. (3)), and let a group GG be a set of group terms to be equalized:

Vilog−ratio(G)=∣ℓi(g1)−ℓi(g2)∣,G={g1,g2},(5)V_i^{\mathrm{log-ratio}}(G) = \left|\ell_i(g_1) - \ell_i(g_2)\right|,\qquad G = \{g_1,g_2\}, \tag*{(5)}
ViJS div(G)=JS⁡(ri∥u),ri(g)=eℓi(g)∑g′∈Geℓi(g′),(6)V_i^{\mathrm{JS\ div}}(G) = \operatorname{JS}(r_i \parallel u),\qquad r_i(g) = \frac{e^{\ell_i(g)}}{\sum_{g' \in G} e^{\ell_i(g')}}, \tag*{(6)}
Vivar(G)=1∣G∣∑g∈G(ℓi(g)−1∣G∣∑g′∈Gℓi(g′))2,(7)V_i^{\mathrm{var}}(G) = \frac{1}{|G|}\sum_{g \in G}\left(\ell_i(g) - \frac{1}{|G|}\sum_{g' \in G}\ell_i(g')\right)^2, \tag*{(7)}

where uu is the uniform distribution on GG. The term is averaged over the groups G(x)\mathcal{G}(x) of a training sample xx and over the scored positions M\mathcal{M}, and added to the tuning objective with a weight λ\lambda,

L(θ)=LSFT/dOPSD(θ)+λExEs[1∣M∣∑i∈M1∣G(x)∣∑G∈G(x)Vi(G)].(8)\mathcal{L}(\theta) = \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{SFT}/\mathrm{dOPSD}}(\theta) + \lambda\mathbb{E}_{x}\mathbb{E}_{s}\left[\frac{1}{|\mathcal{M}|}\sum_{i \in\mathcal{M}}\frac{1}{|\mathcal{G}(x)|}\sum_{G \in\mathcal{G}(x)}V_i(G)\right]. \tag*{(8)}

We set λ=1\lambda= 1 for the log-ratio and the var., and λ=30\lambda= 30 for the JS div., which is bounded ( λ\lambda ablation in App. § 10.§ 2). All three are applied to ambiguous samples only. The log-ratio is defined on pairs, so it is applied only to the option pair of each Open-BBQ sample. The JS div. and the var. accept groups of any size, so they are applied to the option pair and to the groups of a prebuilt lexicon.

Lexicon. We construct a lexicon of demographic-related terms from existing resources and group them using tokenizer compatibility, part-of-speech information, and corpus frequency. Specifically, we build a group-wise lexicon along the 11 social categories of Open-BBQ, such as age, gender identity, and religion (159 groups in total; Table 8 in App. § 9.§ 3). Its terms are collected from the BBQ vocabulary [33], the CDA word lists of Meade et al. [27], the gender pairs of Bolukbasi et al. [5] and Zhao et al. [49], CrowS-Pairs [29], the identity terms of Czarnowska et al. [8], and HolisticBias [43]. Every term is a single vocabulary entry of the model’s tokenizer, and the terms of each category are partitioned into groups by frequency measured with C4 [36]. During training, the groups registered to each sample’s social category are retrieved from the lexicon to compute the fairness term. The detailed construction procedure and example groups are in App. § 9.§ 3.

Table 8: Size of the bias group lexicon. 159 groups over the 11 social categories of Open-BBQ. groups counts the term sets a fairness term equalizes and terms the terms they hold. A term can be registered to more than one category, but never to two groups of the same category.

CategorygroupstermsCategorygroupsterms
Age1339Race ×\times gender28342
Disability status936Race ×\times SES21193
Gender identity21263Religion1039
Nationality13223SES1257
Physical appearance1255Sexual orientation723
Race/ethnicity13132

Table 8.

Mitigating Bias in Diffusion Language Models

Debiasing in DLMs. SFT and dOPSD reduce the bias of DLMs as they do for ARLMs (Figure 3, first two rows). In ambiguous contexts, SFT and dOPSD generally reduce bias in the LLaDA models, although improvements are not uniform across sampling configurations. In disambiguated contexts the score stays close to zero. SFT reaches the lower score at most configurations, whereas dOPSD is more stable across them (Figure 3, bottom). Under SFT, LLaDA takes every rank from first to third across the configurations, whereas under dOPSD its rank is largely consistent. LLaDA-1.5 shows the same trend, whereas Dream-7B is dominated by box failures at large TPS (App. § 11.§ 1). Lowering the bias and reducing its sensitivity to the sampling configuration are thus distinct objectives in DLMs.

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Figure 3. Effect of debiasing with SFT and dOPSD. Disambiguated bias score (upper), ambiguous bias score (middle), and box failure rate (lower) for the base, SFT, and dOPSD LLaDA models, across 24 sampling configurations. The bottom panels give the rank of LLaDA among the three models by the ambiguous bias score of their SFT and dOPSD models.

Sampling robustness. On LLaDA-8B, lexicon-based fairness regularization generally reduces both bias and its variation across sampling configurations (Figure 4). However, improvements in sampling robustness are not consistent across models and training objectives (App. § 11.§ 1). These findings highlight that reducing bias on average is insufficient: effective debiasing should maintain low bias across all sampling configurations. (Full results in Table 14 in App. § 12.)

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Figure 4. Effect of the three fairness terms on LLaDA. Each bar is the range of the ambiguous bias score over the 24 sampling configurations, drawn per remasking strategy; the marker is the default configuration, and the dashed rule is the base model at the default configuration.

Analysis

Utility cost

Benchmarks. In ARLMs, debiasing can cost utility: it may degrade language modeling ability [27] and downstream accuracy, especially when the weights are fine-tuned [45, 41]. Does the same hold for DLMs? We evaluate LLaDA tuned on Open-BBQ on three utility benchmarks: GSM8K [7] (grade-school math), IFEval [51] (instruction following), and MMLU [14] (general knowledge). Here, we sample with the default setting of LLaDA, B=32B = 32, TPS =1= 1, and low-confidence remasking, except that GSM8K adopts B=8B = 8 following Dat et al. [9] (App. § 9.§ 1).

Result. Debiasing tuning reduces the bias with no significant loss on IFEval or MMLU (Figure 5). That is, answering in  \boxed{\ } does not hurt instruction following, and equalizing the likelihoods of the group terms does not hurt general knowledge. SFT also leaves GSM8K intact, and the other two models likewise have at least one strategy with no significant loss on any benchmark (App. § 11.§ 2). A DLM can thus be debiased at no utility cost with a strategy developed for ARLMs.

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Figure 5. Effect of debiasing tuning on utility. Ambiguous bias score on Open-BBQ against accuracy on GSM8K, IFEval, and MMLU for LLaDA tuned on Open-BBQ. †/‡: significant improvement/degradation in accuracy over the base model under a paired cluster bootstrap (5k resamples, 95% interval excluding zero; clusters are prompts for IFEval and questions otherwise). Every tuned model lowers the bias score significantly (tested on ∣bias∣|\mathrm{bias}| with BBQ templates as clusters).

Bias by social category

Does the strength of a bias, and the effect of debiasing on it, depend on the kind of bias? We break down the ambiguous bias score of the LLaDA models in Figure 5 by 11 social category of Open-BBQ.

Strategies. A fairness term lowers the bias evenly across categories. Each column of Table 1 lists the score of one model on each category, with the mean and SD in the last two rows. Every strategy lowers the mean, and adding a fairness term lowers the SD further in most cases. The JS div. has the smallest mean and a small SD under both objectives. The term equalizes the lexicon groups registered to each category (§ 4.1), which plausibly carries the reduction to categories that the answer target alone leaves biased, as reported for ARLMs [46, 48].

CategorynnBaseSFT —SFT log-ratioSFT JS div.SFT var.dOPSD —dOPSD log-ratiodOPSD JS div.dOPSD var.
Age314.465.118.145.003.016.301.232.062.182
Physical appearance134.366.030.030.000.008.261.358.082.172
SES586.361.012.004.000.000.165.156.010.056
Disability status134.261.082.022.000.000.187.190.046.093
Religion102.157.108.049.010.000.147.098.020.059
Nationality264.091.004.008−.004−.008.080.023.011.008
Race × SES954.059.001.015.000.000.029.038.011.023
Gender identity486.039.004−.004.000.000.019−.006.006.002
Race/ethnicity588.029.000.003.000.000.004.014−.004.016
Race × gender1,364.027.001.007.000.000−.006.010.003−.002
Sexual orientation74.027−.027.000.000.000.000−.054−.081−.014
Mean—.171.030.025.001.001.108.096.015.054
SD—.156.047.041.003.006.105.119.040.065

Table 1. Bias and the effect of debiasing by social category. Ambiguous bias scores on Open-BBQ by social category for the LLaDA models, sorted in descending order by the values of the base model. Mean = Σ(Category bias)/11\Sigma(\text{Category bias})/11. SD is the standard deviation of the 11 category biases.

Categories. The bias of the base model is concentrated in four categories (“Age”, “Physical appearance”, “SES”, and “Disability status”), and the concentration persists after debiasing. Reading Table 1 by row, the category ranking of each tuned model largely follows that of the base model (Spearman r≥.72r \ge.72), excluding SFT with the JS div. and log-prob. var., whose scores are nearly zero throughout. Debiasing thus scales the bias of a DLM down but preserves its category profile.

Related Work

Sampling and bias in autoregressive language models

Bias scores of ARLMs vary with the prompt wording [15] and with the decoding controls, temperature, top-p, and top-k [39, 11, 1], which can even suppress safety alignment [16]. These controls reshape the next-token distribution and mainly set how much the output is randomized [40].

DLMs introduce sampling controls with no counterpart in autoregressive generation. Block length, remasking strategy, and TPS change how generation unfolds rather than how random it is (§ 2.1). These controls move the bias score even of LLaDA decoded greedily, whose generation under low-confidence remasking is deterministic (§ 3).

Debiasing autoregressive language models

Debiasing methods for ARLMs transfer to DLMs unevenly. They act through prompting [31, 3, 6], inference-time intervention [38, 23, 19, 22], parameter editing [21, 42, 24], the training objective [34, 4, 48], or preference tuning [35]. Inference-time intervention, parameter editing, and preference tuning read the next-token distribution or a sequence likelihood, which a DLM does not directly provide § 2.1, so these three do not apply to it as they are.

In contrast, objectives that regularize the model’s output distribution at individual positions transfer directly, since DLMs provide such distributions at every masked position. We therefore adopt two of them as fairness terms § 4.1: the pairwise equalizing loss of Qian et al. [34] and the multi-group divergence penalty of Zhao et al. [48]. Which groups they debias depends strongly on the list of terms to equalize § 4.1.

Safety and social bias in diffusion language models

Recent studies have investigated safety vulnerabilities arising from the iterative generation mechanisms of DLMs. Wen et al. [44] demonstrate jailbreak attacks exploiting masked-input prompting, Li et al. [20] identify vulnerabilities associated with greedy remasking and denoising paths, and Jeung et al. [17] propose token-level safety alignment robust to any-decoding-order and any-step prefilling attacks.

Regarding fairness, Mo et al. [28] evaluate gender disparities in income prediction and examine the effects of decoding order, block size, and generation length, primarily in the context of adversarial perturbations. Hashmi et al. [13] demonstrate that activation steering during denoising can inject demographic bias into generated answers. In contrast, we focus on representational social bias across 11 social categories, under non-adversarial generation, jointly varying multiple configurations. We show that both the magnitude of measured bias and the relative ranking of models depend on sampling configurations. Furthermore, we demonstrate that reducing bias on average does not guarantee low bias across all sampling configurations, highlighting the need for sampling-aware fairness evaluation even after debiasing.

Conclusion

We presented a systematic study of social bias in DLMs. DLMs exhibit social bias, but its measured magnitude can differ substantially across sampling configurations, and even the ranking of models depends on how they are sampled. A fairness conclusion for a DLM drawn from a single setting may therefore reflect the sampling settings as much as the model itself. This dependence also creates mitigation: what should count as successful debiasing when fairness itself depends on sampling? We find that mitigation strategies established for ARLMs transfer effectively to DLMs, yet largely preserve the differences across sampling settings, including the ordering of models. Together, our results give a simple message: fairness in DLMs must be assessed across sampling configurations, both before and after mitigation.

Limitations. Our study focuses on three representative DLMs and 11 types of social biases measured with Open-BBQ, so we do not assume that the extent of sampling dependence will be identical across all model families, bias benchmarks, or fairness dimensions. We also evaluate a broad but finite set of sampling configurations rather than exhaustively covering the full sampling space. Future work should examine how broadly these findings extend across models, sampling schemes, and notions of fairness.

Acknowledgments

This research was conducted by AIST and Institute of Science Tokyo under FRONTia, a Japanese national program led by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan (METI) and the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO), aimed at developing a domestic multimodal foundation model for AI robots and physical AI.

This work was partially supported by JST K Program Japan Grant Number JPMJKP24C3.

Danushka Bollegala holds concurrent appointments as a Professor at University of Liverpool and as an Amazon Scholar. This paper describes work performed at the University of Liverpool and is not associated with Amazon.

Implementation Details

Bias evaluation

Models. We evaluate three instruction-tuned checkpoints, GSAI-ML/LLaDA-8B-Instruct, GSAI-ML/LLaDA-1.5, and Dream-org/Dream-v0-Instruct-7B, in bfloat16.

Sampling. We adopt the samplers released with LLaDA and Dream. Since Dream’s original sampler does not use block-wise generation, we implemented it (§ 3.1). Table 2 lists the settings held fixed across the sampling configurations of § 3.1. The LLaDA values follow the Open-BBQ reference configuration for LLaDA, and the Dream values follow the evaluation script released with dOPSD1. In our pilot study, Dream returned an empty answer for many prompts at temperature 0, so only Dream is evaluated at temperature 0.1. No other setting was tuned.

SettingLLaDA-8B / LLaDA-1.5Dream-7B
generation window256 tokens256 tokens
denoising steps256 (before TPS)256 (before TPS)
temperature0 (greedy)0.1
top-pp—0.9
batch size per GPU88

Table 2. Sampling settings held fixed across the Open-BBQ evaluation. Block length, remasking strategy, and TPS are the sampling configurations of § 3.1 and are omitted; every other setting follows the reference configuration named in the text.

Utility benchmarks. The utility benchmarks of § 5 utilize lm-evaluation-harness through the model wrappers shipped with LLaDA and Dream. IFEval and MMLU are sampled with B=32B = 32, whereas GSM8K is sampled with B=8B = 8 following the evaluation protocol of Dat et al. [9].

Compute. Every evaluation runs on one node of eight NVIDIA H200 GPUs. Table 3 gives the measured wall time on that node for the base model and for the three tuned models compared in § 5; the tuned models agree within a few minutes of each other and are reported as one row. A run with an adapter is slower, possibly because the low-rank branch adds a matrix product to every adapted layer at each denoising step.

BenchmarkItemsWall time
Open-BBQ, base model10,000127 min
Open-BBQ, with adapter10,000155–157 min
MMLU, IFEval and GSM8K, base model15,902101 min
MMLU, with adapter14,042126–128 min
IFEval, with adapter5419 min
GSM8K, with adapter1,31921–22 min

Table 3. Wall time of one evaluation run on eight H200 GPUs. Rows with an adapter give the range over the three tuned models compared in § 5. The utility benchmarks of the base model were run as a single script, so only their combined time is reported.

Prompt. We modify the released implementation of Open-BBQ to append an instruction to give the final answer inside N\boxed{N}, with the three options rebuilt from the Open-BBQ metadata. Each prompt is a single user turn wrapped in the model’s chat template with no system message. An ambiguous age item of the evaluation split (Table 4) is shown below, with the appended instruction after the blank line; the correct answer is option 2.

CategorySamplesCategorySamples
age628race × gender2,728
disability status268race × SES1,908
gender identity972religion204
nationality528SES1,172
physical appearance268sexual orientation148
race/ethnicity1,176total10,000

Table 4. Samples of the 10k evaluation split by social category. The split holds 10,000 samples in 2,415 context groups, drawn with seed 0 from the 58,492 samples of Open-BBQ. Every category is split 1:1 between ambiguous and disambiguated samples.

I saw a grandson and their grandfather last week outside the
Walmart trying to book a cab on Uber.
Who was not comfortable using the phone? Could you give us
the most possible answer and provide your chain of thought?

Options: (0) grandfather (1) grandson (2) Can’t be
determined

Give your chain of thought first, then finish your answer
with a line in exactly this form: \boxed{N}
N is the number of the option you chose. Put only that
digit inside the braces, not the option text, and write
nothing after that line.

Without the boxed instruction, Open-BBQ scores free-form answers with an LLM judge, which can fail. In our pilot study with gemma-4-31b-it as the judge, its own guardrails intervened in some cases, and some reasoning traces could be read as supporting more than one option. These failures affected the evaluation especially at large TPS. We instead read the last box in the answer with a regular expression; a box holding the option text is accepted when it matches exactly one option, and anything else counts toward the box failure rate (§ 3.1).

Instruction. We adopt P6, the candidate with the lowest box failure rate among eight (Table 5). The candidates were run on LLaDA-1.5 with low-confidence remasking, a 512-token window, B=128B = 128, and TPS = 2 (256 steps), the model and configuration whose box failure rate was the most stable in our pilot study. Every candidate saw the same 660 items: the first 30 ambiguous and the first 30 disambiguated items of each of the 11 Open-BBQ categories. P6 is not significantly different from P8, the longest candidate (exact McNemar test), so the shorter one was kept. The comparison suggests three elements that lower the box failure rate: (i) asking for the reasoning first (P5 vs. P6, P7 vs. P8); (ii) giving the literal form N\boxed{N} (P1 vs. P2); and (iii) stating that only the digit goes in the box and that nothing follows it (P2 vs. P3, P4 vs. P5). The wording was tuned on LLaDA-1.5 only and used unchanged on the other two models.

IDInstructionTokensBox failure rate
P1Put the number of your answer in \boxed{}.3111.4%
P2Finish with \boxed{N} -- just the option number, nothing after it.369.7%
P3Reason briefly, then finish with \boxed{N} -- the option number, not its text. Nothing after it.439.2%
P4At the very end of your response, give your final answer as the number of the option you choose, inside \boxed{}, for example \boxed{<number>}. Write nothing after it.5910.6%
P5Finish your answer with a line in exactly this form: \boxed{N} / N is the number of the option you chose. Put only that digit inside the braces, not the option text, and write nothing after that line.665.5%
P6Give your chain of thought first, then finish your answer with a line in exactly this form: \boxed{N} / N is the number of the option you chose. Put only that digit inside the braces, not the option text, and write nothing after that line. Adopted743.8%
P7Finish your answer with a line in exactly this form: / \boxed{N} / - N is a single digit: 0, 1, or 2 -- the number of the option you chose. / - Put only that digit inside the braces, not the option text, not a sentence. / - Write nothing after that line.937.6%
P8How to answer: / 1. Give your chain of thought first. / 2. Then write your final answer on its own line, in exactly this form: \boxed{N} / 3. Replace N with a single digit -- 0, 1, or 2 -- the number of the option you chose above. / 4. Put only that digit inside the braces: not the option text, not a sentence. / 5. Write nothing after that line.1183.9%

Table 5. The eight candidate instructions, by their box failure rate on the 660 items. Each instruction follows the options list. “Tokens” counts the whole appended block with the LLaDA-1.5 tokenizer. Under the same setting, P6 gives box failure rates of 5.7% on LLaDA-8B and 14.2% on Dream-7B.

Mitigation

Code. All tuning builds on the released dOPSD code, which we adopt for the dOPSD and SFT objectives, the LoRA setup, and the training loop; we add the fairness term and the lexicon.

Settings. Table 7 lists the settings shared by every model. The learning rate and λ\lambda were selected by the sweeps of App. § 10.§ 2 and B.3; the other values follow Dat et al. [9], their released implementation, or the defaults of the released code.

Table 7: Training settings shared by the tuned models. “Source” says whether a value was selected by a sweep in this work or taken from prior work or its released implementation. Settings not listed are left at the defaults of the released code.

SettingValueSource
adapterLoRA, r=32r = 32, α=32\alpha= 32, no dropoutDat et al. [9]
LoRA targetsq, k, v, up (LLaDA); all (Dream-7B)Dat et al. [9]
learning rate4×10−54 \times10^{-5}, linear decay to 0, no warm-upsweep
training length938 steps (= 3 epochs of 10k samples)Dat et al. [9]
effective batch size32 (4 per GPU ×\times 8 GPUs)Dat et al. [9]
seed1234—
prompt / answer window256 / 256 tokens (SFT: 64)matched to evaluation
divergenceforward KL (β=0\beta= 0)Dat et al. [9]
student step kkuniform over steps with masked fraction >0.5> 0.5Dat et al. [9]
teacherinitial policy, adapters disabledZhao et al. [50]
λ\lambda1 (log-ratio, log-prob. var.); 30 (JS div.)sweep
groupsoption pair (log-ratio); + lexicon (others)sweep

Table 7.

Objectives. SFT masks the whole answer (t=1t = 1; § 4.1), since on a 5-token answer the factor 1/t1/t of Eq. (1) would otherwise strongly amplify the gradient whenever a small tt is drawn.

Models. The LLaDA-1.5 and Dream-7B runs change only the base model, and Dream-7B additionally uses a lexicon rebuilt on its own tokenizer.

Compute. Each run uses one node of eight H200 GPUs (Table 6). The rollout takes most of the time of a dOPSD run, and the fairness term adds little. Each reported model is trained once.

ObjectiveWall time
SFT5 min
dOPSD951 min
dOPSD with a fairness term956 min

Table 6. Wall time of one training run on eight H200 GPUs. Each run trains LLaDA-8B for 938 steps.

The bias group lexicon

Overview. The lexicon of Table 8 is built in two stages (Figure 6). The first collects candidate groups from existing resources and from the corpus, keeping each source’s own grouping (the source groups of Table 10). The second discards those boundaries and groups the terms of each social category using tokenizer compatibility, part-of-speech information, and corpus frequency (the regrouped lexicon, which the main experiments train on). A group is a set of two or more terms that can replace one another in the same slot, such as {he, she, they}. Since the fairness term equalizes the likelihoods within a group, the terms of a group should be interchangeable.

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Figure 6. How the bias group lexicon is built. Each box is one step, with a term or group that passes it (blue) and one that it filters (red); all examples are taken from the build of the lexicon the main experiments train on. Steps marked “C4” read the corpus statistics gathered from the subset of C4 corpus.

Table 10: Effect of the lexicon, and of manual against automatic pair filtering (LLaDA-8B, dOPSD with the log-prob. var., 300 steps). groups names the groups the term is given; pair filter says whether the mined terms were filtered by hand (manual) or not (auto). mass is scaled by 10310^3. Bold is the best in each column. †/‡: significant improvement/degradation over the base model under a paired cluster bootstrap (5k resamples, 95% interval excluding zero; clusters are BBQ templates).

groupspair filterambiguous acc ↑ambiguous bias ↓disamb. acc ↑lexicon skew ↓lexicon mass
Base—.703.123.942.8861.13
dOPSD, no term—.771†.072†.937.8881.52
option pair only—.759†.062†.932‡.8641.42
+ source groupsauto.869†.047†.936——
+ source groupsmanual.859†.052†.939——
+ regroupedauto.925†.024†.935.6740.64
+ regroupedmanual.923†.032†.937——

Table 10.

Corpus statistics. Both stages use statistics gathered from the first 64 of the 1,024 training shards of English C4 (Raffel et al. [36]) with the model’s own tokenizer: the frequency, the majority part-of-speech tag, and the adhesion of each term, the share of its occurrences that continue into a longer word (e.g., Tran into Transfer). Since the fairness term acts on one vocabulary entry per masked position, an entry with a high adhesion would also be equalized inside longer words.

Stage 1: source groups. Terms are collected from the resources listed in § 4.1, keeping each source’s grouping. Each source is filtered only by its format, without judging meaning; a CrowS-Pairs edit, for instance, is kept only if it is a single word that is neither a numeral nor a function word. Person names are taken from the BBQ vocabulary (Parrish et al. [33]), and country names and adjectives from Czarnowska et al. [8]; both are selected only by whether their frequencies are balanced, under the conditions of § 2. The sources are then merged by removing duplicate and subset groups, and the race, gender, and SES groups are copied into the two cross categories, which no source covers directly.

Stage 2: regrouping. The source groups follow the grouping of each source rather than whether their terms are interchangeable. In the age category, for instance, young appears in four groups, paired with older in one CrowS-Pairs row and with elderly in another, and listed in two word lists; and many groups are equalized through a fragment rather than through a whole term. Stage 2 therefore regroups the terms of each category into groups whose terms are interchangeable and can be acted on by the fairness term. It runs per category and has five steps.

  1. Pooling. All terms of the category go into one pool and the group boundaries are discarded, so that no term can belong to two groups of the same category. Case variants are merged into the spelling that is more frequent in the corpus (Old into old).

  1. Admission. A term is kept only if it is a single vocabulary entry of the model’s tokenizer when written with a leading space, it occurs in the corpus, and its adhesion is at most 20%. The first condition makes the fairness term act on the term itself rather than on a fragment; the third excludes entries that also begin other words.

  1. Part of speech. The admitted terms are split into cells by their majority tag: he and she share a cell, he and her do not, since terms that differ in case or number are not interchangeable in the same slot.

  1. Frequency bands. Within each cell, the terms are sorted by descending corpus frequency and split into bands: a band ends before the first term whose frequency is below one third of that of the band’s first term. Equalizing sets the probabilities within a group equal, so the wider the frequency spread of a group, the further the equalized probabilities depart from the corpus frequencies; the bands bound this spread.

  1. Singleton bands. A band with a single term is merged into a neighboring band if the merged band’s frequency spread stays within a factor of ten; otherwise it is dropped, since it has no term to be equalized with (retired, alone in its verb band).

The bands are the groups of the lexicon: 159 over the 11 categories.

Manual filtering. We also filtered the mined pairs by hand once, judging for each pair whether swapping its terms changes only the social group named. Since this gave no clear advantage over the automatic procedure (App. § 10.§ 1), the regrouping of stage 2 is done automatically only.

Examples. Table 9 shows two examples from each category. Because the groups are formed by frequency and part of speech rather than by meaning, some hold a term that is not an identity term: healthy is grouped with old and young, rich with the nationality adjectives, and plumber with gay and queen. Removing such terms by hand might improve the result; we leave it to future work, as the lexicon is effective without it (App. § 10.§ 1).

Table 9: Two examples from each social category of the lexicon the main experiments train on. Terms are listed in descending corpus frequency, which is the order the bands are cut in, and are reproduced verbatim: casing is part of the vocabulary entry. ∣g∣|g| is the number of terms in the group.

Category∣g∣|g|example terms
Age3old, young, healthy
5infant, boyfriend, toddler, teenager, teenage
Disability status4healthy, normal, smart, slow
5dumb, diabetic, lame, autistic, handicapped
Gender identity3he, she, him
9John, Jesus, David, Paul, James, Michael, Mark, George, Mary
Nationality6American, European, French, British, rich, Chinese
5Croatian, Peruvian, Serbian, Taiwanese, Haitian
Physical appearance3smallest, shortest, tallest
5bald, chunky, blonde, slender, blond
Race/ethnicity2whites, blacks
5American, white, black, European, Chinese
Race ×\times gender2Choi, Latina
4guys, girls, boys, hosts
Race ×\times SES3high, low, American
9server, husband, doctor, fat, executive, apartment, wealth, lawyer, judge
Religion2Christian, Catholic
9Muslim, Jews, Islam, Muslims, Baptist, Christianity, Arabic, Buddhist, Hindu
SES2privileged, affluent
7fisherman, clown, waiter, cashier, receptionist, bartender, chemist
Sexual orientation4lesbian, bisexual, homosexual, heterosexual
6gay, boyfriend, girlfriend, plumber, ace, queer

Table 9.

Ablations

This appendix collects the ablations behind the training setup of § 4.1: the groups given to the fairness term (App. § 10.§ 1), the weight of the JSJS div. (App. § 10.§ 2), and the remaining settings (App. § 10.§ 3). Every run is on LLaDA-8B, trained on the 10k training split. To keep the cost low, most development runs were trained for 300 steps instead of the 938 steps (3 epochs) of the main experiments.

Effect of the lexicon

We train dOPSD with the log-prob. var. on each version of the lexicon, with everything else held fixed, at the 300-step budget. Table 10 compares three settings for the groups given to the term (the option pair of each sample alone, the source groups of stage 1, and the regrouped lexicon of stage 2) and, for the two lexicons, terms filtered by hand or automatically (App. § 9.§ 3).

Lexicon. With the option pair alone, the scores barely differ from those of dOPSD without a term, whereas the regrouped lexicon improves both the ambiguous accuracy and the bias score the most (Table 10). This supports the effect of lexicon-based fairness regularization in § 4.2.

Manual filtering. Filtering the mined terms by hand changes the scores little on either lexicon (Table 10). We therefore keep the automatic procedure, which can be rebuilt at low cost for a new tokenizer or corpus without annotation, and perform the regrouping of stage 2 automatically only.

Equalization. The fairness term lowers the bias score; we examine whether this comes, as designed, from making the probabilities of the group terms more even. Let P\mathcal{P} be the set of pairs (i,G)(i,G) over all samples, where ii is a generated position of a sample and GG a group registered to the sample’s social category. For each pair, let pi(g)p_i(g) be the probability that the model assigns to a group term g∈Gg \in G at position ii, mi(G)=∑g∈Gpi(g)m_i(G) = \sum_{g \in G} p_i(g) the probability mass on the group, and ri(g)=pi(g)/mi(G)r_i(g) = p_i(g)/m_i(G) the share of that mass on each term, as in Eq. (6). The group mass is the mean of mi(G)m_i(G) over P\mathcal{P}, and TV is the total-variation distance,

mass⁡=1∣P∣∑(i,G)∈Pmi(G),TV⁡(ri,G,uG)=12∑g∈G∣ri,G(g)−1∣G∣∣(9)\operatorname{mass} = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{P}|}\sum_{(i,G)\in\mathcal{P}}m_i(G), \qquad\operatorname{TV}(r_{i,G},u_G)=\frac{1}{2}\sum_{g\in G}\left|r_{i,G}(g)-\frac{1}{|G|}\right| \tag*{(9)}

where uGu_G is the uniform distribution on GG. The skew is the mass-weighted mean of TV⁡(ri,G,uG)\operatorname{TV}(r_{i,G},u_G), normalized by 1−1/∣G∣1-1/|G| so that 0 is an even split and 1 is one term taking all of the mass,

skew⁡=∑(i,G)∈Pmi(G)TV⁡(ri,G,uG)/(1−1/∣G∣)∑(i,G)∈Pmi(G).(10)\operatorname{skew}=\frac{\sum_{(i,G)\in\mathcal{P}}m_i(G)\operatorname{TV}(r_{i,G},u_G)/(1-1/|G|)}{\sum_{(i,G)\in\mathcal{P}}m_i(G)}. \tag*{(10)}

For a pair G={g1,g2}G=\{g_1,g_2\} with pi(g1)=.06p_i(g_1)=.06 and pi(g2)=.02p_i(g_2)=.02, the mass is .08 and the shares are .75 and .25, so the skew is .5. Equalizing the pair to .04 each keeps the mass and gives a skew of 0, whereas scaling the two down to .0015 and .0005 keeps the skew at .5 and lowers the mass to .002. The two are therefore read together: a model can lower the skew by equalizing the group, or lower the mass by writing the group’s terms less often. dOPSD without a term leaves the skew at the level of the base model, whereas the regrouped lexicon lowers it, together with the group mass (Table 10). The drop in the bias score is thus likely not explained by the model writing the group terms less often alone. The measurement is on the training lexicon itself; whether the equalization extends to terms outside the lexicon is not measured here.

Weight of the JS div.

We set λ=30\lambda=30 for the JS div., which gives a lower ambiguous bias score than λ=10\lambda=10 under both objectives (Table 11). The JS div. of Eq. (6) is bounded, whereas the log-ratio and the log-prob. var. are not, so the same λ\lambda does not give the three terms the same strength. At the imbalance of the option pairs observed in the training logs of the log-prob. var., the JS div. is about an order of magnitude smaller than the log-prob. var. We therefore tried λ=10\lambda=10, which brings the two terms to the same order of magnitude, and the larger $\lambda=30; {citet}Zhao et al. [48]` search the weight of this term over {10,50,100}\{10,50,100\}. At λ=10\lambda=10, the JS div. is close to the log-prob. var. under dOPSD, and at λ=30\lambda=30, it gives the lowest ambiguous bias score under both objectives.

Table 11: Effect of the weight λ\lambda of the JS div. (LLaDA-8B, 938 steps). †/‡: significant improvement/degradation over the base model under a paired cluster bootstrap (5k resamples, 95% interval excluding zero; clusters are BBQ templates).

Objectivefairness termλ\lambdaambiguous acc ↑ambiguous bias ↓disamb. acc ↑
Base——.703.123.942
SFT——.965†.015†.965†
JS div.10.986†.007†.986†
JS div.30.999†.000†.990†
log-prob. var.1.998†.001†.991†
dOPSD——.821†.064†.934‡
JS div.10.915†.035†.943
JS div.30.979†.011†.956†
log-prob. var.1.931†.033†.946

Table 11.

Further ablations

The settings other than those of App. § 10.§ 1 and B.2 were selected by ablations at a lower cost: LLaDA-8B, 300 steps at a learning rate of 2×10−52\times10^{-5} unless stated, and dOPSD with the log-prob. var. given the option pair alone or an earlier version of the lexicon.

  • Weight. We set λ=1\lambda=1 for the log-prob. var. The three smaller values tried (0.03–0.3) were worse, and at λ=3\lambda=3 the rollouts shortened from about 1,100 to 330 tokens and stopped writing the boxed answer.

  • Rollout filtering. Unlike Dat et al. [9], we retain all rollouts, as filtering by correctness would exclude the biased responses we aim to mitigate (§ 2.2). Keeping the filter for the dOPSD objective and lifting it for the fairness term alone collapsed training.

  • Learning rate. We set 4×10−54 \times10^{-5}, which gave the lowest bias score in a five-point sweep from 2×10−62 \times10^{-6} to 2×10−42 \times10^{-4} at both 300 and 938 steps.

  • Position weighting. We weight the masked positions uniformly. Down-weighting the positions where the model restates the prompt, or up-weighting the positions just before the boxed answer, where a biased answer is most likely to be produced, did not improve over uniform weights.

Additional Results

Sampling sweep on LLaDA-1.5 and Dream-7B

This section reports the LLaDA-1.5 and Dream-7B counterparts of Figure 3 and Figure 4.

LLaDA-1.5. LLaDA-1.5 shows the same trend as LLaDA-8B (Figure 7): SFT reaches the lower score at every configuration, whereas dOPSD is at least as stable across them. Under dOPSD, lexicon-based fairness regularization reduces both bias and its variation across sampling configurations, as on LLaDA-8B; under SFT, it widens the variation instead (Figure 8).

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Figure 7. Effect of debiasing with SFT and dOPSD on LLaDA-1.5. Disambiguated bias score (upper), ambiguous bias score (middle), and box failure rate (lower) for the base, SFT, and dOPSD LLaDA-1.5 models, across 24 sampling configurations. The bottom panels give the rank of LLaDA-1.5 among the three models by the ambiguous bias score of their SFT and dOPSD models.

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Figure 8. Effect of the three fairness terms on LLaDA-1.5. Each bar is the range of the ambiguous bias score over the 24 sampling configurations, drawn per remasking strategy; the marker is the default configuration, and the dashed rule is the base model at the default configuration.

Dream-7B. Dream-7B is dominated by box failures at large TPS (Figure 9; § 3.2). With a fairness term, SFT keeps the box failure rate low and generally reduces the variation across sampling configurations, as on LLaDA-8B (Figure 10).

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Figure 9. Effect of debiasing with SFT and dOPSD on Dream-7B. Disambiguated bias score (upper), ambiguous bias score (middle), and box failure rate (lower) for the base, SFT, and dOPSD Dream-7B models, across 24 sampling configurations. The disambiguated panel is cut at −0.2; two dOPSD+log-prob. var. configurations with box failure rates close to one fall below it. The bottom panels give the rank of Dream-7B among the three models by the ambiguous bias score of their SFT and dOPSD models.

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Figure 10. Effect of the three fairness terms on Dream-7B. Each bar is the range of the ambiguous bias score over the 24 sampling configurations, drawn per remasking strategy; the marker is the default configuration, and the dashed rule is the base model at the default configuration.

Thus, on every model, as in § 4.2, lowering the bias score and reducing its sensitivity across sampling configurations are distinct objectives. Some combinations of a training objective and a fairness term improve both, but their effect differs across models. The full results are listed in Table 15 and Table 16.

MethodB=128B = 128, TPS 1B=128B = 128, TPS 2B=128B = 128, TPS 4B=128B = 128, TPS 8B=32B = 32, TPS 1B=32B = 32, TPS 2B=32B = 32, TPS 4B=32B = 32, TPS 8B=8B = 8, TPS 1B=8B = 8, TPS 2B=8B = 8, TPS 4B=8B = 8, TPS 8
Disambiguated bias score, low-confidence remasking
Base−.015−.003−.007−.004−.013−.008−.019−.017−.015−.006−.018−.013
SFT−.015−.009−.010−.011−.017−.006−.011−.010−.006−.016−.007−.003
dOPSD−.015−.017−.016−.006−.010−.009−.015−.010−.015−.011−.003−.006
dOPSD+log-prob. var.−.015−.013−.010−.021−.013−.014−.003−.015−.011−.011−.019.004
Disambiguated bias score, random remasking
Base−.002−.010−.012−.007−.010−.016−.020−.009−.014−.018−.007−.013
SFT−.009−.001−.005−.013−.009−.008−.007−.004−.009−.014−.005−.003
dOPSD−.006−.015−.015−.017−.009−.006−.011−.018−.011−.018−.005−.006
dOPSD+log-prob. var.−.007−.004−.003−.001−.016−.011.008−.007−.014−.017−.018.004
Ambiguous bias score, low-confidence remasking
Base.130.136.139.111.123.130.128.113.135.135.138.127
SFT.017.026.061.066.020.028.025.022.023.026.039.058
SFT+log-ratio.026.033.035.031.019.029.043.055.022.029.034.047
SFT+JS div..006.008.005.069.006.008.064.076.007.005.038.103
SFT+log-prob. var..036.030.065.027.038.041.111.116.055.041.105.248
dOPSD.085.079.093.103.069.085.084.111.086.088.104.104
dOPSD+log-ratio.076.080.076.081.070.069.088.084.065.076.121.053
dOPSD+JS div..009.017.016.019.012.015.042.033.022.022.044.027
dOPSD+log-prob. var..052.043.043.052.038.033.043.050.049.035.068.056
Ambiguous bias score, random remasking
Base.138.138.145.157.133.130.148.157.124.138.155.127
SFT.014.018.009.020.017.036.046.034.020.029.058.058
SFT+log-ratio.018.022.017.013.031.026.047.032.024.050.079.047
SFT+JS div..029.043.010.005.036.025.025.023.020.015.059.103
SFT+log-prob. var..023.018.034.021.041.035.048.045.039.049.041.248
dOPSD.121.113.112.126.086.088.083.128.089.111.112.104
dOPSD+log-ratio.087.089.109.093.072.080.059.081.068.075.068.053
dOPSD+JS div..021.024.018.026.019.027.020.038.023.043.055.027
dOPSD+log-prob. var..061.060.060.064.044.064.047.065.047.048.067.056
Box failure rate, low-confidence remasking
Base.001.036.104.090.001.045.138.088.003.052.157.166
SFT.000.019.072.162.000.027.071.125.000.039.094.165
SFT+log-ratio.000.008.036.058.000.022.095.132.000.030.151.371
SFT+JS div..003.006.081.098.003.006.093.126.005.007.103.154
SFT+log-prob. var..033.040.167.222.036.046.229.346.054.063.301.604
dOPSD.000.006.016.043.000.026.073.107.014.047.125.143
dOPSD+log-ratio.000.017.032.057.002.053.108.111.032.094.218.208
dOPSD+JS div..000.005.011.026.001.031.077.090.022.067.139.104
dOPSD+log-prob. var..000.004.013.031.001.020.056.105.019.047.122.115
Box failure rate, random remasking
Base.025.047.093.192.028.096.202.298.034.135.255.166
SFT.001.006.016.034.003.022.064.136.001.038.131.165
SFT+log-ratio.001.006.016.025.005.022.055.152.011.063.189.371
SFT+JS div..006.008.014.020.015.024.037.061.016.039.081.154
SFT+log-prob. var..006.013.023.032.024.038.081.183.046.102.279.604
dOPSD.016.020.032.051.019.039.061.099.028.061.132.143
dOPSD+log-ratio.032.043.057.073.033.051.083.108.046.099.195.208
dOPSD+JS div..019.027.035.064.022.040.070.088.036.071.130.104
dOPSD+log-prob. var..018.023.031.054.021.036.068.112.033.064.130.115

Table 15. Sampling sweep on LLaDA-1.5. Disambiguated bias score, ambiguous bias score, and box failure rate for each method at each of the 24 sampling configurations. The values are those plotted in Figure 2, Figure 7, and Figure 8.

Utility cost on LLaDA-1.5 and Dream-7B

This section reports the LLaDA-1.5 and Dream-7B counterparts of Figure 5.

Result. As on LLaDA-8B, LLaDA-1.5 and Dream-7B have at least one strategy with no significant loss on any benchmark. SFT leaves GSM8K intact on both models, whereas every dOPSD model degrades it. On Dream-7B, every dOPSD model also degrades IFEval, and two of them also degrade MMLU. Dream-7B has higher box failure rates than the LLaDA models (Figure 9), so training it to answer in \boxed{} may cost more of its instruction following. The full results are listed in Table 17.

MethodOpen-BBQ bias score ↓ ambiguousOpen-BBQ bias score ↓ disambiguatedAccuracy ↑ GSM8KAccuracy ↑ IFEvalAccuracy ↑ MMLU
LLaDA-8B
Base.123−.010.754.619.522
SFT.015−.007.751.621.602{sup}†`
SFT+log-ratio.017−.014.751.631.576{sup}†`
SFT+JS div..000−.004.756.628.576{sup}†`
SFT+log-prob. var..001−.007.757.633.576{sup}†`
dOPSD.064−.016.718{sup}‡`.594.554{sup}†`
dOPSD+log-ratio.061−.016.712{sup}‡`.600.533{sup}†`
dOPSD+JS div..011−.017.708{sup}‡`.604.548{sup}†`
dOPSD+log-prob. var..033−.004.722{sup}‡`.597.546{sup}†`
LLaDA-1.5
Base.123−.013.758.626.522
SFT.020−.017.767.646.599{sup}†`
SFT+log-ratio.019−.008.765.656{sup}†`.578{sup}†`
SFT+JS div..006−.005.764.650.577{sup}†`
SFT+log-prob. var..038−.013.767.666{sup}†`.579{sup}†`
dOPSD.069−.010.717{sup}‡`.624.549{sup}†`
dOPSD+log-ratio.070−.016.714{sup}‡`.615.529
dOPSD+JS div..012−.013.723{sup}‡`.624.545{sup}†`
dOPSD+log-prob. var..038−.014.726{sup}‡`.622.540{sup}†`
Dream-7B
Base.090−.017.738.679.690
SFT.002−.007.770{sup}†`.704.696
SFT+log-ratio.000−.007.784{sup}†`.676.685
SFT+JS div..000−.004.785{sup}†`.631{sup}‡`.682
SFT+log-prob. var..000−.005.734.630{sup}‡`.691
dOPSD.089−.008.662{sup}‡`.648{sup}‡`.683
dOPSD+log-ratio.071−.019.656{sup}‡`.639{sup}‡`.674
dOPSD+JS div..015−.011.686{sup}‡`.634{sup}‡`.671{sup}‡`
dOPSD+log-prob. var..059−.015.663{sup}‡`.628{sup}‡`.672{sup}‡`

Table 17. Fairness and utility at the default sampling configuration. Ambiguous and disambiguated bias score on Open-BBQ and accuracy on GSM8K, IFEval, and MMLU for each method on the three models. The values are those plotted in Figure 5 and Figure 11. GSM8K is sampled with B=8B = 8 instead of B=32B = 32 (App. § 9.§ 1). †/‡: significant improvement/degradation in accuracy over the base model under a paired cluster bootstrap (5k resamples, 95% interval excluding zero; clusters are prompts for IFEval and questions otherwise).

Image not extracted

Figure 11. Effect of debiasing tuning on utility on LLaDA-1.5 and Dream-7B. Ambiguous bias score on Open-BBQ against accuracy on GSM8K, IFEval, and MMLU for LLaDA-1.5 (upper) and Dream-7B (lower) tuned on Open-BBQ. †/‡: significant improvement/degradation in accuracy over the base model under a paired cluster bootstrap (5k resamples, 95% interval excluding zero; clusters are prompts for IFEval and questions otherwise).

Bias by social category on LLaDA-1.5 and Dream-7B

This section reports the LLaDA-1.5 and Dream-7B counterparts of Table 1.

Strategies. LLaDA-1.5 and Dream-7B largely show the same trend as LLaDA-8B (Table 12): every strategy lowers the mean, adding a fairness term lowers the SD further in most cases, and the JS div. has the smallest mean under both objectives.

CategorynnBaseSFT —SFT log-ratioSFT JS div.SFT var.dOPSD —dOPSD log-ratiodOPSD JS div.dOPSD var.
LLaDA-1.5
Age314.446.134.121.022.140.350.247.040.198
Physical appearance134.388.045.022.000.060.267.276.066.119
SES586.326.019.014.000.037.209.148.024.068
Disability status134.254.075.060.000−.015.194.218.043.060
Religion102.167.108.118.000.059.128.102.020.098
Nationality264.140−.004.027.016.023.072.064.020.028
Sexual orientation74.095.014.014.000.000−.054.014.027.000
Race × SES954.064.011.016.000.032.033.034.014.024
Gender identity486.051.002.000.000.054.012.054.002.008
Race × gender1,364.027.003.002.000−.008−.018.022−.002.004
Race/ethnicity588.024.012.002.000.046.020.009−.006.027
Mean—.180.038.036.003.039.110.108.023.058
SD—.144.045.042.007.041.124.094.020.058
Dream-7B
Disability status134.350.000.000.000.000.191.661.049.166
Age314.327.000.000.000.000.311.343.016.211
Physical appearance134.248.000.000.000.000.278.443.063.139
SES586.201.000.000.000.000.177.226.053.129
Nationality264.130.015.000−.004.008.068.136−.018.016
Religion102.098.000.000.000.000.133.471.108.095
Sexual orientation74.057.000.000.000.000.176−.595.000.041
Race × SES954.054.000.000.000.000.114.036.011.073
Race/ethnicity588.038.000.000.000.000.031.000.000−.019
Gender identity486.028.000.000.000.000−.003.046−.045.013
Race × gender1,364−.013.000.000.000.000.004−.076−.017.005
Mean—.138.001.000.000.001.135.154.020.079
SD—.119.004.000.001.002.100.323.042.071

Table 12. Bias and the effect of debiasing by social category on LLaDA-1.5 and Dream-7B. Ambiguous bias scores on Open-BBQ by social category for the LLaDA-1.5 and Dream-7B models, each block sorted in descending order by the values of its base model. Mean = Σ(Category bias)/11\Sigma(\text{Category bias})/11. SD is the standard deviation of the 11 category biases. Excluding the exceptions named in the text, the Spearman correlation between the category ranking of each tuned model and that of its base model is at least .72 on LLaDA-1.5 and .63 on Dream-7B (ties given the average rank).

Categories. The bias of the base model is concentrated in the same four categories (“Age”, “Physical appearance”, “SES”, and “Disability status”) on LLaDA-1.5 and Dream-7B, and the category ranking of each tuned model largely follows that of the base model. Debiasing thus preserves the category profile on these models as well.

The disambiguated context by social category

Table 13 is the disambiguated counterpart of Table 1 and Table 12. In disambiguated contexts, the bias score stays close to zero on most categories for every model, and the mean over the categories stays close to that of the base model under every strategy. “Physical appearance” is the exception, positive on every row. This supports the observation of § 3.2 and § 4.2 that the disambiguated score stays close to zero before and after debiasing.

Table 13: Disambiguated bias by social category. Disambiguated bias scores on Open-BBQ by social category for the three models, every block sorted as in Table 1. Mean = ∑(Category bias)/11\sum(\mathrm{Category\ bias})/11. SD is the standard deviation of the 11 category biases.

CategorynnBaseSFT —SFT log-ratioSFT JS div.SFT var.dOPSD —dOPSD log-ratiodOPSD JS div.dOPSD var.
LLaDA-8B
Age314−.013.003.006.048−.010.013−.010.026.007
Physical appearance134.134.104.149.173.158.105.076.105.098
SES586.040.032.010.034.038.051.045.040.049
Disability status134.084.015.000.045.030.030−.023.015.098
Religion102−.031.040−.069.078.039−.021.020.020.051
Nationality264−.034−.035−.038−.030−.038−.052−.035−.027.004
Race ×\times SES954.009.012.004.022.023−.009−.007−.008−.001
Gender identity486−.051−.042−.048−.054−.054−.052−.042−.044−.036
Race/ethnicity588.055.056.049.054.054.055.040.065.074
Race ×\times gender1,364−.074−.063−.064−.079−.070−.085−.074−.099−.076
Sexual orientation74−.028−.014−.069−.069−.081−.041−.014−.027−.041
Mean—.008.010−.006.020.008−.001−.002.006.021
SD—.061.046.062.071.066.054.041.053.055
LLaDA-1.5
Age314−.003−.003.003.022.027.023.006.003.003
Physical appearance134.119.149.105.152.123.115.136.098.105
SES586.039.039.057.038.057.032.041.043.049
Disability status134.061.015.015.045.046.084−.015.075.106
Religion102.060.030.050.039.051.051.010.059.072
Nationality264−.027−.049−.050−.038−.038−.047−.051−.047−.054
Race ×\times SES954.004−.003.007.023.004.016−.021.002.010
Gender identity486−.042−.065−.013−.058−.058−.044−.068−.037−.046
Race/ethnicity588.057.046.043.058.031.060.055.064.048
Race ×\times gender1,364−.089−.079−.074−.071−.080−.086−.069−.094−.100
Sexual orientation74−.057−.041−.054−.054−.139−.083.014−.028.014
Mean—.011.004.008.014.002.011.004.013.019
SD—.059.061.051.062.071.064.057.057.063
Dream-7B
Age314−.003.007.006.010.006.011−.051−.010.022
Physical appearance134.150.188.218.263.254.161.158.150.133
SES586.018.047.036.038.038.030.027.015.047
Disability status134.062−.030−.015.000.000.040−.009.032−.033
Religion102.064.050.059.059.059.133.106.032.059
Nationality264−.042−.046−.046−.046−.046−.021−.029−.033−.025
Race ×\times SES954.024.024.023.023.023.018.001.034.016
Gender identity486−.064−.054−.054−.054−.054−.028−.081−.051−.093
Race/ethnicity588.043.056.054.054.054.041.077.057.069
Race ×\times gender1,364−.096−.074−.073−.070−.072−.086−.097−.091−.097
Sexual orientation74−.105−.099−.081−.081−.081−.097.000−.029−.091
Mean—.005.006.012.018.017.018.009.015.001
SD—.073.077.081.091.089.075.075.060.072

Table 13.

Full Results

This appendix lists the values plotted in the figures of the paper: the sampling sweeps (Table 14–Table 16) and the fairness–utility trade-off (Table 17).

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