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Robust Action Clusters and Cascades in Opinion Dynamics with Heterogeneous Action Thresholds
Abstract
We study the preservation and propagation of public actions in networks whose agents hold continuous private opinions. Agents update their opinions from their neighbors' observed actions and express them through action rules whose thresholds differ across agents. We characterize groups of agents that preserve a given common action regardless of the outsiders' actions. We call such a group, paired with that action, a robust action cluster. We show that a group is a robust action cluster for that action if and only if each member places enough of its influence weight on the group, where the required influence depends on the member's own action rule. We further give a sufficient condition under which an agent outside the cluster permanently adopts the cluster's action, and we iterate it to obtain a cascade of agents that are guaranteed to adopt that action. Finally, numerical examples show that replacing heterogeneous thresholds by their mean can change both the propagation of an action and the presence of robust action clusters.
Introduction
People often hold a nuanced private opinion but express it through a coarse public choice: a vote, a rating, or one of a few stated positions. Classical averaging models describe social influence through the exchange of opinions [1]. Continuous-opinion discrete-action (CODA) models distinguish these private opinions from the public actions through which agents influence one another [2], [3]. Two people can express the same position despite holding different opinions or using different rules to translate opinions into actions. A group defined by its public behavior can therefore be heterogeneous in both respects.
This distinction raises two questions. When can a group preserve a common action despite influence from the rest of the network? When does that action spread to others? Threshold models of collective behavior show that aggregate outcomes can depend on how individual response thresholds are distributed, not only on their mean [4, 5, 6]. In our setting, by contrast, each action is determined by a private opinion that retains memory of past interactions. No agent is stubborn: a group can preserve an action only through the opinion dynamics that all agents follow.
Related work. The binary CODA model of [3] studies preservation and propagation through majority conditions. Its state-dependent gain and history-dependent tie rule differ from the dynamics considered here. Related stochastic models couple multilevel opinions with binary actions [7]. Quantized behaviors are also analyzed in continuous time [8], [9] and coupled with external dynamics [10]. Complementary models study discrepancies between private and expressed opinions caused by social conformity [11] and the coevolution of binary actions and continuous opinions on two-layer networks [12]. Strategic communication on influence networks can also generate heterogeneous quantized communication rules [13]. Here, the action rules are prescribed and share a common finite action set.
Beyond binary actions, finite verbal scales [14] and a middle option [15] have been studied by simulation. Multistage contagion models further show that additional states can change cascade dynamics [16]. In threshold dynamics, cohesive groups can obstruct contagion [17], while robust coordination under asynchronous binary updates is studied in [18]. These works motivate examining how network cohesion and individual action rules jointly determine action preservation and propagation.
We study this interplay on weighted directed networks with inertial private opinions and heterogeneous thresholds on a common finite action set. For intermediate actions, robustness requires a two-sided cohesion condition that protects against influence toward both lower and higher actions. Actions can switch indefinitely, even with two agents (Example 1), so we study permanent adoption without assuming convergence of the entire network. Our contributions are threefold. First, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for a group to be a robust action cluster. It compares the influence weight each member places on the group with an agent-dependent influence threshold set by that member’s action rule. Thus, it separates the group’s cohesion from the individual rules. Second, a strict version of this condition guarantees that an agent placing enough influence weight on a robust action cluster adopts its action permanently, from any initial opinion. Applying it repeatedly yields a finite cascade of guaranteed adopters and a sufficient condition for permanent consensus on that action. The cascade identifies all guaranteed adopters for two actions, but provides only a sufficient condition for larger action sets. Third, two numerical examples illustrate that mean thresholds alone determine neither the propagation of an intermediate action from a robust action cluster nor the presence of robust action clusters. On a lattice, heterogeneous rules produce robust action clusters. The corresponding homogeneous rule, which gives every agent the mean thresholds, yields none in its final action profile, although the action profile remains fixed in both runs.
The model and its general properties are introduced in Sections II and III; Sections IV and V establish preservation and adoption conditions. Section VI illustrates permanent adoption from a robust seed and distinguishes action profiles that remain fixed from robust action clusters.
Notation. Vectors and matrices are bold (e.g., , ), with and denoting their respective entries. Vector inequalities are componentwise: means for every . The vector has all entries equal to one, and is the identity matrix. We write for set cardinality, and for the set of nonnegative reals. We denote the interior and closure of a set by and , respectively.
Model
Consider agents indexed by . Their interactions are described by a weighted directed graph , where . The entry is the influence weight of agent on agent . A link is present if and only if . Thus is the set of agents observed by . We normalize each agent’s influence weights and assume the following properties for the interaction graph.
Standing Assumption (SA1): The matrix is time-invariant, nonnegative, and row-stochastic (), with zero diagonal.
For a group , agent places influence weight on . By (SA1), it is the fraction of ’s total influence weight, so .
Private Opinions and Public Actions
At each time , agent holds a private opinion and broadcasts a public action. Agents observe only their neighbors’ actions.
All agents choose from a common ordered action set , with . The actions strictly between and are the intermediate actions. At time , agent broadcasts the action , a quantized version of its opinion. The map , called the action rule of agent , assigns an action to each opinion through agent-dependent thresholds. It is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Action rule): For each , let be the thresholds of agent , with the conventions and . The action rule of agent is
By construction, each action rule is nondecreasing and right-continuous: at a threshold, the agent takes the higher of the two adjacent actions (Fig. 1). The opinions at which an agent takes action form the action interval
with lower and upper thresholds and . Only and are infinite.
We require self-consistency: each action is a fixed point of every action rule [8].
Standing Assumption (SA2): For all and , ; equivalently, .
In terms of the thresholds, this means that for every and .
Opinion Dynamics
The observed actions in turn drive the evolution of private opinions. The social input to agent is the weighted average of its neighbors’ actions, . It depends on the neighbors’ opinions only through their actions. The opinion of agent evolves according to the discrete-time dynamics
where is the inertia (self-persistence) parameter of agent , determining the weight assigned to its current opinion. Since , the social input excludes the agent’s own action, and its own opinion enters only through inertia.
We write and . With , the dynamics take the vector form
The public action profile at time is thus , and the state space is . The rest of the paper analyzes this model and characterizes when a group of agents preserves or adopts a common action permanently.
General Properties of the Opinion Dynamics
We first establish basic structural properties of the map on the state space .
Lemma 1 (Well-posedness and monotonicity): We have: (i) . (ii) is monotone: implies .
Proof. (i) Since and is row-stochastic, , and each update (3) is a convex combination of and . (ii) The matrices and are nonnegative, and each is nondecreasing.

Figure 1. Action rules of two agents with , , and , on the opinion range . Filled and open dots show right-continuity. Each step meets the identity (dashed) at its own action level, as required by (SA2).
Next, we show that if all agents share the same action, they preserve it for all time. For any group and any action , let be the states in which every member of holds action , with the other agents unconstrained.
Lemma 2 (Global action consensus). For every , the consensus state is a fixed point of , and implies .
Proof. By (SA2), for all , so and by row-stochasticity of . More generally, if , then for every , so (3) gives . Since , their convex combination lies in , and Lemma 1(i) ensures , so .
By Lemma 1(ii), ordered initial states give ordered trajectories. Monotonicity, however, does not imply convergence, since it still allows persistent switching. As in synchronous threshold dynamics [19], agents can switch actions periodically, even on a connected graph.
The following example shows that two agents can enter a period-two orbit, preventing opinion convergence.
Example 1 (Persistent switching): Consider two agents with action set , where , and dynamics specified by
For arbitrary , define . The opinion update maps to and back. Both states avoid the threshold because , so the agents’ actions switch indefinitely.
Since the action profile need not converge, we study which agents hold a given action permanently, rather than convergence of the whole network. Section IV provides a necessary and sufficient condition under which a group of agents keeps a common action independently of what the rest of the network does. This generalizes Lemma 2 from to any . Section V then provides sufficient conditions under which that action propagates permanently to agents outside the group.
Robust Action Clusters
Agents holding a common action reinforce it through mutual influence, while the other agents may hold different actions. In this section, we investigate when such a group preserves its action regardless of the rest of the network. We start with the central definition of the paper, which concerns a group of agents paired with a public action.
Definition 2 (Robust action cluster): Let and . is a robust action cluster for action if
i.e., is forward invariant under the dynamics (4). For shorthand, we write “ is robust”. The agents in are the outsiders of .
By Lemma 2, is always robust. In general, a robust action cluster preserves its action from every initial state in , whatever the actions of its outsiders. Our first objective is to characterize the robust action clusters for each action . The second, addressed in Section V, is to determine when their action spreads to outsiders.
From the dynamics in (3), each updated opinion is a convex combination of the current opinion and the social input. Hence, an agent whose opinion and input both lie in keeps action . We therefore characterize robustness of by bounding the social inputs that an agent can receive.
If , splitting the social input between and its outsiders gives . Since every action lies in and the weights are nonnegative, each agent’s social input lies in the worst-case input interval , where
Both endpoints are attained when all outsiders hold or , respectively. The interval narrows toward as increases (Figure 2). To preserve , a member must resist changes to both lower and higher actions.

Figure 2. Influence threshold of agent for action . (a) Agent places influence weight on its own group, which holds , and on the other agents, which may hold any action. (b) Worst-case input bounds (6) versus . They cross the thresholds of (gray) at and , and both stay between them exactly when (hatched); here, .
Requiring and and solving for gives two lower bounds on , which motivate the following definition.
Definition 3 (Influence threshold): For an agent and an action , let be the influence threshold, where
with the convention .
By (SA2), . The following theorem gives an exact condition for action preservation.
Theorem 1 (Action preservation): Let and . Then is robust if and only if
Equivalently, for every .
Proof: For each finite endpoint of , (6) gives the corresponding identity
The inclusion holds if and only if , since infinite endpoints impose no restriction.
If and , their convex combination in (3) remains in : since , the next opinion stays strictly below whenever that endpoint is finite.
Conversely, suppose that an input endpoint lies below . This input is attained when all outsiders hold , and with the next opinion lies below . Similarly, if an input endpoint lies above , it is attained when all outsiders hold , and with for sufficiently small the next opinion lies above . In both cases, the other members can hold opinion , so .
We call (8) the cohesion condition. As in [17], it requires members to place enough influence weight on the group, but the required weight depends on each member’s action rule.
Remark 1 (Binary CODA): With actions and a common threshold , . With equal weights on neighbors, the cohesion condition becomes for every . This coincides with the criterion used for robust polarized clusters in [3], although the two models use different opinion updates and threshold tie rules.
Remark 2 (Robust action cluster within a candidate set): For a fixed action , unions of robust action clusters are robust by (8). Given a candidate set , repeatedly remove agents whose influence weight on the remaining set is below . No member of a robust subset of can be removed. At termination, the remaining set is therefore either empty or the unique largest robust action cluster contained in . If none remain, has no robust action cluster for .
Robust action clusters can also make disagreement persist. If disjoint groups and are robust action clusters for actions and , respectively, with , every trajectory starting in preserves both actions, and such trajectories never reach action consensus.
We next ask when a robust action cluster makes other agents adopt its action permanently.
Guaranteed Adoption
Fix and let be a robust action cluster for action , which we call a robust seed. A trajectory is admissible for this seed and target action if .
An agent adopts permanently if for all sufficiently large . A guaranteed adopter adopts permanently along every admissible trajectory. This guarantee must hold for all seed opinions consistent with action and all outsider opinions. An agent may therefore adopt from some initial states without being a guaranteed adopter. A trajectory reaches permanent -consensus if all agents hold from some time on.
We first give a sufficient condition for an outsider to be a guaranteed adopter. Iterating it yields a cascade of guaranteed adopters; when the cascade reaches every agent, every admissible trajectory reaches permanent -consensus.
An Adoption Condition
The cohesion condition of Theorem 1 concerns agents already holding action . To make an outsider adopt from any initial opinion, it suffices to keep its social input inside with a positive margin from each finite endpoint. The following lemma expresses this requirement as the adoption condition (9), a strict version of the cohesion condition.
Lemma 3 (Adoption condition): Suppose is robust. If an outsider satisfies
or, equivalently, , then there is a finite , independent of the initial state, such that every trajectory from satisfies for all .
Proof: The equivalence follows from (6) and (7). Let , omitting the term of an infinite endpoint. By robustness, for all ; iterating (3) and using gives . Since , we may take the finite bound
For , lies strictly inside .
The strict inequality cannot, in general, be relaxed to equality: with a constant input equal to a finite endpoint of , an opinion starting beyond that endpoint converges to it without ever entering The preservation and adoption conditions are independent of , whereas the adoption-time bound depends on .
Cascade
An outsider that adopts an action permanently can help other outsiders meet the adoption condition. Iterating this condition yields a cascade of guaranteed adopters.
Definition 4 (Cascade): Starting from a robust seed , let for , where
This increasing sequence stabilizes after at most strict enlargements; its limit is the cascade closure .
Each step of the cascade preserves robustness and guarantees permanent adoption for new members.
Proposition 1 (Cascade propagation). Let be a robust seed for action . Every set in the cascade sequence of Definition 4 is a robust action cluster for action , and every member of is a guaranteed adopter of action .
Proof. We show by induction on that is robust and that there is a finite time such that every admissible trajectory satisfies for all . For , both claims hold with . Assume they hold for . Each satisfies . Since the dynamics are time-invariant, Lemma 3 applied from time gives for all . The second claim therefore holds for , with (or if no agent joins). Moreover, for every , so every member of satisfies (8): new members because , and members of by Theorem 1. Hence is robust by Theorem 1. Applying the second claim to the limit shows that each of its members is a guaranteed adopter. Thus is sufficient for permanent -consensus along every admissible trajectory.
The iteration in Definition 4 is a progressive linear-threshold cascade with thresholds and the strict adoption rule (9). As in [17], cohesive groups can block it. A nonempty group is an obstruction if , or equivalently , for all . Then no member of satisfies (9) for , even when every other agent has adopted . The cascade reaches every agent if and only if every obstruction intersects the seed. An obstruction blocks only the cascade, not adoption itself: agents outside may still adopt along particular trajectories. For , however, the cascade is exact. If denotes the other action, then , so every obstruction disjoint from the seed is a robust action cluster for , and its members keep along every admissible trajectory starting in . Since is such an obstruction whenever it is nonempty, is then exactly the set of guaranteed adopters. For , the cascade gives only a sufficient condition for guaranteed adoption, since the worst-case inputs of different members of an obstruction need not be simultaneously realizable.
Numerical Illustrations
We illustrate Theorem 1 and the cascade of Definition 4 on two networks. Each example compares two runs: one with heterogeneous action rules, and one in which all agents use the homogeneous rule. Each threshold of this common rule is the mean, over all agents, of the corresponding heterogeneous thresholds. Within each example, the graph and initial opinions are identical in both runs. Table I lists the parameters of both examples, including the thresholds of every action rule. We say that the action profile remains fixed after time if no action changes after . We verify this with the following criterion: every social input at time lies in the closure of the agent’s current action interval. Since , the update (3) then keeps every opinion in its action interval, so neither the actions nor the inputs change.
| Rule (agents) | Action thresholds | ||
| Section VI-A: | |||
| A (8) | 0.47 | ||
| B (3) | 0.67 | ||
| Homogeneous (11) | 0.52 | ||
| Section VI-B: | |||
| C (1250) | |||
| D (1250) | |||
| Homogeneous (2500) |
Table I. Parameters of Section VI. Both examples use undirected graphs with uniform weights for and inertia . Each action rule is given by its thresholds and the influence threshold of (7) for target action .
Propagation of an Intermediate Action
The first example shows that mean thresholds alone do not determine whether an intermediate action propagates from a robust seed. The action set is , and the network of Figure 3a has eleven agents. Agents 1 to 4 form a complete graph and constitute the seed . The seed starts with action and the seven outsiders with action . In the heterogeneous run, rules A and B are assigned as shown in Figure 3a, with both rules represented in the seed.


Figure 3. Propagation of action $1/2$ from a robust minority of four among eleven agents. (a) Initial network: shapes denote rules A and B in the heterogeneous run, colors give initial actions, and thick borders mark the seed , which contains both rules. In the other run, every agent uses the homogeneous rule. (b) Number of agents currently holding action , from identical initial opinions. Under heterogeneous rules all eleven adopt permanently by ; under the homogeneous rule only the four seed members hold action $1/2. Only is displayed; both runs continue to .
Every seed member places influence weight on , so its worst-case input interval , given by (6), lies strictly inside its action interval for action under every rule. Hence is a robust seed for action in both runs, by Theorem 1. Under heterogeneous rules, outsider 5 places weight on the seed, above rule A’s influence threshold of approximately 0.47, and joins the cascade first. Each later outsider places at least on the growing group when it joins, and outsider 11, the only outsider using rule B, joins last with weight . Thus , and every agent is a guaranteed adopter of action . Under the homogeneous rule, the only outsiders with seed neighbors, agents 5 and 8, place weights $1/2 and on the seed, both below , so the cascade stops at .
Figure 3(b) shows the two runs. Under heterogeneous rules, all outsiders permanently adopt action . Agent 5 starts this propagation: its initial input lies above rule A’s middle threshold but below the mean middle threshold of approximately . Under the homogeneous rule, agents 5 and 8 move from to and keep inputs and , below the mean middle threshold, while all other outsiders remain at . The resulting action profile remains fixed, with only the seed holding action . Indeed, every social input lies strictly inside its agent’s current action interval, so the criterion stated at the beginning of this section applies. The stalled cascade alone would show only that the cascade criterion does not certify adoption. The seed preserves its action in both runs, but replacing the individual rules by their mean stops the propagation.
Robust Action Clusters on a Square Lattice
The second example asks which groups in a fixed action profile are robust action clusters. A fixed action profile does not establish robustness. Theorem 1 identifies, from the final action profile alone, the groups that would keep their actions whatever the other agents do. With two actions, every agent of a fixed action profile belongs to such a group. Indeed, let be the set of agents holding . Every other agent holds , so each member of receives the constant input of (6) and keeps as its opinion approaches that input. This input therefore lies in the closure of the action interval, and is robust by Theorem 1. The same holds for . This is the situation of the binary lattice in [3]. We therefore use three actions, the smallest action set in which a fixed action profile need not consist of robust action clusters.
Following [3], we use an open square lattice with horizontal and vertical edges and actions . Initial opinions are independent uniform draws from . In one run, every agent uses the homogeneous rule; in the other, rules C and D are assigned at random to equal
numbers of agents (Table I). On the lattice, an interior agent, away from the boundary, has four neighbors, so an influence threshold translates into a number of neighbors. Under the homogeneous rule, and , so an interior agent needs three of its four neighbors in its group, whatever action it holds. Under rule C, , so an interior agent holding action 0 needs only two; under rule D, , so it needs all four.
In any group disjoint from the lattice boundary, the left-most member of the top row has its upper and left neighbors outside the group, so it places influence weight at most on the group. In Table I, all influence thresholds for actions exceed , and only rule C has . By Theorem 1, no group disjoint from the boundary is a robust action cluster under the homogeneous rule. Under heterogeneous rules, among groups disjoint from the boundary, only those holding action 0 can be robust. Figure 4 shows both consequences. Under the homogeneous rule, the final action profile remains fixed but contains no robust action cluster, including at the boundary (Figure 4(a)). The absence of robust clusters is also observed in 15 additional initializations.
Figure 4. Robust action clusters on an open (non-periodic) 50 × 50 lattice with actions , from the same uniform random initial opinions; both final action profiles remain fixed. (a) Final actions , at , when every agent uses the homogeneous rule: the final action profile contains no robust action cluster. (b) Final actions under heterogeneous rules: half of the agents, placed at random, use rule C and the others rule D (Table I); crosses mark the agents in robust action clusters, all holding action 0. (c) Final private opinions under heterogeneous rules.
Under heterogeneous rules, the final action profile also remains fixed. Applying the procedure of Remark 2 to each final action set leaves no agents for actions and 701 agents for action 0 (Figure 4(b)); we split them into connected robust action clusters.
The other remaining agents also keep their actions, but none belongs to a robust action cluster. Their actions remain fixed only because of the actions currently held around them. For each connected group of these agents holding a common action, we start from the final state and fix all outsider actions to in one run and to in another. At least one run causes an agent in the group to change its action. Every robust action cluster keeps action 0 in both runs, as Theorem 1 predicts. Private opinions do not reveal this distinction. Agents holding action 0 have opinions ranging over whether or not they belong to a robust action cluster (Figure 4(b)–(c)). As in Section VI-A, the homogeneous rule does not reproduce the behavior under heterogeneous rules. Here, it excludes the robust action clusters that rule C makes possible.
Conclusion
We characterized robust action clusters in networks with continuous private opinions and heterogeneous action rules. A group preserves a common action regardless of outsiders’ actions if and only if each member satisfies an action-dependent cohesion condition. A strict version yields a cascade of guaranteed adopters, which identifies all guaranteed adopters in the binary case. Numerical examples show that replacing heterogeneous thresholds by their means can alter both action propagation and the presence of robust clusters. Future work includes addressing seed formation, adoption through intermediate actions beyond the cascade, and asynchronous updates.
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