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Doing Well by Doing Good: Alignment of Revenue and Welfare in Robust Product Line Design through Data-Driven Optimization

Abstract

Product line design (PLD) selects product variants for a firm to maximize expected revenue. Candidate assortments are usually evaluated under random utility maximization (RUM), in which choice probabilities stem from the joint distribution of latent consumer utilities. As this utility distribution cannot be directly observed and is estimated from choice data, distributional uncertainty inevitably arises. This paper studies how to hedge PLD decisions against such ambiguity. We construct a distributionally robust optimization (DRO) model that maximizes worst-case expected revenue over an l1-Wasserstein ball around a nominal utility distribution. We derive a dual reformulation for general nominal distributions and then specialize to two cases. With independent Gumbel utility shocks, the dual simplifies to a closed-form robust multinomial logit. We derive revenue gap bounds for parameters estimated from finite full-assortment choice data. When the true model structure is unknown beforehand, we adopt a data-driven scheme using the empirical distribution of sampled utility vectors and extend optimality-gap analysis to a general RUM oracle. For the NP-hard empirical problem, we propose Adaptive Parametric Search (APS), an algorithm with certified relative optimality guarantees. Numerical experiments show fast computation and better out-of-sample performance.Dual analysis shows that robustness to preference uncertainty endogenously encourages the firm to raise buyer welfare. This incentive takes distinct forms: robustness supports larger assortments in the unconstrained logit setting, whereas under the empirical nominal, it favors products with lower prices and higher utility relative to the outside option. Numerically, we identify a "doing well by doing good" effect: product lines with higher in-sample buyer welfare attain higher out-of-sample revenue and buyer welfare.

Introduction

The product line design (PLD) problem concerns the selection of a limited subset of related product variants from a large candidate set to serve a heterogeneous market [10] (Zufryden 1977).

A key factor in the success of PLD is understanding heterogeneous customer preferences and predicting choice behavior across alternative product lines. Random utility maximization (RUM) models provide a standard framework to analyze this choice behavior. Specifically, it assumes that a random customer assigns a utility for every available alternative and selects the alternative with the highest realized utility. Therefore, the utility distribution over the population determines the choice probability of each alternative—the probability that it realizes the highest utility—which in turn allows the firm to evaluate the expected revenue of a product line.

A central challenge in constructing an RUM model is the inevitable uncertainty in customer utilities. This is because neither realized utilities nor their underlying distribution is directly observable and therefore both must be inferred from data such as transactions or conjoint surveys. More specifically, the error jointly reflects the inconsistency in respondents’ choices and the limited number of observations for each customer, leading to substantial estimation error in the inferred utilities [1] (Toubia et al. 2007).

As such, it is essential to design product lines that remain robust to uncertainty in the utility distribution. In this paper, we study the robust revenue-maximizing PLD problem under a general RUM framework. Specifically, we propose a distributionally robust optimization (DRO) model that maximizes the worst-case expected revenue over an ℓ1\ell_1-Wasserstein ball centered at the nominal utility distribution. Analysis of the dual reformulation reveals a general mechanism for robust PLD: protecting revenue against customer preference uncertainty creates an endogenous incentive to increase buyers’ welfare, defined as the expected utility customers obtain from their chosen alternatives. This finding is surprising because revenue and buyers’ welfare are typically viewed as competing objectives: revenue-oriented designs may favor higher-priced or less-preferred variants, thereby reducing customer welfare [19]. In contrast, our results show that, under preference uncertainty, buyers’ welfare serves not as a competing objective but as an insurance of revenue against customer preference uncertainty.

Two representative implementations are then considered. We first study the problem when the random utilities follows independent Gumbel shocks, yielding a closed-form robust multinomial logit (MNL) model. We show that in the unconstrained MNL setting, this structure further preserves the revenue-order property: an optimal robust product line can be found within the class of revenue-ordered assortments, substantially simplifying the resulting optimization problem. We quantify the optimality gap when the parameters are estimated from finitely many full-assortment choices. To accommodate more general choice behaviors, we then present a nonparametric implementation that represents the distribution of the complete utility vector directly by its empirical distribution. Its objective can be evaluated from sampled utility vectors and therefore can approximate any general RUM models, including those for which choice probabilities do not admit a closed-form expression. We establish a finite-sample bound linking this empirical first-choice formulation to the product line design problem under oracle distribution following arbitrary RUM.

The two implementations translate the general welfare mechanism into distinct operational principles. In the unconstrained MNL setting, the DRO model admits an optimal revenue-ordered product line that expands as the extent of distributional uncertainty increases. Under the empirical first-choice representation, robustness favors a more cost-effective product line that delivers greater customer utility relative to the revenue extracted.

Main Contributions

Our main contributions are summarized as follows.

  • A general Wasserstein DRO framework for revenue-maximizing PLD. We formulate a robust PLD model under a general RUM by maximizing worst-case expected revenue over an ℓ1\ell_1-Wasserstein neighborhood of the nominal joint utility distribution. Unlike approaches that

perturb only a prespecified set of parameters or scenarios, our framework operates directly on the utility distribution of general RUM models. Performance guarantee of two specific implementations are established. Extensive numerical experiments demonstrate the superior performance of the proposed DRO model.

  • An endogenous alignment between revenue robustness and buyers’ welfare. Analysis of the dual reformulation reveals that protecting revenue against adverse utility shifts creates an endogenous incentive to increase buyers’ welfare. Specifically, greater aversion to distributional uncertainty raises the guaranteed lower bound on the buyers’ welfare delivered by the selected product line, thereby making higher-welfare product lines increasingly attractive as the extent of robustness increases. Under specific RUM specifications, this general mechanism translates into distinct operational principles that benefits customers. In the unconstrained MNL setting, robustness favors larger assortments; with an empirical nominal distribution, it favors more cost-effective product lines composed of products with lower prices and greater marginal utility relative to the outside option. Our numerical results on a semi-synthetic case study shows that the “goodness” to benefit more to the customer eventually pays back in the way of better out-of-sample revenue and buyers’ welfare, and therefore, yields a “doing well by doing good” effect in the robust PLD problem.

  • A certified solution method for empirical DRO. When the joint utility distribution is unknown, we use the empirical distribution of sampled utility vectors as the nominal. For the resulting cardinality-constrained problem, we develop Adaptive Parametric Search (APS). Given a prescribed tolerance δ∈(0,1)\delta\in(0,1), APS certifies that the returned product line attains at least a (1−δ)(1-\delta) fraction of the empirical robust optimum. Across 360 synthetic instances, APS meets its prescribed tolerance in every run and, at δ=0.05\delta= 0.05, is 70.7× faster on average and up to 662.4× faster than a direct mixed-integer linear reformulation.

Related Literature

Our work is most closely related to the literature on robust product line design and robust assortment planning. Because these two problems share closely related mathematical structures in our setting, we discuss them jointly and use the term product line design throughout for consistency.

Existing robust PLD models differ primarily in their assumptions about customer choice and the structure of the uncertainty set. Although a growing literature studies robust PLD under emerging choice models, such as ranking-based choice ([22]) and Markov chain choice ([5]), we focus on RUM-based models. RUMs offer a clear economic interpretation of customer choice and allow the outcomes of product-line decisions to be evaluated from both the seller’s perspective, through revenue, and the customer’s perspective, through buyers’ welfare.

Within the RUM framework, most studies focus on either the first-choice model or the multinomial logit (MNL) model. For the first-choice model, Wang and Curry (2012) allow each respondent’s estimated partworth utilities to vary within a box uncertainty set and maximize the resulting worst-case market share. Liu et al. [14] propose a related formulation in which each respondent’s utility vector varies within a more general polyhedral uncertainty set constructed from conjoint-analysis responses. Wang and Gutierrez (2022) adopt a scenario-based framework in which each scenario represents a possible first-choice model and optimize worst-case market share or expected revenue across scenarios. Liu et al. [15] introduce a Wasserstein DRO framework for the first-choice model, but focus on single-product design and share-of-choice maximization. For the MNL model, Rusmevichientong and Topaloglu [21] study robust assortment optimization when the attraction parameters are allowed to vary within a prescribed uncertainty set. Jin et al. [12] instead adopt a distributionally robust approach by placing a Kullback–Leibler divergence ball around a nominal MNL model. Moreover, Bertsimas and Mišić [1] jointly address parameter and model uncertainty. They construct multiple uncertainty sets around different nominal choice models, including first-choice and mixture-logit specifications, and maximize worst-case revenue over their union.

Most of these studies focus on improving performance under uncertainty but provide limited insight into the economic mechanisms through which robustness reshapes product-line decisions. Although Rusmevichientong and Topaloglu [21]; Jin et al. [12] show that revenue-ordered assortments remain optimal and that greater uncertainty aversion leads to larger assortments, these results are specific to MNL-based models. Appendix EC.§ 3 shows that these properties need not survive a cardinality constraint, and that they do not extend to a general RUM. In contrast, our analysis shows that the underlying driver is an endogenous emphasis on buyers’ welfare induced by revenue robustness, which not only explain why a larger assortment is required for a more robust product line but also persists under a general RUM framework and cardinality constraints.

Liu et al. [15] is the most closely related study. From the perspective of share-of-choice maximization, they show that a Wasserstein DRO model under the first-choice framework also places an endogenous emphasis on buyers’ welfare. Our work differs from theirs in four respects. First, they maximize share-of-choice, the fraction of customers who select any of the offered products rather than the outside option. Product prices are therefore ignored or treated as identical, and the objective only requires knowing whether a customer prefers some offered product to the outside option. We maximize worst-case expected revenue. Because products earn different revenues, the firm must identify the product each customer chooses and balance higher-priced products chosen by fewer customers against lower-priced products chosen by more customers. Revenue maximization therefore creates a sharper conflict with buyers’ welfare: a larger share of customers who buy is only sometimes consistent with higher buyers’ welfare. The resulting price–utility trade-off yields a further implication of the welfare mechanism. Under the empirical model, greater robustness favors products that deliver more utility per unit of revenue. Second, Liu et al. [15] design a single product, whereas we select a product line from a candidate set. The number of feasible lines grows exponentially with the cardinality of the line, a computational difficulty that their analysis leaves unaddressed. We develop a set-branching procedure with modular bounds and an adaptive parametric search that returns a feasible line whose value is at least (1−δ)(1-\delta) times the empirical optimum. Across 360 instances with up to several hundred products and customers, the algorithm certifies every solution and, at δ=0.05\delta= 0.05, is 70.7×70.7 \times faster on average than the mixed-integer formulation. Third, their nominal distribution is the empirical distribution of sampled utilities. We formulate the DRO model for an arbitrary RUM nominal, which covers standard parametric specifications and broadens the scope of the structural results. Under an MNL nominal, the robust objective has a closed form, an optimal product line is revenue-ordered, and, without a cardinality constraint, that line expands as the robustness radius increases. Fourth, we provide finite-sample guarantees for the revenue loss when the nominal distribution is estimated from data, which is not investigated by Liu et al. [15].

The literature on semiparametric choice models also addresses uncertainty in the utility distribution ([20, 18, 9]). These studies share our motivation that the joint distribution of customer utilities may be imperfectly known. However, they address this uncertainty by selecting the distribution that maximizes the expected utility of the customer’s chosen alternative. This optimization is embedded in the construction of the choice model and is therefore independent of the firm’s downstream objective. In contrast, our model selects the worst-case utility distribution according to the firm’s revenue objective, so the effect of distributional uncertainty depends explicitly on both product revenues and the product-line decision.

Finally, another relevant stream of literature incorporates buyers’ welfare into product line design. Buyers’ welfare has long been considered as an explicit objective, dating back at least to Kohli and Sukumar [13]. For a recent review of this literature, we refer readers to Sumida et al. [23]. In these studies, revenue and buyers’ welfare are typically viewed as conflicting objectives, and the resulting models are designed to balance the trade-off between them. In contrast, our model begins from a purely revenue-maximization perspective and shows that robustness can endogenously align the firm’s revenue objective with buyers’ welfare.

Organization

§ 2 establishes the classical product line design problem under a general random utility model. § 3 derives the Wasserstein robust model for a general nominal and specializes it to the multinomial logit, including the expected revenue loss when the logit parameters are estimated from choice data. § 4 develop a tractable implementation of any RUM based on approximating the nominal utility distribution with its empirical counterpart and derives the corresponding expected revenue guarantee. § 5 presents the certified algorithm for the empirical problem. § 6 evaluates the algorithm against the mixed-integer benchmark, and § 7 reports the conjoint case study. § 8 concludes the paper and proposes further research directions. Proofs and supporting formulations appear in the appendices.

The Classical Model

In this section, we introduce the classical non-robust PLD model as a benchmark for the analysis that follows. Throughout the paper, sets are denoted by calligraphic letters and their cardinalities by the corresponding uppercase letters (e.g., ∣A∣=A|\mathcal{A}| = A). The symbol ≔\coloneqq indicates a definition. Vectors and matrices are written in boldface, and I{⋅}\mathbb{I}\{\cdot\} denotes the indicator function.

Following a large body of prior work (e.g., Green and Krieger, [10]; Chen and Hausman, [4]; Bertsimas and Mišić, [2]), we formulate the PLD problem as the selection of a product line S⊆AS \subseteq\mathcal{A} from a set of candidate products A={1,2,…,A}\mathcal{A} = \{1,2,\ldots,A\}. Each product i∈Ai \in\mathcal{A} generates revenue ri>0r_i > 0, and we write rˉ=max⁡i∈Ari\bar{r} = \max_{i\in\mathcal{A}} r_i. The outside option is indexed by 00 and yields zero revenue, i.e., r0=0r_0 = 0. Let L\mathcal{L} denote the family of feasible product lines that satisfy the firm’s structural or managerial constraints. For example, if the firm may offer at most pp products, then L={S⊆A:∣S∣≤p}\mathcal{L} = \{S \subseteq\mathcal{A}: |S| \leq p\}.

The choice model describes how customers select among the offered products and the outside option and therefore forms the basis for evaluating a product line. We adopt the random utility maximization framework. Under this framework, each customer is associated with a random utility vector U=(U0,U1,…,UA)\mathbf{U} = (U_0,U_1,\ldots,U_A), where the randomness captures preference heterogeneity across customers. Given a product line SS, the customer chooses the alternative with the highest utility from S∪{0}S \cup\{0\}. Let QQ denote the population distribution of UU. For any i∈S∪{0}i \in S \cup\{0\}, the choice probability of alternative ii under product line SS is qi(S;Q)=PQ(Ui≥Uj, ∀j∈S∪{0})q_i(S;Q) = \mathbb{P}_Q(U_i \geq U_j,\ \forall j \in S \cup\{0\}). For i∈Si \in S, this probability represents the expected market share for product ii.1 Therefore, the expected revenue of product line SS under the population distribution QQ is R(S;Q)=∑i∈Sriqi(S;Q)R(S;Q) = \sum_{i\in S} r_i q_i(S;Q), and the population PLD problem is

max⁡S∈LR(S;Q).(1)\max_{S\in\mathcal{L}} R(S;Q). \tag*{(1)}

The choice probabilities and the resulting expected revenue depend critically on the underlying distribution of the utility vector UU. Different distributional assumptions give rise to different random utility choice models. For example, if the utility shocks are independently and identically distributed according to a type-I extreme value distribution, the RUM reduces to the multinomial logit (MNL) model; if they follow a multivariate normal distribution, the resulting model is the multinomial probit model.

However, the population distribution QQ is not directly observable and must be inferred from limited data, yielding a proxy distribution Q^\widehat{Q} for optimization. A parametric approach, such as the MNL model, imposes a distributional structure and estimates its parameters, gaining parsimony at the risk of model misspecification. In contrast, a nonparametric approach, such as an empirical approximation based on i.i.d. samples, avoids imposing a specific distributional form but may require a large sample to accurately approximate the population distribution and is therefore susceptible to sampling error when data are limited. In either case, the proxy Q^\widehat{Q} used for optimization may differ from the true population distribution QQ. This discrepancy motivates a robust formulation that accommodates both representations while protecting product-line decisions against ambiguity in the underlying customer preference distribution.

The Distributionally Robust Optimization Model and Analysis

We now replace the population objective in Problem (1) with a distributionally robust counterpart centered at a nominal utility distribution. Section 3.1 develops the general model and its dual reformulation without imposing a parametric structure on the nominal. Section 3.2 specializes the nominal to the multinomial logit.

The DRO Model with a General RUM Nominal Distribution

As discussed above, the proxy distribution Q^\widehat{Q} may differ from the population distribution QQ because of sampling and estimation errors. We account for this discrepancy by evaluating each product line over a Wasserstein neighborhood centered at a nominal distribution QQ. In the implementations below, this nominal is the proxy Q^\widehat{Q} or an empirical distribution constructed from it. The Wasserstein distance between two distributions measures the minimum transportation cost required to move probability mass from one distribution to the other.

Definition 1 (Wasserstein Metric, Esfahani and Kuhn, 2018). Let M(u)\mathcal{M}(u) be the set of probability measures supported on uu, and let Π(P,Q)\Pi(P,Q) collect their joint distributions with marginals PP and QQ. The Wasserstein distance is

dW(P,Q)=inf⁡Π∈Π(P,Q)∫U2∥U−U~∥Π(dU,dU~),d_W(P,Q)=\inf_{\Pi\in\Pi(P,Q)}\int_{\mathcal{U}^2}\lVert U-\widetilde{U}\rVert\Pi(dU,d\widetilde{U}),

where ∥⋅∥\lVert\cdot\rVert is the chosen ground norm.

Unless stated otherwise, the ground norm is ℓ1\ell_1. For a radius ϵ≥0\epsilon\ge0, define the ambiguity set centered at QQ as Uϵ(Q)={P∈M(u):dW(P,Q)≤ϵ}\mathcal{U}_{\epsilon}(Q)=\{P\in\mathcal{M}(u):d_W(P,Q)\le\epsilon\}. The radius ϵ\epsilon controls the extent of distributional protection. Increasing ϵ\epsilon enlarges the ambiguity set, whereas ϵ=0\epsilon=0 gives U0(Q)={Q}\mathcal{U}_0(Q)=\{Q\} and recovers the nominal model.

For a product line SS, define its worst-case expected revenue over this ambiguity set as Rϵ(S;Q)=inf⁡P∈Uϵ(Q)R(S;P)R_{\epsilon}(S;Q)=\inf_{P\in\mathcal{U}_{\epsilon}(Q)}R(S;P). The corresponding Wasserstein DRO problem is max⁡S∈SRϵ(S;Q)\max_{S\in\mathcal{S}}R_{\epsilon}(S;Q).

Direct evaluation of the inner problem requires optimization over probability distributions. For a fixed product line and ϵ>0\epsilon>0, this infinite-dimensional problem admits the following one-dimensional dual reformulation.

Proposition 1 (Dual reformulation of the worst-case revenue). Fix a product line S∈LS \in\mathcal{L}, and suppose that the Wasserstein distance is induced by the ℓ1\ell_1-norm. If the nominal distribution QQ has a finite first moment, then, for any ϵ>0\epsilon> 0, the worst-case expected revenue satisfies

Rϵ(S;Q)=max⁡λ≥0{−λϵ+λEU∼Q[max⁡i∈S∪{0}Ui]−λEU∼Q[max⁡i∈S∪{0}{Ui−riλ}]}(2)R_{\epsilon}(S; Q) = \max_{\lambda\ge0} \left\{ -\lambda\epsilon+ \lambda\mathbb{E}_{U \sim Q}\left[\max_{i \in S \cup\{0\}} U_i\right] - \lambda\mathbb{E}_{U \sim Q}\left[\max_{i \in S \cup\{0\}}\left\{U_i - \frac{r_i}{\lambda}\right\}\right] \right\} \tag*{(2)}
=max⁡λ≥0{−λϵ+EU∼Q[min⁡i∈S∪{0}{ri+λ(max⁡j∈S∪{0}Uj−Ui)}]}.= \max_{\lambda\ge0} \left\{ -\lambda\epsilon+ \mathbb{E}_{U \sim Q}\left[\min_{i \in S \cup\{0\}}\left\{r_i + \lambda\left(\max_{j \in S \cup\{0\}} U_j - U_i\right)\right\}\right] \right\}.

Proposition 1 replaces the search over distributions with an optimization over the scalar dual variable λ\lambda. Both expectations are taken under QQ, so the least favorable distribution need not be constructed explicitly. The reformulation can also be combined with the outer problem, yielding a joint optimization over (S,λ)(S,\lambda). The DRO problem for PLD is

max⁡S∈LRϵ(S;Q)(3)\max_{S \in\mathcal{L}} R_{\epsilon}(S; Q) \tag*{(3)}

The dual reveals that the first expectation in (2) is the utility customers obtain from their chosen alternatives, which is the standard buyers’ welfare measure in product-line design [11, 13, 15]. We denote this expectation by W(S;Q)W(S; Q). Because λ≥0\lambda\ge0, welfare enters the dual objective through the nonnegative term λW(S;Q)\lambda W(S; Q), which creates an endogenous incentive to offer product lines that deliver greater customer value.

Moreover, observe that, the final term in (2) satisfies

λmax⁡i∈S∪{0}{Ui−riλ}=max⁡i∈S∪{0}{λUi−ri}.\lambda\max_{i \in S \cup\{0\}} \left\{U_i - \frac{r_i}{\lambda}\right\} = \max_{i \in S \cup\{0\}} \{\lambda U_i - r_i\}.

Therefore, the right-hand side is piecewise linear and convex in λ\lambda, as it is the pointwise maximum of affine functions. Since expectations preserve convexity, λEU∼Q[max⁡i∈S∪{0}{Ui−ri/λ}]\lambda\mathbb{E}_{U \sim Q}\left[\max_{i \in S \cup\{0\}}\left\{U_i - r_i/\lambda\right\}\right] is also convex in λ\lambda. It follows that the objective in (2) is concave in λ\lambda. This concavity further reveals the welfare incentive induced by the DRO model. Because r0=0r_0 = 0 and ri>0r_i > 0 for every i∈Si \in S, the outside option becomes the maximizer of λUi−ri\lambda U_i - r_i as λ→0+\lambda\to0^+. Consequently, the right derivative of the dual objective at λ=0\lambda= 0 is W(S;Q)−EQ[U0]−ϵW(S; Q) - \mathbb{E}_Q[U_0] - \epsilon. By concavity, λ=0\lambda= 0 is optimal if and only if W(S;Q)−EQ[U0]≤ϵW(S; Q) - \mathbb{E}_Q[U_0] \le\epsilon. When λ∗=0\lambda^* = 0, the robust revenue equals zero, the smallest attainable revenue level. Hence, such a product line cannot be robust optimal whenever another feasible product line attains strictly positive robust revenue. This observation imposes a welfare requirement on any robust-optimal product line.

Corollary 1 (Lower Bound on Buyers’ Welfare). Let W∗(Q)=max⁡S∈LW(S;Q)W^*(Q) = \max_{S \in\mathcal{L}} W(S; Q) be the maximum buyers’ welfare over all feasible product lines under QQ, and define the critical radius as ϵ†(Q)=W∗(Q)−EQ[U0]\epsilon^\dagger(Q) = W^*(Q) - \mathbb{E}_Q[U_0]. Then, for any 0≤ϵ<ϵ†(Q)0 \le\epsilon< \epsilon^\dagger(Q), every optimal solution Sϵ∗(Q)S^*_\epsilon(Q) satisfies

W(Sϵ∗(Q);Q)−EQ[U0]≥ϵ.W(S^*_\epsilon(Q); Q) - \mathbb{E}_Q[U_0] \ge\epsilon.

In the corollary above, W(S;Q)−EQ[U0]W(S; Q) - \mathbb{E}_Q[U_0] measures the incremental welfare generated by offering SS relative to offering only the outside option. Corollary 1 therefore shows that robustness imposes an implicit welfare requirement, and that this requirement becomes more stringent as ϵ\epsilon increases.

Without further structure on the nominal distribution, the expectations in the general reformulation may not be directly computable, and the form of the welfare requirement depends on both the nominal and the feasible family. The next subsection specializes the nominal to the multinomial logit, for which these expectations are available in closed form.

DRO Model with MNL Nominal Distribution

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