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Adversarial Tracking: Attacks on Image Sensors for Object Tracking in Autonomous Vehicles

Abstract

Object tracking systems estimate the motion of surrounding vehicles by linking detected objects across video frames. In particular, Tracking-By-Detection (TBD) systems combine object detectors with motion prediction and data association to maintain object identities over time. However, neural network-based detectors are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that perturb input images, and their impact on downstream trajectory estimation is not fully characterized by detection accuracy alone. Therefore, this paper evaluates image-specific and image-agnostic attacks on YOLOv3 and YOLOv4 detectors paired with SORT, Deep SORT, Strong SORT, and OC-SORT tracking systems. The evaluation uses CARLA simulator and measures tracking quality through Multiple Object Tracking Accuracy (MOTA), Higher Order Tracking Accuracy (HOTA), and Identification F1 (IDF1). Under image-specific attacks, HOTA for YOLOv3-based trackers declines from 53.45-56.19% to 14.85-17.03%, while MOTA reaches -772.60% in the worst case. YOLOv4-based trackers exhibit greater robustness, while HOTA still declines to 25.06-26.86%. In addition, image-agnostic attacks can reduce the tracking accuracy using a single Universal Adversarial Perturbation (UAP), without generating a separate perturbation for individual frames.

Introduction

Object tracking is a fundamental perception task in autonomous driving that estimates the locations and identities of surrounding objects over time [1]. Camera-based object tracking includes Single-Object Tracking (SOT) and Multi-Object Tracking (MOT). SOT follows one specified target, whereas MOT follows several objects and maintains a separate tracklet for each [2].

Although deep neural networks have substantially advanced the tracking performance, they are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that perturb input images [3]. For example, Tracking-By-Detection (TBD) systems combine neural object detectors with motion prediction and association across consecutive frames. Some TBD systems rely on pre-trained object detectors, and perturbations generated against widely used object detection models, such as YOLO [4, 5, 6], may transfer to tracking systems. Therefore, the tracking performance of TBD systems heavily rely on the accuracy of object detectors. However, detection errors do not necessarily translate directly into tracking errors, as the data association stage may reject inconsistent detections [3]. Nevertheless, persistent detection errors can disrupt data association, leading to fragmented trajectories [7], as shown in Figure 1.

Clean and adversarial tracking showing fragmented and spurious tracklets

Figure 1. Adversarial Attacks on Object Tracking: Adversarial perturbations disrupt Multi-Object Tracking (MOT) by fragmenting continuous tracklets and generating spurious tracklets.

Therefore, a systematic evaluation at the tracking level is necessary to characterize the impact of adversarial attacks on autonomous driving. The contributions are as follows.

  • CARLA Dataset: An open-source framework is developed to generate synthetic autonomous driving dataset using CARLA Simulator [8].1

  • Tracking Benchmark: A benchmark is established to evaluate representative real-time tracking algorithms, including SOT [9], Deep-SORT [10], Strong-SORT [11], and OC-SORT [12], in combination with three object detectors: YOLOv3, YOLOv4, and YOLOX.

  • Adversarial Attacks: Image-specific and image-agnostic attacks against TBD systems are evaluated using MOTA, IDF1, and HOTA.2

Background

Object Tracking

Camera-based Multi-Object Tracking (MOT) methods generally follow two approaches, Joint Detection and Tracking (JDT) and Tracking-By-Detection (TBD). JDT methods integrate detection and tracking, whereas TBD methods use a modular framework with an object detector, state estimation, an optional feature extractor, and data association [1]. Figure 2 summarizes these components and their roles in online tracking.

Common components of online tracking methods based on the TBD framework

Figure 2. Common components of online tracking methods based on the TBD framework.

Object Detector: The object detector identifies objects in each camera frame and provides bounding boxes, confidence scores, and predicted classes. The tracking stages then associate detections across frames to maintain object identities.

State Estimation: To maintain object identities, SORT-like trackers commonly use a Kalman filter to predict the next state of each track [9]. Under a constant-velocity model, the state is represented by

x=[u,v,s,r,u˙,v˙,s˙]T(1)\mathbf{x} = [u,v,s,r,\dot{u},\dot{v},\dot{s}]^{T} \tag*{(1)}

where (u,v)(u,v) is the box center, ss is its scale, rr is its aspect ratio, and [u˙,v˙,s˙][\dot{u},\dot{v},\dot{s}] denotes the corresponding rates. The Kalman filter updates this state when a detection is associated with the predicted track. Consequently, association can reject isolated inconsistent boxes, but a sustained series of false detections may still form incorrect trajectories.

Feature Extractor (Optional): Motion state alone may be insufficient to distinguish nearby or occluded objects. Therefore, appearance-based trackers, including Deep SORT, use a convolutional neural network (CNN) to extract descriptors that support identity association [10]. This optional stage is shown in Figure 2.

Data Association: The data association module matches current detections to predicted track states and, when available, image-derived features. The Mahalanobis distance [13] can measure the discrepancy between a detection and a predicted state. Subsequently, the Hungarian algorithm [14] can solve the resulting assignment problem. Although these stages help maintain object identities, their effectiveness depends on the incoming detections.

Evaluation Metrics

MOT performance is evaluated through MOTA [15], IDF1 [16], and HOTA [17]. These metrics capture different aspects of detector errors, identity preservation, and their combined tracking effect. They are therefore reported together in Section IV.

Multiple Object Tracking Accuracy (MOTA): MOTA accounts for false positives (FP), false negatives (FN), and identity switches (IDSW) across time tt. It penalizes detection and association errors relative to ground-truth instances (GTGT):

MOTA=1−∑tFNt+∑tFPt+∑tIDSWt∑tGTt(2)MOTA = 1 - \frac{\sum_t FN_t + \sum_t FP_t + \sum_t IDSW_t}{\sum_t GT_t} \tag*{(2)}

Identification F1 Score (IDF1): IDF1 measures whether predicted identities remain consistent with ground-truth identities across the sequence [16]. It is defined through identification true positives (IDTP), false positives (IDFP), and false negatives (IDFN):

IDF1=2IDTP2IDTP+IDFP+IDFN(3)IDF_1 = \frac{2IDTP}{2IDTP + IDFP + IDFN} \tag*{(3)}

Higher Order Tracking Accuracy (HOTA): Provides a balanced evaluation of Detection Accuracy (DetA) and Association Accuracy (AssA) with different α\alpha thresholds [17]:

HOTAα=DetAα⋅AssAα(4)HOTA_{\alpha} = \sqrt{\mathrm{DetA}_{\alpha} \cdot\mathrm{AssA}_{\alpha}} \tag*{(4)}

DetA measures how accurately objects are detected, while AssA measures how consistently their identities are maintained across frames. This means that HOTA provides a more balanced assessment of detection and association performance.

Overall, MOTA emphasizes detection and identity errors, IDF1 focuses on identity consistency, and HOTA provides a balanced measure of detection and association performance.

Adversarial Attacks

Both JDT and TBD methods have been studied under adversarial attacks. For example, attacks on GOTURN-style single-object tracking [18] and FairMOT [19] alter learned tracking behavior. For modular TBD systems, an attacker may instead target the detector, the association process, or tracklet management. The distinction matters because detector-only attacks need not access the internal tracking model.

Attacking Object Detectors: The accuracy of TBD methods heavily relies on the object detector’s ability to produce precise bounding boxes of target objects. Missed or misplaced detections can therefore disrupt subsequent track association.

In 2019, the first adversarial attack against MOT models attacked a TBD method that used YOLOv3 as the object detector [3]. Moreover, YOLOX [6] and CenterNet [20] stand out as two widely-used object detectors for autonomous driving applications, yet they both exhibit vulnerability to adversarial attacks [21, 22]. To mitigate adversarial attacks, temporal outlier detection offers a potential approach to identifying adversarial perturbations [23].

Attacking Association Methods: Association assigns an identity to each detected object across frames. Liu et al. [24] describe attacks that alter object-label evidence and can undermine association. Unlike those methods, detector-only attacks first alter the image measurements passed to otherwise unchanged tracking modules.

Attacking Tracklets: Tracklets retain an object’s estimated position and motion, often through Kalman-filter state prediction. An error in these observations can alter subsequent matches and, in some cases, switch nearby identities. Lin et al. [7] attacked the appearance and distance cues of neighboring pedestrians to disrupt tracking. Such attacks differ from the detector-input perturbations considered here because they explicitly seek to affect temporal association.

Methodology

Although some MOT systems use 3D LiDAR measurements [25], this study focuses on vision-only TBD systems. Specifically, we focus on modular TBD methods to investigate whether traditional statistical tracking components, such as the Kalman filter, can help mitigate the effects of adversarial attacks.

Given an input image xx, the object detection model produces a set of NN candidate detections H={h1,h2,…,hN}\mathcal{H} = \{h_1,h_2,\ldots,h_N\}. Each detection hypothesis is represented as

hi=(bi,ci,pi),1≤i≤N,(5)h_i = (b_i,c_i,p_i), \qquad1 \le i \le N, \tag*{(5)}

where bi=(bix,biy,biw,bih)b_i = (b_i^x,b_i^y,b_i^w,b_i^h) specifies the bounding-box position and size, ci∈[0,1]c_i \in[0,1] is the confidence score, and pi=(pi1,pi2,…,piK)p_i = (p_i^1,p_i^2,\ldots,p_i^K) contains class probabilities for KK classes. The superscript tt below denotes the video-frame index.

For an image xx at time tt, the detector therefore produces

H(xt)=h1t,h2t,…,hNt.(6)\mathcal{H}(x_t) = h_1^t,h_2^t,\ldots,h_N^t. \tag*{(6)}

Each hypothesis hit=(bit,cit,pit)h_i^t = (b_i^t,c_i^t,p_i^t) describes a candidate object detected in the corresponding frame.

The adversarial attack aims to generate a perturbation δ∈[−1,1]whc\delta\in[-1,1]^{whc} such that the detector produces a different set of hypotheses for the perturbed image x′=x+δx' = x+\delta, i.e.,

H(x′)≠H(x).(7)\mathcal{H}(x') \ne\mathcal{H}(x). \tag*{(7)}

Image-Specific Attack: The image-specific attack generates a perturbation tailored to a single input image. The attack maximizes or minimizes an adversarial loss Ladv\mathcal{L}_{adv} with respect to the input image, rather than updating the model parameters. Maximizing the adversarial loss Ladv\mathcal{L}_{adv} encourages the detector to generate incorrect bounding boxes, while minimizing them suppresses detected objects. The adversarial perturbation δt\delta_t at time step tt is updated using the following equation:

δt+1←Proj⁡∞,ϵ(δt+αtsign⁡(∇xLadv(x+δt)))(8)\delta_{t+1} \leftarrow\operatorname{Proj}_{\infty,\epsilon}\left(\delta_t+\alpha_t\operatorname{sign}\left(\nabla_x\mathcal{L}_{adv}(x+\delta_t)\right)\right) \tag*{(8)}

where αt\alpha_t is the learning rate and Proj⁡∞,ϵ\operatorname{Proj}_{\infty,\epsilon} constrains the perturbation within an l∞l_\infty bound of ϵ\epsilon. The learning rate is decayed after each iteration.

Image-Agnostic Attack: The same optimization principle can be extended to an image-agnostic attack, which learns a single perturbation that can be applied to multiple input images. Given a set of sample images XSX_S, the perturbation is iteratively optimized by computing the adversarial gradient for each image and accumulating the resulting updates. A smaller learning rate is used to improve the transferability of the perturbation across different images:

δ←Proj⁡∞,ϵ(δ+αsign⁡(∇xLadv(x+δ))),x∈XS.(9)\delta\leftarrow\operatorname{Proj}_{\infty,\epsilon}\left(\delta+\alpha\operatorname{sign}\left(\nabla_x\mathcal{L}_{adv}(x+\delta)\right)\right), \qquad x \in X_S. \tag*{(9)}

Unlike the image-specific attack, which produces a different perturbation for each image, the image-agnostic attack produces a single universal perturbation that is optimized across the available sample images.

Lastly, the adversarial loss Ladv\mathcal{L}_{adv} is defined as

Ladv(x)=∑i=1Nσ(ci)∗σ(pi)∑i=1N[σ(biw)∗σ(bih)]2,(10)\mathcal{L}_{adv}(x) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N}\sigma(c_i)*\sigma(p_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^{N}[\sigma(b_i^w)*\sigma(b_i^h)]^2}, \tag*{(10)}

where NN is the number of candidate boxes, cic_i is the confidence score, pip_i is the class probability, and biwb_i^w and bihb_i^h are the predicted box dimensions. The sigmoid function is denoted by σ(⋅)\sigma(\cdot). Thus, the adversarial loss increases the detection confidence for all objects while reducing the size of predicted bounding boxes, thereby increasing the number of detections.

Experimental Results

The experiment applies image-specific and image-agnostic attacks to SORT [9], Deep SORT [10], Strong SORT [11], and OC-SORT [12] with YOLOv3 and YOLOv4 detectors in CARLA simulator [8] across seven maps. The evaluation investigates whether conventional tracking components, such as the Kalman filter and the Hungarian algorithm, can mitigate the effects of adversarial attacks.

Image-Specific PCB Attack

The image-specific attack was tested with hyperparameters of attack strength ϵ=8\epsilon= 8 and learning rate decay k=0.99k = 0.99. We updated the perturbation frame-by-frame, iterating one step per frame for 300 consecutive frames on each of the 7 maps.

After applying adversarial perturbations, MOTA decreases significantly for both YOLOv3 and YOLOv4, as shown in Figure 3. YOLOv3 generates many small false-positive boxes, whereas YOLOv4 produces fewer but larger spurious detections (see Figure 3 (a) and (b)). Notably, the MOTAs of YOLOv3 drop to negative values due to a large number of false positives.

Four-panel comparison of YOLOv3 and YOLOv4 detections and MOTA under image-specific attacks

Figure 3. Image-Specific Attacks substantially degrade the MOTA by generating a large number of small false positives bounding boxes. In contrast, YOLOv4 produces fewer but larger boxes, making it comparatively more robust to these attacks.

The effectiveness of the image-specific attack can be further improved by increasing the number of optimization iterations per frame, as false positives are relatively rare in the initial frames, leaving the tracking method largely unaffected. HOTA and IDF1 also decline, as shown in the retained Appendix plots, Figure 5 and Figure 6. These findings demonstrate that perturbing the object detection model alone is sufficient to compromise TBD frameworks.

HOTA under no attack, image-specific, and image-agnostic attacks for YOLOv3 across OC-SORT, Strong-SORT, Deep-SORT, and SORT

(a) YOLOv3 HOTA

HOTA under no attack, image-specific, and image-agnostic attacks for YOLOv4 across OC-SORT, Strong-SORT, Deep-SORT, and SORT

(b) YOLOv4 HOTA

Figure 5. HOTA under Image-Specific and Image-Agnostic Attacks against YOLOv3 and YOLOv4.

IDF1 under no attack, image-specific, and image-agnostic attacks for YOLOv3 across OC-SORT, Strong-SORT, Deep-SORT, and SORT

(a) YOLOv3 IDF1

IDF1 under no attack, image-specific, and image-agnostic attacks for YOLOv4 across OC-SORT, Strong-SORT, Deep-SORT, and SORT

(b) YOLOv4 IDF1

Figure 6. IDF1 under Image-Specific and Image-Agnostic Attacks against YOLOv3 and YOLOv4.

Image-Agnostic Attack

The image-agnostic attack generates an Universal Adversarial Perturbation (UAP) to attack all video frames. We trained the UAP on Map 02 for 100 iterations, as Map 02 generalizes best across all maps. The training was conducted with a learning rate of α=0.001\alpha= 0.001, a learning rate decay of k=0.98k = 0.98, and an attack strength of ϵ=8\epsilon= 8.

Figure 4 shows that the UAP reduces MOTA for both detectors. For YOLOv3, this reduction is smaller than that under the image-specific attack. However, several YOLOv4 combinations show a larger MOTA reduction with the UAP, so the relative effect depends on the detector. The HOTA and IDF1 results in Figure 5 and Figure 6 provide corresponding evidence of degraded track association and identity preservation.

Image-Agnostic Attacks generate a Universal Adversarial Perturbation

Figure 4. Image-Agnostic Attacks generate a Universal Adversarial Perturbation (UAP) applied to all video frames. Although generally less effective than image-specific attacks, they can still substantially degrade MOTA.

The YOLOv3 and YOLOv4 examples predominantly contain false detections labeled as birds and chairs, respectively, as shown in Figure 4(a) and (b). Vehicle-class filtering can reject many such boxes, but the resulting MOTA losses show that downstream tracking is not fully protected. These examples do not establish how much of the remaining error comes from missed vehicles or accepted false tracks. Vehicle-targeted perturbations would therefore provide a useful further comparison.

Conclusion

This study evaluated four real-time online tracking methods—SORT, Deep SORT, Strong SORT, and OC SORT—using the CARLA dataset. With the same object detector, OC SORT achieved tracking accuracy comparable to Strong SORT without requiring additional neural networks for feature extraction. This finding suggests that improving conventional tracking components, such as the Kalman filter, can enhance tracking accuracy without introducing additional deep learning-based components and potential attack surfaces.

Furthermore, for TBD methods, the tracking performance is highly dependent on detection accuracy. Our experimental results demonstrated that both image-specific and image-agnostic attacks substantially degraded MOTA, HOTA and IDF1, indicating that perturbing the object detector alone is sufficient to compromise the tracking system.

References

Appendix

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