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Zero sum two-player differential game under three regimes

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Abstract

This paper investigates a two player zero-sum stochastic differential game characterized by three distinct regimes, reflecting the regime switching dynamics within the system. We aim to derive an explicit solution for a number of configurations of the switching system by means of the viscosity solutions approach. In particular, we analyze the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equations and examine how the interactions between the different regimes affect the structure of the value function. The proposed framework provides a systematic approach to characterize the optimal strategies of the two players and to obtain explicit representations of the value function un der suitable assumptions. We also illustrate how to derive the value functions in case we know the qualitative structure of switching regions.

AMS Classification: 60G40; 62P20; 91B99; 91B28; 35B37; 49L25.

Introduction

In recent decades, stochastic differential games have attracted considerable attention due to their numerous applications in economics, finance, engineering, and operational research. Among these problems, zero-sum two-player switching games constitute an important class of stochastic control problems in which competing players influence the evolution of a system by switching between different operational regimes. Such models combine the strategic interactions of differential games with the flexibility of regime-switching control, providing a natural framework for studying decision-making under uncertainty when switching actions incur costs.

A zero-sum switching game describes a competitive situation in which the gain of one player is exactly the loss of the other. In the stochastic setting, the players’ decisions affect both the current payoff and the future evolution of the system, leading to highly coupled optimization problems. The strategic complexity increases significantly when several operating regimes are available, since each player must determine not only the optimal timing of a switch but also the most advantageous regime to select while anticipating the opponent’s actions.

The theory of regime-switching models originated with the pioneering work of [11] and was further developed by [10] for the analysis of economic and financial systems exhibiting structural changes. Since then, regime-switching models have become a standard tool for describing systems whose dynamics evolve according to a finite collection of states. When combined with stochastic control and game-theoretic considerations, they give rise to switching games in which players modify the regime of the system through costly interventions.

Switching control and switching games have been extensively studied in the literature. Important contributions include the works of Bensoussan and Lions [3], Øksendal and Sulem [15], Pham [18], and Bayraktar and Yao [1], among others. In general, the value functions of these games are characterized as viscosity solutions of systems of variational or quasi-variational inequalities, whose analysis relies on sophisticated techniques from stochastic control theory. Existence and uniqueness results have been established in a broad setting, and several qualitative properties of the associated Nash equilibria have been investigated.

Despite these advances, obtaining explicit solutions remains a difficult task. Most existing works focus on the characterization of the value function through variational inequalities, while closed-form analytical solutions are available only in a limited number of special cases. The difficulty increases rapidly as the number of regimes grows because the number of possible switching decisions and the interactions between the players become considerably more intricate.

In [7], we obtained an explicit solution for a zero-sum two-player switching game in the case of two regimes, providing an analytical characterization of the value functions and the corresponding optimal switching strategies. The present paper extends that analysis to the considerably more challenging case of three regimes. The transition from two to three regimes substantially enriches the strategic structure of the game by introducing additional switching possibilities and more complex interactions between the players.

The principal novelty of this paper is the derivation of an explicit solution for the three-regime zero-sum two-player switching game. To the best of our knowledge, explicit analytical solutions for this class of problems are scarce in the literature due to the significant mathematical complexity generated by the increased number of regimes. Our results show that moving beyond the two-regime setting gives rise to a richer strategic structure, in which the interaction between multiple switching opportunities fundamentally shapes the equilibrium strategies. The three-regime framework therefore provides new structural insights into the geometry of the switching regions and the resulting equilibrium policies, while substantially broadening the scope of the explicit analysis.

From an application point of view, the three-regime model is relevant in numerous contexts. In finance, it can describe markets evolving through bearish, neutral, and bullish phases. In economics, it models strategic decisions under different macroeconomic environments, while in engineering it applies to systems operating under several modes with different performance characteristics. The additional regime allows for a richer representation of realistic systems and more flexible modeling of strategic interactions.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the mathematical framework and formulates the zero-sum switching game together with the standing assumptions. Section 3 derives the associated quasi-variational inequalities and characterizes the switching regions. Section 4 presents the explicit solution of the three-regime switching game and establishes the corresponding equilibrium strategies, in section 5 we give a numerical procedure to compute the value function in case we know the qualitative structure of the switching regions and in section 6 we illustrate our results by numerical simulations.

Problem formulation and Assumptions

Problem formulation

The problem consists of a two-player game. The first player (Player I) and the second player (Player II) both make decisions based on the value of a state process X:=(Xt)t≥0X := (X_t)_{t \ge0}.

Each player operates under several modes or regimes. Let D:={1,2,…,d}\mathcal{D} := \{1,2,\ldots,d\} denote the finite set of regimes, where each regime is identified by an index in {1,…,d}\{1,\ldots,d\}.

The switching costs are known from both players, and at any given time, each player knows the current regime of his counterpart.

The regime configuration of both players is modeled by a two-dimensional càdlàg process ItI_t taking values in D×D\mathcal{D} \times\mathcal{D}. For each value of ItI_t, there is an associated running profit function fItf_{I_t}, assumed to be non-negative.

The state process XX represents the price of a commodity and thus takes values in R+∗\mathbb{R}_{+}^{*}.

We denote by JJ the payoff of the game. Player I aims to maximize JJ by choosing a switching strategy ξ:=(ξn)n≥1\xi:= (\xi_n)_{n \ge1} at stopping times τ:=(τn)n≥1\tau:= (\tau_n)_{n \ge1}, which form an increasing sequence of stopping times. Player II aims to minimize JJ by choosing a switching strategy η:=(ηm)m≥1\eta:= (\eta_m)_{m \ge1} at stopping times ρ:=(ρm)m≥1\rho:= (\rho_m)_{m \ge1}.

Switching from regime ii to regime jj incurs a cost cijc_{ij} for Player I and χij\chi_{ij} for Player II.

The payoff of the game is given by

J(x,ξ,η)=E[∫0∞e−rsf(Xsμs,νs,μs,νs) ds−∑n≥1e−rτnC(ξn−1,ξn)+∑m≥1e−rρmχ(ηm−1,ηm)],(1)J(x,\xi,\eta) = \mathbb{E}\left[\int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-rs} f\left(X_s^{\mu_s,\nu_s},\mu_s,\nu_s\right)\,\mathrm{d}s - \sum_{n \ge1} e^{-r\tau_n} C(\xi_{n-1},\xi_n) + \sum_{m \ge1} e^{-r\rho_m}\chi(\eta_{m-1},\eta_m)\right], \tag*{(1)}

where r>0r > 0 is the discount rate.

The regime processes of the players are defined by

μt=∑n≥1ξn1{τn≤t<τn+1},νt=∑m≥1ηm1{ρm≤t<ρm+1}.\mu_t = \sum_{n \ge1} \xi_n \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau_n \le t < \tau_{n+1}\}}, \qquad\nu_t = \sum_{m \ge1} \eta_m \mathbf{1}_{\{\rho_m \le t < \rho_{m+1}\}}.

Hence, by definition, we have It=(μt,νt)I_t = (\mu_t,\nu_t).

State dynamics

In this work, the process XtX_t follows a regime-switching geometric Brownian motion to ensure positivity, and is given by

dXt=b(Xt,μt,νt) dt+σ(Xt,μt,νt) dWt,X0=x,I0−=(i,j).(2)\mathrm{d}X_t = b(X_t,\mu_t,\nu_t)\,\mathrm{d}t + \sigma(X_t,\mu_t,\nu_t)\,\mathrm{d}W_t,\qquad X_0 = x,\qquad I_{0-} = (i,j). \tag*{(2)}

where

b(Xt,μt,νt)=bItXt,σ(Xt,μt,νt)=σItXt.b(X_t,\mu_t,\nu_t) = b_{I_t}X_t,\qquad\sigma(X_t,\mu_t,\nu_t) = \sigma_{I_t}X_t.

Throughout the paper, we refer to bItb_{I_t} and σIt\sigma_{I_t} as diffusion coefficients. We also denote by XI0xX_{I_0}^{x} (or simply XxX^x) the solution of the stochastic differential equation.

Assumptions

Throughout the paper, dd is a positive integer and D={1,…,d}\mathcal{D} = \{1,\ldots,d\}.

[H1] The functions b:R+∗×D×D→R+b : \mathbb{R}_{+}^{*} \times\mathcal{D} \times\mathcal{D} \to\mathbb{R}_{+} and σ:R+∗×D×D→R+\sigma: \mathbb{R}_{+}^{*} \times\mathcal{D} \times\mathcal{D} \to\mathbb{R}_{+} are continuous and satisfy the Lipschitz condition: there exists C>0C > 0 such that for all x,x′∈R+∗x,x' \in\mathbb{R}_{+}^{*} and i,j∈Di,j \in\mathcal{D},

∣σ(x,i,j)−σ(x′,i,j)∣+∣b(x,i,j)−b(x′,i,j)∣≤C∣x−x′∣.(3)\left|\sigma(x,i,j)-\sigma(x',i,j)\right|+\left|b(x,i,j)-b(x',i,j)\right| \le C|x-x'|. \tag*{(3)}

Moreover, they satisfy the linear growth condition:

∣σ(x,i,j)∣+∣b(x,i,j)∣≤C(1+∣x∣).|\sigma(x,i,j)|+|b(x,i,j)| \le C(1+|x|).

[H2] The function f:R+∗×D×D→R+f : \mathbb{R}_{+}^{*} \times\mathcal{D} \times\mathcal{D} \to\mathbb{R}_{+} is continuous and satisfies: there exists C>0C > 0 such that for all x,x′∈R+∗x,x' \in\mathbb{R}_{+}^{*} and i,j∈Di,j \in\mathcal{D},

∣f(x,i,j)∣≤C(1+∣x∣),∣f(x,i,j)−f(x′,i,j)∣≤C∣x−x′∣.(4)|f(x,i,j)| \le C(1+|x|),\qquad|f(x,i,j)-f(x',i,j)| \le C|x-x'|. \tag*{(4)}

[H3] For all i,j∈Di,j \in\mathcal{D}, the switching costs cijc_{ij} and χij\chi_{ij} are constants satisfying the triangular condition:

cik<cij+cjk,χik<χij+χjk,j≠i,k.(5)c_{ik} < c_{ij} + c_{jk}, \qquad\chi_{ik} < \chi_{ij} + \chi_{jk}, \qquad j \ne i,k. \tag*{(5)}

This ensures that direct switching is cheaper than indirect switching through an intermediate regime.

Note that switching costs may be negative, but condition (2.5) prevents arbitrage by repeated switching. In particular,

0<cij+cji,0<χij+χji.(6)0 < c_{ij} + c_{ji}, \qquad0 < \chi_{ij} + \chi_{ji}. \tag*{(6)}

We may alternatively write c(i,j)c(i,j) instead of cijc_{ij}, and f(x,i,j)f(x,i,j) instead of fij(x)f_{ij}(x).

[H4] The discount rate rr satisfies

r>max⁡i,j∈Dbij.r > \max_{i,j \in\mathcal{D}} b_{ij}.

This assumption is mainly technical and ensures integrability properties needed for the explicit solution.

[H5] The sequences of cumulative switching costs

cn=∑m=1ne−rτmc(ξm−1,ξm),χn=∑l=1ne−rρlχ(ηl−1,ηl),c_n = \sum_{m=1}^{n} e^{-r\tau_m}c(\xi_{m-1},\xi_m), \qquad\chi_n = \sum_{l=1}^{n} e^{-r\rho_l}\chi(\eta_{l-1},\eta_l),

converge almost surely, and their limits satisfy

lim⁡n→∞cn∈L1,lim⁡n→∞χn∈L1.(7)\lim_{n \to\infty} c_n \in L^1, \qquad\lim_{n \to\infty} \chi_n \in L^1. \tag*{(7)}

Preliminary Results

Existence of solutions for the SDE

Under assumption [H1], the stochastic differential equation (2.2) admits a unique strong solution.

Viscosity solutions

Let FF be a continuous function such that

F(x,v,Dxv,Dxx2v)=0,(8)F(x,v,D_xv,D^2_{xx}v) = 0, \tag*{(8)}

where DxvD_xv and Dxx2vD^2_{xx}v denote respectively the first and second derivatives with respect to xx.

We assume that FF is nonincreasing with respect to its last argument, and that xx belongs to an open subset O⊂R+\mathcal{O} \subset\mathbb{R}^{+}.

References

  1. [1]E. Bayraktar, & Yao, S. (2011). Optimal Stopping for Non-Linear Expectations—Part I. Stochastic Processes and their Applications, 121(2), 185-211.
  2. [3]A. Bensoussan, & Lions, J.-L. (1984). Impulse Control and Quasi-Variational Inequalities. Paris: Gauthier-Villars. xiv + 684 pp. ISBN: 2-04015577-5.
  3. [6]B. El Asri, S. Mazid, Stochastic differential switching game in infinite horizon,J. Math. Anal. Appl(2019).arxiv.org/abs/1805.01223
  4. [7]B. El Asri, M. Paka Explicit Solution to an Optimal Two-player Switching Game in Infinite Horizon, J Optim Th Appl, (2026) 209:49.
  5. [10]Hamilton, J. D. (1989). A New Approach to the Economic Analysis of Nonstationary Time Series and the Business Cycle. Econometrica, 57(2), 357–384.
  6. [11]R. A. Howard, Dynamic Programming and Markov Processes, MIT Press, 1960.
  7. [15]Øksendal, B., & Sulem, A. (2007). Applied Stochastic Control of Jump Diffusions (2nd ed.). Berlin: Springer, Universitext. xiv + 262 pp. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-69826-5.DOI
  8. [17]Pham H. (2005) : “On the smooth-fit property for one-dimensional optimal switching problem”, to appear in Séminaire de Probabilités, Vol. XL.
  9. [18]H.Pham, V.L.Vath , Zhou XY (2009) Optimal switching over multiple regimes. SIAM J. Control Optim. 48(4):2217-2253.

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