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Efficient cross-domain multi-factor authentication

Abstract

Secure cross-domain authentication is crucial for protecting information exchange across terminals in different security domains. However, existing cross-domain authentication models suffer from inflexibility, high storage and computational consumption. In response to these problems, a cross-domain multi-factor authentication protocol with improved efficiency (CDAuth) is proposed. CDAuth employs a universally applicable multi-factor authentication approach, integrating pseudo-identity, attribute concealment, and biometric hiding. The authentication information sets can be freely added or modified to accommodate various access scenarios. This boosts privacy, flexibility, and applicability compared to traditional methods. Furthermore, multi-edge servers as Certification Authorities (CAs) store only the union of terminal attributes and a verification token per user in their subdomains, instead of each user's attribute and biometric sets as in traditional schemes, significantly reducing storage consumption. Additionally, replacing the bilinear pairing operations with the native group operations, while maintaining security, significantly reduces computational consumption. Our analysis shows that CDAuth can resist common security attacks and is more efficient than the previous schemes.

Introduction

The rapid growth of digitization and networking is connecting more devices and driving the expansion of smart cities, homes, and manufacturing [1, 2]. This increased connectivity enhances information exchange and societal progress but also raises significant threats to security and privacy [3, 4]. Effective authentication of the numerous devices is crucial for protecting privacy and ensuring network security. Emerging technologies like AI, big data, and 5G facilitate cross-regional and cross-departmental data sharing [5, 6]. For example, in medical alliance systems, secure connections allow authorized users to access medical resources from other institutions. Terminals must first authenticate within their hospital before accessing external information, facilitating cross-domain cooperation and improving the efficiency of medical services [7]. However, if different encryption settings or PKI systems are used without proper identification and verification, access may fail. Therefore, cross-domain authentication is a critical issue.

Most cross-domain authentication systems [8, 9, 10] rely on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [11], where certificate authorities (CAs) manage digital certificates. However, certificate management is costly, and revocation is challenging.

Y. Li and Z. Wang are with Key Laboratory of Smart Manufacturing in Energy Chemical Process, Ministry of Education, East China University of Science and Technology, China. (e-mail: [email protected])

Z. Cao is with College of Electronics and Information Engineering, Tongji University, Shanghai 201804, China, and Shanghai Research Institute for Intelligent Autonomous Systems, Tongji University, Shanghai 201210, China. (e-mail: [email protected])

Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC) [12, 13] simplifies this by using identity (ID) for authentication, removing the need for certificates. Yet, single-ID authentication suffers from weaker security and privacy risks [14], and IBC schemes often lack scalability. Attribute-based authentication [15, 16] provides better flexibility and scalability but remains vulnerable to theft and tampering. Biometric authentication, being portable and unique, mitigates these issues, but current schemes [17, 18] mainly emphasize accuracy and efficiency while neglecting the privacy of biometric data. Multi-factor authentication [19, 20] improves security by combining ID and biometric, typically on smart cards, but introduces the burden of managing smart cards, the high system overhead and the authentication granularity remains coarse and inflexible. Although [21, 22] improve anonymity and privacy, challenges persist, including device vulnerabilities, dependence on universal factors, limited flexibility, and high computational and storage costs.

The large-scale connection of terminals requires extensive terminal user authentication. Relying on a single authority for distributing attributes, biometrics, and ID-based authentication, as well as managing keys, places a heavy burden on that authority. If compromised, the entire system collapses. To address this, multi-authority authentication is introduced [23, 24], multiple authorities collaborate for intra-domain and cross-domain authentication. Some cross-domain authentication schemes introduce blockchain technology to enable multi-authority authentication [25, 26], using single or multiple chains along with smart contracts and consensus mechanisms for decentralized authentication. In the approaches [23, 27], edge/fog computing is integrated with blockchain to improve response times and reduce single-point failures. However, blockchain generation demands substantial time and effort, while blockchain read/write operations during authentication consume significant performance resources.

Alternatively, some schemes deploy a central server in each domain for local authentication, with inter-server collaboration enabling cross-domain access [24, 28]. This distributed approach improves authentication efficiency and speed without the high energy consumption of traditional blockchain methods [7, 23]. However, it lacks the immutability and traceability advantages of blockchain, and the legitimacy and security of the central servers are not fully addressed. Additionally, while single ID authentication in these schemes improves efficiency, it remains vulnerable to network attacks.

In this paper, we propose an efficient multi-authority cross-domain multi-factor authentication scheme called CDAuth. It uses an edge-cloud framework, where the cloud acts as the CA managing and authenticating edge servers, while edge servers near users handle local authentication and management. CDAuth improves on previous research by addressing its limitations and strengthening cross-domain authentication and information security. The main contributions are as follows.

(1) An enhanced multi-factor authentication method is proposed, combining ID, attributes, and biometrics to enable secure and flexible access across multiple network domains. It supports universal applicability by adjusting the types (e.g., adding PINs, passwords) and size of authentication sets to suit different scenarios. Encrypted authentication data can be integrated into smart cards or devices as needed. Data are obfuscated to ensure privacy and security, offering secure and flexible access in various scenarios.

(2) Our multi-factor authentication approach significantly reduces storage overhead compared to traditional attribute-based schemes [15, 16], where the CA must store each user’s full attribute and biometric sets. Instead, the CA maintains only the union of attributes for all users and a single verification token per user. For example, with 5 users each having 10 attributes and 10 biometric features, our approach stores only the union of these 50 attributes and 5 verification tokens, ranging from 15 to 55, while previous methods store all 100 factors individually. This efficiency scales in large networks, while also enhancing privacy, as attackers can access only the collective authentication set rather than individual user data.

(3) CDAuth improves cross-domain authentication efficiency by replacing costly bilinear pairings with lightweight native group operations, reducing terminal computation overhead. Performance analysis shows that, with the same number of attributes, the computational cost of the other two attribute-based cross-domain authentication schemes [15, 16] is 3–6 times higher than that of CDAuth. Moreover, compared with multi-factor cross-domain authentication [20, 21, 22], CDAuth incurs lower computational cost with the same number of authentication factors, making it both lightweight and efficient.

(4) We conducted a comprehensive security and performance analysis of CDAuth, evaluating its security and computational overhead. This detailed analysis ensures the scheme’s robustness and efficiency.

Related Work

The widespread deployment of mobile terminals in the Internet of Things (IoT) has increased the demand for secure cross-domain access and interaction, making cross-domain authentication essential for trusted data exchange and reliable communication among multiple security domains. Recently, several blockchain-based cross-domain authentication schemes [16, 29] have been proposed to establish inter-domain trust via smart contracts and consensus mechanisms. Some schemes [30, 31] adopt blockchain for distributed cross-domain authentication, using decentralized key management to reduce management overhead and eliminate single points of failure. Blockchain’s decentralization, immutability, and traceability enhance authentication security, but often incurs high computation and communication costs. To improve efficiency, Jiang et al. [4] combined Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and Certificateless Cryptography (CLC) in a two-layer consortium and private blockchain architecture, and Lv et al. [32] employed a multi-chain framework with proxy signatures to enable batch verification of multiple users using a single signature. Wang et al. [33] combined edge computing with blockchain for cross-domain authentication, offloading pseudonym generation to edge servers to reduce latency and redundant interactions. Some methods [22, 34] used accumulators to improve efficiency, with blockchain maintaining dynamic accumulators per domain that accumulate key materials from terminals for batch authentication of unlinkable identities, enabling rapid anonymous authentication. Although these techniques reduce overhead to some extent, blockchain’s inherent resource demands and slow read/write performance still limit their practical deployment.

Several non-blockchain solutions have been proposed that are both secure and efficient. Chen et al. [8] introduced a certificate-based cross-domain authentication mechanism for VANETs, bidirectionally synchronized database to maintain authentication during primary database failures and mitigate single points of failure. It uses virtual identity anonymous authentication for privacy but faces efficiency and certificate management challenges. Additionally, [35] used hyper-elliptic curve cryptography (HECC) to halve key length compared to ECC, and [36] replaced bilinear pairings with symmetric polynomials to reduce computational overhead, though further optimization is possible. Chen et al. [37] proposed a secure and efficient cross-domain authentication scheme integrating edge and fog computing, distributing computation and storage to the network edge for improved real-time interaction. It ensures forgery and collusion resistance and non-repudiation without blockchain. However, these schemes often rely on single-factor authentication, limiting scalability and resilience to attacks.

In IoT, multi-domain data interaction requires flexible authentication for dynamic access. Existing certificateless [35] and identity/pseudonym-based methods [36] depend on identity keys, limiting flexibility and fine-grained access. The method in [28] proposed an attribute-based authentication that supports flexible authentication with diverse attributes; however, it has seen limited adoption in cross-domain scenarios. He et al. [15, 16] implemented an attribute-based cross-domain authentication scheme, but its computational cost remains prohibitively high. Zhang et al. [22] proposed a multi-factor cross-domain authentication method that combines biometrics and hardware to generate key materials and employs accumulators for cross-domain verification. While this approach enhances security, its authentication granularity is coarse, scalability is limited, and hardware management and portability remain challenging—issues common to many existing multi-factor authentication schemes [20, 21].

Finally, Table I provides a comparative overview of existing authentication schemes and highlights their respective strengths and limitations. CDAuth optimizes these prior schemes by leveraging an edge–cloud collaborative framework to balance communication latency and enhance overall efficiency. It further refines multi-factor authentication to support broader applicability and fine-grained access control. Authentication factors are hidden, and credentials are self-generated, enabling bidirectional anonymous authentication via verification functions. Moreover, each communication round verifies data integrity and user status to ensure data immutability and timely detection of malicious behavior. These properties are achieved with reduced computational and storage overhead, making CDAuth suitable for complex network environments.

CategorySchemeMethodAdvantageDisadvantage
Blockchain-basedJiang et al. [4] (2024)Dual blockchain, ECC, ID-basedEnhances security and privacy while reducing throughputHigh blockchain read/write and maintenance complexity
He et al. [15] (2025)Bilinear Pairing, Attribute-basedBatch verification Fine-grained and flexibleHigh blockchain read/write and maintenance complexity
Huang et al. [16] (2022)Bilinear Pairing, Zero-knowledge proof, Attribute-basedAnonymous authentication Fine-grained and flexibleHigh blockchain read/write and maintenance complexity
Zhang et al. [22] (2022)Dynamic Accumulators Multi-factorMulti-factor anonymous authentication Enhances security and efficiencyHigh blockchain read/write and maintenance complexity
Cui et al. [23] (2024)ECC, ID-basedAnonymous mutual authenticationHigh blockchain read/write and maintenance complexity
Ghaemi et al. [29] (2024)ECC, ID-basedAnonymous authentication More fault-toleranceHigh blockchain read/write and maintenance complexity
Liu et al. [30] (2024)ECC, ID-basedAnonymous mutual authenticationHigh blockchain read/write and maintenance complexity
Sasikumar et al. [31] (2024)ECC, ID-basedData transparency and traceabilityHigh blockchain read/write and maintenance complexity
Lv et al. [32] (2024)Bilinear Pairing, Multi-blockchain, ID-basedCross-chain authentication Batch verificationHigh blockchain read/write and maintenance complexity
Wang et al. [33] (2024)ECC, ID-basedrequiring only a single blockchain query low-latency edge responseHigh blockchain read/write and maintenance complexity
Zhong et al. [34] (2024)ECC, ID-basedBatch authentication multi-accumulator batch proofHigh blockchain read/write and maintenance complexity
Cheng et al. [36] (2023)ECC, ID-basedPairing-free IBS Batch verificationHigh blockchain read/write and maintenance complexity
Not blockchain-basedChen et al. [8] (2024)Bilinear Pairing, ID-basedAnonymous authentication Batch verificationRelies on a trusted authority High computational overhead Coarse-grained and inflexible
Shukla et al. [20] (2022)ECC, Multi-factorMulti-factor anonymous authentication Enhances securityRisk of smart card loss Coarse-grained and inflexible
Tian et al. [21] (2024)Bilinear Pairing, Multi-factorMulti-factor anonymous authentication Enhances securityLacks cross-domain capability relies on a trusted authority Coarse-grained and inflexible
Pan et al. [35] (2023)Bilinear pairing ID-basedMutual authentication Lightweight designLacks cross-domain capability Coarse-grained and inflexible
Peñuelas et al. [28] (2024)Bilinear Pairing, Attribute-basedMulti-authority, Fine-grained and flexibleHigh computational overhead Focuses on attribute-based encryption
Chen et al. [37] (2024)Bilinear pairing, Threshold signatureDistributed authentication Enhance security and robustnessComplicated system deployment and upkeep

Table I. Summary of related works

Preliminaries

We start by defining some notation used in this paper in Table II. For integers mm and nn where m≤nm \le n, [m,n][m,n] denotes the set {m,m+1,…,n}\{m,m+1,\ldots,n\}. If m=1m=1, we use [n][n] to refer to [1,n][1,n]. For a prime pp, Zp\mathbb{Z}_p denotes the set {0,1,…,p−1}\{0,1,\ldots,p-1\} and Zp∗\mathbb{Z}_p^* denotes the set [p−1][p-1], with arithmetic operations performed modulo pp. λ\lambda is a security parameter, and p≥2λ+1p \ge2^\lambda+1. ∣∣|| is the character connector.

NotationDescription
λ\lambdaa security parameter
DmD_mthe mm-th subdomain
um,iu_{m,i}the ii-th user in the mm-th subdomain
idum,i,pidmid_{u_{m,i}},pid_{m}the pseudo-ID of um,iu_{m,i} and ESmES_m
SiTS^T_ithe global attribute set in each subdomain
SS, biobioeach user’s attribute set, biometric template
PKCS,pkES,pkum,iPK_{CS},pk_{ES},pk_{u_{m,i}}public keys of CSCS, ESmES_m and um,iu_{m,i}
ksm−Mks_{m-M}session key between ESmES_m and ESMES_M
Autm,i,AutM,m,iAut_{m,i},Aut_{M,m,i}authentication credentials of ESmES_m, um,iu_{m,i}
AutM,m,iAut_{M,m,i}cross-domain authentication credential in DMD_M of um,iu_{m,i}
regum,ireg_{u_{m,i}}registration credential of um,iu_{m,i}
Sigm,Sigm,iSig_{m},Sig_{m,i}Signatures of ESmES_m and um,iu_{m,i}
SigM,m,iSig_{M,m,i}Cross-domain signatures of um,iu_{m,i} for DMD_M

Table II. Notations

Complexity assumption and Anti-Collision One-Way Hash Function

Definition 1. (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem, (DLP)) Let (p,G,g)(p,G,g) be a group system of order pp. Given the tuple (p,G,g,ζ⋅g)(p,G,g,\zeta\cdot g), g∈Gg \in G, the discrete logarithm problem states that a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A\mathcal{A} has negligible advantage in finding ζ∈Zp∗\zeta\in\mathbb{Z}_p^*. Formally, Pr⁡[A(p,G,g,ζ⋅g)=ζ]\Pr[\mathcal{A}(p,G,g,\zeta\cdot g)=\zeta] is negligible.

A one-way hash function hh is a deterministic mapping from an arbitrary-length binary string to a fixed-length mm-bit output. Let the adversary A\mathcal{A}’s advantage in finding a hash collision within time rtrt be defined as AdvhA(rt)=Pr⁡[A→r(x1,x2):x1≠x2,h(x1)=h(x2)]Adv_h^{\mathcal{A}}(rt)=\Pr[\mathcal{A}\to_r(x_1,x_2):x_1 \ne x_2,h(x_1)=h(x_2)], where A→r(x1,x2)\mathcal{A}\to_r(x_1,x_2) denotes two inputs selected randomly by A\mathcal{A}. If AdvhA(rt)Adv_h^{\mathcal{A}}(rt) is negligible, then hh is collision-resistant.

Fuzzy Extractor

Biometric data, such as fingerprints, iris scans, or gaits, are inherently noisy and not perfectly deterministic. To securely extract keys from such data, we employ a fuzzy extractor [38], consisting of two procedures: a probabilistic generation function GenGen and a deterministic reproduction function RepRep.

(1) Generation. For a biometric template Bio∈MBio \in\mathcal{M}, Gen(Bio)=(ζ,ρ)Gen(Bio)=(\zeta,\rho), where ζ∈{0,1}ℓ\zeta\in\{0,1\}^{\ell} is an extracted string, ρ∈{0,1}∗\rho\in\{0,1\}^{*} is a public helper string and M\mathcal{M} is a metric space. If the statistic distance SD((ζ,ρ),(Uℓ,ρ))≤εSD((\zeta,\rho),(U_{\ell},\rho))\leq\varepsilon, then ζ\zeta is indistinguishable from uniform even given ρ\rho. UℓU_{\ell} is the uniform distribution over ℓ\ell-bit strings and ε\varepsilon denotes the statistical bound on the deviation of ζ\zeta from uniform. Let A\mathcal{A} be a PPT adversary attempting to invert the fuzzy extractor generation function GenGen. The advantage of A\mathcal{A} in recovering a biometric template BioBio from (ζ,ρ)=Gen(Bio)(\zeta,\rho)=Gen(Bio) within time rtrt is defined as AdvGenA(rt)=Pr⁡[A(1ℓ,ζ,ρ)→Bio′:Gen(Bio′)=(ζ,ρ)]Adv^{\mathcal{A}}_{Gen}(rt)=\Pr[\mathcal{A}(1^{\ell},\zeta,\rho)\rightarrow Bio^{\prime}:Gen(Bio^{\prime})=(\zeta,\rho)], where A(1ℓ,ζ,ρ)→Bio′\mathcal{A}(1^{\ell},\zeta,\rho)\rightarrow Bio^{\prime} denotes that A\mathcal{A} outputs a candidate biometric template Bio′Bio^{\prime}. If AdvGenA(rt)Adv^{\mathcal{A}}_{Gen}(rt) is negligible in ℓ\ell, then GenGen is one-way.

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