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FirstSwap: Pre-Consensus Trade Approvals for Decentralized Market Design

Abstract

Decentralized exchanges typically give traders no execution guarantee until a block is finalized. In the meantime, external prices move, traders strategically delay submission, and block producers can influence inclusion and ordering. We introduce FirstSwap, a DEX built on a constant-function market maker pricing curve that gives traders an early pre-approval before consensus, guaranteeing inclusion and execution within their submitted price limit, with final ordering determined by limit prices rather than by a block producer. We demonstrate the benefits of trade pre-approvals in an economic model combining auction theory with CEX-DEX arbitrage. When the CEX price changes gradually, FirstSwap rewards earlier traders with better prices, discouraging strategic delay and yielding higher social welfare and gains to AMM liquidity providers than a batch auction. When the CEX price jumps abruptly, FirstSwap yields higher welfare and smaller AMM losses than fair ordering. The central challenge is delivering fast trade pre-approvals without consensus. We introduce a decentralized, scaled admissibility protocol under which each validator reserves only a fraction of the available liquidity at every price. A trader obtains approval in a single round of messages with a quorum of validators. Somewhat surprisingly, despite Byzantine validators who may approve trades arbitrarily, we show that all quorum-certified trades are jointly admissible and execute within their limits. Our protocol extends naturally to a setting where buy and sell orders can be pre-approved against each other before a block is finalized.

Introduction

This paper introduces FirstSwap, a decentralized exchange operated by a network of validators that finalizes blocks of trades epoch by epoch. FirstSwap Second, we propose a fast, consensus-free implementation for a network of validators to collectively operate the pre-approval system. Each pre-approval is obtained through a single direct exchange between the trader and a quorum of validators, with each validator deciding whether to pre-approve a trade request based solely on local information, requiring no coordination among validators. Somewhat surprisingly, the protocol guarantees that at the end of a block epoch, all pre-approvals obtained in this manner can settle within their price limits. Furthermore, Byzantine validators cannot prevent pre-approved trade requests from settling, and if they attempt to hide pre-approved trade requests, not only

Qualitative comparison of exchange mechanisms

Figure 1. Qualitative comparison of exchange mechanisms (Batch = batch auction, FIFO = first-in-first-out, FS = FirstSwap). Both overall welfare and AMM gains from trade follow the same trends, under the conditions of Equation (11) and Lemma 4. Higher positions indicate higher outcomes within each scenario; vertical distances are not to scale. The ranges indicate that the comparison of FS with FIFO (small jump) or Batch (large jump) is ambiguous without further assumptions.

do they fail but their action is punishable. A straightforward extension of our protocol allows for simultaneous buy and sell orders to be handled simultaneously, where validators can pre-approve additional buys when they have seen sell trade requests that could execute against them and conversely. AMM liquidity providers can also deposit and withdraw funds at the end of the block after orders are executed without impacting our analysis.

Overview

The Exchange Design. Assume for now that the protocol is run by a single validator. FirstSwap allocates trades against a pool of fungible assets for sale. The exchange employs a continuous pricing mechanism identical to that of constant-function market makers (CFMMs). The price per unit p(x)p(x) increases as more assets are purchased, where xx is the quantity already bought.

The pre-approval mechanism operates epoch by epoch. During an epoch, trade requests in the form tx=(amt,limit)\mathrm{tx}=(\mathrm{amt},\mathrm{limit}) arrive and are admitted to FirstSwap promptly upon arrival. A trader’s limit price limit\mathrm{limit} constrains the total quantity that may be consumed before and including their trade. For each trade request, the pre-approval system determines whether it can be satisfied based on the trades pre-approved so far. If so, unlike existing blockchain-based platforms, the system returns a pre-approval certificate immediately. Pre-approved trades are then gathered into a finalized block for execution. FirstSwap guarantees that all pre-approved trade requests can be executed within their price limits, and the final ordering of trades within the finalized block is computed deterministically.

A key notion in the pre-approval mechanism is admissibility: A set TT of trades of the form (amt,limit)(\mathrm{amt},\mathrm{limit}) is admissible if for every limit ℓ\ell in TT, the sum total xx of amounts in trades whose limit is ≤ℓ\le\ell satisfies p(x)≤ℓp(x)\le\ell. Note that if a set is admissible, then executing trades in ascending order of limits allows all trade requests to settle within the requested price limits. An incoming trade request tx\mathrm{tx} may be pre-approved if adding the trade request to the set AA of previously pre-approved trades preserves admissibility; that is, if A∪{tx}A\cup\{\mathrm{tx}\} is admissible.

For illustration, consider the special case where all trade requests are for a single unit and the price function is simply p(x)=xp(x)=x, so the price per unit equals the number of units already consumed. The set A={3,1,3,5}A=\{3,1,3,5\} (writing only limits for each trade) is admissible, because for every limit ℓ\ell, the number of trade requests in AA with limit at most ℓ\ell is ≤ℓ\le\ell; indeed, an execution in sorted order 1,3,3,51,3,3,5 satisfies all price limits.

Now consider an incoming trade request tx=4\mathrm{tx}=4. The set A∪{tx}={3,1,3,5,4}A\cup\{\mathrm{tx}\}=\{3,1,3,5,4\} remains admissible, so the new trade request can be pre-approved, and the execution order is 1,3,3,4,51,3,3,4,5. A different incoming trade request may be tx′=2\mathrm{tx}'=2. The set A∪{tx′}={3,1,3,5,2}A\cup\{\mathrm{tx}'\}=\{3,1,3,5,2\} is not admissible: for ℓ=3\ell=3, there are 4 trade requests whose limits are at most 3, hence p({tx∈A∪{2}∣tx≤3})=4>3p(\{\mathrm{tx}\in A\cup\{2\}\mid\mathrm{tx}\le3\})=4>3. Indeed, no sequenced execution of T∪{tx′}T\cup\{\mathrm{tx}'\} may satisfy all price limits. Thus, tx′\mathrm{tx}' should be denied pre-approval.

Economic Incentives and Market Efficiency in FirstSwap. A trade in FirstSwap has a greater chance of executing when it is sent earlier and when it offers a higher limit price, since trades are processed in the order received and more high-limit-price trades can be approved. Traders rationally offer prices strictly below their asset valuations, to ensure a positive gain from an executed trade, but high-valuation traders offer higher prices and also submit trades earlier. FirstSwap uses both trade time and limit price to ensure that assets go to traders who value them the most. The sorting method in FirstSwap lives between the extremes of two other MEV-resistant AMM mechanisms. A first-in-first-out fair ordering protocol as in [11] sets a trade’s execution price purely based on arrival time, while a batch auction as in [8, 9] approves trades only based on limit price and ignores arrival time entirely. FirstSwap, unlike the other two mechanisms, incentivizes traders to bid strictly less than their valuations. This lack of honest bidding in FirstSwap actually increases economic efficiency in a model with the realistic possibility of CEX-DEX arbitrage by reducing the volume of arbitrage trades.

We illustrate the economic value of FirstSwap relative to other market designs in an economic model that combines auction theory with dynamic CEX-DEX arbitrage trading. Our model is the first, to our knowledge, that allows us to compare the social welfare of different AMM trading mechanisms where both the limit price and time of a trade are chosen strategically. This makes our model ideal for examining market design responses to the CEX-DEX arbitrage problem. By rewarding traders for trading fast instead of waiting for a better trading opportunity, FirstSwap yields higher utilitarian welfare and gains to AMM liquidity providers than an end-of-epoch batch auction. This is in contrast to [8], which argues in favor of batch auctions in a setting where there is no motive for traders to wait. While a fair ordering protocol based on [22, 11] provides similar improvements over a batch auction, FirstSwap provides higher welfare and gains to AMM liquidity providers than fair ordering after a large, sudden jump in the CEX price.

Fast, Consensus-free Pre-approvals. Granting pre-approvals one by one requires solving the consensus problem repeatedly among the network of validators. FirstSwap avoids solving consensus for each trade request to speed up the pre-approval step. We develop in § 3 a pre-approval protocol consisting of a single exchange between the trader and a quorum of validators that requires no coordination among validators.

In a nutshell, consensus-free pre-approval works as follows. The trader sends a trade request to the network of validators. Each validator considers only the trade requests it has pre-approved locally and returns a signed response. A trade request that has pre-approvals from a quorum of qq distinct validators is pre-approval-certified. In order to guarantee that all pre-approval-certified trade requests form an admissible set without relying on consensus, each validator pre-approves only a certain fraction of the allowed capacity at each price. For nn validators, ff dishonest validators, and quorum size q=n−fq=n-f, the pre-approval fraction is η:=q−fn−f\eta:= \frac{q-f}{n-f}. For the conventional BFT quorum sizes, n=3f+1n=3f+1, q=2f+1q=2f+1 and η=f+12f+1≈12\eta=\frac{f+1}{2f+1}\approx\frac{1}{2}; choosing larger quorum systems, e.g., q=⌈4n+15⌉q=\left\lceil\frac{4n+1}{5}\right\rceil can yield η≈45\eta\approx\frac{4}{5}. Importantly, modified admissibility is checked locally by each validator without any coordination among validators. Nevertheless, we show that all trade requests which are pre-approved individually by validators in this manner can be settled within their price limits.

At the end of each epoch, validators run a single BFT consensus instance, each contributing a mini-block of its own pre-approved trades. The consensus output is formed from at least n−fn-f mini-blocks and orders them into a final block, guaranteeing inclusion of every trade with a pre-approval certificate.

Fast Pre-Approvals as a Market Design Tool

To analyze the economic properties, we first describe the exchange mechanism, as if run by a single validator, and assume messages are delivered in the order they are sent. Theorem 1 shows that the same economic allocations would also occur in a range of distributed implementations. § 3 presents one Byzantine fault-tolerant protocol under partial synchrony.

A trade is a tuple tx=(amt,limit)\mathrm{tx}=(\mathrm{amt},\mathrm{limit}), where amt∈R+\mathrm{amt}\in\mathbb{R}_{+} is the amount of assets the trader wants to buy, and limit∈R+\mathrm{limit}\in\mathbb{R}_{+} is the maximum price per unit. As in a constant-function market maker (CFMM) [21], we consider a monotonically increasing price function pp such that if xx units of assets have already been bought from the exchange, the price per unit paid for buying the next infinitesimal quantity is p(x)p(x).

The exchange operates in periods of time called epochs. In each epoch, traders send their trades to the exchange. The exchange approves the trade if adding this trade to the set of all trades approved so far keeps the set admissible.

Definition 1 (Admissibility of trades). Let S={txi=(amti,limiti)}i=1mS=\{\mathrm{tx}_i=(\mathrm{amt}_i,\mathrm{limit}_i)\}_{i=1}^{m} be a set of trades. SS is admissible if for all ii, p(∑j:limitj≤limitiamtj)≤limitip\left(\sum_{j:\mathrm{limit}_j\le\mathrm{limit}_i}\mathrm{amt}_j\right)\le\mathrm{limit}_i.

Let S={txi=(amti,limiti)}i=1mS=\{\mathrm{tx}_i=(\mathrm{amt}_i,\mathrm{limit}_i)\}_{i=1}^{m} be the set of approved trades in the epoch. The validator executes each trade txi\mathrm{tx}_i at the price p(∑j:limitj≤limitiamtj)p\left(\sum_{j:\mathrm{limit}_j\le\mathrm{limit}_i}\mathrm{amt}_j\right). This is equivalent to ordering the approved trades by their limit price, then executing them at the price determined by the pricing curve. Admissibility ensures that all trades can be charged prices consistent with the pricing function while satisfying their limit prices. Ordering by limit prices is without loss of generality due to Lemma 1. Thus, while we could choose any such ordering, ordering by limit prices naturally favors trades with higher valuations.

Lemma 1. Let S={txi=(amti,limiti)}i=1mS=\{\mathrm{tx}_i=(\mathrm{amt}_i,\mathrm{limit}_i)\}_{i=1}^{m} be a set of trades. There exists an ordering (txi=(amti,limiti))i=1m(\mathrm{tx}_i=(\mathrm{amt}_i,\mathrm{limit}_i))_{i=1}^{m} on SS such that for all ii, p(∑j≤iamtj)≤limitip\left(\sum_{j\le i}\mathrm{amt}_j\right)\le\mathrm{limit}_i if and only if SS is admissible.

Economic Model

The model has a continuum of infinitesimal traders and time is measured continuously. At time tt, trader ii has value θi,t=pex,t+εi\theta_{i,t}=p_{\mathrm{ex},t}+\varepsilon_i for holding the asset provided by the AMM, where pex,tp_{\mathrm{ex},t} is a publicly observed “CEX price” and εi∼Fε\varepsilon_i \sim F_{\varepsilon} is drawn i.i.d. across traders and is fixed over time. The distribution FεF_{\varepsilon} has unit mass and is normalized to mean 0, so that pex,tp_{\mathrm{ex},t} reflects the valuation of the average trader. We write ε(r)=Fε−1(1−r)\varepsilon(r) = F_{\varepsilon}^{-1}(1-r) for the value of ε\varepsilon with a fraction rr of the population with a higher valuation for r∈(0,1)r \in(0,1). We make the simple choice that only the CEX price evolves over time, since only arbitrage trades are time-sensitive enough to meaningfully vary in value within a single epoch.

We analyze the FirstSwap protocol first when the CEX price evolves gradually as a diffusion,

Diffusion model:pex,t=pex,0+σexWt,Tblk∼Exp⁡(λblk),\text{Diffusion model:}\qquad p_{\mathrm{ex},t} = p_{\mathrm{ex},0} + \sigma_{\mathrm{ex}} W_t,\qquad T_{\mathrm{blk}} \sim\operatorname{Exp}(\lambda_{\mathrm{blk}}),

where WtW_t is Brownian motion and the exponentially distributed random time TblkT_{\mathrm{blk}} at which the epoch ends and transactions execute is independent of WtW_t. This Brownian-price/Poisson-epoch timing follows the approach of [27, 28] to tractably study loss-versus-rebalancing against an AMM. We adapt their approach in a model with rational traders with differing values who can strategically wait to trade. We also examine the case when the CEX price experiences a single large jump Δpex\Delta p_{\mathrm{ex}} and pex,t=pex,0+Δpex, ∀t>0p_{\mathrm{ex},t} = p_{\mathrm{ex},0} + \Delta p_{\mathrm{ex}}, \ \forall t > 0. Economic incentives for traders differ markedly in these settings. With gradual information, traders will strategically wait to observe the evolution of pex,tp_{\mathrm{ex},t} before trading, while they will race each other for good price execution [8] after a jump. Each active trader may buy once. Passive LPs commit ex ante to providing AMM liquidity at a price p(x)p(x), where xx is cumulative inventory sold.

Measures of Economic Value We compare our trading mechanisms using two criteria: social welfare and AMM gains from trade. In the continuum model, social welfare at the end of the epoch, TblkT_{\mathrm{blk}}, is

Social welfare:x0pex,Tblk+∫qi(εi)εi dFε(εi),(1)\text{Social welfare:}\qquad x_0p_{\mathrm{ex},T_{\mathrm{blk}}} + \int q_i(\varepsilon_i)\varepsilon_i \,dF_{\varepsilon}(\varepsilon_i), \tag*{(1)}

where x0x_0 is total asset supply and qi(εi)q_i(\varepsilon_i) is the final quantity allocated to a trader with private value εi\varepsilon_i. For fixed x0x_0, the common-value component x0pex,Tblkx_0p_{\mathrm{ex},T_{\mathrm{blk}}} is identical across allocations. Thus welfare differences come from allocating more of the asset to traders with higher private values. We treat active traders and passive AMM liquidity providers as ex ante drawn from the same population; because passive liquidity must be treated identically by the mechanism, its allocation is uncorrelated with εi\varepsilon_i. Hence, increasing the covariance between active-trader holdings and εi\varepsilon_i increases overall social welfare.

Our second metric is AMM gains relative to passively holding the asset:

AMM gains:(x0−xLP)(pˉ−pex,Tblk),(2)\text{AMM gains:}\qquad(x_0-x_{\mathrm{LP}})(\bar{p}-p_{\mathrm{ex},T_{\mathrm{blk}}}), \tag*{(2)}

where xLPx_{\mathrm{LP}} is the inventory remaining with passive liquidity providers and pˉ\bar{p} is the average execution price received by the AMM across trades executed. Because AMM liquidity is passive, strategic traders can leave the AMM with less inventory precisely when pex,Tblkp_{\mathrm{ex},T_{\mathrm{blk}}} is high. This results in “loss-versus-rebalancing” or LVR, where the passive AMM liquidity experiences losses after large price movements. An ideal protocol therefore induces traders with high private valuations εi\varepsilon_i to buy without inducing a large negative correlation between the volume x0−xLPx_0-x_{\mathrm{LP}} executed and price movements pˉ−pex,Tblk\bar{p}-p_{\mathrm{ex},T_{\mathrm{blk}}}.

The trader’s problem with gradual price evolution A trader chooses both when to submit a trade and the limit price attached to that trade. Let τ\tau be the stopping time at which the trade occurs and let pbid,τp_{\mathrm{bid},\tau} denote the limit price submitted at that time. If a mass xτx_\tau of traders has already been approved to trade, the marginal AMM price for our trader is p(xτ)p(x_\tau). Thus a trader with private value ε\varepsilon has expected utility

sup⁡τ,pbid,τ E[1{τ<Tblk}1{pbid,τ≥p(xτ)}(pex,τ+ε−p(xτ))].(3)\underset{\tau,p_{\mathrm{bid},\tau}}{\sup}\ \mathbb{E}\left[1\{\tau<T_{\mathrm{blk}}\}1\{p_{\mathrm{bid},\tau}\ge p(x_\tau)\}\left(p_{\mathrm{ex},\tau}+\varepsilon-p(x_\tau)\right)\right]. \tag*{(3)}

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