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WorksPhysics and Astronomy

Composable Device-Independent Quantum Digital Signatures

Abstract

Extending device-independent (DI) quantum cryptography to composably support all fundamental information security objectives is crucial for secure quantum networks. Achieving this goal requires composable quantum digital signatures (QDSs), which support integrity, authenticity, and nonrepudiation when integrated into quantum networks. Yet existing QDS protocols generally rely on assumptions about the underlying quantum devices, while their security analyses remain largely restricted to stand-alone settings, leaving related-key attacks on the underlying linear feedback shift register (LFSR)-based Toeplitz authentication unaddressed. Here, we establish the first composable security framework for QDS within constructive cryptography, and realize the corresponding ideal QDS resource by developing a DI-QDS protocol employing one-time universal hashing and multi-channel multiplexing. We further derive a related-key security bound for the underlying LFSR-based Toeplitz authentication, thereby establishing unforgeability while extending the forgery boundary considered in previous QDS security analyses. We also demonstrate the practical feasibility of our DI-QDS protocol under realistic quantum network conditions in the finite-size regime, with numerical simulations showing that it enables efficient signing of multibit documents over metropolitan-scale distances. Our results establish QDS as a composable cryptographic primitive and extend DI quantum cryptography to support the full range of information security objectives with composable security guarantees in future quantum networks.

Introduction

Quantum cryptography seeks to establish security from physical principles rather than computational hardness assumptions [1]. Yet the security of conventional quantum cryptographic protocols relies on a detailed characterization of the underlying devices [2, 3]. Device-independent (DI) quantum cryptography advances this goal by removing the need for such detailed device characterization, with security based on correlations that violate a Bell inequality [2, 4, 5, 6]. As DI cryptography is extended toward quantum networks [7, 8], it is essential to address the full range of fundamental information security objectives, including confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and nonrepudiation [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14].

Substantial progress in DI cryptography has been made across several fundamental tasks, including quantum key distribution (QKD) [2, 3, 15], quantum random-number generation [16], randomness expansion [17, 18], and multiparty cryptography such as DI quantum conference-key agreement (QCKA) [8, 19]. Among these prominent DI cryptographic protocols, DI-QKD and DI-QCKA establish secret keys that support confidentiality [8, 10, 19], whereas DI quantum random-number generation and randomness expansion generate private random bits that are fundamental to cryptographic security [16, 17, 18, 20]. However, these DI cryptographic primitives do not by themselves address the remaining security objectives [9, 10, 14, 21, 22]. Digital signatures can address these objectives, and quantum digital signatures (QDSs) provide information-theoretic security based on quantum principles [9, 23]. Recent advances, particularly one-time universal hashing (OTUH), have enabled efficient signing of multibit documents of arbitrary length [10, 13]. Yet existing QDS protocols generally rely on assumptions about the underlying quantum devices, and their security analyses remain largely restricted to stand-alone settings [9, 21].

QDS must also satisfy composable security, which requires that the security guarantees of a protocol remain valid when it is used as a component of a larger cryptographic system [1, 24, 25, 26, 27]. In modern cryptography, composable security is an essential notion for maintaining the security of cryptographic protocols in complex and unpredictable environments and has been established across a broad range of quantum cryptographic protocols, including QKD [25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41], quantum random-number generation [42, 43], delegated quantum computation [27], and quantum secret sharing (QSS) [44]. For DI information processing, composable security has also been established for QKD [2, 5, 45, 46, 47], randomness expansion [17, 48, 49], randomness amplification [50, 51], encryption with certified deletion [52], and quantum-state certification [53].

The security of these protocols relies not only on quantum resources but also on the classical cryptographic mechanisms they employ, including authentication [25, 28]. As quantum networks advance toward real-world deployment, classical cryptographic mechanisms may be incorporated into protocols involving more complex key management and adversarial capabilities, requiring explicit security analyses within the complete protocol [54]. In QDS, key management involves the exchange of key shares, which may be tampered with by the adversarial side, introducing a class of related-key attacks not covered by conventional security analyses of linear feedback shift register (LFSR)-based Toeplitz authentication [10, 21, 55, 56], which is also overlooked in the authentication of QKD. Thus, these analyses do not directly provide the unforgeability guarantee required for the composable security of QDS.

In this work, we establish the first composable security framework for QDS and construct a DI-QDS protocol that realizes the corresponding ideal QDS resource, thereby providing both composable and DI security guarantees within a unified analysis. We formulate the composable security of QDS within constructive cryptography [57, 58]. The ideal QDS resource is not restricted to the DI realization considered here and can serve as a common composable security target for other QDS implementations. We further derive a related-key security bound for the underlying LFSR-based Toeplitz authentication, generalizing its conventional security analysis to cover related-key attacks and thereby providing the unforgeability guarantee required for composable QDS security while extending the forgery boundary considered in previous QDS security analyses.

We instantiate the composable construction with OTUH-QDS [10, 56], enabling our protocol to efficiently sign multibit documents of arbitrary length with fixed-length signatures. We generate the required correlated keys via a DI key generation protocol (KGP) [5, 47]. We employ the entropy accumulation theorem (EAT) to establish its finite-size security against general attacks without assuming that the states and measurements are independent and identically distributed across protocol rounds [5, 47, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63]. Our protocol further employs multi-channel multiplexing with adaptive entanglement swapping to improve the efficiency of remote entanglement distribution, leading to a square-root improvement in this efficiency over the single-channel scheme [64, 65]. Finally, we present an explicit three-party implementation of composable DI-QDS and numerically analyze its performance with finite resources over quantum networks with lossy channels. We show that our protocol enables efficient signing of multibit documents over metropolitan-scale distances, demonstrating the practical feasibility of composable DI-QDS. Our work enables QDS to serve as a fundamental cryptographic primitive within larger quantum cryptographic systems and extends DI quantum cryptography to support the full range of information security objectives with composable security guarantees in future quantum networks.

The article is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we present the protocol, including the distribution and messaging stages. In Sec. III, we present the physical picture and modeling of the protocol and analyze its main components. In Sec. IV, we establish the composable security of the protocol and discuss its applications. In § 1.6, we present the numerical simulations and evaluate the signature rate, achievable distance, and protocol performance under different scenarios. Finally, § 1.7 concludes the article.

PROTOCOL CONTENT

Our proposed protocol consists of two stages, the distribution stage and the messaging stage. In the distribution stage, we need to generate three-party correlated keys among Alice, Bob, and Charlie, which is realized by independently sharing keys between Alice and Bob and between Alice and Charlie, followed by a key-mapping protocol. To avoid opening memory loopholes, Alice should set up independent sublaboratories and devices for Bob and Charlie, isolating them to prevent any information leakage [19, 66]. To prevent memory attacks across successive DI-KGP instances, once the key pool generated in an instance is exhausted, the devices used in that instance are securely isolated or destroyed, and fresh devices are used for subsequent instances [66]. Then we use those keys distributed to sign and verify in the messaging stage. These keys are denoted as {Xa,Ya,Za}\{X_a,Y_a,Z_a\}, {Xb,Yb,Zb}\{X_b,Y_b,Z_b\}, and {Xc,Yc,Zc}\{X_c,Y_c,Z_c\}, which satisfy

Xa=Xb⊕Xc,Ya=Yb⊕Yc,Za=Zb⊕Zc.(1)\begin{aligned} X_a &= X_b \oplus X_c,\\ Y_a &= Y_b \oplus Y_c,\\ Z_a &= Z_b \oplus Z_c. \tag*{(1)} \end{aligned}

The lengths of these keys are the same, denoted as nn. The subscripts a,b,ca,b,c represent that these keys belong to Alice, Bob, and Charlie, respectively.

Distribution stage

In the distribution stage, we perform an all-photon DI-KGP [47, 63, 64] to distribute those keys in Eq. (1) between Alice, Bob, and Charlie. This is a three-party key distribution protocol designed to generate correlated keys among the three parties satisfying Eq. (1). It consists of two parallel bipartite DI distribution protocols followed by a key-mapping protocol. The two bipartite DI-KGPs establish remote entanglement through adaptive entanglement swapping over multiple parallel channels. For simplicity, we only describe the distribution protocol between Alice and Bob, while the distribution steps between Alice and Charlie remain consistent with it. The subsequent key generation procedure is performed over the nrn_r effective rounds retained after successful entanglement swapping. We denote the retained effective rounds by {N1,N2,…,Nnr}\{N_1,N_2,\ldots,N_{n_r}\}.

  1. Randomness preparation. Each party sets up mrm_r channels, collectively referred to as the set {M1,M2,…,Mmr}\{M_1,M_2,\ldots,M_{m_r}\}, as illustrated in Figure 1. For each

Figure 1. Schematic of the distribution stage of the proposed QDS protocol. (a) Alice and Bob each generate mrm_r entangled photon pairs. For each pair, the local kk photon is measured immediately, while the corresponding tt photon is transmitted to the intermediate node Eve through an optical channel. At Eve’s node, quantum nondemolition (QND) measurements identify the successfully arrived photons. Based on the QND outcomes, SWs adaptively pair the arrived photons from Alice and Bob and route each formed photon pair to a separate BSA, where the Bell measurements are performed in parallel. (b) Optical implementation of one BSA, consisting of polarizing beam splitters (PBSs), half-wave plates (HWPs), and single-photon detectors. (c) Successful click patterns. Coincident clicks of D1HD_{1H} and D2HD_{2H}, or of D1VD_{1V} and D2VD_{2V}, correspond to the outcome ∣Φ⟩ta,tb+=12(∣H⟩ta∣H⟩tb+∣V⟩ta∣V⟩tb)|\Phi\rangle^{+}_{t_a,t_b} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|H\rangle_{t_a}|H\rangle_{t_b} + |V\rangle_{t_a}|V\rangle_{t_b}), whereas coincident clicks of D1HD_{1H} and D2VD_{2V}, or of D1VD_{1V} and D2HD_{2H}, correspond to ∣Φ⟩ta,tb−=12(∣H⟩ta∣H⟩tb−∣V⟩ta∣V⟩tb)|\Phi\rangle^{-}_{t_a,t_b} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|H\rangle_{t_a}|H\rangle_{t_b} - |V\rangle_{t_a}|V\rangle_{t_b}). Any other click events are regarded as a failure of the Bell measurement. A Bell click event corresponds to an effective round of distribution.

channel, Alice possesses a secret string generated by local random number generators. These numbers are organized into a matrix:

X=[X1,1X1,2⋯X1,nrX2,1X2,2⋯X2,nr⋮⋮⋱⋮Xmr,1Xmr,2⋯Xmr,nr].(2)X = \begin{bmatrix} X_{1,1} & X_{1,2} & \cdots& X_{1,n_r} \\ X_{2,1} & X_{2,2} & \cdots& X_{2,n_r} \\ \vdots& \vdots& \ddots& \vdots\\ X_{m_r,1} & X_{m_r,2} & \cdots& X_{m_r,n_r} \end{bmatrix}. \tag*{(2)}

The rows of XX are denoted as XMi={Xi,1,Xi,2,…,Xi,nr}X_{M_i} = \{X_{i,1}, X_{i,2}, \ldots, X_{i,n_r}\} for i=1,2,…,mri = 1, 2, \ldots, m_r, representing the string of random numbers utilized in channel MiM_i. The columns of XX are denoted as XNi={X1,i,X2,i,…,Xmr,i}X_{N_i} = \{X_{1,i}, X_{2,i}, \ldots, X_{m_r,i}\} for i=1,2,…,nri = 1, 2, \ldots, n_r, representing the sequence utilized in a single round of protocol execution.

For the matrix XX, each element Xi,j∈{0,1}X_{i,j} \in\{0, 1\} signifies the uniformly chosen measurement setting, and P(Xi,j=0)=P(Xi,j=1)=12P(X_{i,j} = 0) = P(X_{i,j} = 1) = \frac{1}{2}. Bob holds a similar matrix YY generated by local random number generators with Yi,j∈{0,1,2}Y_{i,j} \in\{0, 1, 2\} and P(Yi,j=0)=P(Yi,j=1)=γ/2P(Y_{i,j} = 0) = P(Y_{i,j} = 1) = \gamma/2, P(Yi,j=2)=1−γP(Y_{i,j} = 2) = 1 - \gamma, in which γ∈(0,1)\gamma\in(0, 1) represents the testing probability.

State preparation and local readout

For channel MiM_i, in round NjN_j, both Alice and Bob prepare an entangled photon pair in a Bell state. We denote this pair as

∣Φ⟩k,t+=12(∣H⟩k∣H⟩t+∣V⟩k∣V⟩t),(3)|\Phi\rangle^{+}_{k,t} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|H\rangle_k|H\rangle_t + |V\rangle_k|V\rangle_t), \tag*{(3)}

where the subscript kk represents the photon that will be retained locally and measured immediately, whereas the subscript tt signifies the photon that will be transferred to the intermediary node, Eve. As depicted in Figure 1, after the generation of the Bell pairs, they promptly measure the local kk photons and transmit the tt photons to the intermediary node, Eve.

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