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A minimal intuitionistic public announcement logic

Abstract

We introduce intuitionistic public announcement logics Lmin and Lequ determined by classes of birelational frames where the intuitionistic preorder and the modal accessibility relation do not need to satisfy the confluence conditions traditionally considered within the framework of IPAL. Our logics can be seen as generalisations of IPAL seeing that their language is based on a binary epistemic modality of "relativised knowledge" that allows us to define valid reduction axioms. Our main results are the soundness and completeness of Lmin with respect to the class of all birelational frames and the soundness and completeness of Lequ with respect to the class of all birelational frames where the modal accessibility relation is an equivalence relation.

Introduction

IPAL — the intuitionistic public announcement logic introduced in [22, 23] — constitutes the subject of numerous discussions from the point of view of its model theory, the point of view of its proof theory, etc [26, 27]. In all these discussions, strong hypotheses concerning the birelational models (W,≤,R,V)(W, \leq, R, V) in which the formulas are interpreted are made in order to be able to achieve four essential objectives. The first and second objectives date back to [12, 31]. They respectively consist of interpreting the modal operators □\Box and ◊\Diamond of “necessity” and “possibility” in the way Kripke [18] interprets the first-order quantifiers ∀\forall and ∃\exists in his definition of the possible-worlds semantics of intuitionistic first-order logic. That is to say, for all formulas CC, in a birelational model (W,≤,R,V)(W, \leq, R, V), given s∈Ws\in W, □C\Box C holds at ss if for all t∈Wt\in W, if s≤ts\leq t then for all u∈Wu\in W, if tRutRu then CC holds at uu and ◊C\Diamond C holds at ss if there exists t∈Wt\in W such that sRtsRt and CC holds at tt. The third objective is specific to logics based on public announcement operators [9]. It concerns the existence of reduction axioms which make it possible to associate with each formula a semantically equivalent formula containing no occurrence of these operators. For instance, the reduction axiom for atoms [A]p↔(A→p)[A]p\leftrightarrow(A\to p), the reduction axiom for “false” [A]⊥↔¬A[A]\bot\leftrightarrow\neg A, etc.1 The fourth objective — probably the most important — is specific to logics based on intuitionist implication. Indeed, it concerns the property of heredity which requires the truth sets associated to each formula to be increasing relative to the preorders which equip the birelational models. That is to say, for all formulas CC, in a birelational model (W,≤,R,V)(W,\le,R,V), given s,t∈Ws,t\in W such that s≤ts\le t, if CC holds at ss then CC holds at tt. To achieve these objectives, all authors without exception choose to only interpret formulas in backward and forward confluent birelational models, i.e. birelational models (W,≤,R,V)(W,\le,R,V) such that R∘≤⊆≤∘RR\circ\le\subseteq\le\circ R and R−1∘≤⊆≤∘R−1R^{-1}\circ\le\subseteq\le\circ R^{-1}, seeing that these hypotheses guarantee the validity of the reduction axiom for “necessity” [A]□C↔(A→□[A]C)[A]\Box C\leftrightarrow(A\to\Box[A]C) and the property of heredity for ◊\Diamond-formulas.

Today, we want to depart from the tradition by proposing a minimalist approach to IPAL for which no hypothesis about the structures underlying its model theory is made. Unfortunately, that is easier said than done, seeing that without the hypotheses of backward and forward confluence, the reduction axiom for “necessity” [A]□C↔(A→□[A]C)[A]\Box C\leftrightarrow(A\to\Box[A]C) is no longer valid whereas the property of heredity for ◊\Diamond-formulas is no longer verified. Indeed, it does not seem possible to achieve our goal without modifying the language of IPAL.5 In this article, leaving aside for the moment all considerations regarding the operator ◊\Diamond of “possibility”, we replace the operator □\Box of “necessity” with a new binary operator ▹\triangleright of “relativized necessity” interpreted as follows in a birelational model (W,≤,R,V)(W,\le,R,V): given s∈Ws\in W, C▹DC\triangleright D holds at ss if for all t∈Wt\in W, if s≤ts\le t then for all u∈Wu\in W, if tRutRu and CC holds at uu then DD holds at uu. The reader may easily verify that □\Box is definable in terms of ▹\triangleright, seeing that for all formulas DD, □D\Box D holds exactly where ⊤▹D\top\triangleright D holds. More importantly, a reduction axiom for “relativized necessity” can be proposed: the reduction axiom [A](C▹D)↔(A→((A∧[A]C)▹[A]D))[A](C\triangleright D)\leftrightarrow(A\to((A\land[A]C)\triangleright[A]D)) whose validity does not require the hypothesis of backward confluence. Together with the modal axioms (MA1), (MA2) and (MA3) and the necessitation rule (NEC) presented in § 4 and characterizing the properties of ▹\triangleright, the reduction axiom for “relativized necessity” — when added to the reduction axioms already known for atoms, for “false”, etc — makes it possible to axiomatize the validities determined by the class of all birelational models. The addition in § 4 of two other modal axioms (MA4) and (MA5) characterizing further properties of ▹\triangleright makes it possible to axiomatize the validities determined by the class of all birelational models where the modal accessibility relation is an equivalence relation.

In Sections 2 and 3, we introduce the syntax and the semantics of our version of IPAL. In § 4, we present the definitions of our intuitionistic public announcement logics Lmin⁡L_{\min} and LequL_{\mathrm{equ}}. In Section 5, we present results needed for the proofs developed in Section 6 of the completeness of Lmin⁡L_{\min} with respect to validity in the class Cmin⁡\mathcal{C}_{\min} of all birelational models and the completeness of LequL_{\mathrm{equ}} with respect to validity in the class Cequ\mathcal{C}_{\mathrm{equ}} of all birelational models where the modal accessibility relation is an equivalence relation.6 That is to say, in Section 6, we prove the following completeness results:

Proposition 10. Lmin⁡L_{\min} is complete with respect to Cmin⁡\mathcal{C}_{\min}.

Proposition 12. LequL_{\mathrm{equ}} is complete with respect to Cequ\mathcal{C}_{\mathrm{equ}}.

We assume the reader is at home with the basic tools and techniques in intuitionistic logic and modal logic. See [6, 7, 17] for more on them. See [28, 29, 34] for an introduction to intuitionistic modal logic and [9, 11, 25] for an introduction to epistemic logic and dynamic epistemic logic.

Syntax

Let At\mathop{\mathrm{At}} be a countably infinite set (with typical members called atoms and denoted pp, qq, etc). Let FOR\mathop{\mathrm{FOR}} be the countably infinite set (with typical members called formulas and denoted AA, BB, etc) defined as follows:

  • A::=p∣⊥∣⊤∣(A∨A)∣(A∧A)∣(A→A)∣(A▹A)∣[A]AA ::= p \mid\bot\mid\top\mid(A \lor A) \mid(A \land A) \mid(A \to A) \mid(A \triangleright A) \mid[A]A,

where pp ranges over At\mathop{\mathrm{At}}. We follow the standard rules for omission of the parentheses. In particular, for all formulas AA, BB, CC, when we write A∨B▹CA \lor B \triangleright C, A∧B▹CA \land B \triangleright C, A▹B∨CA \triangleright B \lor C and A▹B∧CA \triangleright B \land C, we mean (A∨B)▹C(A \lor B) \triangleright C, (A∧B)▹C(A \land B) \triangleright C, A▹(B∨C)A \triangleright(B \lor C) and A▹(B∧C)A \triangleright(B \land C). For all formulas AA, BB, we write ¬A\neg A as the abbreviation of A→⊥A \to\bot, A↔BA \leftrightarrow B as the abbreviation of (A→B)∧(B→A)(A \to B) \land(B \to A), □A\Box A as the abbreviation of ⊤▹A\top\triangleright A and ■A\blacksquare A as the abbreviation of A▹⊥A \triangleright\bot. Let sf⁡:FOR→℘(FOR)\operatorname{sf} : \mathop{\mathrm{FOR}} \to\wp(\mathop{\mathrm{FOR}}) be the function associating to each formula AA the set sf⁡(A)\operatorname{sf}(A) of all AA’s subformulas. A formula AA is simple if for all formulas BB, CC, B▹C∉sf⁡(A)B \triangleright C \notin\operatorname{sf}(A) and [B]C∉sf⁡(A)[B]C \notin\operatorname{sf}(A). Let FORs\mathop{\mathrm{FOR}}_{\mathrm{s}} be the set of all simple formulas. A simple substitution is a function σ:FORs→FOR\sigma: \mathop{\mathrm{FOR}}_{\mathrm{s}} \to\mathop{\mathrm{FOR}} such that for all simple formulas AA, BB, σ(⊥)=⊥\sigma(\bot)=\bot, σ(⊤)=⊤\sigma(\top)=\top, σ(A∨B)=σ(A)∨σ(B)\sigma(A \lor B)=\sigma(A)\lor\sigma(B), σ(A∧B)=σ(A)∧σ(B)\sigma(A \land B)=\sigma(A)\land\sigma(B) and σ(A→B)=σ(A)→σ(B)\sigma(A \to B)=\sigma(A)\to\sigma(B). A formula AA is direct if for all formulas BB, CC, if B▹C∈sf⁡(A)B \triangleright C \in\operatorname{sf}(A) then B=⊤B=\top. Let FORd\mathop{\mathrm{FOR}}_{\mathrm{d}} be the set of all direct formulas. Obviously, direct formulas can also be considered as formulas of the language of IPAL. A formula AA is modal if for all formulas BB, CC, [B]C∉sf⁡(A)[B]C \notin\operatorname{sf}(A). Let FORm\mathop{\mathrm{FOR}}_{\mathrm{m}} be the set of all modal formulas. Obviously, direct modal formulas can also be considered as ◊\Diamond-free formulas of the language of intuitionistic modal logics developed in [12, 31, 33]. Let deg⁡:FOR→N\deg: \mathop{\mathrm{FOR}} \to\mathbb{N} be the function defined as follows: deg⁡(p)=deg⁡(⊥)=deg⁡(⊤)=0\deg(p)=\deg(\bot)=\deg(\top)=0, deg⁡(A∨B)=deg⁡(A∧B)=deg⁡(A→B)=deg⁡(A▹B)=max⁡{deg⁡(A),deg⁡(B)}\deg(A\lor B)=\deg(A\land B)=\deg(A\to B)=\deg(A\triangleright B)=\max\{\deg(A),\deg(B)\} and $\deg([A]B)=\deg(A)+2 ×deg⁡(B)+1\times\deg(B)+1. Let ∥⋅∥:FOR⟶N\lVert\cdot\rVert: \mathbf{FOR}\longrightarrow\mathbb{N} be the function associating to each formula AA the number ∥A∥\lVert A\rVert of occurrences of symbols in AA. Let ≺\prec be the binary relation on FOR\mathbf{FOR} such that for all formulas AA, BB, A≺BA\prec B if and only if deg⁡(A)<deg⁡(B)\deg(A)<\deg(B), or deg⁡(A)=deg⁡(B)\deg(A)=\deg(B) and ∥A∥<∥B∥\lVert A\rVert<\lVert B\rVert. Obviously, ≺\prec is a strict order on FOR\mathbf{FOR}. In other respect, FOR\mathbf{FOR} has no infinite ≺\prec-descending chain.

Proposition 1. For all formulas AA, BB, CC and for all atoms pp, A≺A∨BA\prec A\vee B, B≺A∨BB\prec A\vee B, A≺A∧BA\prec A\wedge B, B≺A∧BB\prec A\wedge B, A≺A→BA\prec A\to B, B≺A→BB\prec A\to B, A≺A▹BA\prec A\mathbin{\triangleright}B, B≺A▹BB\prec A\mathbin{\triangleright}B, A≺[A]pA\prec[A]p, A≺[A]⊥A\prec[A]\bot, A≺[A](B∨C)A\prec[A](B\vee C), [A]B≺[A](B∨C)[A]B\prec[A](B\vee C), [A]C≺[A](B∨C)[A]C\prec[A](B\vee C), [A]B≺[A](B∧C)[A]B\prec[A](B\wedge C), [A]C≺[A](B∧C)[A]C\prec[A](B\wedge C), [A]B≺[A](B→C)[A]B\prec[A](B\to C), [A]C≺[A](B→C)[A]C\prec[A](B\to C), A≺[A](B▹C)A\prec[A](B\mathbin{\triangleright}C), [A]B≺[A](B▹C)[A]B\prec[A](B\mathbin{\triangleright}C), [A]C≺[A](B▹C)[A]C\prec[A](B\mathbin{\triangleright}C) and [A∧[A]B]C≺[A][B]C[A\wedge[A]B]C\prec[A][B]C.

The intuitive reading of A▹BA\mathbin{\triangleright}B is “from now on, the agent knows that BB holds when AA holds”. As a result, the intuitive reading of □A\Box A is “from now on, the agent knows that AA holds” and the intuitive reading of ■A\blacksquare A is “from now on, the agent knows that AA does not hold”. In other respect, the intuitive reading of [A]B[A]B is “from now on, BB holds after it has been publicly announced that AA holds”.

Semantics

A frame is a structure of the form (W,≤,R)(W,\leq,R) where WW is a nonempty set (with typical members denoted ss, tt, etc), ≤\leq is a preorder on WW and RR is a binary relation on WW.7 Let Cmin⁡\mathcal{C}_{\min} be the class of all frames. Let Cequ\mathcal{C}_{\mathrm{equ}} be the class of all frames (W,≤,R)(W,\leq,R) where RR is an equivalence relation on WW, i.e. RR is reflexive, symmetric and transitive. For all frames (W,≤,R)(W,\leq,R), a subset UU of WW is increasing if for all s,t∈Ws,t\in W, if s∈Us\in U and s≤ts\leq t then t∈Ut\in U. A valuation on a frame (W,≤,R)(W,\leq,R) is a function V:At⟶℘(W)V:\mathit{At}\longrightarrow\wp(W) such that for all atoms pp, V(p)V(p) is increasing. A model is a structure of the form (W,≤,R,V)(W,\leq,R,V) where (W,≤,R)(W,\leq,R) is a frame and V:At⟶℘(W)V:\mathit{At}\longrightarrow\wp(W) is a valuation on (W,≤,R)(W,\leq,R). Obviously, for all models (W,≤,R,V)(W,\leq,R,V) and for all subsets UU of WW, if UU is nonempty then the restriction of (W,≤,R,V)(W,\leq,R,V) to UU is a model. In other respect, for all models (W,≤,R,V)(W,\leq,R,V) based on a frame in Cequ\mathcal{C}_{\mathrm{equ}} and for all subsets UU of WW, if UU is nonempty then the restriction of (W,≤,R,V)(W,\leq,R,V) to UU is a model based on a frame in Cequ\mathcal{C}_{\mathrm{equ}}. For all formulas CC, given a model (W,≤,R,V)(W,\leq,R,V) and s∈Ws\in W, the truth condition of CC in (W,≤,R,V)(W,\leq,R,V) at ss (in symbols (W,≤,R,V),s⊨C(W,\leq,R,V),s\models C) is defined as follows:8

  • (W,≤,R,V),s⊨p(W,\leq,R,V),s\models p if and only if s∈V(p)s\in V(p),

  • (W,≤,R,V),s⊨A→B(W,\leq,R,V),s\models A\to B if and only if for all t∈Wt\in W, if s≤ts\leq t then (W,≤,R,V),t⊭A(W,\leq,R,V),t\not\models A, or (W,≤,R,V),t⊨B(W,\leq,R,V),t\models B,

  • (W,≤,R,V),s⊨A▹B(W,\leq,R,V),s\models A\mathbin{\triangleright}B if and only if for all t∈Wt\in W, if s≤ts\leq t then for all u∈Wu\in W, if tRutRu then (W,≤,R,V),u⊭A(W,\leq,R,V),u\not\models A, or (W,≤,R,V),u⊨B(W,\leq,R,V),u\models B,9

  • (W,≤,R,V),s⊨[A]B(W,\leq,R,V),s\models[A]B if and only if for all t∈Wt\in W, if s≤ts\leq t then (W,≤,R,V),t⊭A(W,\leq,R,V),t\not\models A, or (W,≤,R,V)+A,t⊨B(W,\leq,R,V)^{+A},t\models B,

where (W,≤,R,V)+A(W,\le,R,V)^{+A} denotes the restriction of (W,≤,R,V)(W,\le,R,V) to the set of all v∈Wv\in W such that (W,≤,R,V),v⊨A(W,\le,R,V),v\models A. The reader may easily verify by induction on the formula CC that for all models (W,≤,R,V)(W,\le,R,V) and for all s,t∈Ws,t\in W, if (W,≤,R,V),s⊨C(W,\le,R,V),s\models C and s≤ts\le t then (W,≤,R,V),t⊨C(W,\le,R,V),t\models C.10

Proposition 2. Given a model (W,≤,R,V)(W,\le,R,V), for all s∈Ws\in W and for all formulas AA, BB, (W,≤,R,V),s⊨¬A(W,\le,R,V),s\models\neg A if and only if for all t∈Wt\in W, if s≤ts\le t then (W,≤,R,V),t⊭A(W,\le,R,V),t\not\models A, (W,≤,R,V),s⊨A↔B(W,\le,R,V),s\models A\leftrightarrow B if and only if for all t∈Wt\in W, if s≤ts\le t then (W,≤,R,V),t⊨A(W,\le,R,V),t\models A if and only if (W,≤,R,V),t⊨B(W,\le,R,V),t\models B, (W,≤,R,V),s⊨□A(W,\le,R,V),s\models\Box A if and only if for all t∈Wt\in W, if s≤ts\le t then for all u∈Wu\in W, if tRutRu then (W,≤,R,V),u⊨A(W,\le,R,V),u\models A and (W,≤,R,V),s⊨■A(W,\le,R,V),s\models\blacksquare A if and only if for all t∈Wt\in W, if s≤ts\le t then for all u∈Wu\in W, if tRutRu then (W,≤,R,V),u⊭A(W,\le,R,V),u\not\models A.11

Obviously, for all formulas AA, BB, for all models (W,≤,R,V)(W,\le,R,V) and for all s∈Ws\in W, if ss belongs to (W,≤,R,V)+A(W,\le,R,V)^{+A} and (W,≤,R,V)+A,s⊨B(W,\le,R,V)^{+A},s\models B then (W,≤,R,V),s⊨[A]B(W,\le,R,V),s\models[A]B. Moreover, for all formulas AA, BB, for all models (W,≤,R,V)(W,\le,R,V) and for all s∈Ws\in W, ss belongs to (W,≤,R,V)+A∧[A]B(W,\le,R,V)^{+A\wedge[A]B} if and only if ss belongs to (W,≤,R,V)+A(W,\le,R,V)^{+A} and ss belongs to (W,≤,R,V)+A+B(W,\le,R,V)^{+A+B}. In other respect, when these conditions hold, (W,≤,R,V)+A∧[A]B=(W,≤,R,V)+A+B(W,\le,R,V)^{+A\wedge[A]B}=(W,\le,R,V)^{+A+B}. A formula CC is true in a model (W,≤,R,V)(W,\le,R,V) (in symbols (W,≤,R,V)⊨C(W,\le,R,V)\models C) if for all s∈Ws\in W, s⊨Cs\models C. A formula CC is valid in a frame (W,≤,R)(W,\le,R) (in symbols (W,≤,R)⊨C(W,\le,R)\models C) if for all valuations V:At→P(W)V:\mathrm{At}\to\mathcal{P}(W) on (W,≤,R)(W,\le,R), (W,≤,R,V)⊨C(W,\le,R,V)\models C. A formula CC is valid on a class C\mathcal{C} of frames (in symbols C⊨C\mathcal{C}\models C) if for all frames (W,≤,R)(W,\le,R) in C\mathcal{C}, (W,≤,R)⊨C(W,\le,R)\models C.

Axiomatization

A logic is a set L\mathrm{L} of formulas such that

(IPL) for all simple substitutions σ:FORs→FOR\sigma:\mathrm{FOR}_{\mathrm{s}}\to\mathrm{FOR} and for all intuitionistically valid simple formulas AA, L\mathrm{L} contains σ(A)\sigma(A),

(MP) for all formulas AA, BB, if A∈LA\in\mathrm{L} and A→B∈LA\to B\in\mathrm{L} then B∈LB\in\mathrm{L},

(MA) for all formulas AA, BB, CC, DD, L\mathrm{L} contains

(MA1) A▹AA\mathbin{\triangleright}A,

(MA2) (A▹C)∧(B▹C)→(A∨B▹C)(A\mathbin{\triangleright}C)\wedge(B\mathbin{\triangleright}C)\to(A\vee B\mathbin{\triangleright}C),

(MA3) (A▹B)∧(C▹D)→(A∧(B→C)▹D)(A\mathbin{\triangleright}B)\wedge(C\mathbin{\triangleright}D)\to(A\wedge(B\to C)\mathbin{\triangleright}D),

(NEC) for all formulas AA, BB, CC, if A→B∈LA\to B\in\mathrm{L} then (C▹A)→(C▹B)∈L(C\mathbin{\triangleright}A)\to(C\mathbin{\triangleright}B)\in\mathrm{L} and (B▹C)→(A▹C)∈L(B\mathbin{\triangleright}C)\to(A\mathbin{\triangleright}C)\in\mathrm{L},

(RA) for all formulas AA, BB, CC and for all atoms pp, L\mathrm{L} contains

(RA1) [A]p↔(A→p)[A]p\leftrightarrow(A\to p),

(RA2) [A]⊥↔¬A[A]\bot\leftrightarrow\neg A,

(RA3) [A]⊤↔⊤[A]\top\leftrightarrow\top.

(RA4)[A](B∨C)↔(A→[A]B∨[A]C),9\mathrm{(RA4)}\quad[A](B\vee C)\leftrightarrow(A\to[A]B\vee[A]C),^{9}
(RA5)[A](B∧C)↔[A]B∧[A]C,\mathrm{(RA5)}\quad[A](B\wedge C)\leftrightarrow[A]B\wedge[A]C,
(RA6)[A](B→C)↔([A]B→[A]C),\mathrm{(RA6)}\quad[A](B\to C)\leftrightarrow([A]B\to[A]C),
(RA7)[A](B▹C)↔(A→(A∧[A]B▹[A]C)),10\mathrm{(RA7)}\quad[A](B\triangleright C)\leftrightarrow(A\to(A\wedge[A]B\triangleright[A]C)),^{10}
(RA8)[A][B]C↔[A∧[A]B]C.\mathrm{(RA8)}\quad[A][B]C\leftrightarrow[A\wedge[A]B]C.

Let Σref\Sigma_{\mathrm{ref}} be the least set of formulas containing all formulas of the form

(MA4)(A▹B)→(A→B),\mathrm{(MA4)}\quad(A\triangleright B)\to(A\to B),

where AA, BB range over FOR. Let Σsym\Sigma_{\mathrm{sym}} be the least set of formulas containing all formulas of the form

(MA5)(A▹B∨(C▹D))→((D→(A▹B))→(C→(A▹B))),\mathrm{(MA5)}\quad(A\triangleright B\vee(C\triangleright D))\to((D\to(A\triangleright B))\to(C\to(A\triangleright B))),

where AA, BB, CC, DD range over FOR. Let Lmin⁡\mathrm{L}_{\min} be the least logic. Let Lequ\mathrm{L}_{\mathrm{equ}} be the least logic containing Σref∪Σsym\Sigma_{\mathrm{ref}}\cup\Sigma_{\mathrm{sym}}. A logic L\mathrm{L} is consistent if ⊥∉L\bot\notin\mathrm{L}. Obviously, for all logics L\mathrm{L}, L\mathrm{L} is consistent if and only if L≠FOR\mathrm{L}\ne\mathrm{FOR}. A logic L\mathrm{L} is sound with respect to a class C\mathcal{C} of frames if for all formulas AA, if A∈LA\in\mathrm{L} then C⊨A\mathcal{C}\models A. A logic L\mathrm{L} is complete with respect to a class C\mathcal{C} of frames if for all formulas AA, if C⊨A\mathcal{C}\models A then A∈LA\in\mathrm{L}.

Proposition 3 says that the standard rule of replacement by equivalent is admissible in any logic.

Proposition 3. Let L\mathrm{L} be a logic. For all formulas AA, BB, CC, DD, if A↔B∈LA\leftrightarrow B\in\mathrm{L} and C↔D∈LC\leftrightarrow D\in\mathrm{L} then (A∨C)↔(B∨D)∈L(A\vee C)\leftrightarrow(B\vee D)\in\mathrm{L}, (A∧C)↔(B∧D)∈L(A\wedge C)\leftrightarrow(B\wedge D)\in\mathrm{L}, (A→C)↔(B→D)∈L(A\to C)\leftrightarrow(B\to D)\in\mathrm{L} and (A▹C)↔(B▹D)∈L(A\triangleright C)\leftrightarrow(B\triangleright D)\in\mathrm{L}.

Proof. Let AA, BB, CC, DD be formulas. Suppose A↔B∈LA\leftrightarrow B\in\mathrm{L} and C↔D∈LC\leftrightarrow D\in\mathrm{L}. We only consider the last fact. Since A↔B∈LA\leftrightarrow B\in\mathrm{L} and C↔D∈LC\leftrightarrow D\in\mathrm{L}, therefore A→B∈LA\to B\in\mathrm{L}, B→A∈LB\to A\in\mathrm{L}, C→D∈LC\to D\in\mathrm{L} and D→C∈LD\to C\in\mathrm{L}. Hence, using (NEC), (A▹C)→(B▹C)∈L(A\triangleright C)\to(B\triangleright C)\in\mathrm{L}, (B▹C)→(B▹D)∈L(B\triangleright C)\to(B\triangleright D)\in\mathrm{L}, (B▹D)→(A▹D)∈L(B\triangleright D)\to(A\triangleright D)\in\mathrm{L} and (A▹D)→(A▹C)∈L(A\triangleright D)\to(A\triangleright C)\in\mathrm{L}. Thus, (A▹C)→(B▹D)∈L(A\triangleright C)\to(B\triangleright D)\in\mathrm{L} and (B▹D)→(A▹C)∈L(B\triangleright D)\to(A\triangleright C)\in\mathrm{L}. Consequently, (A▹C)↔(B▹D)∈L(A\triangleright C)\leftrightarrow(B\triangleright D)\in\mathrm{L}.

Proposition 4 says that as for public announcement logic PAL [9], reduction axioms provide in any logic, a deterministic algorithm producing given a formula, a provably equivalent modal formula.

Proposition 4. Let LL be a logic. There exists a deterministic algorithm producing given a formula AA, a modal formula BB such that A↔B∈LA \leftrightarrow B \in L.

Proof. By Proposition 1, let τ:FOR⟶FORm\tau: \mathbf{FOR} \longrightarrow\mathbf{FOR}_{\mathrm{m}} be the function defined as follows: τ(p)=p\tau(p)=p, τ(⊥)=⊥\tau(\bot)=\bot, τ(⊤)=⊤\tau(\top)=\top, τ(A∨B)=τ(A)∨τ(B)\tau(A\lor B)=\tau(A)\lor\tau(B), τ(A∧B)=τ(A)∧τ(B)\tau(A\land B)=\tau(A)\land\tau(B), τ(A→B)=τ(A)→τ(B)\tau(A\to B)=\tau(A)\to\tau(B), τ(A▹B)=τ(A)▹τ(B)\tau(A\mathbin{\triangleright}B)=\tau(A)\mathbin{\triangleright}\tau(B), τ([A]p)=τ(A)→p\tau([A]p)=\tau(A)\to p, τ([A]⊥)=¬τ(A)\tau([A]\bot)=\neg\tau(A), τ([A]⊤)=⊤\tau([A]\top)=\top, τ([A](B∨C))=τ(A)→(τ([A]B)∨τ([A]C))\tau([A](B\lor C))=\tau(A)\to(\tau([A]B)\lor\tau([A]C)), τ([A](B∧C))=τ([A]B)∧τ([A]C)\tau([A](B\land C))=\tau([A]B)\land\tau([A]C), τ([A](B→C))=τ([A]B)→τ([A]C)\tau([A](B\to C))=\tau([A]B)\to\tau([A]C), τ([A](B▹C))=τ(A)→(τ(A)∧τ([A]B)▹τ([A]C))\tau([A](B\mathbin{\triangleright}C))=\tau(A)\to(\tau(A)\land\tau([A]B)\mathbin{\triangleright}\tau([A]C)) and τ([A][B]C)=τ([A∧[A]B]C)\tau([A][B]C)=\tau([A\land[A]B]C). The reader may easily verify by induction on the formula AA that A↔τ(A)∈LA\leftrightarrow\tau(A)\in L.

Our goal is to show the equivalences “for all formulas AA, A∈Lmin⁡A\in L_{\min} if and only if Cmin⁡⊨A\mathcal{C}_{\min}\vDash A” and “for all formulas AA, A∈LequA\in L_{\mathrm{equ}} if and only if Cequ⊨A\mathcal{C}_{\mathrm{equ}}\vDash A”. With Propositions 5 and 6, we show the implications “for all formulas AA, if A∈Lmin⁡A\in L_{\min} then Cmin⁡⊨A\mathcal{C}_{\min}\vDash A” and “for all formulas AA, if A∈LequA\in L_{\mathrm{equ}} then Cequ⊨A\mathcal{C}_{\mathrm{equ}}\vDash A”. The converse implications “for all formulas AA, if Cmin⁡⊨A\mathcal{C}_{\min}\vDash A then A∈Lmin⁡A\in L_{\min}” and “for all formulas AA, if Cequ⊨A\mathcal{C}_{\mathrm{equ}}\vDash A then A∈LequA\in L_{\mathrm{equ}}” will be shown in Section 6 with Propositions 10 and 12.

Proposition 5 (Soundness of Lmin⁡L_{\min}). Lmin⁡L_{\min} is sound with respect to Cmin⁡\mathcal{C}_{\min}.

Proof. It suffices to demonstrate that (IPL), (MP), (MA1), (MA2), (MA3), (NEC) and (RA1)–(RA8) give rise to Cmin⁡\mathcal{C}_{\min}-valid formulas. We only consider the “left to right” direction of the cases of (RA7) and (RA8).

Case of (RA7): For the sake of the contradiction, suppose there exists formulas AA, BB, CC such that [A](B▹C)→(A→(A∧[A]B▹[A]C))[A](B\mathbin{\triangleright}C)\to(A\to(A\land[A]B\mathbin{\triangleright}[A]C)) is not Cmin⁡\mathcal{C}_{\min}-valid. Hence, there exists a model (W,≤,R,V)(W,\leq,R,V) and there exists s∈Ws\in W such that (W,≤,R,V),s⊨[A](B▹C)(W,\leq,R,V),s\vDash[A](B\mathbin{\triangleright}C), (W,≤,R,V),s⊨A(W,\leq,R,V),s\vDash A and (W,≤,R,V),s⊭A∧[A]B▹[A]C(W,\leq,R,V),s\not\vDash A\land[A]B\mathbin{\triangleright}[A]C. Thus, (W,≤,R,V)+A,s⊨B▹C(W,\leq,R,V)^{+A},s\vDash B\mathbin{\triangleright}C. Moreover, there exists t∈Wt\in W such that s≤ts\leq t and there exists u∈Wu\in W such that tRutRu, (W,≤,R,V),u⊨A∧[A]B(W,\leq,R,V),u\vDash A\land[A]B and (W,≤,R,V),u⊭[A]C(W,\leq,R,V),u\not\vDash[A]C. Since (W,≤,R,V),s⊨A(W,\leq,R,V),s\vDash A, therefore (W,≤,R,V),t⊨A(W,\leq,R,V),t\vDash A.14 Moreover, (W,≤,R,V),u⊨A(W,\leq,R,V),u\vDash A and (W,≤,R,V),u⊨[A]B(W,\leq,R,V),u\vDash[A]B. Consequently, (W,≤,R,V)+A,u⊨B(W,\leq,R,V)^{+A},u\vDash B. Since (W,≤,R,V)+A,s⊨B▹C(W,\leq,R,V)^{+A},s\vDash B\mathbin{\triangleright}C, s≤ts\leq t, tRutRu, (W,≤,R,V),t⊨A(W,\leq,R,V),t\vDash A and (W,≤,R,V),u⊨A(W,\leq,R,V),u\vDash A, therefore (W,≤,R,V)+A,u⊨C(W,\leq,R,V)^{+A},u\vDash C. Hence, (W,≤,R,V),u⊨[A]C(W,\leq,R,V),u\vDash[A]C: a contradiction.

Case of (RA8): For the sake of the contradiction, suppose there exists formulas AA, BB, CC such that [A][B]C→[A∧[A]B]C[A][B]C\to[A\land[A]B]C is not Cmin⁡\mathcal{C}_{\min}-valid. Thus, there exists a model (W,≤,R,V)(W,\leq,R,V) and there exists s∈Ws\in W such that (W,≤,R,V),s⊨[A][B]C(W,\leq,R,V),s\vDash[A][B]C and (W,≤,R,V),s⊭[A∧[A]B]C(W,\leq,R,V),s\not\vDash[A\land[A]B]C. Consequently, there exists t∈Wt\in W such that s≤ts\leq t, (W,≤,R,V),t⊨A∧[A]B(W,\leq,R,V),t\vDash A\land[A]B and (W,≤,R,V)+A∧[A]B,t⊭C(W,\leq,R,V)^{+A\land[A]B},t\not\vDash C. Hence, (W,≤,R,V),t⊨A(W,\leq,R,V),t\vDash A and (W,≤,R,V)+A,t⊨[A]B(W,\leq,R,V)^{+A},t\vDash[A]B. Thus, (W,≤,R,V)+A,t⊨B(W,\leq,R,V)^{+A},t\vDash B. Moreover, since (W,≤,R,V),s⊨[A][B]C(W,\leq,R,V),s\vDash[A][B]C and s≤ts\leq t, therefore (W,≤,R,V)+A,t⊨[B]C(W,\leq,R,V)^{+A},t\vDash[B]C. Consequently, (W,≤,R,V)+A+B,t⊨C(W,\leq,R,V)^{+A+B},t\vDash C. Since tt belongs to (W,≤,R,V)+A∧[A]B(W,\leq,R,V)^{+A\wedge[A]B}, tt belongs to (W,≤,R,V)+A(W,\leq,R,V)^{+A} and tt belongs to (W,≤,R,V)+A+B(W,\leq,R,V)^{+A+B}, therefore (W,≤,R,V)+A∧[A]B=(W,≤,R,V)+A+B(W,\leq,R,V)^{+A\wedge[A]B}=(W,\leq,R,V)^{+A+B}. Since (W,≤,R,V)+A+B(W,\leq,R,V)^{+A+B}, t⊨Ct\models C, therefore (W,≤,R,V)+A∧[A]B,t⊨C(W,\leq,R,V)^{+A\wedge[A]B},t\models C: a contradiction.

Proposition 6 (Soundness of Lequ\mathrm{L}_{\mathrm{equ}}). Lequ\mathrm{L}_{\mathrm{equ}} is sound with respect to Cequ\mathcal{C}_{\mathrm{equ}}.

Proof. It suffices to demonstrate that (IPL), (MP), (MA1)–(MA5), (NEC) and (RA1)–(RA8) give rise to Cequ\mathcal{C}_{\mathrm{equ}}-valid formulas. We only consider the cases of (MA4) and (MA5).

Case of (MA4): For the sake of the contradiction, suppose there exists formulas AA, BB such that (A▹B)→(A→B)(A\mathbin{\triangleright}B)\to(A\to B) is not Cequ\mathcal{C}_{\mathrm{equ}}-valid. Hence, there exists a model (W,≤,R,V)(W,\leq,R,V) based on a frame in Cequ\mathcal{C}_{\mathrm{equ}} and there exists s∈Ws\in W such that (W,≤,R,V),s⊨A▹B(W,\leq,R,V),s\models A\mathbin{\triangleright}B, (W,≤,R,V),s⊨A(W,\leq,R,V),s\models A and (W,≤,R,V),s⊭B(W,\leq,R,V),s\not\models B. Since RR is reflexive, therefore (W,≤,R,V),s⊨B(W,\leq,R,V),s\models B: a contradiction.

Case of (MA5): For the sake of the contradiction, suppose there exists formulas A,B,C,DA,B,C,D such that (A▹B∨(C▹D))→((D→(A▹B))→(C→(A▹B)))(A\mathbin{\triangleright}B\vee(C\mathbin{\triangleright}D))\to((D\to(A\mathbin{\triangleright}B))\to(C\to(A\mathbin{\triangleright}B))) is not Cequ\mathcal{C}_{\mathrm{equ}}-valid. Thus, there exists a model (W,≤,R,V)(W,\leq,R,V) based on a frame in Cequ\mathcal{C}_{\mathrm{equ}} and there exists s∈Ws\in W such that (W,≤,R,V),s⊨A▹B∨(C▹D)(W,\leq,R,V),s\models A\mathbin{\triangleright}B\vee(C\mathbin{\triangleright}D), (W,≤,R,V),s⊨D→(A▹B)(W,\leq,R,V),s\models D\to(A\mathbin{\triangleright}B), (W,≤,R,V),s⊨C(W,\leq,R,V),s\models C and (W,≤,R,V),s⊭A▹B(W,\leq,R,V),s\not\models A\mathbin{\triangleright}B. Consequently, there exists t∈Wt\in W such that s≤ts\leq t and there exists u∈Wu\in W such that tRutRu, (W,≤,R,V),u⊨A(W,\leq,R,V),u\models A and (W,≤,R,V),u⊭B(W,\leq,R,V),u\not\models B. Since (W,≤,R,V),s⊨C(W,\leq,R,V),s\models C, therefore (W,≤,R,V),t⊨C(W,\leq,R,V),t\models C. Moreover, since (W,≤,R,V),s⊨A▹B∨(C▹D)(W,\leq,R,V),s\models A\mathbin{\triangleright}B\vee(C\mathbin{\triangleright}D), therefore (W,≤,R,V),u⊨B∨(C▹D)(W,\leq,R,V),u\models B\vee(C\mathbin{\triangleright}D). Thus, (W,≤,R,V),u⊨B(W,\leq,R,V),u\models B, or (W,≤,R,V),u⊨C▹D(W,\leq,R,V),u\models C\mathbin{\triangleright}D. Since (W,≤,R,V),u⊭B(W,\leq,R,V),u\not\models B, therefore (W,≤,R,V),u⊨C▹D(W,\leq,R,V),u\models C\mathbin{\triangleright}D. Since RR is symmetric, tRutRu and (W,≤,R,V),t⊨C(W,\leq,R,V),t\models C, therefore (W,≤,R,V),t⊨D(W,\leq,R,V),t\models D. Since (W,≤,R,V),s⊨D→(A▹B)(W,\leq,R,V),s\models D\to(A\mathbin{\triangleright}B) and s≤ts\leq t, therefore (W,≤,R,V),t⊨(A▹B)(W,\leq,R,V),t\models(A\mathbin{\triangleright}B). Since tRutRu and (W,≤,R,V),u⊨A(W,\leq,R,V),u\models A, therefore (W,≤,R,V),u⊨B(W,\leq,R,V),u\models B: a contradiction.

Theories

In this section, we provide definitions and results concerning the elements composing the canonical frame of Lmin⁡\mathrm{L}_{\min} and the canonical frame of Lequ\mathrm{L}_{\mathrm{equ}} defined in Section 6.

Let L\mathrm{L} be a consistent logic. A L\mathrm{L}-theory is a set Γ\Gamma of formulas such that L⊆Γ\mathrm{L}\subseteq\Gamma and for all formulas AA, BB, if A∈ΓA\in\Gamma and A→B∈ΓA\to B\in\Gamma then B∈ΓB\in\Gamma. A L\mathrm{L}-theory Γ\Gamma is proper if ⊥∉Γ\bot\notin\Gamma. Obviously, for all L\mathrm{L}-theories Γ\Gamma, Γ\Gamma is proper if and only if Γ≠FOR\Gamma\neq\mathrm{FOR}. A proper L\mathrm{L}-theory Γ\Gamma is prime if for all formulas AA, BB, if A∨B∈ΓA\vee B\in\Gamma then A∈ΓA\in\Gamma, or B∈ΓB\in\Gamma. For all L\mathrm{L}-theories Γ\Gamma and for all formulas AA, let Γ+A={B∈FOR:A→B∈Γ}\Gamma^{+A}=\{B\in\mathrm{FOR}: A\to B\in\Gamma\}. It immediately follows from these definitions that for all L\mathrm{L}-theories Γ\Gamma and for all formulas AA, Γ+A\Gamma^{+A} is the least L\mathrm{L}we show with Propositions 7 and 8 results that will play for Lmin⁡\mathbf{L}_{\min} and for Lequ\mathbf{L}_{\mathrm{equ}} the role played by the Existence Lemma in classical modal logic [6 Lemma 4.20].

Proposition 7. For all L-theories Γ\Gamma and for all formulas AA, BB, if A▹B∉ΓA\mathbin{\triangleright}B\notin\Gamma then there exists a prime L-theory Δ\Delta such that (i) for all formulas CC, DD, if C▹D∈ΓC\mathbin{\triangleright}D\in\Gamma then C∉ΔC\notin\Delta, or D∈ΔD\in\Delta, (ii) A∈ΔA\in\Delta and (iii) B∉ΔB\notin\Delta.

Proof. 15 Let Γ\Gamma be a L-theory and AA, BB be formulas. Suppose A▹B∉ΓA\mathbin{\triangleright}B\notin\Gamma. Notice that using (MA1), B▹B∈ΓB\mathbin{\triangleright}B\in\Gamma. Let S={(Δ,Λ):Δ\mathcal{S}=\{(\Delta,\Lambda):\Delta is a L-theory and Λ\Lambda is a set of formulas such that for all C∈ΔC\in\Delta, for all n∈Nn\in\mathbb{N} and for all D1,…,Dn∈ΛD_1,\ldots,D_n\in\Lambda, C▹(D1∨…(Dn∨⊥)…)∉ΓC\mathbin{\triangleright}(D_1\lor\ldots(D_n\lor\bot)\ldots)\notin\Gamma, A∈ΔA\in\Delta and B∈Λ}B\in\Lambda\}.

We claim that (L+A,{B})∈S(\mathbf{L}+A,\{B\})\in\mathcal{S}. If not, there exists C∈L+AC\in\mathbf{L}+A, there exists n∈Nn\in\mathbb{N} and there exists D1,…,Dn∈{B}D_1,\ldots,D_n\in\{B\} such that C▹(D1∨…(Dn∨⊥)…)∈ΓC\mathbin{\triangleright}(D_1\lor\ldots(D_n\lor\bot)\ldots)\in\Gamma. Hence, A→C∈LA\to C\in\mathbf{L}. Moreover, (D1∨…(Dn∨⊥)…)→B∈L(D_1\lor\ldots(D_n\lor\bot)\ldots)\to B\in\mathbf{L}. Thus, using (NEC), (C▹(D1∨…(Dn∨⊥)…))→(A▹(D1∨…(Dn∨⊥)…))∈L(C\mathbin{\triangleright}(D_1\lor\ldots(D_n\lor\bot)\ldots))\to(A\mathbin{\triangleright}(D_1\lor\ldots(D_n\lor\bot)\ldots))\in\mathbf{L} and (A▹(D1∨…(Dn∨⊥)…))→(A▹B)∈L(A\mathbin{\triangleright}(D_1\lor\ldots(D_n\lor\bot)\ldots))\to(A\mathbin{\triangleright}B)\in\mathbf{L}. Consequently, (C▹(D1∨…(Dn∨⊥)…))→(A▹B)∈L(C\mathbin{\triangleright}(D_1\lor\ldots(D_n\lor\bot)\ldots))\to(A\mathbin{\triangleright}B)\in\mathbf{L}. Since C▹(D1∨…(Dn∨⊥)…)∈ΓC\mathbin{\triangleright}(D_1\lor\ldots(D_n\lor\bot)\ldots)\in\Gamma, therefore A▹B∈ΓA\mathbin{\triangleright}B\in\Gamma: a contradiction. Therefore (L+A,{B})∈S(\mathbf{L}+A,\{B\})\in\mathcal{S}. Hence, S\mathcal{S} is nonempty. Moreover, obviously, for all nonempty chains (Δi,Λi)i∈I(\Delta_i,\Lambda_i)_{i\in I} of elements of S\mathcal{S}, (⋃{Δi:i∈I},⋃{Λi:i∈I})(\bigcup\{\Delta_i:i\in I\},\bigcup\{\Lambda_i:i\in I\}) is an element of S\mathcal{S}. Thus, by Kuratowski-Zorn Lemma, S\mathcal{S} possesses a maximal element (Δ,Λ)(\Delta,\Lambda). Consequently, Δ\Delta is a L-theory and Λ\Lambda is a set of formulas such that

(∗)(*) for all C∈ΔC\in\Delta, for all n∈Nn\in\mathbb{N} and for all D1,…,Dn∈ΛD_1,\ldots,D_n\in\Lambda, C▹(D1∨…(Dn∨⊥)…)∉ΓC\mathbin{\triangleright}(D_1\lor\ldots(D_n\lor\bot)\ldots)\notin\Gamma,

(∗∗)(**) A∈ΔA\in\Delta,

(∗∗∗)(***) B∈ΛB\in\Lambda.

We claim that Δ\Delta is proper. If not, Δ=FOR\Delta=\mathrm{FOR}. Hence, B∈ΔB\in\Delta. Since (∗)(*) and (∗∗∗)(***), therefore B▹B∉ΓB\mathbin{\triangleright}B\notin\Gamma: a contradiction. Therefore Δ\Delta is proper.

We claim that Δ\Delta is prime. If not, there exists formulas EE, FF such that E∨F∈ΔE\lor F\in\Delta, E∉ΔE\notin\Delta and F∉ΔF\notin\Delta. Thus, by the maximality of (Δ,Λ)(\Delta,\Lambda) in S\mathcal{S}, (Δ+E,Λ)∉S(\Delta+E,\Lambda)\notin\mathcal{S} and (Δ+F,Λ)∉S(\Delta+F,\Lambda)\notin\mathcal{S}. Consequently, there exists C′∈Δ+EC'\in\Delta+E, there exists n′∈Nn'\in\mathbb{N} and there exists D1′,…,Dn′′∈ΛD'_1,\ldots,D'_{n'}\in\Lambda such that C′▹(D1′∨…(Dn′′∨⊥)…)∈ΓC'\mathbin{\triangleright}(D'_1\lor\ldots(D'_{n'}\lor\bot)\ldots)\in\Gamma and there exists C′′∈Δ+FC''\in\Delta+F, there exists n′′∈Nn''\in\mathbb{N} and there exists D1′′,…,Dn′′′′∈ΛD''_1,\ldots,D''_{n''}\in\Lambda such that C′′▹(D1′′∨…(Dn′′′′∨⊥)…)∈ΓC''\mathbin{\triangleright}(D''_1\lor\ldots(D''_{n''}\lor\bot)\ldots)\in\Gamma. Hence, E→C′∈ΔE\to C'\in\Delta and F→C′′∈ΔF\to C''\in\Delta. Thus, E∨F→C′∨C′′∈ΔE\lor F\to C'\lor C''\in\Delta. Since E∨F∈ΔE\lor F\in\Delta, therefore C′∨C′′∈ΔC'\lor C''\in\Delta. Since (D1′∨…(Dn′′∨⊥)…)→(D1′∨…(Dn′′∨(D1′′∨…(Dn′′′′∨⊥)…))…)∈L(D'_1\lor\ldots(D'_{n'}\lor\bot)\ldots)\to(D'_1\lor\ldots(D'_{n'}\lor(D''_1\lor\ldots(D''_{n''}\lor\bot)\ldots))\ldots)\in\mathbf{L} and (D1′′∨…(Dn′′′′∨⊥)…)→(D1′∨…(Dn′′∨(D1′′∨…(Dn′′′′∨⊥)…))…)∈L(D''_1\lor\ldots(D''_{n''}\lor\bot)\ldots)\to(D'_1\lor\ldots(D'_{n'}\lor(D''_1\lor\ldots(D''_{n''}\lor\bot)\ldots))\ldots)\in\mathbf{L}, therefore using (NEC), (C′▹(D1′∨…(Dn′′∨⊥)…))→(C′▹(D1′∨…(Dn′′∨(D1′′∨…(Dn′′′′∨⊥)…))…))∈L(C'\mathbin{\triangleright}(D'_1\lor\ldots(D'_{n'}\lor\bot)\ldots))\to(C'\mathbin{\triangleright}(D'_1\lor\ldots(D'_{n'}\lor(D''_1\lor\ldots(D''_{n''}\lor\bot)\ldots))\ldots))\in\mathbf{L} and (C′′▹(D1′′∨…(Dn′′′′∨⊥)…))→(C′′▹(D1′∨…(Dn′′∨(D1′′∨…(Dn′′′′∨⊥)…))…))∈L(C''\mathbin{\triangleright}(D''_1\lor\ldots(D''_{n''}\lor\bot)\ldots))\to(C''\mathbin{\triangleright}(D'_1\lor\ldots(D'_{n'}\lor(D''_1\lor\ldots(D''_{n''}\lor\bot)\ldots))\ldots))\in\mathbf{L}. Since C′▹(D1′∨…(Dn′′∨⊥)…)∈ΓC'\mathbin{\triangleright}(D'_1\lor\ldots(D'_{n'}\lor\bot)\ldots)\in\Gamma and C′′▹(D1′′∨…(Dn′′′′∨⊥)…)∈ΓC''\mathbin{\triangleright}(D''_1\lor\ldots(D''_{n''}\lor\bot)\ldots)\in\Gamma, therefore C′▹(D1′∨…(Dn′′∨(D1′′∨…(Dn′′′′∨⊥)…))…)∈ΓC'\mathbin{\triangleright}(D'_1\lor\ldots(D'_{n'}\lor(D''_1\lor\ldots(D''_{n''}\lor\bot)\ldots))\ldots)\in\Gamma and C′′▹(D1′∨…(Dn′′∨(D1′′∨…(Dn′′′′∨⊥)…))…)∈ΓC''\mathbin{\triangleright}(D'_1\lor\ldots(D'_{n'}\lor(D''_1\lor\ldots(D''_{n''}\lor\bot)\ldots))\ldots)\in\Gamma. Consequently, using (MA2), C′∨C′′▹(D1′∨…(Dn′′∨(D1′′∨…(Dn′′′′∨⊥)…))…)∈ΓC'\lor C''\mathbin{\triangleright}(D'_1\lor\ldots(D'_{n'}\lor(D''_1\lor\ldots(D''_{n''}\lor\bot)\ldots))\ldots)\in\Gamma. Since (∗)(*), D1′,…,Dn′′∈ΛD'_1,\ldots,D'_{n'}\in\Lambda, D1′′,…,Dn′′′′∈ΛD''_1,\ldots,D''_{n''}\in\Lambda and C′∨C′′∈ΔC'\lor C''\in\Delta, therefore C′∨C′′▹(D1′∨…(Dn′′∨(D1′′∨…(Dn′′′′∨⊥)…))…)∉ΓC'\lor C''\mathbin{\triangleright}(D'_1\lor\ldots(D'_{n'}\lor(D''_1\lor\ldots(D''_{n''}\lor\bot)\ldots))\ldots)\notin\Gamma: a contradiction.

We claim that for all formulas CC, DD, if C▹D∈ΓC\mathbin{\triangleright}D\in\Gamma then C∉ΔC\notin\Delta, or D∈ΔD\in\Delta. If not, there exists formulas C,DC,D such that C▹D∈ΓC\triangleright D\in\Gamma, C∈ΔC\in\Delta and D∉ΔD\notin\Delta. Hence, by the maximality of (Δ,Λ)(\Delta,\Lambda) in SS, (Δ+D,Λ)∉S(\Delta+D,\Lambda)\notin S. Thus, there exists C′∈Δ+DC'\in\Delta+D, there exists n′∈Nn'\in\mathbb{N} and there exists D1′,…,Dn′′∈ΛD'_1,\ldots,D'_{n'}\in\Lambda such that C′▹(D1′∨…(Dn′′∨⊥)…)∈ΓC'\triangleright(D'_1\vee\ldots(D'_{n'}\vee\bot)\ldots)\in\Gamma. Consequently, D→C′∈ΔD\to C'\in\Delta. Since C∈ΔC\in\Delta, therefore C∧(D→C′)∈ΔC\wedge(D\to C')\in\Delta. Since (∗)(*) and D1′,…,Dn′′∈ΛD'_1,\ldots,D'_{n'}\in\Lambda, therefore C∧(D→C′)▹(D1′∨…(Dn′′∨⊥)…)∉ΓC\wedge(D\to C')\triangleright(D'_1\vee\ldots(D'_{n'}\vee\bot)\ldots)\notin\Gamma. Since C▹D∈ΓC\triangleright D\in\Gamma and C′▹(D1′∨…(Dn′′∨⊥)…)∈ΓC'\triangleright(D'_1\vee\ldots(D'_{n'}\vee\bot)\ldots)\in\Gamma, therefore using (MA3), C∧(D→C′)▹(D1′∨…(Dn′′∨⊥)…)∈ΓC\wedge(D\to C')\triangleright(D'_1\vee\ldots(D'_{n'}\vee\bot)\ldots)\in\Gamma: a contradiction.

We claim that B∉ΔB\notin\Delta. If not, since (∗)(*) and (∗∗∗)(***), therefore B▹B∉ΓB\triangleright B\notin\Gamma: a contradiction. Therefore B∉ΔB\notin\Delta.

Proposition 8. If LL contains Lequ\mathbf{L}_{\mathrm{equ}} then for all LL-theories Γ\Gamma and for all formulas A,BA,B, if A▹B∉ΓA\triangleright B\notin\Gamma then there exists a prime LL-theory Δ\Delta such that Γ⊆Δ\Gamma\subseteq\Delta and there exists a prime LL-theory Λ\Lambda such that (i) for all formulas C,DC,D, if C▹D∈ΔC\triangleright D\in\Delta then C∉ΛC\notin\Lambda, or D∈ΛD\in\Lambda, (ii) for all formulas C,DC,D, if C▹D∈ΛC\triangleright D\in\Lambda then C∉ΔC\notin\Delta, or D∈ΔD\in\Delta, (iii) A∈ΛA\in\Lambda and (iv) B∉ΛB\notin\Lambda.

Proof. 16 Suppose LL contains Lequ\mathbf{L}_{\mathrm{equ}}. Let Γ\Gamma be a LL-theory and A,BA,B be formulas. Suppose A▹B∉ΓA\triangleright B\notin\Gamma. Let S={Δ:Δ is a L-theory such that Γ⊆Δ and A▹B∉Δ}S=\{\Delta:\Delta\text{ is a }L\text{-theory such that }\Gamma\subseteq\Delta\text{ and }A\triangleright B\notin\Delta\}. Since A▹B∉ΓA\triangleright B\notin\Gamma, therefore Γ∈S\Gamma\in S. Hence, SS is nonempty. Moreover, obviously, for all non-empty chains (Δi)i∈I(\Delta_i)_{i\in I} of elements of SS, ⋃{Δi:i∈I}\bigcup\{\Delta_i:i\in I\} is an element of SS. Thus, by Kuratowski-Zorn Lemma, SS possesses a maximal element Δ\Delta. Consequently, Δ\Delta is a LL-theory such that Γ⊆Δ\Gamma\subseteq\Delta and A▹B∉ΔA\triangleright B\notin\Delta. Imitating the standard results about theories in intuitionistic propositional logic, the reader may easily demonstrate that Δ\Delta is proper and prime. Notice that using (MA1), B▹B∈ΔB\triangleright B\in\Delta. Let T={(Λ,Θ):Λ is a L-theory and Θ is a set of formulas such that for all C∈Λ\mathcal{T}=\{(\Lambda,\Theta):\Lambda\text{ is a }L\text{-theory and }\Theta\text{ is a set of formulas such that for all }C\in\Lambda, for all n∈Nn\in\mathbb{N} and for all D1,…,Dn∈ΘD_1,\ldots,D_n\in\Theta, C▹(D1∨…(Dn∨⊥)…)∉Δ, for all C∈Δ and for all D∈FOR∖Δ, C▹D∈Θ, A∈Λ and B∈Θ}C\triangleright(D_1\vee\ldots(D_n\vee\bot)\ldots)\notin\Delta,\text{ for all }C\in\Delta\text{ and for all }D\in\mathbf{FOR}\setminus\Delta,\ C\triangleright D\in\Theta,\ A\in\Lambda\text{ and }B\in\Theta\}.

We claim that (L+A,{B}∪{C▹D:C∈Δ and D∈FOR∖Δ})∈T(L+A,\{B\}\cup\{C\triangleright D:C\in\Delta\text{ and }D\in\mathbf{FOR}\setminus\Delta\})\in\mathcal{T}. If not, there exists E∈L+AE\in L+A, there exists n∈Nn\in\mathbb{N} and there exists F1,…,Fn∈{B}∪{C▹D:C∈Δ and D∈FOR∖Δ}F_1,\ldots,F_n\in\{B\}\cup\{C\triangleright D:C\in\Delta\text{ and }D\in\mathbf{FOR}\setminus\Delta\} such that E▹(F1∨…(Fn∨⊥)…)∈ΔE\triangleright(F_1\vee\ldots(F_n\vee\bot)\ldots)\in\Delta. Hence, A→E∈LA\to E\in L. Moreover, there exists n′∈Nn'\in\mathbb{N}, there exists C1,…,Cn′∈ΔC_1,\ldots,C_{n'}\in\Delta and there exists D1,…,Dn′∈FOR∖ΔD_1,\ldots,D_{n'}\in\mathbf{FOR}\setminus\Delta such that (F1∨…(Fn∨⊥)…)→B∨((C1▹D1)∨…((Cn′▹Dn′)∨⊥)…)∈L(F_1\vee\ldots(F_n\vee\bot)\ldots)\to B\vee((C_1\triangleright D_1)\vee\ldots((C_{n'}\triangleright D_{n'})\vee\bot)\ldots)\in L. Thus, using (NEC), (E▹(F1∨…(Fn∨⊥)…))→(A▹(F1∨…(Fn∨⊥)…))∈L(E\triangleright(F_1\vee\ldots(F_n\vee\bot)\ldots))\to(A\triangleright(F_1\vee\ldots(F_n\vee\bot)\ldots))\in L. Moreover, (C1∧…(Cn′∧⊤)…)∈Δ(C_1\wedge\ldots(C_{n'}\wedge\top)\ldots)\in\Delta and (D1∨…(Dn′∨⊥)…)∉Δ(D_1\vee\ldots(D_{n'}\vee\bot)\ldots)\notin\Delta. Consequently, by the maximality of Δ\Delta in SS, Δ+(D1∨…(Dn′∨⊥)…)∉S\Delta+(D_1\vee\ldots(D_{n'}\vee\bot)\ldots)\notin S. Hence, A▹B∈Δ+(D1∨…(Dn′∨⊥)…)A\triangleright B\in\Delta+(D_1\vee\ldots(D_{n'}\vee\bot)\ldots). Thus, (D1∨…(Dn′∨⊥)…)→(A▹B)∈Δ(D_1\vee\ldots(D_{n'}\vee\bot)\ldots)\to(A\triangleright B)\in\Delta. Since for all k∈(n′)k\in(n'), (C1∧…(Cn′∧⊤)…)→Ck∈L(C_1\wedge\ldots(C_{n'}\wedge\top)\ldots)\to C_k\in L and Dk→(D1∨…(Dn′∨⊥)…)∈LD_k\to(D_1\vee\ldots(D_{n'}\vee\bot)\ldots)\in L, therefore using (NEC), for all k∈(n′)k\in(n'), (Ck▹Dk)→((C1∧…(Cn′∧⊤)…)▹(D1∨…(Dn′∨⊥)…))∈L(C_k\triangleright D_k)\to((C_1\wedge\ldots(C_{n'}\wedge\top)\ldots)\triangleright(D_1\vee\ldots(D_{n'}\vee\bot)\ldots))\in L. Since (F1∨…(Fn∨⊥)…)→B∨((C1▹D1)∨…((Cn′▹Dn′)∨⊥)…)∈L(F_1\vee\ldots(F_n\vee\bot)\ldots)\to B\vee((C_1\triangleright D_1)\vee\ldots((C_{n'}\triangleright D_{n'})\vee\bot)\ldots)\in L, therefore (F1∨…(Fn∨⊥)…)→B∨((C1∧…(Cn′∧⊤)…)▹(D1∨…(Dn′∨⊥)…))∈L(F_1\vee\ldots(F_n\vee\bot)\ldots)\to B\vee((C_1\wedge\ldots(C_{n'}\wedge\top)\ldots)\triangleright(D_1\vee\ldots(D_{n'}\vee\bot)\ldots))\in L. As a result, using (NEC), (A▹(F1∨…(Fn∨⊥)…))→(A▹B∨((C1∧…(Cn′∧⊤)…)▹(D1∨…(Dn′∨⊥)…)))∈L(A\triangleright(F_1\vee\ldots(F_n\vee\bot)\ldots))\to(A\triangleright B\vee((C_1\wedge\ldots(C_{n'}\wedge\top)\ldots)\triangleright(D_1\vee\ldots(D_{n'}\vee\bot)\ldots)))\in L. Since E▹(F1∨…(Fn∨⊥)…)∈ΔE\triangleright(F_1\vee\ldots(F_n\vee\bot)\ldots)\in\Delta and (E▹(F1∨…(Fn∨⊥)…))→(A▹(F1∨…(Fn∨⊥)…))∈L(E\triangleright(F_1\vee\ldots(F_n\vee\bot)\ldots))\to(A\triangleright(F_1\vee\ldots(F_n\vee\bot)\ldots))\in L, therefore A▹B∨((C1∧…(Cn′∧⊤)…)▹(D1∨…(Dn′∨⊥)…))∈ΔA\triangleright B\vee((C_1\wedge\ldots(C_{n'}\wedge\top)\ldots)\triangleright(D_1\vee\ldots(D_{n'}\vee\bot)\ldots))\in\Delta. Hence, using (MA5), ((D1∨…(Dn′∨⊥)…)→(A▹((D_1\vee\ldots(D_{n'}\vee\bot)\ldots)\to(A\triangleright B)→((C1∧⋯(Cn′∧⊤)⋯ )→(A▹B))∈ΔB)\to((C_1\land\cdots(C_{n'}\land\top)\cdots)\to(A\triangleright B))\in\Delta. Since (D1∨⋯(Dn′∨⊥)⋯ )→(A▹B)∈Δ(D_1\lor\cdots(D_{n'}\lor\bot)\cdots)\to(A\triangleright B)\in\Delta, therefore (C1∧⋯(Cn′∧⊤)⋯ )→(A▹B)∈Δ(C_1\land\cdots(C_{n'}\land\top)\cdots)\to(A\triangleright B)\in\Delta. Since (C1∧⋯(Cn′∧⊤)⋯ )∈Δ(C_1\land\cdots(C_{n'}\land\top)\cdots)\in\Delta, therefore A▹B∈ΔA\triangleright B\in\Delta: a contradiction. Therefore (L+A,{B}∪{C▹D:C∈Δ and D∈FOR∖Δ})∈T(L+A,\{B\}\cup\{C\triangleright D:C\in\Delta\text{ and }D\in\mathbf{FOR}\setminus\Delta\})\in\mathcal{T}. Thus, T\mathcal{T} is nonempty. Moreover, obviously, for all nonempty chains (Λi,Θi)i∈I(\Lambda_i,\Theta_i)_{i\in I} of elements of T\mathcal{T}, (⋃{Λi:i∈I},⋃{Θi:i∈I})(\bigcup\{\Lambda_i:i\in I\},\bigcup\{\Theta_i:i\in I\}) is an element of T\mathcal{T}. Consequently, by Kuratowski-Zorn Lemma, T\mathcal{T} possesses a maximal element (Λ,Θ)(\Lambda,\Theta). Hence, Λ\Lambda is a LL-theory and Θ\Theta is a set of formulas such that

(∗)(*) for all C∈ΛC\in\Lambda, for all n∈Nn\in\mathbb{N} and for all D1,…,Dn∈ΘD_1,\ldots,D_n\in\Theta, C▹(D1∨⋯(Dn∨⊥)⋯ )∉ΔC\triangleright(D_1\lor\cdots(D_n\lor\bot)\cdots)\notin\Delta,

(∗∗)(**) for all C∈ΔC\in\Delta and for all D∈FOR∖ΔD\in\mathbf{FOR}\setminus\Delta, C▹D∈ΘC\triangleright D\in\Theta,

(∗∗∗)(***) A∈ΛA\in\Lambda and (∗∗∗∗)(****) B∈ΘB\in\Theta.

We claim that Λ\Lambda is proper. If not, Λ=FOR\Lambda=\mathbf{FOR}. Thus, B∈ΛB\in\Lambda. Since (∗)(*) and (∗∗∗∗)(****), therefore B▹B∉ΔB\triangleright B\notin\Delta: a contradiction. Therefore Λ\Lambda is proper.

We claim that Λ\Lambda is prime. If not, there exists formulas GG, HH such that G∨H∈ΛG\lor H\in\Lambda, G∉ΛG\notin\Lambda and H∉ΛH\notin\Lambda. Consequently, by the maximality of (Λ,Θ)(\Lambda,\Theta) in T\mathcal{T}, (Λ+G,Θ)∉T(\Lambda+G,\Theta)\notin\mathcal{T} and (Λ+H,Θ)∉T(\Lambda+H,\Theta)\notin\mathcal{T}. Hence, there exists C′∈Λ+GC'\in\Lambda+G, there exists n′∈Nn'\in\mathbb{N} and there exists D1′,…,Dn′′∈ΘD'_1,\ldots,D'_{n'}\in\Theta such that C′▹(D1′∨⋯(Dn′′∨⊥)⋯ )∈ΔC'\triangleright(D'_1\lor\cdots(D'_{n'}\lor\bot)\cdots)\in\Delta and there exists C′′∈Λ+HC''\in\Lambda+H, there exists n′′∈Nn''\in\mathbb{N} and there exists D1′′,…,Dn′′′′∈ΘD''_1,\ldots,D''_{n''}\in\Theta such that C′′▹(D1′′∨⋯(Dn′′′′∨⊥)⋯ )∈ΔC''\triangleright(D''_1\lor\cdots(D''_{n''}\lor\bot)\cdots)\in\Delta. Thus, G→C′∈ΛG\to C'\in\Lambda and H→C′′∈ΛH\to C''\in\Lambda. Consequently, G∨H→C′∨C′′∈ΛG\lor H\to C'\lor C''\in\Lambda. Since G∨H∈ΛG\lor H\in\Lambda, therefore C′∨C′′∈ΛC'\lor C''\in\Lambda. Since (D1′∨⋯(Dn′′∨⊥)⋯ )→(D1′∨⋯(Dn′′∨(D1′′∨⋯(Dn′′′′∨⊥)⋯ ))⋯ )∈L(D'_1\lor\cdots(D'_{n'}\lor\bot)\cdots)\to(D'_1\lor\cdots(D'_{n'}\lor(D''_1\lor\cdots(D''_{n''}\lor\bot)\cdots))\cdots)\in L and (D1′′∨⋯(Dn′′′′∨⊥)⋯ )→(D1′∨⋯(Dn′′∨(D1′′∨⋯(Dn′′′′∨⊥)⋯ ))⋯ )∈L(D''_1\lor\cdots(D''_{n''}\lor\bot)\cdots)\to(D'_1\lor\cdots(D'_{n'}\lor(D''_1\lor\cdots(D''_{n''}\lor\bot)\cdots))\cdots)\in L, therefore using (NEC), (C′▹(D1′∨⋯(Dn′′∨⊥)⋯ ))→(C′▹(D1′∨⋯(Dn′′∨(D1′′∨⋯(Dn′′′′∨⊥)⋯ ))⋯ ))∈L(C'\triangleright(D'_1\lor\cdots(D'_{n'}\lor\bot)\cdots))\to(C'\triangleright(D'_1\lor\cdots(D'_{n'}\lor(D''_1\lor\cdots(D''_{n''}\lor\bot)\cdots))\cdots))\in L and (C′′▹(D1′′∨⋯(Dn′′′′∨⊥)⋯ ))→(C′′▹(D1′∨⋯(Dn′′∨(D1′′∨⋯(Dn′′′′∨⊥)⋯ ))⋯ ))∈L(C''\triangleright(D''_1\lor\cdots(D''_{n''}\lor\bot)\cdots))\to(C''\triangleright(D'_1\lor\cdots(D'_{n'}\lor(D''_1\lor\cdots(D''_{n''}\lor\bot)\cdots))\cdots))\in L. Since C′▹(D1′∨⋯(Dn′′∨⊥)⋯ )∈ΔC'\triangleright(D'_1\lor\cdots(D'_{n'}\lor\bot)\cdots)\in\Delta and C′′▹(D1′′∨⋯(Dn′′′′∨⊥)⋯ )∈ΔC''\triangleright(D''_1\lor\cdots(D''_{n''}\lor\bot)\cdots)\in\Delta, therefore C′▹(D1′∨⋯(Dn′′∨(D1′′∨⋯(Dn′′′′∨⊥)⋯ ))⋯ )∈ΔC'\triangleright(D'_1\lor\cdots(D'_{n'}\lor(D''_1\lor\cdots(D''_{n''}\lor\bot)\cdots))\cdots)\in\Delta and C′′▹(D1′∨⋯(Dn′′∨(D1′′∨⋯(Dn′′′′∨⊥)⋯ ))⋯ )∈ΔC''\triangleright(D'_1\lor\cdots(D'_{n'}\lor(D''_1\lor\cdots(D''_{n''}\lor\bot)\cdots))\cdots)\in\Delta. Hence, using (MA2), C′∨C′′▹(D1′∨⋯(Dn′′∨(D1′′∨⋯(Dn′′′′∨⊥)⋯ ))⋯ )∈ΔC'\lor C''\triangleright(D'_1\lor\cdots(D'_{n'}\lor(D''_1\lor\cdots(D''_{n''}\lor\bot)\cdots))\cdots)\in\Delta. Since (∗)(*), D1′,…,Dn′′∈ΘD'_1,\ldots,D'_{n'}\in\Theta, D1′′,…,Dn′′′′∈ΘD''_1,\ldots,D''_{n''}\in\Theta and C′∨C′′∈ΛC'\lor C''\in\Lambda, therefore C′∨C′′▹(D1′∨⋯(Dn′′∨(D1′′∨⋯(Dn′′′′∨⊥)⋯ ))⋯ )∉ΔC'\lor C''\triangleright(D'_1\lor\cdots(D'_{n'}\lor(D''_1\lor\cdots(D''_{n''}\lor\bot)\cdots))\cdots)\notin\Delta: a contradiction. Therefore Λ\Lambda is prime.

We claim that for all formulas CC, DD, if C▹D∈ΔC\triangleright D\in\Delta then C∉ΛC\notin\Lambda, or D∈ΛD\in\Lambda. If not, there exists formulas CC, DD such that C▹D∈ΔC\triangleright D\in\Delta, C∈ΛC\in\Lambda and D∉ΛD\notin\Lambda. Thus, by the maximality of (Λ,Θ)(\Lambda,\Theta) in T\mathcal{T}, (Λ+D,Θ)∉T(\Lambda+D,\Theta)\notin\mathcal{T}. Consequently, there exists C′∈Λ+DC'\in\Lambda+D, there exists n′∈Nn'\in\mathbb{N} and there exists D1′,…,Dn′′∈ΘD'_1,\ldots,D'_{n'}\in\Theta such that C′▹(D1′∨⋯(Dn′′∨⊥)⋯ )∈ΔC'\triangleright(D'_1\lor\cdots(D'_{n'}\lor\bot)\cdots)\in\Delta. Hence, D→C′∈ΛD\to C'\in\Lambda. Since C∈ΛC\in\Lambda, therefore C∧(D→C′)∈ΛC\land(D\to C')\in\Lambda. Since (∗)(*) and D1′,…,Dn′′∈ΘD'_1,\ldots,D'_{n'}\in\Theta, therefore C∧(D→C′)▹(D1′∨⋯(Dn′′∨⊥)⋯ )∉ΔC\land(D\to C')\triangleright(D'_1\lor\cdots(D'_{n'}\lor\bot)\cdots)\notin\Delta. Since C▹D∈ΔC\triangleright D\in\Delta and C′▹(D1′∨⋯(Dn′′∨⊥)⋯ )∈ΔC'\triangleright(D'_1\lor\cdots(D'_{n'}\lor\bot)\cdots)\in\Delta, using (MA3), C∧(D→C′)▹(D1′∨⋯(Dn′′∨⊥)⋯ )∈ΔC\land(D\to C')\triangleright(D'_1\lor\cdots(D'_{n'}\lor\bot)\cdots)\in\Delta: a contradiction. Therefore for all formulas CC, DD, if C▹D∈ΔC\triangleright D\in\Delta then C∉ΛC\notin\Lambda, or D∈ΛD\in\Lambda.

We claim that for all formulas CC, DD, if C▹D∈ΛC\triangleright D\in\Lambda then C∉ΔC\notin\Delta, or D∈ΔD\in\Delta. If not, there exists formulas CC, DD such that C▹D∈ΛC\triangleright D\in\Lambda, C∈ΔC\in\Delta and D∉ΔD\notin\Delta. Notice that using (MA1), (C▹D)▹(C▹D)(C\triangleright D)\triangleright(C\triangleright D). Since (∗)(*), C∈ΔC\in\Delta and D∉ΔD\notin\Delta, therefore C▹D∉ΔC\triangleright D\notin\Delta. Since (∗)(*) and C▹D∈ΛC\triangleright D\in\Lambda, therefore (C▹D)▹(C▹D)∉Δ(C\triangleright D)\triangleright(C\triangleright D)\notin\Delta: a contradiction. Therefore for all formulas CC, DD, if C▹D∈ΛC\triangleright D\in\Lambda then C∉ΔC\notin\Delta, or D∈ΔD\in\Delta.

We claim that B∉ΛB\notin\Lambda. If not, since (∗)(*) and (∗∗∗∗)(****), therefore B▹B∉ΔB\triangleright B\notin\Delta: a contradiction. Therefore B∉ΛB\notin\Lambda.

Completeness

Now, we are ready to show the completeness of Lmin⁡L_{\min} and the completeness of LequL_{\mathrm{equ}}. With this aim, we introduce the canonical model (Wmin⁡,≤min⁡,Rmin⁡,Vmin⁡)(W_{\min}, \leq_{\min}, R_{\min}, V_{\min}) for Lmin⁡L_{\min} and the canonical model (Wequ,≤equ,Requ,Vequ)(W_{\mathrm{equ}}, \leq_{\mathrm{equ}}, R_{\mathrm{equ}}, V_{\mathrm{equ}}) for LequL_{\mathrm{equ}}. With Propositions 9 and 11, we show results that will play for Lmin⁡L_{\min} and for LequL_{\mathrm{equ}} the role played by the Truth Lemma in classical modal logic [6 Lemma 4.21].

Firstly, we consider the proof of completeness of Lmin⁡L_{\min}.

The canonical frame of Lmin⁡L_{\min} is the structure (Wmin⁡,≤min⁡,Rmin⁡)(W_{\min}, \leq_{\min}, R_{\min}) where Wmin⁡W_{\min} is the nonempty set of all prime Lmin⁡L_{\min}-theories, ≤min⁡\leq_{\min} is the preorder on Wmin⁡W_{\min} such that for all Γ,Δ∈Wmin⁡\Gamma, \Delta\in W_{\min}, Γ≤min⁡Δ\Gamma\leq_{\min} \Delta if and only if Γ⊆Δ\Gamma\subseteq\Delta and Rmin⁡R_{\min} is the binary relation on Wmin⁡W_{\min} such that for all Γ,Δ∈Wmin⁡\Gamma, \Delta\in W_{\min}, ΓRmin⁡Δ\Gamma R_{\min} \Delta if and only if for all formulas A,BA, B, if A▹B∈ΓA \triangleright B \in\Gamma then A∉ΔA \notin\Delta, or B∈ΔB \in\Delta. The canonical valuation of Lmin⁡L_{\min} is the valuation Vmin⁡:At→℘(Wmin⁡)V_{\min} : \mathrm{At} \to\wp(W_{\min}) on (Wmin⁡,≤min⁡,Rmin⁡)(W_{\min}, \leq_{\min}, R_{\min}) such that for all atoms pp, Vmin⁡(p)={Γ∈Wmin⁡:p∈Γ}V_{\min}(p) = \{\Gamma\in W_{\min} : p \in\Gamma\}. The model (Wmin⁡,≤min⁡,Rmin⁡,Vmin⁡)(W_{\min}, \leq_{\min}, R_{\min}, V_{\min}) is called canonical model of Lmin⁡L_{\min}.

Proposition 9. Let AA be a modal formula. For all Γ∈Wmin⁡\Gamma\in W_{\min}, (Wmin⁡,≤min⁡,Rmin⁡,Vmin⁡),Γ⊨A(W_{\min}, \leq_{\min}, R_{\min}, V_{\min}), \Gamma\models A if and only if A∈ΓA \in\Gamma.

Proof. By induction on AA. We only consider the “left to right” direction of the case A=B▹CA = B \triangleright C. Let Γ∈Wmin⁡\Gamma\in W_{\min}. Suppose (Wmin⁡,≤min⁡,Rmin⁡,Vmin⁡),Γ⊨B▹C(W_{\min}, \leq_{\min}, R_{\min}, V_{\min}), \Gamma\models B \triangleright C. For the sake of the contradiction, suppose B▹C∉ΓB \triangleright C \notin\Gamma. Consequently, by Proposition 7, there exists a prime LL-theory Δ\Delta such that for all formulas D,ED, E, if D▹E∈ΓD \triangleright E \in\Gamma then D∉ΔD \notin\Delta, or E∈ΔE \in\Delta, B∈ΔB \in\Delta and C∉ΔC \notin\Delta. Hence, Δ∈Wmin⁡\Delta\in W_{\min} and ΓRmin⁡Δ\Gamma R_{\min} \Delta. Since B∈ΔB \in\Delta and C∉ΔC \notin\Delta, therefore by induction hypothesis, (Wmin⁡,≤min⁡,Rmin⁡,Vmin⁡),Δ⊨B(W_{\min}, \leq_{\min}, R_{\min}, V_{\min}), \Delta\models B and (Wmin⁡,≤min⁡,Rmin⁡,Vmin⁡),Δ⊭C(W_{\min}, \leq_{\min}, R_{\min}, V_{\min}), \Delta\not\models C. Since (Wmin⁡,≤min⁡,Rmin⁡,Vmin⁡),Γ⊨B▹C(W_{\min}, \leq_{\min}, R_{\min}, V_{\min}), \Gamma\models B \triangleright C and ΓRmin⁡Δ\Gamma R_{\min} \Delta, therefore (Wmin⁡,≤min⁡,Rmin⁡,Vmin⁡),Δ⊨C(W_{\min}, \leq_{\min}, R_{\min}, V_{\min}), \Delta\models C: a contradiction.

Proposition 10 (Completeness of Lmin⁡L_{\min}). Lmin⁡L_{\min} is complete with respect to Cmin⁡C_{\min}.

Proof. For the sake of the contradiction, suppose Lmin⁡L_{\min} is not complete with respect to Cmin⁡C_{\min}. Hence, there exists a formula AA such that Cmin⁡⊨AC_{\min} \models A and A∉Lmin⁡A \notin L_{\min}. Thus, by Propositions 4 and 5, Cmin⁡⊨τ(A)C_{\min} \models\tau(A) and τ(A)∉Lmin⁡\tau(A) \notin L_{\min}. Consequently, by Proposition 9, there exists a prime Lmin⁡L_{\min}-theory Γ\Gamma such that (Wmin⁡,≤min⁡,Rmin⁡,Vmin⁡),Γ⊭τ(A)(W_{\min}, \leq_{\min}, R_{\min}, V_{\min}), \Gamma\not\models\tau(A). Hence, Cmin⁡⊭τ(A)C_{\min} \not\models\tau(A): a contradiction. Therefore Lmin⁡L_{\min} is complete with respect to Cmin⁡C_{\min}.

Secondly, we consider the proof of completeness of LequL_{\mathrm{equ}}.

The canonical frame of LequL_{\mathrm{equ}} is the structure (Wequ,≤equ,Requ)(W_{\mathrm{equ}}, \leq_{\mathrm{equ}}, R_{\mathrm{equ}}) where WequW_{\mathrm{equ}} is the nonempty set of all prime LequL_{\mathrm{equ}}-theories, ≤equ\leq_{\mathrm{equ}} is the preorder on WequW_{\mathrm{equ}} such that for all Γ,Δ∈Wequ\Gamma, \Delta\in W_{\mathrm{equ}}, Γ≤equΔ\Gamma\leq_{\mathrm{equ}} \Delta if and only if Γ⊆Δ\Gamma\subseteq\Delta and RequR_{\mathrm{equ}} is the reflexive symmetric binary relation on WequW_{\mathrm{equ}} such that for all Γ,Δ∈Wequ\Gamma, \Delta\in W_{\mathrm{equ}}, ΓRequΔ\Gamma R_{\mathrm{equ}} \Delta if and only if for all formulas A,BA, B, if A▹B∈ΓA \triangleright B \in\Gamma then A∉ΔA \notin\Delta, or B∈ΔB \in\Delta and for all formulas A,BA, B, if A▹B∈ΔA \triangleright B \in\Delta then A∉ΓA \notin\Gamma, or B∈ΓB \in\Gamma.17 The canonical valuation of Lequ\mathbf{L}_{\mathrm{equ}} is the valuation Vequ:At→℘(Wequ)V_{\mathrm{equ}}:\mathrm{At}\to\wp(W_{\mathrm{equ}}) on (Wequ,≤equ,Requ)(W_{\mathrm{equ}},\leq_{\mathrm{equ}},R_{\mathrm{equ}}) such that for all atoms pp, Vequ(p)={Γ∈Wequ:p∈Γ}V_{\mathrm{equ}}(p)=\{\Gamma\in W_{\mathrm{equ}}:p\in\Gamma\}. The model (Wequ,≤equ,Requ,Vequ)(W_{\mathrm{equ}},\leq_{\mathrm{equ}},R_{\mathrm{equ}},V_{\mathrm{equ}}) is called canonical model of Lequ\mathbf{L}_{\mathrm{equ}}.

Proposition 11. Let AA be a modal formula. For all Γ∈Wequ\Gamma\in W_{\mathrm{equ}}, (Wequ,≤equ,Requ,Vequ),Γ⊨A(W_{\mathrm{equ}},\leq_{\mathrm{equ}},R_{\mathrm{equ}},V_{\mathrm{equ}}),\Gamma\models A if and only if A∈ΓA\in\Gamma.

Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 9 where the use of Proposition 7 is replaced by a use of Proposition 8.

Proposition 12 (Completeness of Lequ\mathbf{L}_{\mathrm{equ}}). Lequ\mathbf{L}_{\mathrm{equ}} is complete with respect to CequC_{\mathrm{equ}}.

Proof. For the sake of the contradiction, suppose Lequ\mathbf{L}_{\mathrm{equ}} is not complete with respect to CequC_{\mathrm{equ}}. Hence, there exists a formula AA such that Cequ⊨AC_{\mathrm{equ}}\models A and A∉LequA\notin\mathbf{L}_{\mathrm{equ}}. Thus, by Propositions 4 and 6, Cequ⊨τ(A)C_{\mathrm{equ}}\models\tau(A) and τ(A)∉Lequ\tau(A)\notin\mathbf{L}_{\mathrm{equ}}. Consequently, by Proposition 11, there exists a prime Lequ\mathbf{L}_{\mathrm{equ}}-theory Γ\Gamma such that (Wequ,≤equ,Requ,Vequ),Γ⊭τ(A)(W_{\mathrm{equ}},\leq_{\mathrm{equ}},R_{\mathrm{equ}},V_{\mathrm{equ}}),\Gamma\not\models\tau(A). As mentioned above, RequR_{\mathrm{equ}} is a reflexive symmetric binary relation on WequW_{\mathrm{equ}}. Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that RequR_{\mathrm{equ}} is an equivalence relation on WequW_{\mathrm{equ}}. Let (W′,≤′,R′)(W',\leq',R') be the frame where W′W' is the nonempty set of all couples of the form (Δ,{Λ,Θ})(\Delta,\{\Lambda,\Theta\}) where Δ,Λ,Θ∈Wequ\Delta,\Lambda,\Theta\in W_{\mathrm{equ}} are such that Δ∈{Λ,Θ}\Delta\in\{\Lambda,\Theta\} and ΛRequΘ\Lambda R_{\mathrm{equ}}\Theta, ≤′\leq' is the preorder on W′W' such that for all (Δ,{Λ,Θ}),(Φ,{Ψ,Π})∈W′(\Delta,\{\Lambda,\Theta\}),(\Phi,\{\Psi,\Pi\})\in W', (Δ,{Λ,Θ})≤′(Φ,{Ψ,Π})(\Delta,\{\Lambda,\Theta\})\leq'(\Phi,\{\Psi,\Pi\}) if and only if Δ≤equΦ\Delta\leq_{\mathrm{equ}}\Phi and R′R' is the equivalence relation on W′W' such that for all (Δ,{Λ,Θ}),(Φ,{Ψ,Π})∈W′(\Delta,\{\Lambda,\Theta\}),(\Phi,\{\Psi,\Pi\})\in W', (Δ,{Λ,Θ})R′(Φ,{Ψ,Π})(\Delta,\{\Lambda,\Theta\})R'(\Phi,\{\Psi,\Pi\}) if and only if {Λ,Θ}={Ψ,Π}\{\Lambda,\Theta\}=\{\Psi,\Pi\}. Let V′:At→℘(W′)V':\mathrm{At}\to\wp(W') be the valuation on (W′,≤′,R′)(W',\leq',R') such that for all atoms pp, V′(p)={(Δ,{Λ,Θ})∈W′:p∈Δ}V'(p)=\{(\Delta,\{\Lambda,\Theta\})\in W':p\in\Delta\}.

Lemma. Let BB be a modal formula. For all (Δ,{Λ,Θ})∈W′(\Delta,\{\Lambda,\Theta\})\in W', (W′,≤′,R′,V′),(Δ,{Λ,Θ})⊨B(W',\leq',R',V'),(\Delta,\{\Lambda,\Theta\})\models B if and only if (Wequ,≤equ,Requ,Vequ),Δ⊨B(W_{\mathrm{equ}},\leq_{\mathrm{equ}},R_{\mathrm{equ}},V_{\mathrm{equ}}),\Delta\models B.

Proof. By induction on BB. We only consider the “left to right” direction of the case B=C▹DB=C\triangleright D. Let (Δ,{Λ,Θ})∈W′(\Delta,\{\Lambda,\Theta\})\in W'. Suppose (W′,≤′,R′,V′),(Δ,{Λ,Θ})⊨C▹D(W',\leq',R',V'),(\Delta,\{\Lambda,\Theta\})\models C\triangleright D. For the sake of the contradiction, suppose (Wequ,≤equ,Requ,Vequ),Δ⊭C▹D(W_{\mathrm{equ}},\leq_{\mathrm{equ}},R_{\mathrm{equ}},V_{\mathrm{equ}}),\Delta\not\models C\triangleright D. Hence, there exists Φ∈Wequ\Phi\in W_{\mathrm{equ}} such that Δ≤equΦ\Delta\leq_{\mathrm{equ}}\Phi and there exists Ψ∈Wequ\Psi\in W_{\mathrm{equ}} such that ΦRequΨ\Phi R_{\mathrm{equ}}\Psi, (Wequ,≤equ,Requ,Vequ),Ψ⊨C(W_{\mathrm{equ}},\leq_{\mathrm{equ}},R_{\mathrm{equ}},V_{\mathrm{equ}}),\Psi\models C and (Wequ,≤equ,Requ,Vequ),Ψ⊭D(W_{\mathrm{equ}},\leq_{\mathrm{equ}},R_{\mathrm{equ}},V_{\mathrm{equ}}),\Psi\not\models D. Obviously, (Φ,{Φ,Ψ})(\Phi,\{\Phi,\Psi\}) and (Ψ,{Φ,Ψ})(\Psi,\{\Phi,\Psi\}) are in W′W'. Moreover, (Δ,{Λ,Θ})≤′(Φ,{Φ,Ψ})(\Delta,\{\Lambda,\Theta\})\leq'(\Phi,\{\Phi,\Psi\}) and (Φ,{Φ,Ψ})R′(Ψ,{Φ,Ψ})(\Phi,\{\Phi,\Psi\})R'(\Psi,\{\Phi,\Psi\}). Since (Wequ,≤equ,Requ,Vequ),Ψ⊨C(W_{\mathrm{equ}},\leq_{\mathrm{equ}},R_{\mathrm{equ}},V_{\mathrm{equ}}),\Psi\models C and (Wequ,≤equ,Requ,Vequ),Ψ⊭D(W_{\mathrm{equ}},\leq_{\mathrm{equ}},R_{\mathrm{equ}},V_{\mathrm{equ}}),\Psi\not\models D, therefore by induction hypothesis, (W′,≤′,R′,V′),(Ψ,{Φ,Ψ})⊨C(W',\leq',R',V'),(\Psi,\{\Phi,\Psi\})\models C and (W′,≤′,R′,V′),(Ψ,{Φ,Ψ})⊭D(W',\leq',R',V'),(\Psi,\{\Phi,\Psi\})\not\models D. Since (Δ,{Λ,Θ})≤′(Φ,{Φ,Ψ})(\Delta,\{\Lambda,\Theta\})\leq'(\Phi,\{\Phi,\Psi\}) and (Φ,{Φ,Ψ})R′(Ψ,{Φ,Ψ})(\Phi,\{\Phi,\Psi\})R'(\Psi,\{\Phi,\Psi\}), therefore (W′,≤′,R′,V′),(Δ,{Λ,Θ})⊭C▹D(W',\leq',R',V'),(\Delta,\{\Lambda,\Theta\})\not\models C\triangleright D: a contradiction.

Since (Wequ,≤equ,Requ,Vequ),Γ⊭τ(A)(W_{\mathrm{equ}},\leq_{\mathrm{equ}},R_{\mathrm{equ}},V_{\mathrm{equ}}),\Gamma\not\models\tau(A), then (W′,≤′,R′,V′),(Γ,{Γ})⊭τ(A)(W',\leq',R',V'),(\Gamma,\{\Gamma\})\not\models\tau(A). Thus, Cequ⊭τ(A)C_{\mathrm{equ}}\not\models\tau(A): a contradiction. Therefore Lequ\mathbf{L}_{\mathrm{equ}} is complete with respect to CequC_{\mathrm{equ}}.

And in the end, we compare Lmin⁡L_{\min} and LequL_{\mathrm{equ}} to the intuitionistic public announcement logics studied in [22, 23].

Proposition 13. (1) Lmin⁡∩FORdL_{\min}\cap\mathrm{FOR}_{d} is strictly contained in IPAL interpreted over the class of all backward and forward confluent models,

(2) Lequ∩FORdL_{\mathrm{equ}}\cap\mathrm{FOR}_{d} is strictly contained in IPAL interpreted over the class of all backward and forward confluent models where the modal accessibility relation is an equivalence relation.

Proof. (1) It suffices to notice that the instance [p]□r↔(p→□[p]r)[p]\Box r\leftrightarrow(p\to\Box[p]r) of the reduction axiom for “necessity” [A]□C↔(A→□[A]C)[A]\Box C\leftrightarrow(A\to\Box[A]C) considered in the literature of IPAL is not valid in the class of all models. Indeed, the reader may easily verify that 0⊨[p]□r0\models[p]\Box r and 0⊭p→□[p]r0\not\models p\to\Box[p]r in the model (W,≤,R,V)(W,\leq,R,V) such that W={0,1,2}W=\{0,1,2\}, ≤={(0,0),(1,1),(1,2),(2,2)}\leq=\{(0,0),(1,1),(1,2),(2,2)\}, R={(0,0),(0,1),(1,0),(1,1),(2,2)}R=\{(0,0),(0,1),(1,0),(1,1),(2,2)\}, V(p)={0,2}V(p)=\{0,2\} and V(r)={0}V(r)=\{0\}.

(2) Similar to the proof of Item (1).

Conclusion

Much remains to be done.

First, recall that direct modal formulas can also be considered as ◊\Diamond-free formulas of the language of intuitionistic modal logics. In particular, the restriction of Lmin⁡L_{\min} to the set of all its direct modal formulas is equal to the so-called “intuitionistic modal logic K without ◊\Diamond” considered by Simpson [33 Chapter 3], an intuitionistic modal logic called iK by Almeida et al. [1] and van der Giessen [13]. Therefore the restriction of Lmin⁡L_{\min} to the set of all its modal formulas deserves to be studied for its own sake. In doing so, one should not forget to compare the new binary operator ▹\mathbin{\triangleright} of “relativized necessity” and the connective of strict implication firstly developed in [20] and recently studied in [14, 21].

Second, recall that the dual ◊\Diamond of □\Box introduced by Pˇrenosil [32] and developed by Balbiani and Gencer [4, 5] is such that for all formulas AA, given a model (W,≤,R,V)(W,\leq,R,V) and s∈Ws\in W, (W,≤,R,V),s⊨◊A(W,\leq,R,V),s\models\Diamond A if and only if there exists t∈Wt\in W such that t≤st\leq s and there exists u∈Wu\in W such that tRutRu and (W,≤,R,V),u⊨A(W,\leq,R,V),u\models A. Therefore the extension of Lmin⁡L_{\min} by the dual ◃\mathbin{\triangleleft} of ▹\mathbin{\triangleright} deserves to be studied for its own sake. It could be such that for all formulas AA, BB, given a model (W,≤,R,V)(W,\leq,R,V) and s∈Ws\in W, (W,≤,R,V),s⊨A◃B(W,\leq,R,V),s\models A\mathbin{\triangleleft}B if and only if there exists t∈Wt\in W such that t≤st\leq s and there exists u∈Wu\in W such that tRutRu, (W,≤,R,V),u⊭A(W,\leq,R,V),u\not\models A and (W,≤,R,V),u⊨B(W,\leq,R,V),u\models B.

Third, in order to evaluate the computability of Lmin⁡L_{\min} and the computability of LequL_{\mathrm{equ}}, one may design tableau calculi or sequent calculi for these intuitionistic public announcement logics, following the lines of reasoning adopted in [2, 19] with respect to the classical setting and in [3, 8, 27] with respect to the intuitionistic setting. Calculi for the restrictions of Lmin⁡\mathbf{L}_{\min} and Lequ\mathbf{L}_{\mathrm{equ}} to the sets of all their modal formulas deserve to be studied for their own sake as well.

Fourth, one may develop the multi-agent version with common knowledge, or distributed knowledge of Lmin⁡\mathbf{L}_{\min} and Lequ\mathbf{L}_{\mathrm{equ}}. In this multi-agent version, one has to determine which reduction axioms make it possible to associate with each formula a semantically equivalent formula containing no public announcement operators. See [16, 26, 35, 36] for various multi-agent version with common knowledge, or distributed knowledge of intuitionistic modal logics.

Fifth, in a multi-agent version with common knowledge, or distributed knowledge of Lmin⁡\mathbf{L}_{\min} and Lequ\mathbf{L}_{\mathrm{equ}}, a successful announcement is a formula that always becomes known after being announced. Many dynamic phenomena can be explained by analyzing successful announcements [10]. As a result, one may investigate the syntactic characterization of the successful announcements within the context of intuitionistic public announcement logic.

Acknowledgements

Special acknowledgement is granted to our colleagues of the Toulouse Institute of Computer Science Research for many stimulating discussions about the subject of this article. We also thank the reviewers for their feedback: their insightful suggestions were essential in improving the readability of an earlier version of this work.

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