WorksMathematics
When Suspicion Adds Up: A Stochastic Framework for Optimizing Honeypot-Based Insider-Threat Detection
Abstract
Insider threats pose security risks when employees or other trusted users misuse their access to organizational systems. Detecting these threats is difficult because harmful activity can resemble routine behavior. Honeypots, or decoy resources monitored for suspicious interactions, can provide evidence of potentially malicious activity. We develop a decision framework that models evidence accumulation through honeypot interactions using a continuous-time Markov chain and jointly selects honeypot counts and monitoring horizons to minimize expected losses from malicious activity and false detections. For thresholds of two and three interactions, we derive closed-form true- and false-detection probabilities and expected detection times conditional on detection within the monitoring horizon. We characterize boundary cases and establish stochastic-ordering results. Our numerical results highlight the value of the proposed framework across different settings.