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Expanding and Evaluating the Applicability of Safe Pareto Improvements

Abstract

Even when players can make credible joint commitments in games, disagreement about the game's default outcome (e.g., about equilibrium selection) can prevent them from agreeing on any particular payoff profile. We study safe Pareto improvements (SPIs): commitments that sidestep this obstacle by inducing a new game that is isomorphic to the original (after iteratively removing strictly dominated actions) but entrywise Pareto better. We do so by constructing token games: cheap-talk games rendered meaningful by commitments to take payoff-relevant actions (in prior work, strategies in the original game) as a function of the token outcome. Since these token games preserve the original game's strategic structure, players should expect them to be played isomorphically and hence agree that they Pareto improve on the original. In this work, we study token game SPIs under three additional commitment abilities: (1) burning utility, (2) transferring utility between players, and (3) transferring utility with an outside party conditional on the token outcome (e.g., via insurance-like contracts). We characterize when SPIs exist in each case and give efficient algorithms for optimizing over them. Finally, we propose evaluating SPI frameworks by how often they enable SPIs in randomly generated games. In such experiments, our methods substantially outperform prior work.

Paper details

vlnc:W_8p4tf843
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