WorksComputer Science
Low Probability of Target Detection in Wireless Sensing by Harnessing Reconfigurable-antenna based Reflectors
Abstract
In this paper, we introduce low probability of target detection (LPTD) as a new security objective for wireless sensing systems, where the existence of a target is concealed from passive wardens. Unlike conventional communication security and covert communication, LPTD aims to protect the sensed target itself from malicious detection, rather than concealing transmitted signals or communication activities. Specifically, we propose a reconfigurable-antenna-based reflector-assisted target covertness scheme, where passive reflectors deployed around the target are harnessed as artificial scattering sources to confuse the warden. By adjusting their reflection coefficients, these reflectors reshape the local scattering environment and mask the target-induced echo. We then analyze the warden's optimal detection strategy and derive the false-alarm and missed-detection probabilities, followed by a closed-form expression for its minimum total detection error probability. Numerical results validate the analysis and show that sufficient cooperation among reflectors can increase the warden's minimum total detection error probability to approximately 0.94–0.96, making target detection close to random guessing.
Introduction
Wireless sensing technologies have provided ubiquitous target awareness, but it also exposes physical targets to unauthorized observation. By reusing radio signals for detection, localization, and environmental perception, wireless sensing has become a promising technology for next-generation networks [1]. However, the target’s privacy in wireless sensing is inherently exposed to the open propagation environment. Since sensing waveforms and target echoes naturally radiate through space, a passive warden can detect the target’s presence and further estimate its sensitive sensing information by directly sensing the target’s physical response [2], leading to serious privacy leakage. Therefore, preventing the illegal detection of targets becomes a fundamental security challenge in wireless sensing systems.
Existing wireless security techniques cannot directly address this target detection threat, as they primarily focus on securing transmitted data or hiding communication behavior. Specifically, traditional physical-layer security methods, such as secure beamforming [3], artificial noise [4], and cooperative jamming [5], usually require the passive warden’s CSI or location for directional jamming design, and suffer from scalability issues due to extra power consumption or dedicated deployment [6]. Meanwhile, covert communications, also known as low probability of detection (LPD) communications, have been widely studied to hide confidential message transmission from a warden through techniques such as low-power transmission [7], spread-spectrum signaling [8], artificial noise, and backscatter-assisted reflection control [9]. However, since the warden detects the target by capturing its natural signal reflections, the target remains exposed regardless of how covert the transmitted message is. In summary, existing solutions are still insufficient to hinder the detection of targets in wireless sensing networks.
To protect the target from being detected, this work proposes a novel scheme that leverages reconfigurable-antenna-based reflectors to achieve low probability of target detection (LPTD) against wardens. Specifically, the proposed scheme harnesses widely distributed reflectors around the target, which can be implemented in various forms, such as ambient backscatter devices [10], reconfigurable surfaces [11], and reconfigurable corner reflectors [12], to act as artificial scattering sources to confuse the warden. By appropriately configuring their reflection coefficients or electromagnetic responses, these reflectors reshape the local scattering environment [13, 14], thereby reducing the statistical distinguishability between the target-induced scattering response and the surrounding reflected signals in the warden’s observation. In this way, the target echo is concealed within the uncertainty introduced by the surrounding reflections, making it difficult for a passive warden to reliably determine the presence of the true target. Specifically, the main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
We propose an reflector-assisted target covertness scheme to achieve LPTD against a target-detection warden. Specifically, we model a system where a multi-antenna monostatic radar transceiver illuminates the target area, while a passive warden (Willie) attempts to detect the target’s presence. The reflectors act as controllable reflectors to obfuscate Willie’s observation. Within this model, we extend the concept of LPD and formally define LPTD based on Willie’s minimum total detection error probability, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the first work in IoT sensing environments.
We formulate the target detection problem from the warden’s perspective and derive a closed-form expression for the minimum total detection error probability. By modeling a binary hypothesis-testing problem of target detection, we characterize Willie’s optimal target detection strategy, derive the false-alarm and missed-detection probabilities, and obtain a closed-form detection error boundary.
We verify the effectiveness of the proposed scheme through both theoretical derivation and simulation. The results demonstrate the effect of key system parameters on the LPTD performance, including the number of reflectors, transmit SNR, and scattering coherence. It is evident that sufficient reflector cooperation can increase the warden’s minimum total detection error probability to about 0.94–0.96, rendering Willie’s target detection nearly random guessing.
Notations: Boldface lower-case letters denote vectors. The operators and represent the transpose and the Hermitian transpose, respectively. denotes the absolute value of a complex scalar. , , and represent the statistical expectation, probability, and conditional probability operators, respectively. indicates that the random variable follows a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) distribution with mean and variance .
Problem Formulation
System Model
As shown in Figure 1, we consider a wireless sensing system consisting of a legitimate base station (BS), one target, a target-detection warden named Willie, and reflectors deployed around the target. The BS transmits sensing waveforms to illuminate the target area, while Willie passively observes the wireless environment to determine whether the target is present. The reflectors are low-power passive devices that manipulate incident radio-frequency (RF) signals through controllable load impedances [15].
Figure 1. The system model, where a malicious target detection warden is confused by the signals from reflectors in sensing the existence of a true target.
The BS is equipped with transmit antennas, while Willie and each reflector have a single antenna [16]. The reflector set is denoted by . A sensing frame contains symbols [17], where is sufficiently large such that noise fluctuations and signal-noise cross terms vanish. The BS transmit signal at the -th symbol is
where is the beamforming vector satisfying , and is the normalized sensing symbol with .
All channels follow a block-fading model, remaining constant within each sensing frame and varying independently across frames. Let denote the BS-to-node channel for , where , , and denote the target, Willie, and the -th reflector, respectively. Let denote the scalar channel between nodes and . Specifically, and , where and are independent small-scale fading components. The large-scale path loss is modeled as , where is the reference path loss at distance , and is the path-loss exponent.
Reflection Signal of Reflectors
The harnessed reconfigurable-antenna-based reflectors are deployed around the target to manipulate and reflect the incident RF signal. These reflectors can be implemented by ambient backscatter devices, RIS elements, or reconfigurable corner reflectors. Unlike active jammers, they do not generate new RF signals on their own. Instead, they reshape the surrounding scattering environment by controlling their electromagnetic reflection responses [18].
For a reconfigurable antenna, the reflected signal can be controlled by adjusting the load impedance connected to the antenna. Specifically, the antenna reflection coefficient is given by
where denotes the configurable load impedance of the -th reflector at the -th sensing symbol, denotes its antenna impedance. By switching or continuously tuning , the reflector can accordingly control the amplitude and phase of the reflected signal. Such impedance-based control provides a unified physical interpretation for different passive or nearly passive reflecting implementations.
Accordingly, we model the effective complex reflection coefficient of the -th reflector at the -th sensing symbol as
where and denote the effective reflection amplitude and phase shift, respectively, , . The coefficient captures the overall configurable reflection response, including the effect of the antenna-load impedance and other implementation-dependent losses. Typically, the reflection coefficients remain fixed within a sensing frame, i.e., , while they can be reconfigured across different frames to alter the local scattering environment.
The signal reflected by the -th reflector is therefore expressed as
where represents the incident signal received by the -th reflector from the BS.
For notational convenience, the reflection coefficients of all reflectors at the -th sensing symbol are collected into
Willie's Target Detection
Willie’s goal is to infer the target’s existence from the received sensing signals. The general received signal at Willie during the -th sensing symbol is given by
where represents the radar cross section (RCS) [19] of the sensing target, and is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at Willie. Due to the severe multiplicative path loss, the multi-cascaded signal between the target and the reflectors is neglected in the following performance analysis.
To detect the target, Willie formulates a binary hypothesis testing problem [20]. Define as the target is absent, and as the target is present. Therefore, Willie’s received signal under and is expressed as
Design Goals
The objective of our scheme design is to achieve LPTD at Willie, characterizing whether the reflectors can conceal the existence of the target from Willie. The reflectors reshape the scattering environment around the target, making the received energy at Willie under and difficult to distinguish. Specifically, we define LPTD as
Definition 1. Let denote Willie’s optimal minimum total detection error probability after optimizing his detection threshold. The target is said to achieve LPTD (or covert target) if
where specifies the desired LPTD or target covertness level.
Performance Analysis for Willie’s Detection Error Boundary
In this section, we derive Willie’s detection error boundary under the proposed reflector-assisted target covertness model.
Willie'sDetection Strategy
Since the BS sensing waveform is known, Willie can remove the deterministic direct BS-Willie component if the corresponding channel is available [21]. The residual received signal is defined as
Then, Willie performs a binary hypothesis test based on the residual observation vector . According to the Neyman–Pearson lemma [22], for a given false alarm constraint, Willie’s optimal detector is the likelihood ratio test, given by
where is the likelihood ratio threshold.
Since Willie does not know the instantaneous reflector reflection coefficients and cascaded reflector channels [13], he cannot coherently separate the target-induced echo from the reflector-induced reflections. Therefore, we consider a non-coherent radiometer detector, which is widely adopted in detection problems with unknown instantaneous CSI and a single antenna Willie [23]. Under this detector, Willie makes his decision based on the received residual energy, i.e., . Therefore, the corresponding decision for the existence of the target is
where is the energy detection threshold.
Let , where denotes the transmit beamforming vector satisfying . Define the equivalent reflector-induced scattering channel as , and the direct target-induced scattering channel is defined as , Willie’s residual signal can be written as
By the law of large numbers for the transmitted samples, the radiometer output converges to
False Alarm and Missed Detection Probabilities
Although the channels themselves are independent, reflectors may exhibit spatial correlation or deliberate phase alignment, thereby resulting in a non-zero. To account for possible correlation among the reflector-reflected paths, we introduce a partial coherence factor among different reflector-reflected paths. A larger indicates stronger coherent combining among the reflector-reflected signals at Willie. Furthermore, we approximate the aggregate reflector-induced scattering channel as an equivalent circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variable. This approximation is motivated by the central limit theorem [24], since is formed by the superposition of multiple independent reflected paths with random amplitudes and phases. Thus, we have
where denotes the normalized average reflector-induced scattering strength. To capture the partial coherence among different reflector-reflected paths, define , where is the average reflection power of the -th reflector, and is the effective BS antenna gain towards the -th reflector. Then, is denoted as
Similarly, we have
where , and denotes the effective BS antenna gain towards the target.
Since and are independent zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables, their sum also follows a complex Gaussian distribution
Therefore, the random received powers under the two hypotheses follow exponential distributions
where , , and is the BS transmit SNR.
For a given threshold , Willie’s false alarm probability is . Based on (14), we obtain
Since is exponentially distributed with mean , the false alarm probability is
Similarly, Willie’s missed detection probability is . Based on (14), we have
Since is exponentially distributed with mean , the missed detection probability is
Total Detection Error Probability Boundary
The total detection error probability at Willie is
Substituting (22) and (24) into (26), we obtain For , define . Then, the total detection error probability is given by
and for , .
For , define
Then, Willie’s optimal probability of target detection can be obtained by setting the derivative of to zero
Then, we have
where . According (27), Willie’s optimal energy threshold is
Define the scattering separability ratio as
Since , we have . Substituting into (28), Willie’s minimum total detection error probability is given by
Performance Evaluation
In this section, we present numerical experimental results to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed reflector-assisted LPTD scheme and to validate the derived detection error boundary. Based on the typical setting in wireless sensing and reflector [18], [25], [26], the BS, target, and Willie are located at (0, 0) m, (50, 0) m, and (40, 20) m, respectively. Passive reflectors are randomly distributed within a circular region of radius 5 m centered at the target. The BS is equipped with a 16-antenna ULA and steers its beam toward the target. The carrier frequency is set to 28 GHz, the path-loss exponent is , and the reference path loss is given by with m. The noise floor at Willie is dBm, and the BS transmit SNR is set to 10 dB. The average reflector reflection power and partial coherence factor are set to and , respectively. We consider three target reflection strengths, i.e., , corresponding to small, medium, and large targets. The number of reflectors varies from 1 to 29. Each result is averaged over 100 independent reflector layouts and Monte Carlo realizations.
Figure 2 compares the theoretical and simulation results of Willie’s minimum total detection error probability under different numbers of reflectors. The close agreement between the simulation markers and theoretical curves validates the derived analytical results. Moreover,
Figure 2. Impact of reflector Number on LPTD Performance.
increases with because additional reflectors strengthen the surrounding scattering, reducing the statistical difference between and and thereby masking the target echo. Smaller targets achieve higher since their weaker reflection produces a smaller and is therefore easier to conceal. Although larger targets are more detectable, increasing the number of reflectors still significantly improves the LPTD performance, demonstrating the effectiveness of the proposed target covertness scheme.
Figure 3 illustrates the impact of the transmit SNR on Willie’s detection performance. Without reflector assistance, a finite-block condition [27] is considered, where we find that increasing strengthens the target echo observed by Willie. As a result, the received energy distributions under and become increasingly separated, leading to a lower . This indicates that, in conventional wireless sensing without ambient scattering protection, a higher sensing transmit power directly benefits the passive target detector. In contrast, when reflectors are present, both the target-induced echo and the reflector-induced reflected signals are amplified by the BS transmit power. Hence, the dominant factor gradually changes from the absolute received power level to the relative scattering separability between the target echo and the reflector-induced ambient reflections. This explains why the reflector-assisted curves maintain much higher over the considered SNR range.
Figure 3. Impact of Transmit SNR on LPTD Performance.
Figure 4 shows the effect of the coherence factor among reflector-reflected paths. It can be seen that increases as becomes larger, especially when more reflectors are deployed. This is because a larger enhances the coherent combination of the reflector-induced scattering components, thereby increasing the aggregate ambient scattering strength observed by Willie. As a result, the target-induced echo becomes less distinguishable from the surrounding reflected signals. The results indicate that not only the number of reflectors but also their scattering coherence plays an important role in determining the target covertness performance. In practice, this suggests that properly coordinating the reflection phases of reflectors can further enhance LPTD performance without increasing the BS transmit power.
Figure 4. Impact of reflector Scattering Coherence on LPTD Performance.
Overall, the above results consistently demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed reflector-assisted LPTD scheme. By increasing the number of cooperative reflectors and enhancing the aggregate ambient scattering strength, the received energy distributions under the target-absent and target-present hypotheses become highly overlapped at Willie. Under the considered parameter settings, can be increased to about 0.94–0.96, which means that Willie has almost no reliable capability to distinguish whether the true target exists. This result confirms that reflectors can effectively create a scattering-dominated uncertainty region around the target, thereby enabling a LPTD without active jamming or additional dedicated deployment.
Conclusion
This paper proposed a novel reflector-assisted target covertness scheme to achieve an LPTD at the warden of the malicious target detector. Rather than relying on active jamming, we harnessed distributed passive reflectors to reshape the local scattering environment, thereby overwhelming the target’s echo with controllable artificial uncertainty. Furthermore, we derived the closed-form boundary for the warden’s target detection error, revealing the fundamental relationship between the covertness and key system parameters. The results showed that Willie’s minimum total detection error probability can be increased to around 0.94–0.96 with sufficient cooperation among reflectors, making the warden’s target detection close to random guessing.
Acknowledge
This work was supported by the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking under the EU’s Horizon Europe program (Ambient-6G, Grant No. 101192113), Business Finland (FISRE, Dnro 955/31/2026), and the Research Council of Finland (BANLOS, Decision No. 375519).
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