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WorksPhysics and Astronomy

Implementation of a 1D Gaussian-modulated CV-QKD under finite-size parameter estimation

Abstract

Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) is a promising technology for quantum-secure communications, offering high secret-key rates and straightforward integration with coherent optical communication systems. Conventional Gaussian-modulated CV-QKD encodes information in both optical-field quadratures, increasing requirements for state preparation, modulation, and calibration, while potentially introducing additional preparation imperfections. Unidimensional (1D) Gaussian modulation offers a simpler alternative by encoding information in only one quadrature, while the conjugate quadrature constrains the protocol's security. However, an integrated experimental 1D implementation combining independent-laser coherent reception with practical reconciliation, finite-size parameter estimation, and privacy amplification remains challenging. Here, we experimentally demonstrate a 1D Gaussian-modulated CV-QKD system over 12~km of standard single-mode fiber using a local local oscillator (LLO) architecture with independent lasers and an integrated offline classical post-processing chain. The implementation includes coherent detection, digital signal processing, information reconciliation, parameter estimation, physicality-constrained security analysis, and privacy amplification. The 1D system achieves a privacy-amplified rate of 1.4211.421~Mbit/s under the asymptotic security treatment and 0.3640.364~Mbit/s under the finite-size scenario. These results establish an experimental baseline for the performance–complexity trade-off associated with unidimensional Gaussian modulation and provide an experimental basis for developing lower-complexity CV-QKD transmitters.

Introduction

Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two distant parties, Alice and Bob, to generate secret keys whose security rests on the laws of quantum physics rather than assumptions about computational complexity [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Among the different approaches to QKD, continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) has attracted considerable attention because it can leverage coherent optical communication technologies, offering high secret-key rates over metropolitan distances and facilitating integration with existing optical communication infrastructure [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. In conventional Gaussian-modulated (GM) CV-QKD, hereafter referred to as two-dimensional (2D) Gaussian modulation, Alice independently modulates both optical-field quadratures. Bob then measures the received states using homodyne or heterodyne detection [11, 12, 13].

The unidimensional (1D) GM CV-QKD protocol proposed by Usenko and Grosshans [14] provides an alternative in which information is encoded in only one optical-field quadrature. The conjugate quadrature remains nominally unmodulated and does not directly contribute to the raw key. Still, its measured statistics constrain the physically admissible Alice–Bob covariance matrices and therefore the information potentially available to Eve. By reducing the dimensionality of state preparation, the 1D protocol offers the prospect of lower transmitter complexity, at the cost of a more constrained security analysis and increased sensitivity to finite-size statistical uncertainty and experimental imperfections.

Several experimental implementations of 1D and related single-quadrature CV-QKD protocols have been reported [15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. However, to the best of our knowledge, no experimental 1D GM CV-QKD implementation has combined independent-laser coherent reception, practical information reconciliation, finite-size parameter estimation (PE), physicality-constrained security analysis, privacy amplification, and an integrated classical post-processing chain. Here, we implement such system in an optical fiber of 12 km with independent lasers and RF heterodyne detection and compare the measured key rates, under asymptotic and finite-size frameworks.

Methodology

In conventional GM CV-QKD, both optical-field quadratures are modulated, allowing direct estimation of the corresponding Alice–Bob correlations. In contrast, the 1D protocol modulates only one quadrature, here denoted by XX, while the conjugate quadrature PP remains unmodulated [14]. Consequently, the Alice–Bob correlation CPC_P associated with the unmodulated quadrature cannot be directly estimated from Alice’s modulation data and must instead be constrained by the physicality condition of the covariance matrix.

For each physically admissible covariance matrix, we evaluate Eve’s information, i.e., the Holevo information (χBE\chi_{BE}), from its symplectic spectrum under the Gaussian collective-attack model [7, 14]. In the 1D protocol only the XX-quadrature outcomes xBx_B form the raw key, whereas the PP-quadrature outcomes are used solely to estimate Bob’s unmodulated-quadrature variance and are never disclosed. Eve’s information is therefore bounded by χ(xB:E)\chi(x_B : E), for which Bob’s key measurement is the XX marginal of the RF-heterodyne detection, i.e., a homodyne measurement with efficiency ηB/2\eta_B/2 and trusted electronic noise [13, 15] (see Appendix). If both heterodyne outcomes entered the key, or if pBp_B were disclosed, Eve’s information would have to be bounded by the larger quantity χ(xB,pB:E)\chi(x_B, p_B : E) [20]. In the asymptotic regime, we maximize χBE\chi_{BE} over the physically allowed values of CPC_P. In the finite-size regime, this optimization additionally incorporates conservative confidence intervals for the experimentally estimated channel transmittance, excess noise, and unmodulated-quadrature variance, accounting for statistical uncertainties in the security analysis, and the secret key fraction is further reduced by privacy amplification correction Δ(n)\Delta(n) [21]. The Appendix provides a detailed formulation of the 1D covariance matrix, the physicality constraints, the Holevo bound, and the finite-size procedure.

Figure 1 schematically illustrates the 1D CV-QKD architecture using an amplitude modulator (AM). Alice and Bob use independent narrow-linewidth (∼1\sim1 kHz) CW lasers centered at 1550 nm in an LLO architecture. Although the 1D protocol requires modulating only one optical-field quadrature, the experimental implementation used an IQ modulator driven by a two-channel 16-bit AWG operating at 3.125 GSa/s. The IQ modulator was operated in single-sideband (SSB) mode to compensate for the optical-frequency separation between the independent lasers, shifting the signal toward a lower intermediate frequency within the detector bandwidth. Therefore, the IQ modulator was used because of experimental constraints rather than an intrinsic requirement of the 1D protocol. An automatic bias controller stabilizes the modulator, while a variable optical attenuator (VOA) sets the transmitted modulation level. A Faraday isolator reduces back-reflections and susceptibility to Trojan-horse attacks [22]. The Gaussian modulation sequence is generated pseudorandomly on a standard PC and is used here as a proof-of-concept source; a practical transmitter can replace it with a QRNG without changing the optical architecture.

Experimental setup of LLO CV-QKD

Figure 1. Experimental setup of LLO CV-QKD. Alice’s station consists of a continuous-wave (CW) laser operating at 1550 nm and an in-phase and quadrature modulator (IQM) with an automatic bias controller (ABC) driven by an arbitrary waveform generator (AWG) with 16-bit resolution and a sampling rate of 3.125 GSa/s. A variable optical attenuator (VOA) is placed after the amplitude modulator (AM) modulator (at the exit of Alice’s station) to adjust the optical power and enforce the few-photon regime. A 12 km single-mode fiber (SMF) constitutes the quantum channel. At Bob’s station, a polarization controller (PC) allows one to align the polarization of the incoming signal to the LO signal generated from an independent CW laser; both overlap at a balanced beam splitter. The differential signal was detected and digitized using a balanced homodyne detector (BHD), followed by a 12-bit oscilloscope with a matched sampling rate of 3.125 GSa/s. EC: electrical connection.

The quantum channel consists of 12 km of SMF with an average attenuation of 0.185 dB/km, corresponding to a total loss of 2.22 dB. Bob performs RF-heterodyne detection by interfering the received signal with an independent LLO whose optical-frequency offset from Alice is approximately 850 MHz [23, 24]. Because this frequency separation approaches the nominal 1 GHz bandwidth of the balanced detector, the SSB configuration lets the quantum signal be detected at a lower intermediate frequency, avoiding operation near the detector’s bandwidth limit. The interference signal is detected using a 1 GHz balanced detector and digitized at 3.125 GSa/s for offline processing.

Before the QKD acquisitions, we independently calibrated the modulation level in a back-to-back configuration with the 12 km fiber removed. These measurements provided the mean photon number nAn_A and modulation variance VMV_M, which were then fixed for channel parameter estimation. We obtained Bob’s shot-noise and electronic-noise references from dedicated vacuum-plus-electronic and electronic-only acquisitions, respectively. We obtained the shot-noise contribution from the difference between the corresponding variances. The detection efficiency was ηB=0.80\eta_B = 0.80. Throughout the security analysis, we treat the calibrated detector efficiency and electronic noise according to a trusted-receiver model. Both noise references are expressed in units of the shot noise of one heterodyne output, i.e. per quadrature, and the input-reference excess noise is obtained from Bob’s estimate as ξin=2ξB/ηBT\xi_{\mathrm{in}} = 2\xi_B/\eta_B T (see Appendix).

Figure 2 summarizes the DSP. Alice maps the Gaussian symbols, upsamples and RRC pulse-shapes the sequence, and adds two pilot tones and a CAZAC synchronization sequence. Bob performs CAZAC-based timing synchronization, coarse carrier-frequency recovery, subframe division, fine frequency and phase recovery, matched filtering, and symbol-rate downsampling. During phase recovery, a fraction of the quantum symbols is sacrificed to estimate and compensate for phase fluctuations.

DSP chain used in the experiment

Figure 2. DSP chain used in the experiment, including transmitter-side Gaussian symbol generation and pulse shaping, pilot-tone and CAZAC insertion, and receiver-side synchronization, carrier recovery, matched filtering, and downsampling. CAZAC: constant amplitude zero autocorrelation; CFR: carrier-frequency recovery; RRC: root-raised cosine.

Information reconciliation uses reverse eight-dimensional MDR combined with MET-LDPC codes [25]. LDPC decoding is performed over blocks containing approximately 10610^6 reconciled symbols. We evaluate the reconciliation efficiency β\beta from the actual error-correction leakage of successfully decoded blocks, while failed blocks contribute to the FER.

We perform information reconciliation before parameter estimation. We retain successfully decoded and verified blocks for privacy amplification. At the same time, all recovered quantum symbols, including those from failed decoding blocks, failed decoding blocks, contribute to channel characterization following the post-reconciliation strategy of Jain et al. [26]. The information disclosed for parameter estimation is treated as public and does not contribute to the final privacy-amplified key.

We construct two-sided confidence intervals for TXT_X and VPBV_P^B, together with an upper confidence bound for ξB,X\xi_{B,X}. Each confidence bound is assigned a failure probability not exceeding δPE=10−10\delta_{\mathrm{PE}} = 10^{-10}, resulting in an overall parameter-estimation failure probability bounded by 3δPE3\delta_{\mathrm{PE}} through the union bound [16, 21]. We use the resulting confidence region in the physicality-constrained optimization described in the Appendix. The finite-size regime additionally includes the privacy amplification correction

Δ(n)=7log⁡2(2/ϵˉ)n,(1)\Delta(n) = 7\sqrt{\frac{\log_2(2/\bar{\epsilon})}{n}}, \tag*{(1)}

in the form of Ref. [27], where n=(1−FER)NPEn = (1 - \mathrm{FER})N_{\mathrm{PE}} is the number of symbols of the successfully reconciled blocks that enter privacy amplification and ϵˉ=10−10\bar{\epsilon} = 10^{-10} is the smoothing parameter. In this work, the treatment is restricted to finite-size parameter-estimation privacy amplification corrections under the Gaussian collective-attack model and does not constitute a complete composable finite-key security proof.

Table I summarizes the main experimental parameters and secret-key performance. The dataset consisted of 82 independently processed frames with approximately 10610^6 transmitted states per frame, of which 78,562,560 recovered symbols entered parameter estimation and reconciliation.

Finally, successfully reconciled and verified blocks are compressed by universal Toeplitz hashing [8, 11]. The experimental secret key rate (SKR) is

SKRexp=ℓtdata,(2)\mathrm{SKR}_{\mathrm{exp}} = \frac{\ell}{t_{\mathrm{data}}}, \tag*{(2)}

where ℓ\ell is the data output length and tdatat_{\mathrm{data}} is the total quantum-signal transmission time associated with the NexcludedN_{\mathrm{excluded}} – Number of symbols excluded during DSP; NPEN_{\mathrm{PE}} – Number of symbols used for parameter estimation, including those from unsuccessful reconciliation blocks. NtotalN_{\mathrm{total}} – Transmitted symbols in the block (10610^{6} per physical frame, including pilot tonesm the CAZAC sequence and DSP exclusions), which define tdatat_{\mathrm{data}} in Eq. (2).

processed acquisitions, including acquisitions that do not yield reconciled key material.

Results

The calibrated mean photon number was nA1D=0.320n_{\mathrm{A}}^{\mathrm{1D}} = 0.320 photons per symbol. Under the adopted normalization, VM=4nAV_{\mathrm{M}} = 4n_{\mathrm{A}}. The mean input-referred excess noises over the first 80 valid frames were 31.444 ±\pm 4.412 mSNU, with no systematic drift observed over the acquisition sequence.

For the analytical performance curves, the finite-size secret-key rate is written as

SKRtheory=Rs(1−FER)NPENtotal(βIAB−χBE)−Δ(n),(3)\mathrm{SKR}_{\mathrm{theory}} = R_{\mathrm{s}}(1-\mathrm{FER})\frac{N_{\mathrm{PE}}}{N_{\mathrm{total}}}\left(\beta I_{\mathrm{AB}}-\chi_{\mathrm{BE}}\right)-\Delta(n), \tag*{(3)}

where NPE/NtotalN_{\mathrm{PE}}/N_{\mathrm{total}} accounts for the symbols of each physical frame that do not enter reconciliation, so that the projection is comparable with Eq. (2).

Figure 3 shows the resulting SKR as a function of transmission distance. The markers indicate the experimental post-processing results at 12 km, whereas the curves are security-model projections using the experimentally recovered operating parameters. The aggregate experimental β\beta and FER are held fixed as distance varies, so the curves should not be interpreted as experimentally validated operating points away from 12 km. The asymptotic regime reaches 48.3 km, whereas the finite-size case falls to zero at 14.9 km: the correction Δ(n)\Delta(n) of the present block is independent of the channel and removes 0.516 Mbit/s at every distance, while the attenuation effect decrease the SKR quickly with the channel loss.

Figure 3. Secret-key rate versus fiber distance for the 1D implementation. The curves are security-model projections using the experimentally recovered operating parameters and fixed aggregate reconciliation performance, with the block size and confidence levels of the data set (NPE=7.9×107N_{\mathrm{PE}} = 7.9 \times10^{7}, δPE=10−10\delta_{\mathrm{PE}} = 10^{-10}, n=5.3×107n = 5.3 \times10^{7}, ϵˉ=10−10\bar{\epsilon} = 10^{-10}). Markers indicate the experimental results at 12 km: circle (square) for the asymptotic (finite-size) case.

Figure 4 illustrates the physicality constraint imposed on the unknown correlation CPC_{\mathrm{P}}. The Appendix provides the analytical expressions defining the admissible region and its boundary. In the finite-size treatment, the statistical uncertainty of the experimentally estimated parameters further enlarges the admissible region over which Eve’s Holevo information is maximized. The worst case is not found at the lower transmittance bound: because both the excess-noise bound and the physicality region depend on TXT_{\mathrm{X}}, Eve’s information is maximized at the upper bound TX=0.5756T_{\mathrm{X}} = 0.5756, with ξX=36.04\xi_{\mathrm{X}} = 36.04, VPB=1.0155V_{\mathrm{P}}^{\mathrm{B}} = 1.0155, and CP=−0.5694C_{\mathrm{P}} = -0.5694, where the admissible correlation is largest.

Figure 4. Physicality-constrained region for the unknown Alice–Bob correlation CPC_{\mathrm{P}} associated with the unmodulated quadrature, where VPBV_{\mathrm{P}}^{\mathrm{B}} denotes Bob’s measured variance of the unmodulated PP quadrature. The curve is the physicality boundary of Eq. (S5) at finite-size wort case (TX,ξX)=(0.5756,36.04 mSNU)(T_{\mathrm{X}},\xi_{\mathrm{X}})=(0.5756,36.04\,\mathrm{mSNU}). The green shaded area is the physical region, the grey band is the confidence interval of VPBV_{\mathrm{P}}^{\mathrm{B}}, and the cross is the worst-case point (VPB,CP)=(1.0155,−0.5694)(V_{\mathrm{P}}^{\mathrm{B}},C_{\mathrm{P}})=(1.0155,-0.5694). The experimentally recovered VPBV_{\mathrm{P}}^{\mathrm{B}} restricts the set of admissible covariance matrices, and Eve’s Holevo information is maximized over this physical region.

At 12 km, the implementation achieved 1.421 Mbit/s asymptotically and 0.364 Mbit/s under finite-size regime. The theoretical rates at the same operating point were 1.469 and 0.412 Mbit/s for the asymptotic and finite-size treatments, respectively. The experimental rates lies 48 kbit/s below both projections. In relative terms, the difference is 3% of the asymptotic rate and 13% of the finite-size rate, while the finite-size approach reduces the experimental rate by 74.4%.

Discussion

To further investigate the performance potential of the 1D protocol, we further investigate how one can improve its capacity. Figure 5 shows the asymptotic and finite-size SKR at 12 km as a function of the mean photon number per transmitted symbol, nAn_{\mathrm{A}}, ate the experimental excess-noise level and block size. Unless otherwise stated, the numerical projections retain the aggregate experimental reconciliation efficiency and FER.

Figure 5. Asymptotic (solid) and finite-size (dashed) SKR at 12 km as a function of the mean photon number per transmitted symbol nAn_{\mathrm{A}}. Markers indicate the experimental operating point under the two treatments.

Increasing nAn_{\mathrm{A}} improves the SKR until it reaches an optimum operating region: the simulation peaks near nA≈0.75n_{\mathrm{A}}\approx0.75 (VM≈2.0V_{\mathrm{M}}\approx2.0 SNU) asymptotically, at 2.00 Mbit/s, and near nA≈0.70n_{\mathrm{A}}\approx0.70 (VM≈2.8V_{\mathrm{M}}\approx2.8 SNU) with the finite-size picture, at 0.84 Mbit/s, both above the experimental nA=0.32n_{\mathrm{A}}=0.32. Beyond the optimum, the finite-size rate falls faster than the asymptotic one and vanished at nA≈1.8n_{\mathrm{A}}\approx1.8: the penalty of the confidence region grows with the modulation variance, from 5.9×10−35.9\times10^{-3} bit/symbol at nA=0.32n_{\mathrm{A}}=0.32 to 8.1×10−38.1\times10^{-3} bit/symbol at nA=1.8n_{\mathrm{A}}=1.8, because the admissible interval of CBC_{\mathrm{B}} widens with VMV_{\mathrm{M}}, while Δ(n)\Delta(n) is fixed. Experimentally, however, nAn_{\mathrm{A}} and ξin\xi_{\mathrm{in}} are not necessarily independent; larger modulation energies may increase sensitivity to modulator nonlinearities, calibration errors, or residual DSP impairments. The curves should therefore be interpreted as fixed-noise optimization studies rather than as evidence that increasing nAn_{\mathrm{A}} alone improves experimental performance.

Figure 6 shows the dependence of the rate at 12 km

Asymptotic and finite-size secret key rates at 12 km as a function of the block size

Figure 6. Asymptotic (solid) and finite-size (dashed) SKR at 12 km as a function of the block size NPEN_{\mathrm{PE}} for the experimental parameters values of Table I. Markers indicate the experimental block of 7.9×1077.9\times10^{7} symbols under the two regimes.

on the block size for the experimental parameters values in Table 1 and for the theoretical simulation under the same assumptions. The asymptotic rate does not depend on the block size. The finite-size key becomes positive only above NPE≈4.0×107N_{\mathrm{PE}}\approx4.0\times10^{7} symbols; at the experimental block of 7.9×1077.9\times10^{7} symbols the projection gives 0.412 Mbit/s, and the blocks of 10810^{8} and 10910^{9} symbols would raise it to 0.53 and 1.17 Mbit/s, i.e., 36% and 80% of the asymptotic rate.

ParameterExperimental value
Physical frames82
ηB\eta_{\mathrm{B}}0.8
⟨nA⟩\langle n_{\mathrm{A}}\rangle (mean photons number/symbol)0.320
VMV_{\mathrm{M}} (SNU)1.280
TT0.5740
ξB\xi_{\mathrm{B}} (mSNU)7.222
ξin\xi_{\mathrm{in}} (mSNU)31.456
velv_{\mathrm{el}} (mSNU)34.619
VPBV_{\mathrm{P}}^{\mathrm{B}} (SNU)1.01283
β\beta0.9316
FER (%)32.62
NtotalN_{\mathrm{total}}90,20,000
NPEN_{\mathrm{PE}}78,562,560
NexcludedN_{\mathrm{excluded}}3,437,440
δPE\delta_{\mathrm{PE}}10−1010^{-10}
ϵˉ\bar{\epsilon}10−1010^{-10}
Δ(n)\Delta(n) (bit/symbol)5.63×10−35.63 \times10^{-3}
SKR asymptotic (Mbit/s)1.421
SKR finite-size (Mbit/s)0.364

Table 1. Experimental parameters and performance of the 1D GM CV-QKD implementation.

Table 2 places the present implementation in the context of representative experimental demonstrations of unidimensional CV-QKD. Because the reported experiments employ different channel types, symbol rates, local-oscillator configurations, detection architectures, reconciliation procedures, and security assumptions, the reported SKRs should not be interpreted as a direct performance ranking. Previous experiments established single-quadrature CV-QKD in fiber and free-space links using transmitted-LO, polarization, and more recently LLO-based coherent-detection architectures [15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. The present work extends this progression by combining independent-laser RF-heterodyne reception at 156.25 MBaud with practical MDR/LDPC reconciliation, verification, finite-size parameter estimation, and privacy amplification. At 12 km, the system yields a privacy-amplified rate of 1.421 Mbit/s under the asymptotic treatment and 0.364 Mbit/s under finite-size treatment.

WorkChannelLO / DetectionRateSecurity / ProcessingReported SKR
[16]50 kmTLO; homodyne500 kHzAsym.; β=95.2%\beta= 95.2\%; RR, PA0.70 kb/s
[17]460 mTLO; homodyne10 kHzAsym.; β=95%\beta= 95\% assumed0.152 kb/s
[18]Free spaceTLO; homodyne2.5 MHzAsym.; β=95%\beta= 95\% assumed0.487 Mbit/s
[19]17.5 kmLLO; heterodyne50 MBaudAsym.; β=97%\beta= 97\% assumed6.12 kbit/s
This work12 kmLLO; heterodyne156.25 MBaudFS; β=93.16%\beta= 93.16\%; RR, PA1.421 Mbit/s (asym.), 0.364 Mbit/s (FS)

Table 2. Comparison with representative experimental demonstrations of unidimensional Gaussian-modulated CV-QKD.

Although the present experiment deliberately uses an IQ-modulator-based platform and therefore does not directly demonstrate a reduction in transmitter hardware, single-quadrature state preparation offers a path toward simpler symbol generation, electrical driving, optical modulation, calibration, and stabilization. Future transmitters may therefore exploit architectures based on a single amplitude modulator together with DSP algorithms specifically designed for the 1D signal structure.

Conclusion

We have experimentally demonstrated a unidimensional Gaussian-modulated CV-QKD system over 12 km of optical fiber, combining independent-laser RF-heterodyne reception with an integrated offline classical post-processing chain. Operating at 156.25 MBaud, the system incorporates practical information reconciliation, parameter estimation, physicality-constrained security analysis, and privacy amplification, yielding a privacy-amplified key rate of 1.421 Mbit/s under the asymptotic treatment and 0.364 Mbit/s when finite-size parameter-estimation uncertainties and privacy-amplification corrections are included.

A central result of this work is the quantitative assessment of finite-size effects in an experimental 1D CV-QKD implementation. The approximately 74% reduction in key rate highlights the substantial impact of statistical uncertainty on a protocol in which the unmodulated quadrature constrains Eve’s information through the covariance matrix’s physicality. Despite this penalty, we obtain a positive privacy-amplified key rate using experimentally measured channel parameters and actual reconciliation performance, rather than assumed reconciliation efficiencies. The security analysis is restricted to Gaussian collective attacks and does not constitute a complete composable finite-key security proof.

These results establish an experimental benchmark for integrating and evaluating the performance of unidimensional CV-QKD with independent local oscillators. Although the present implementation does not directly reduce transmitter hardware complexity, it provides a practical foundation for investigating the trade-off between simplified state preparation and the statistical constraints imposed by unidimensional modulation. Future work will focus on reducing excess noise, improving finite-size performance, and implementing transmitter architectures that directly exploit the reduced modulation dimensionality.

Funding

This work has been fully funded by the project Demonstração offline do sistema CV-QKD, supported by QuIN - Quantum Industrial Innovation EMBRAPII CIMATEC Competence Center in Quantum Technologies, with financial resources from the PPI IoT/Manufatura 4.0 of the MCTI grant number 053/2023, signed with EMBRAPII.

Acknowledgments

We thank John A. Mora Rodriguez and B. Miranda for valuable discussions.

Disclosures

The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest related to this article.

Data availability

The data and source code underlying the results presented in this work may be made available upon formal request, subject to review and approval by the authors.

Asym.: asymptotic; FS: finite-size; TLO: transmitted local oscillator; LLO: local local oscillator; RR: reverse reconciliation; PA: privacy amplification.

Unidimensional Gaussian-modulated CV-QKD security model

Usenko and Grosshans [14] introduced the unidimensional Gaussian-modulated CV-QKD protocol and its corresponding security analysis. As described in the manuscript, Alice modulates only one optical-field quadrature, denoted by XX, while the conjugate quadrature PP remains unmodulated. However, the formulation is equivalent under interchange of the two quadratures, i.e., modulating on PP while leaving XX unmodulated. In the entanglement-based representation, the Alice–Bob covariance matrix can be written as

γAB=(1+VM0CX001+VM0CPCX0VXB00CP0VPB),(4)\gamma_{AB} = \begin{pmatrix} \sqrt{1+V_M} & 0 & C_X & 0 \\ 0 & \sqrt{1+V_M} & 0 & C_P \\ C_X & 0 & V_X^B & 0 \\ 0 & C_P & 0 & V_P^B \end{pmatrix}, \tag*{(4)}

where VMV_M is Alice’s modulation variance, VXBV_X^B and VPBV_P^B are Bob’s quadrature variances, and CXC_X and CPC_P denote the Alice–Bob correlations in the corresponding quadratures. For the modulated quadrature,

CX=TXVM(1+VM)1/4,(5)C_X = \sqrt{T_X V_M}(1+V_M)^{1/4}, \tag*{(5)}

and

VXB=1+TX(VM+ξX),(6)V_X^B = 1+T_X(V_M+\xi_X), \tag*{(6)}

where TXT_X is the channel transmittance and ξX\xi_X is the input-referred excess noise associated with the XX quadrature.

Since Alice does not modulate the PP quadrature, the corresponding Alice–Bob correlation CPC_P cannot be directly estimated from Alice’s modulation data. Instead, Bob’s measured variance VPBV_P^B, together with the covariance matrix’s physicality condition, constrains the admissible values of CPC_P. A physical covariance matrix must satisfy

γAB+iΩ≥0,(7)\gamma_{AB}+i\Omega\ge0, \tag*{(7)}

where Ω\Omega is the symplectic form. Equivalently, all symplectic eigenvalues of γAB\gamma_{AB} must be greater than or equal to unity. For the unidimensional protocol, the physicality constraint can be expressed as

(CP−C0)2≤VM1+VM(1−TXV0B)(VPB−V0B),(8)(C_P-C_0)^2 \le\frac{V_M}{\sqrt{1+V_M}}\left(1-T_XV_0^B\right)\left(V_P^B-V_0^B\right), \tag*{(8)}

with

V0B=11+TXξX,(9)V_0^B = \frac{1}{1+T_X\xi_X}, \tag*{(9)}

and

C0=−V0BTXVM(1+VM)1/4.(10)C_0=-V_0^B\frac{\sqrt{T_XV_M}}{(1+V_M)^{1/4}}. \tag*{(10)}

The physicality diagram presented in the main manuscript illustrates the admissible region in the (CP,VPB)(C_P,V_P^B) plane defined by (A5). We obtain its boundary by replacing the inequality with an equality, with V0BV_0^B and C0C_0 determined by Eqs. (9) and (10), respectively. Accordingly, the figure in the main manuscript graphically represents the physicality constraint derived in this section, rather than an additional independent condition.

The experimentally determined quantities therefore define an admissible interval of CPC_P. Eve’s Holevo information is conservatively evaluated by maximizing over all physically allowed correlations,

χBEworst=max⁡CP∈PχBE,(11)\chi_{BE}^{\mathrm{worst}}=\max_{C_P\in\mathcal{P}}\chi_{BE}, \tag*{(11)}

where P\mathcal{P} denotes the physical region defined by Eq. (8). In the finite-size analysis (Sec. C), the confidence intervals for TXT_X, ξB,X\xi_{B,X}, and VPBV_P^B are also considered. The optimization then extends over the union of physical regions consistent with these statistically allowed parameter values, as conceptually indicated in the finite-size treatment of the physicality diagram in the main manuscript.

Holevo bound with a private P quadrature

Bob’s RF-heterodyne receiver recovers both quadratures of every symbol. Only X-quadrature outcomes xBx_B form the raw key: they are the input of reverse reconciliation and privacy amplification. The P-quadrature outcomes pBp_B are used solely to estimate VPBV_P^B in (A1) and are never disclosed, so they do not add to the information accessible to Eve about the key. Under Gaussian collective attacks, Eve’s information on the key is therefore bounded by the Holevo quantity

χBE=χ(xB:E)=S(ρE)−S(ρE∣xB),(12)\chi_{BE}=\chi(x_B:E)=S(\rho_E)-S(\rho_{E|x_B}), \tag*{(12)}

where S(ρ)S(\rho) denotes the von Neumann entropy [11]. This criterion differs from the heterodyne-based unidimensional protocol of Ref. [20], in which both heterodyne outcomes are processed by Bob and Eve’s information is bounded by the larger quantity χ(xB,pB:E)≥χ(xB:E)\chi(x_B,p_B:E)\ge\chi(x_B:E).

We also consider the trusted-noise scenario, where the detection efficiency ηB\eta_B and the electronic noise νel\nu_{\mathrm{el}} are treated as trusted [5, 27] (see Figure 7 for a schematic representation). Unlike Ref. [20], Bob only disclose the xBx_B outcome. Each heterodyne detection carries half of the received signal, so the X marginal of the heterodyne measurement is equivalent to a homodyne measurement of efficiency ηB/2\eta_B/2 with electronic noise νel\nu_{\mathrm{el}}, where νel\nu_{\mathrm{el}} is referred to the shot noise of one output (per quadrature). We model it by a beam-splitter of transmittance ηB/2\eta_B/2 that mixes mode BB with one mode F0F_0 of a two-mode squeezed vacuum F0GF_0G of quadrature variance

Figure 7. Trusted-noise model for the unidimensional coherent-state CV-QKD protocol in the entanglement-based representation [14]. Alice and Bob share a two-mode squeezed vacuum state (TMSVS) of variance VV, with VM=V2−1V_{M}=V^{2}-1. Alice performs a homodyne detection of xAx_{A} on her mode AA, which conditionally prepares coherent states displaced along the xx quadrature only; the other mode is squeezed by SS (squeezing parameter −log⁡V-\log\sqrt{V}) and sent to Bob through the quantum channel as mode A′A^{\prime}. Eve interacts with this mode, leading to an output mode B′B^{\prime}, and keeps her results in a quantum memory (QM). At Bob’s station, B′B^{\prime} interacts with one mode, F0F_{0}, of another TMSVS by mixing them in a beam splitter of transmittance η\eta, which models the detection efficiency and the electronic noise; the mode FF is discarded and the mode GG remains with Bob. The resulting mode BB is measured by RF-heterodyne detection. Only the xBx_{B} outcomes form the raw key; the pBp_{B} outcomes are used solely to estimate VPBV_{P}^{B} and are never disclosed.

ν=1+νel/(1−ηB/2)\nu=1+\nu_{\mathrm{el}}/(1-\eta_{B}/2), followed by a homodyne measurement of xx on the transmitted mode, whose variance is (ηB/2)VXB+1−ηB/2+νel(\eta_{B}/2)V_{X}^{B}+1-\eta_{B}/2+\nu_{\mathrm{el}}. The modes F0GF_{0}G purify the system, so that S(ρE)=S(ρAB)S(\rho_{E})=S(\rho_{AB}) and S(ρE∣xB)=S(ρAF0G∣xB)S(\rho_{E|x_{B}})=S(\rho_{AF_{0}G|x_{B}}). The von Neumann entropy follow from symplectic eigenvalues, S(ρ)=∑ig[(νi−1)/2]S(\rho)=\sum_{i}g[(\nu_{i}-1)/2] with g(x)=(x+1)log⁡2(x+1)−xlog⁡2xg(x)=(x+1)\log_{2}(x+1)-x\log_{2}x. The symplectic eigenvalues ν1,2\nu_{1,2} and ν3,4,5\nu_{3,4,5} are computed from γAB\gamma_{AB} and γAF0G∣xB\gamma_{AF_{0}G|x_{B}}, respectively, as [27]

ν1,22=A±A2−4B2,ν3,42=C±C2−4D2,ν5=1(13)\nu_{1,2}^{2}=\frac{A\pm\sqrt{A^{2}-4B}}{2},\qquad\nu_{3,4}^{2}=\frac{C\pm\sqrt{C^{2}-4D}}{2},\qquad\nu_{5}=1 \tag*{(13)}

where

A=det⁡γA+det⁡γB+2det⁡C=1+VM+VPB+VPBTX(VM+ξX)+2CPTXVM(1+VM)1/4,(14)\begin{aligned} A&=\det\gamma_{A}+\det\gamma_{B}+2\det C\\ &=1+V_{M}+V_{P}^{B}\\ &\quad+V_{P}^{B}T_{X}(V_{M}+\xi_{X})\\ &\quad+2C_{P}\sqrt{T_{X}V_{M}}(1+V_{M})^{1/4}, \tag*{(14)} \end{aligned}
B=det⁡γAB=(1+TXξX)[(1+VM)VPB−CP21+VM],(15)\begin{aligned} B&=\det\gamma_{AB}\\ &=(1+T_{X}\xi_{X})\left[(1+V_{M})V_{P}^{B}\right.\\ &\quad\left.-C_{P}^{2}\sqrt{1+V_{M}}\right], \tag*{(15)} \end{aligned}

and

C=A(1+νel)+[(1+TXξX)(VM+2)+VMTX−A]ηB/2dX(16)C=\frac{A(1+\nu_{\mathrm{el}})+[(1+T_{X}\xi_{X})(V_{M}+2)+V_{M}T_{X}-A]\eta_{B}/2}{d_{X}} \tag*{(16)}
D=B(1+νel−ηB/2)+(1+VM)(1+TXξX)ηB/2dX(17)D=\frac{B(1+\nu_{\mathrm{el}}-\eta_{B}/2)+(1+V_{M})(1+T_{X}\xi_{X})\eta_{B}/2}{d_{X}} \tag*{(17)}

with dX=1+νel+(ηB/2)TX(VM+ξX)d_{X}=1+\nu_{\mathrm{el}}+(\eta_{B}/2)T_{X}(V_{M}+\xi_{X}) the variance of Bob’s XX outcome. The Holevo bound is then

χBE=g[ν1−12]+g[ν2−12]−g[ν3−12]−g[ν4−12].(18)\chi_{BE}=g\left[\frac{\nu_{1}-1}{2}\right]+g\left[\frac{\nu_{2}-1}{2}\right]-g\left[\frac{\nu_{3}-1}{2}\right]-g\left[\frac{\nu_{4}-1}{2}\right]. \tag*{(18)}

Finally, the secret key fraction is given by

K=βIAB−χBE,(19)K=\beta I_{AB}-\chi_{BE}, \tag*{(19)}

where the mutual information can be written as IAB=12log⁡2(1+SNR)I_{AB}=\frac{1}{2}\log_{2}(1+\mathrm{SNR}), with

SNR=ηBTXVM/21+νel+ηBTXξX/2.(20)\mathrm{SNR}=\frac{\eta_{B}T_{X}V_{M}/2}{1+\nu_{\mathrm{el}}+\eta_{B}T_{X}\xi_{X}/2}. \tag*{(20)}

Parameter estimation and finite-size statistical bounds

Parameter estimation uses the full set of recovered quantum symbols submitted to information reconciliation, including symbols from LDPC blocks that do not decode successfully [26]. Consequently, decoding failures contribute to the frame-error rate but do not reduce the number of samples used for parameter estimation. For the modulated quadrature, the linear channel model is written as [21]

xB=tXxA+zX,(21)x_B = t_X x_A + z_X, \tag*{(21)}

where xAx_A denotes Alice’s Gaussian modulation values, xBx_B denotes Bob’s recovered measurements, tXt_X is the effective channel gain, and zXz_X represents the total additive noise.

The channel gain, channel transmittance, and residual-noise variance are estimated as

t^X=Cov⁡(xA,xB)Var⁡(xA),T^X=2t^X2ηB,σ^X2=Var⁡(xB−t^XxA),(22)\begin{aligned} \hat{t}_X &= \frac{\operatorname{Cov}(x_A,x_B)}{\operatorname{Var}(x_A)},\\ \hat{T}_X &= \frac{2\hat{t}_X^2}{\eta_B},\\ \hat{\sigma}_X^2 &= \operatorname{Var}\left(x_B-\hat{t}_Xx_A\right), \tag*{(22)} \end{aligned}

where the factor of two accounts for the RF heterodyne detection convention and ηB=0.80\eta_B=0.80 is Bob’s detection efficiency.

We estimate the Bob-referred excess noise after subtracting the calibrated shot-noise and electronic-noise contributions. For RF heterodyne detection, the Bob-referred excess noise is related to the input-referred excess noise used in the covariance-matrix model by

ξB,X=ηBTX2ξX.(23)\xi_{B,X}=\frac{\eta_B T_X}{2}\xi_X. \tag*{(23)}

Each heterodyne output receives half of the received signal and half of the excess noise, with the shot noise of one output normalized to unity [24]. The main manuscript reports the input-referred quantity ξX\xi_X.

For the final experimental data set, the parameter-estimation block contains NPE=78,562,560N_{\mathrm{PE}}=78{,}562{,}560 recovered quantum symbols. The corresponding point estimates for the modulated quadrature are

TX≃0.5740,ξX=31.456 mSNU,ξB,X≃7.222 mSNU,VPB=1.01283 SNU.(24)\begin{aligned} T_X &\simeq0.5740,\\ \xi_X &= 31.456\ \mathrm{mSNU},\\ \xi_{B,X} &\simeq7.222\ \mathrm{mSNU},\\ V_P^B &= 1.01283\ \mathrm{SNU}. \tag*{(24)} \end{aligned}

The Bob-referred and input-referred noise values are consistent with Eq. (23). The unmodulated-quadrature variance VPBV_P^B is estimated separately from Bob’s recovered PP-quadrature measurements and enters the physicality-constrained optimization described in Sec. A.

In the finite-size regime, the statistical analysis constructs confidence intervals for the channel transmittance, excess noise, and unmodulated-quadrature variance. RF heterodyne detection provides both XX and PP measurements for each recovered symbol. Accordingly, the numbers of observations used in the two quadrature branches are m=l=NPE=78,562,560m=l=N_{\mathrm{PE}}=78{,}562{,}560; these are measurements of the same symbol set, not disjoint subsets.

Following the adopted finite-size parameter-estimation treatment, we set

δPE1D=10−10,zPE=2erfc⁡−1(δPE).(25)\delta_{\mathrm{PE}}^{\mathrm{1D}}=10^{-10},\qquad z_{\mathrm{PE}}=\sqrt{2}\operatorname{erfc}^{-1}\left(\delta_{\mathrm{PE}}\right). \tag*{(25)}

The resulting finite-size confidence region can be written as

TXmin⁡≤TX≤TXmax⁡,ξB,X≤ξB,Xmax⁡,VP,min⁡B≤VPB≤VP,max⁡B.(26)\begin{aligned} T_X^{\min} &\leq T_X \leq T_X^{\max},\\ \xi_{B,X} &\leq\xi_{B,X}^{\max},\\ V_{P,\min}^B &\leq V_P^B \leq V_{P,\max}^B. \tag*{(26)} \end{aligned}

With t^X=ηBT^X/2\hat{t}_X=\sqrt{\eta_B\hat{T}_X/2}, σ^X2=1+vel+ηBT^Xξ^X/2\hat{\sigma}_X^2=1+v_{\mathrm{el}}+\eta_B\hat{T}_X\hat{\xi}_X/2 and v^P=1+vel+(ηB/2)(VPB−1)\hat{v}_P=1+v_{\mathrm{el}}+(\eta_B/2)(V_P^B-1) the Bob-referred PP variance, the bounds are

TXmin⁡,max⁡=2ηB(t^X∓zPEσ^X2mVM)2,T_X^{\min,\max}=\frac{2}{\eta_B}\left(\hat{t}_X\mp z_{\mathrm{PE}}\sqrt{\frac{\hat{\sigma}_X^2}{mV_M}}\right)^2,
ξB,Xmax⁡=σ^X2(1+zPE2m)−1−vel,\xi_{B,X}^{\max}=\hat{\sigma}_X^2\left(1+z_{\mathrm{PE}}\sqrt{\frac{2}{m}}\right)-1-v_{\mathrm{el}},
VP,min⁡/max⁡B=1+2ηB[v^P(1∓zPE2m)−1−vel].(27)V_{P,\min/\max}^B=1+\frac{2}{\eta_B}\left[\hat{v}_P\left(1\mp z_{\mathrm{PE}}\sqrt{\frac{2}{m}}\right)-1-v_{\mathrm{el}}\right]. \tag*{(27)}

which give TX∈[0.5724,0.5756]T_X\in[0.5724,0.5756], ξB,Xmax⁡=8.297 mSNU\xi_{B,X}^{\max}=8.297\ \mathrm{mSNU} and VPB∈[1.01015,1.01552]V_P^B\in[1.01015,1.01552] for the final data set.

For a given transmittance within the confidence interval, the corresponding input-referred excess-noise upper bound is

ξXmax⁡(TX)=2ξB,Xmax⁡ηBTX.(28)\xi_X^{\max}(T_X)=\frac{2\xi_{B,X}^{\max}}{\eta_B T_X}. \tag*{(28)}

Rather than assuming, at first glance, that either boundary of the transmittance confidence interval is the worst-case channel, Eve’s Holevo information is maximized over the finite-size confidence region, together with the physically admissible Alice–Bob correlation CPC_P in the unmodulated quadrature. Defining CTC_T, CξC_\xi, and CPC_P as the statistically admissible sets for TXT_X, ξB,X\xi_{B,X}, and VPBV_P^B, respectively, with CξC_\xi restricted by the upper confidence bound ξB,Xmax⁡\xi_{B,X}^{\max}, we obtain

χBEfinite=max⁡TX∈CT, ξB,X∈Cξ,VPB∈CP,CP∈CP(TX,ξX,VPB)χBE,(29)\chi_{BE}^{\mathrm{finite}}= \max_{\substack{T_X\in C_T,\ \xi_{B,X}\in C_\xi,\\ V_P^B\in C_P,\\ C_P\in C_P(T_X,\xi_X,V_P^B)}} \chi_{BE}, \tag*{(29)}

where ξX=2ξB,X/(ηBTX)\xi_X=2\xi_{B,X}/(\eta_BT_X) at each candidate operating point and PP is the physical region defined by (A5). The worst-case values of TXT_X, ξX\xi_X, and VPBV_P^B, as well as χBEfinite\chi_{BE}^{\mathrm{finite}}, are determined jointly by this constrained optimization.

For the final data set, the maximum is attained at the upper transmittance bound, TX=0.5756T_X = 0.5756, with ξX=36.04\xi_X = 36.04 SNU from (C8), VPB=1,01552V_P^B = 1,01552 and CP=−0.5694C_P = -0.5694: both the noise bound of (C8) and the region defined by (A5) depend on TXT_X, and the larger admissible correlation at the upper bound overweighs the smaller channel loss.

We obtain the reconciliation contribution from the measured information-reconciliation performance, rather than reevaluating it at an extremal point of the parameter-estimation confidence region. For the final data set, the reconciliation efficiency is β≃0.9316\beta\simeq0.9316, and we use βIAB\beta I_{AB} consistently in the asymptotic and finite-size key-rate calculations. In the finite-size parameter-estimation comparison considered here, the statistical confidence region modifies the worst-case Holevo information.

Finally, we present the effects of the privacy-amplification correction. The finite length of the key also reduces the number of secret bits that can be extracted by privacy amplification. Following Leverrier et al. [21], the finite-size secret fraction is

Kfinite=βIAB−χBEfinite−Δ(n),K_{\mathrm{finite}} = \beta I_{AB} - \chi_{BE}^{\mathrm{finite}} - \Delta(n),
Δ(n)=(2dim⁡HX+3)log⁡2(2/εˉ)n=7log⁡2(2/εˉ)n,(30)\Delta(n) = (2\dim\mathcal{H}_X + 3)\sqrt{\frac{\log_2(2/\bar{\varepsilon})}{n}} = 7\sqrt{\frac{\log_2(2/\bar{\varepsilon})}{n}}, \tag*{(30)}

where dim⁡HX=2\dim\mathcal{H}_X = 2 is the dimension of the binary key variable after reconciliation, εˉ\bar{\varepsilon} is the smoothing parameter of the min-entropy and nn is the number of symbols that enter privacy amplification. This is the form adopted in the finite-size analysis of the unidimensional protocol of Ref. [27]; the additional term (2/n)log⁡2(1/εPA)(2/n)\log_2(1/\varepsilon_{\mathrm{PA}}) of Ref. [21], which accounts for the failure probability εPA\varepsilon_{\mathrm{PA}} of privacy amplification, equals 1.3×10−61.3 \times10^{-6} bit/symbol for the present block with εPA=10−10\varepsilon_{\mathrm{PA}} = 10^{-10} and is omitted. Since only the successfully reconciled blocks are hashed, n=(1−FER)Nkey=52,933,920n = (1-\mathrm{FER})N_{\mathrm{key}} = 52,933,920 symbols (442 accepted LDPC blocks of 119,760 symbols), and with εˉ=10−10\bar{\varepsilon} = 10^{-10},

Δ(n)=5.628×10−3 bit/symbol.(31)\Delta(n) = 5.628 \times10^{-3}\ \text{bit/symbol}. \tag*{(31)}

The finite-size secret fraction of the final data set is therefore Kfinite=0.16699−0.15687−0.00563=0.00449K_{\mathrm{finite}} = 0.16699 - 0.15687 - 0.00563 = 0.00449 bit/symbol, against K=0.01602K = 0.01602 bit/symbol in the asymptotic treatment: the parameter-estimation confidence region and Δ(n)\Delta(n) remove 5.90×10−35.90 \times10^{-3} and 5.63×10−35.63 \times10^{-3} bit/symbol, respectively. The treatment bounds collective Gaussian attacks with the parameter-estimation and privacy-amplification corrections of Ref. [21]; it is not a composable finite-key proof.

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