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Optimal Voting: Beyond a Utilitarian View

Abstract

A common measure of the quality of a voting rule is the social welfare of the alternatives it elects. Prior work shows that, when voter utilities are drawn from a neutral distribution, expected utilitarian welfare is maximized by a positional scoring rule. We extend this approach to the power mean family of welfare functions, which includes utilitarian, Nash, and egalitarian welfare as special cases. We show that, across the power mean family, a deterministic positional scoring rule (PSR) is asymptotically optimal for expected social welfare among all social choice functions and we characterize this rule for a broad class of utility distributions. We further show that, among randomized PSRs, plurality uniquely maximizes expected social welfare for all power means. Experimentally, we find that optimal score vectors often yield substantially higher welfare than canonical score vectors. On highly structured utility distributions, optimal score vectors take on novel shapes unlike existing canonical score vectors, highlighting open questions for future analysis.

Introduction

Voting is used to aggregate the preferences of a group of stakeholders over a set of alternatives in order to arrive at a shared group decision [14, 38]. Voting rules frequently operate on a ranking over alternatives provided by each voter, yet voters often have an underlying intensity of preference or utility associated with each alternative. Voters, who may be part of a human society or a digital agent such as a recommender system [1] or AI agent, may not even know their exact utility over alternatives; this might arise from uncertain or changing human preferences, lack of alignment between human preferences and AI agent representatives [16], or even noisiness in a communication environment. As a result, ordinal rankings are relied upon to achieve good outcomes from a voting procedure. The quality of such a procedure might be measured in two ways: First, voting rules may be desirable due to the axiomatic properties which they satisfy. Second, voting rules aim to optimize some target function based on voter preferences.

Under the axiomatic perspective, much work studies voting procedures which provably satisfy some set of desirable principles for all possible preferences [38]. For instance, a system designer might wish to ensure that a single voter does not have unilateral control over election outcomes (non-dictatorship) or that an alternative who is preferred head-to-head against all other alternatives is always selected (Condorcet consistency). The optimization view, which we focus on in this paper, sees the goal of a voting rule as finding some outcome that maximizes a target function. This may be, for example, a straightforward sum of voter utilities — known as utilitarian welfare. A frequent focus of research is on

worst-case analysis; finding the voting rule which maximizes the worst possible outcome that a voting rule might produce [30].

Recently, the optimization view has been shown effective on axiomatic settings using black-box techniques, i.e., machine learning, to find novel rules that rarely violate axioms, rather than provably satisfying axioms [15, 25]. These approaches show the existence of such rules but are not immediately useful in practice. An optimization approach constrained to a bounded class of rules, such as score based rules, has shown that the axiomatic approach can be cleanly combined with optimization to blend these schools of thought [10].

Contribution. We focus on the optimization task of maximizing a broad class of function over voter utilities: the power mean, which includes special cases such as utilitarian (utility sum), Nash (utility product), and egalitarian (min utility) welfare functions. We find that deterministic positional scoring rules (PSRs) asymptotically maximize welfare and explore how the optimal rule changes based on utility distribution and power mean. These rules are particularly desirable as an optimization target as they are well understood axiomatically [33, 37], thus blending both schools of voting. This work generalizes and extends prior results for specific instances of the power mean family [3, 13]. Among our results, we introduce a novel description of the rule exactly optimizing Nash social welfare and strengthen previous results on egalitarian welfare. We also show that the best randomized PSR is always a kk-approval rule and, under a minimal assumption on voter independence, is plurality. These contributions are summarized in Table 1. Experimental analysis supports these results and finds the optimized positional scoring vector for distributions outside of our theoretical analysis, highlighting open questions for future research and suggesting that the well-known Borda rule may prove to maximize social welfare on certain highly structured preference domains.

Welfare FunctionDeterministicRandomized
Power MeanE[ψp(U(k))]\mathbb{E}[\psi_p(U_{(k)})]
Egalitarian (p→−∞p \to-\infty)Veto*
Nash (p=0p=0)nlog⁡E[U(k)1/n]n\log\mathbb{E}[U_{(k)}^{1/n}]kk-Approval†
Utilitarian (p=1p=1)E[U(k)]\mathbb{E}[U_{(k)}] [13]
Maximax (p→∞p\to\infty)Plurality*

Table 1. Average-case welfare maximizing PSRs. Results with no citation are new. We show deterministic rules asymptotically maximize power mean welfare across all social choice functions. *: Apesteguia et al. [3] provide non-asymptotic, non-PSRs exactly maximizing welfare. †: With neutrality on alternatives and independence among voters this is plurality.

Related Work

Much of the past work is focused on a worst-case analysis and many papers have explored the optimization of utilitarian social welfare. We find less work that studies other social welfare functions.

Average Case Analysis Several previous works have studied the rule which maximizes utilitarian social welfare and few that study other functions. Weber [36] assumes voter utilities are distributed independently and uniformly on an interval and show that Borda asymptotically maximizes utilitarian welfare. Bordley [12] and Merrill [26] use computer simulation to expand these results to additional utility distributions and voting rules in the utilitarian setting. Borda was shown to be the optimal score vector for expected utilitarian welfare by Apesteguia et al. [3], when utilities are sampled i.i.d. from a uniform distribution for all voters. Under a slightly different model, Boutilier et al. [13] also show that expected utilitarian welfare is maximized by a scoring rule based on the order statistics of the underlying utility distribution and, on uniform utilities, is the Borda vector for any number of voters. Later work shows a novel positional scoring rule, binomial voting, approximately maximizes utilitarian welfare [21]. Pivato [28] shows Borda is highly likely to elect the alternative maximizing social welfare in a given profile, under varying utility distributions. Experimental analysis also shows that on Euclidean preferences, Borda typically results in much higher utilitarian welfare than other voting rules [22].

Worst Case Analysis Early work from Procaccia and Rosenschein [30] introduced distortion as a measure of the worst-case quality of voting rules and shows that many deterministic PSRs, such as Borda and Veto, have unbounded distortion. Subsequent work shows that despite poor worst-case welfare, all PSRs can be learned with an efficient number of samples in polynomial time, highlighting the possibility of attempting to learn novel PSRs optimized for a metric of interest, such as expected welfare [31]. Boutilier et al. [13] show that a randomized rule based on the harmonic score vector (1,1/2,1/3,…)(1,1/2,1/3,\ldots) is near-optimal for utilitarian distortion.

Optimization of Non-Utilitarian SW In addition to their utilitarian result, Apesteguia et al. [3] also show that egalitarian and maximax welfare are not optimized by a PSR as social welfare cannot be exactly represented as a summation over per-voter terms. Use of the power mean function as a welfare function in voting was first proposed by Cousins [17] who apply a sample-complexity approach to identify possible causes of systemic bias. This is extended to the weighted power mean function by Pardeshi et al. [27] who study the PAC-learnability of welfare functions based on their weights. A similar welfare function has also been used in studying fair allocations [8, 9]. The optimization of arbitrary utility functions has been discussed by Armstrong et al. [4] and applied to a measure of axiomatic satisfaction [15]. Nash-based rules have been studied normatively for allocations [2] and voting [5]. Aziz et al. [5] detail properties of a Nash rule which takes as input voter utilities but do not comment on ordinal rules. Ebadian et al. [18] study Nash welfare and show that a rule exists which can always achieve within a Θ(log⁡m)\Theta(\log m) approximation to the best welfare.

Model

Following a typical model of voting [38], we have a set of alternatives A={a1,a2,…,am}A=\{a_1,a_2,\ldots,a_m\} and a set of voters V={v1,v2,…,vn}V=\{v_1,v_2,\ldots,v_n\}. We assume each voter viv_i draws a utility vector (ui(a))a∈A(u_i(a))_{a\in A} from a distribution DD over R≥0m\mathbb{R}_{\ge0}^m, giving a utility function ui:A→R≥0u_i:A\to\mathbb{R}_{\ge0} where ui(a)u_i(a) denotes the utility to viv_i if aa is selected as a winner. The set of utility functions indexed by voter is called a utility profile u\mathbf{u}.

Each utility function induces a preference order σ\sigma over the alternatives AA, where σ(a)\sigma(a) refers to the rank of aa in σ\sigma and the collection of all preference orders is a preference profile. For a voter viv_i, σi\sigma_i denotes a strict ordering over AA such that σi(a)<σi(a′)⟺ui(a)>ui(a′)\sigma_i(a)<\sigma_i(a')\Longleftrightarrow u_i(a)>u_i(a'). That is, viv_i prefers aa over a′a' if, and only if, viv_i receives more utility from the election of aa than from the election of a′a'. Let σ\boldsymbol{\sigma} refer to the preference profile containing all orderings induced by a utility profile u\mathbf{u}. The sets of all possible utility and preference profiles are denoted, respectively, U\mathbb{U} and P\mathbb{P}. We use the term “profile” to refer to both types of profile as contextually appropriate.

We introduce three utility assumptions used throughout.

(A1) Voters draw their utility vectors independently from the same neutral distribution DD on (0,∞)m(0,\infty)^m. DD is unchanged when the alternatives are relabelled and the joint distribution of utility profiles is anonymous and neutral.

(A1†) Each voter’s utilities for the mm alternatives are i.i.d. draws from a distribution with CDF FF, shared between all voters.

(A2) No voter assigns equal utility to two alternatives and each ranking σi\sigma_i is strict.

Under A1 and A2 our model matches the utility assumptions used by Boutilier et al. [13]. If we use A1† and A2 we instead get the model of Apesteguia et al. [3]. A1 allows utilities over alternatives to be correlated within a single voter’s preference order while under A1† does not. Unless stated otherwise we assume A1 and A2.

Positional Scoring Rules

A social choice function (SCF) f:P→2A∖∅f:\mathbb{P}\to2^A\setminus\varnothing maps a preference profile to a non-empty set of winning alternatives. An SCF is called resolute if it always returns a single winning alternative [38].

We focus on a special class of SCFs known as positional scoring rules (PSR) which are parameterized by a score vector s=(s1,…,sm)\mathbf{s}=(s_1,\ldots,s_m). PSRs assign a score to each alternative based on the number of times it is ranked in each position: Ss(a,σ)=∑σi∈σsσi(a)S_s(a,\sigma)=\sum_{\sigma_i\in\sigma}s_{\sigma_i(a)}. We assume scores are always non-negative. We consider both deterministic and randomized PSRs. In the deterministic setting winning alternatives are exactly those who receive the maximal score, fs(σ)={a∈A∣Ss(a,σ)=max⁡a′∈ASs(a′,σ)}f_s(\sigma)=\{a\in A\mid S_s(a,\sigma)=\max_{a'\in A}S_s(a',\sigma)\}. In the randomized setting (denoted fsRf_s^R), a single winner is chosen with probability directly proportional to their score; Pr⁡[fsR(σ)=a]=Ss(a,σ)/(ns)\Pr[f_s^R(\sigma)=a]=S_s(a,\sigma)/(ns), where sˉ=∑j=1msj\bar{s}=\sum_{j=1}^m s_j. Observe that, in the deterministic setting, scoring vectors can be scaled additively and multiplicatively without changing the outcome of the corresponding PSR, and can be scaled multiplicatively in the randomized setting. Any rule we refer to as “unique” is unique only up to these transformations.

We say that a PSR fsf_s is feasible if si≥si+1 ∀ 1≤i<ms_i\ge s_{i+1}\ \forall\ 1\le i<m and s1>sms_1>s_m. For simplicity we typically denote feasible deterministic PSRs as s=(1,…,0)s=(1,\ldots,0). In the literature there are a number of classic PSRs that are considered canonical such as Plurality: (1,0,…,0)(1,0,\ldots,0); Veto: (1,1,…,0)(1,1,\ldots,0); Borda: (m−1,m−2,…,0)(m-1,m-2,\ldots,0); Harmonic [13]: sh=(1,1/2,1/3,…,1/m)s^h=(1,1/2,1/3,\ldots,1/m), and Binomial [21]: sjbi=∑k=jm(kj)s_j^{bi}=\sum_{k=j}^m\binom{k}{j}. All of these PSRs, visualized in Figure 1, target normative ideas of a correct score for each rank. e.g., Plurality models a winner-take-all mentality, while Borda linearly scales reward for candidates with their rank. We consider only resolute rules here and can transform any non-resolute social choice function into a resolute SCF with a tie-breaking method. Two tie-breaking methods are common: lexicographic, and random [6, 19]. Lexicographic tie-breaking requires an ordering over alternatives and would violate rule neutrality so when ties occur we select a winner uniformly at random.

Canonical score vectors

Figure 1. The canonical score vectors discussed in Section 3.

Social Welfare

A social welfare function (SWF) is a function W:Rn×A→RW : \mathbb{R}^{n} \times A \to\mathbb{R} which uses the utility each voter would receive from the election of alternative aa to compute a single numeric value representing the quality of aa as a social decision. Different SWFs aim to capture different aspects of quality and may be more or less appropriate in varying settings [32]. We write W({ui(a) ∀ i∈V},a)W(\{u_i(a) \ \forall\ i \in V\}, a) and assume that WW is computable in polynomial time. Due to the range of fairness concerns we focus on a general family of social welfare functions, the power mean, which generalizes existing welfare functions into a single parameterized model [27], defined (slightly abusing notation) as,

WPM(u,a,p)={(1n∑i=1nui(a)p)1pif p≠0,(∏i=1nui(a))1nif p=0.W^{\mathrm{PM}}(\mathbf{u},a,p)= \begin{cases} \left(\frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n}u_i(a)^p\right)^{\frac{1}{p}} & \text{if } p\ne0,\\ \left(\prod_{i=1}^{n}u_i(a)\right)^{\frac{1}{n}} & \text{if } p=0. \end{cases}

Based on the parameter p∈[−∞,∞]p \in[-\infty,\infty], WPMW^{\mathrm{PM}} can reduce to a number of special cases from the literature [3, 13]. We treat p=±∞p=\pm\infty as the min and max functions which are approached in the limit.

  1. (p=1)(p=1): 1n∑i∈Vui(a)\frac{1}{n}\sum_{i\in V}u_i(a) measures the mean utility across all voters, i.e., utilitarian social welfare. This can be maximized when a single voter receives a large amount of utility, or when all voters receive increased utility.

  2. (p=0)(p=0): ∏i∈Vui(a)1n\prod_{i\in V}u_i(a)^{\frac{1}{n}} measures the geometric mean of all voter’s utility and is maximized when voter utilities are both high and equal. Corresponds directly with Nash welfare.

  3. (p→−∞)(p\to-\infty): min⁡i∈V(ui(a))\min_{i\in V}(u_i(a)) is based on only a single voter’s utility, and is maximized when the voter receiving the lowest amount of utility receives as high utility as possible. This is referred to as Egalitarian or Rawlsian social welfare.

  4. (p→∞)(p\to\infty): max⁡i∈Vui(a)\max_{i\in V}u_i(a) is also based on a single voter’s utility but is maximized when the voter receiving the most utility receives high utility. This function, referred to as Maximax, largely represents unfairness and is included primarily as a special case of the power mean function.

Social Welfare Optimization

We now discuss our optimization framework. We focus on analyzing average-case social welfare

and study voting rules which maximize this asymptotically. We first introduce assumptions used in our theoretical results.

Assumptions. Let UU denote a voter’s utility for a fixed alternative (by A1 voter and alternative identity do not matter here). Let U(1)>U(2)>⋯>U(m)U_{(1)}>U_{(2)}>\cdots>U_{(m)} denote voter’s utilities in descending order (strict by A2), so that U(k)U_{(k)} is the utility of that voter that voter ranks in position kk. We use this non-standard notation for order statistics so that U(i)U_{(i)} corresponds with the indexing of sis_i in a score vector. For fixed p∈Rp\in\mathbb{R}, ψp:(0,∞)→R\psi_p:(0,\infty)\to\mathbb{R} is the Box-Cox transform,

ψp(t)={tp−1pif p≠0,log⁡tif p=0.(1)\psi_p(t)= \begin{cases} \frac{t^p-1}{p} & \text{if }p\ne0,\\ \log t & \text{if }p=0. \end{cases} \tag*{(1)}

which Lemma 1 shows is continuous, strictly increasing, and satisfies ψp(WPM(u,a,p))=1n∑iψp(ui(a))\psi_p(W^{\mathrm{PM}}(\mathbf{u},a,p))=\frac{1}{n}\sum_i\psi_p(u_i(a)). Many of our proofs rely on the assumption below which holds for every pp whenever the support of DD lies in [ε,M][\varepsilon,M] for some 0<ε<M<∞0<\varepsilon<M<\infty.

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