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Diffusion Sensitivity Geometry and Strong Duality for Optimal Privacy-Utility Tradeoffs

Abstract

Existing approaches to differential privacy in diffusion models rely on loose sensitivity bounds and isotropic Gaussian noise, leading to unnecessary estimation error. We develop a framework for the optimal privacy-utility tradeoff of ideal diffusion denoisers, replacing conservative bounds with exact sensitivity characterizations and provably optimal noise calibration. First, we show that worst-case sensitivity over datasets of arbitrary size can be characterized exactly using only two records. For a data domain of size mm, this reduces the analysis to at most m(m−1)m(m-1) constraints, regardless of dataset size. Our characterization can be arbitrarily tighter than conventional diameter-based sensitivity bounds, revealing potentially unbounded improvements in noise calibration. Second, we obtain exact privacy guarantees for Rényi, approximate, and Gaussian differential privacy, as well as mutual-information privacy for binary records, avoiding the looseness of previous generic privacy conversions. Finally, we show that the minimum achievable weighted mean-squared error can be computed through a semidefinite program and prove strong duality, providing certificates of global optimality.

Introduction

Diffusion models [1, 2] now lead generative modeling of images and other high-dimensional data. Their training sets often contain sensitive content, revealed by the trained models; deep networks are shown to regenerate near-copies of training images [3], and an adversary can infer whether an individual record was used for training from the model’s denoising behavior [4, 5]. Differential privacy (DP) [6] is the standard remedy. Existing private diffusion models are trained with DP-SGD [7, 8, 9], which clips per-example gradients during training and adds isotropic Gaussian noise scaled to a fixed clipping norm. This calibration ignores the geometry of what is being protected and can add far more noise than the guarantee requires.

We ask what the optimal privacy-utility tradeoff is when privacy is enforced at the denoiser itself. We study explicitly the empirical risk minimizing denoiser (denoted as the ideal denoiser), which materializes as a softmax-weighted average of the training records [5]. We release it through a Gaussian mechanism with a general covariance Σ\Sigma and measure model utility by a weighted mean-squared error. We answer exactly how far one record can move the denoiser, how much privacy a given Σ\Sigma provides, and how to find the Σ\Sigma which provides the best privacy-utility tradeoff. Our contributions follow:

  • Sensitivity (Section III). The worst-case effect of one record, over datasets of every size, is generated by two-record datasets (Lemma 1, Theorem 1); for a fixed query and a domain of mm points, at most m(m−1)m(m-1) constraints are needed. When one covariance must serve every query, the worst case is the largest Mahalanobis distance between two points of the domain (Corollary 1), which can be far smaller than a naive diameter-based bound (Fig. 1).

  • Privacy accounting (Section IV). We demonstrate that a single quantity ρ∗(Σ)\rho_*(\Sigma) fixes the Rényi divergence between adjacent datasets at every order, the smallest zCDP and Gaussian DP parameters (Theorem 2), and the exact (ε,δ)(\varepsilon,\delta) curve for standard differential privacy, with no loss from generic conversions.

  • Optimal noise (Section V). The least-error covariance under any of these budgets solves a semidefinite program whose conic dual has an exact gap formula; strong duality holds with both optima attained (Theorem 3), so dual solutions certify global optimality.

  • Mutual-information privacy (Section VI). For binary records, mutual-information DP reduces to the capacity of a binary-input Gaussian channel whose capacity is strictly increasing in the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) by the I-MMSE identity, giving another exact instance of the same program.

Privacy-utility tradeoffs. Information theory has long studied the tension between disclosure and utility, as exemplified with Yamamoto’s source coding problem with a secret component [10]. It has since been studied through the privacy funnel [11], MMSE estimation under privacy constraints [12, 13], and estimation guarantees under disclosure limits [14]. Under DP, Geng and Viswanath show that the optimal additive noise for a scalar query follows a staircase-shaped distribution rather than the Gaussian law [15]. However, none of these works directly apply to the diffusion model, which we show leads to interesting characterizations of privacy-utility tradeoffs.

Gaussian mechanisms and accounting. We consider approximate DP [6], Rényi DP [16], zCDP [17], Gaussian DP [18], and the mutual-information formulation of Cuff and Yu [19]; our exact (ε,δ)(\varepsilon,\delta) curve follows the analytic calibration of Balle and Wang [20]. Correlated Gaussian noise has been optimized for linear marginal queries through the matrix mechanism [21] and for unbiased mean estimation [22]. In those problems the sensitivity follows directly from the query; here the release is a specific nonlinear function of the data, and its sensitivity set must first be characterized.

Information-estimation relations. The I-MMSE identity [23] has been extended to mismatched estimation [24], arbitrary additive perturbations through score functions [25], Poisson and semimartingale channels [26, 27], pointwise relations [28], Gaussian networks and matrix-valued SNR [29, 30], and channels with feedback and memory [31, 32]. We use the identity to show that the binary-input channel induced by our mechanism has capacity strictly increasing in the SNR, which makes mutual-information privacy an exact sensitivity budget.

The Ideal Denoiser

Normalized empirical posterior mean

Let K⊂RdK \subset\mathbb{R}^d be a public (nonempty) bounded domain. A dataset D=(x1,…,xn)D=(x_1,\ldots,x_n) is a (nonempty) finite multiset in KK. Fix a public query g∈Rdg \in\mathbb{R}^d and noise scale σ>0\sigma> 0. Define

wg(x)=exp⁡{−∥g−x∥22σ2},(1)w_g(x)=\exp\left\{-\frac{\lVert g-x\rVert^2}{2\sigma^2}\right\}, \tag*{(1)}
ri(g;D)=wg(xi)∑j=1nwg(xj),mg(D)=∑i=1nri(g;D)xi.(2)r_i(g;D)=\frac{w_g(x_i)}{\sum_{j=1}^{n}w_g(x_j)},\qquad m_g(D)=\sum_{i=1}^{n}r_i(g;D)x_i. \tag*{(2)}

The denominator is a sum of the weights of xjx_j. If X0X_0 is drawn uniformly from DD and G=X0+σZG=X_0+\sigma Z with Z∼N(0,I)Z\sim\mathcal{N}(0,I), Bayes’ rule implies that mg(D)=E[X0∣G=g,D]m_g(D)=\mathbb{E}[X_0\mid G=g,D]. In particular mg(D)∈conv⁡Km_g(D)\in\operatorname{conv}K.

Write Gt=atX0+1−atZG_t=\sqrt{a_t}X_0+\sqrt{1-a_t}Z, where 0<at<10<a_t<1 is the cumulative signal coefficient. For an ideal predictor ϵ1∗\epsilon^*_1, we obtain

mt(Gt;D)=Gt−1−atϵ∗(Gt,t;D)at.(3)m_t(G_t;D)=\frac{G_t-\sqrt{1-a_t}\epsilon^*(G_t,t;D)}{\sqrt{a_t}}. \tag*{(3)}

The entire numerator is divided by at\sqrt{a_t}. Equations (1)–(2) use the rescaled query g=Gt/atg=G_t/\sqrt{a_t} and σ2=(1−at)/at\sigma^2=(1-a_t)/a_t. The empirical posterior mean formulation is related to the ideal diffusion noise predictor setting studied in DIME [5].

Mechanism and a linear objective

Release only

MΣ,g(D)=mg(D)+ZΣ,ZΣ∼N(0,Σ).(4)M_{\Sigma,g}(D)=m_g(D)+Z_{\Sigma},\qquad Z_{\Sigma}\sim\mathcal{N}(0,\Sigma). \tag*{(4)}

The covariance is the same for all private datasets, independent of the data and of the Gaussian draw. It may depend on public information and the fixed query. Let LL be a fixed linear map and Q⪰0Q\succeq0 its error weight. For W=LTQLW=L^{\mathsf T}QL, the expected additional quadratic loss is exactly

E∥LZΣ∥Q2=tr⁡(WΣ).(5)\mathbb{E}\lVert LZ_{\Sigma}\rVert_Q^2=\operatorname{tr}(W\Sigma). \tag*{(5)}

The cross term against any baseline reconstruction error has mean zero. Mean prediction MSE uses W=IW=I. If noise is added to ϵ∗\epsilon^* instead, the reconstruction cost is (1−at)tr⁡(WΣϵ)/at(1-a_t)\operatorname{tr}(W\Sigma_{\epsilon})/a_t. Conversely, mean noise ZΣZ_{\Sigma} is equivalent to noise at/(1−at)ZΣ\sqrt{a_t/(1-a_t)}Z_{\Sigma} in the ideal noise prediction.

We assume W≻0W\succ0 to obtain compactness and for ease of computing matrix square roots. A semidefinite task weight still defines a valid SDP, but may leave unpenalized directions with unbounded variance and an unattained infimum. Adding a specified small positive weight or separately bounding those directions changes the problem. Equation (5) measures exact quadratic response or one-step reconstruction error. i.e., we do not use a nonlinear full sampler.

From a Fixed Dataset to Global Sensitivity

Exact deletion

For n≥2n\geq2, let D−kD_{-k} delete record kk. Define sk(g;D)=mg(D)−mg(D−k)s_k(g;D)=m_g(D)-m_g(D_{-k}). Since all Gaussian weights are positive,

sk=rk(xk−mg(D−k))=rk1−rk(xk−mg(D)).(6)s_k=r_k(x_k-m_g(D_{-k}))=\frac{r_k}{1-r_k}(x_k-m_g(D)). \tag*{(6)}

Indeed, mg(D)=rkxk+(1−rk)mg(D−k)m_g(D)=r_kx_k+(1-r_k)m_g(D_{-k}). This shows that the relevant direction depends on the posterior responsibility and the location of the deleted record relative to the remaining mean. In particular,

∥sk∥≤rkdiam⁡(K).(7)\lVert s_k\rVert\leq r_k\operatorname{diam}(K). \tag*{(7)}

The posterior spread also determines the query Jacobian:

∇gmg(D)=σ−2∑iri(xi−mg(D))(xi−mg(D))T,(8)\nabla_gm_g(D)=\sigma^{-2}\sum_i r_i(x_i-m_g(D))(x_i-m_g(D))^{\mathsf T}, \tag*{(8)}

obtained by differentiating rir_i.

Adjacency Notions

Add/Remove

1) Add/Remove: For global add/remove privacy, our domain consists of all nonempty finite multisets in KK. Define

Sgar={±sk(g;D):D⊂K, ∣D∣≥2}.(9)S_g^{\mathrm{ar}}=\{\pm s_k(g;D):D\subset K,\ |D|\ge2\}. \tag*{(9)}

Replacement

2) Replacement: Define

Sgrep={sk(g;D∪{xk})−sk(g;D∪{xk′}):D⊂K, ∣D∣≥1}.(10)S_g^{\mathrm{rep}}=\{s_k(g;D\cup\{x_k\})-s_k(g;D\cup\{x'_k\}):D\subset K,\ |D|\ge1\}. \tag*{(10)}

For the replacement adjacency at fixed dataset size N≥1N\ge1, write neighboring datasets as D=(u,a)D=(u,a) and D′=(u,b)D'=(u,b), and form the larger multiset V=(u,a,b)V=(u,a,b). Then

mg(D)−mg(D′)=[mg(D)−mg(V)]+[mg(V)−mg(D′)].(11)m_g(D)-m_g(D')=[m_g(D)-m_g(V)]+[m_g(V)-m_g(D')]. \tag*{(11)}

An add/remove Mahalanobis squared bound ρar\rho_{\mathrm{ar}} therefore implies a replacement bound 4ρar4\rho_{\mathrm{ar}} by the triangle inequality.

A finite exact reduction for one fixed query

Lemma 1 ([33]). For any convex function ff and set SS, it holds that

sup⁡Sf=sup⁡conv⁡(S)f.\sup_{S}f=\sup_{\operatorname{conv}(S)}f.

Proof. For a convex ff and any x∈conv⁡(S)x\in\operatorname{conv}(S), write x=∑iλisix=\sum_i\lambda_i s_i with si∈Ss_i\in S, λi≥0\lambda_i\ge0, ∑iλi=1\sum_i\lambda_i=1. Convexity gives us f(x)≤∑iλif(si)≤sup⁡s∈Sf(s)f(x)\le\sum_i\lambda_i f(s_i)\le\sup_{s\in S}f(s). Taking sup over x∈conv⁡(S)x\in\operatorname{conv}(S) on the left, we get sup⁡conv⁡(S)f≤sup⁡Sf\sup_{\operatorname{conv}(S)}f\le\sup_S f. The reverse inequality is trivial since S⊆conv⁡(S)S\subseteq\operatorname{conv}(S).

Theorem 1 (Two record reduction). For fixed gg, σ\sigma and the add/remove adjacency notion, define

tg(x,y)=wg(x)wg(x)+wg(y)(x−y),x,y∈K.(12)t_g(x,y)=\frac{w_g(x)}{w_g(x)+w_g(y)}(x-y),\qquad x,y\in K. \tag*{(12)}

The closed symmetric convex hull of SgarS_g^{\mathrm{ar}} equals that generated by all tg(x,y)t_g(x,y). Consequently, for every Σ≻0\Sigma\succ0,

sup⁡s∈SgarsTΣ−1s=sup⁡x,y∈Ktg(x,y)TΣ−1tg(x,y).(13)\sup_{s\in S_g^{\mathrm{ar}}}s^{\mathsf T}\Sigma^{-1}s=\sup_{x,y\in K}t_g(x,y)^{\mathsf T}\Sigma^{-1}t_g(x,y). \tag*{(13)}

Proof. Denote T={tg(x,y):x,y∈K}T=\{t_g(x,y):x,y\in K\}. We first observe that T⊆SgarT\subseteq S_g^{\mathrm{ar}}, so T⊆conv⁡ST\subseteq\operatorname{conv}S. Take D={x,y}D=\{x,y\} valid 2-point dataset in KK. Then sx(g;D)=mg({x,y})−mg({y})=tg(x,y)s_x(g;D)=m_g(\{x,y\})-m_g(\{y\})=t_g(x,y) exactly, so every tg(x,y)t_g(x,y) itself is some sk(g;D)s_k(g;D). It remains to show that S⊆conv⁡TS\subseteq\operatorname{conv}T. Consider some arbitrary sk∈Sgars_k\in S_g^{\mathrm{ar}}. We first show that 0∈conv⁡(T)0\in\operatorname{conv}(T). Taking any x,y∈Kx,y\in K, then clearly 00 lies in the line between tg(x,y)=c1(x−y)t_g(x,y)=c_1(x-y) and tg(y,x)=c2(y−x)t_g(y,x)=c_2(y-x) for some c1,c2>0c_1,c_2>0. We can expand

sk=rk1−rk(xk−mg(D))=rk1−rk∑i≠kri(xk−xi)=∑i≠krirk1−rk(xk−xi)=∑i≠kcitg(xk,xi)\begin{aligned} s_k=\frac{r_k}{1-r_k}(x_k-m_g(D))=\frac{r_k}{1-r_k}\sum_{i\ne k}r_i(x_k-x_i) \\ &=\sum_{i\ne k}\frac{r_i r_k}{1-r_k}(x_k-x_i)=\sum_{i\ne k}c_i t_g(x_k,x_i) \end{aligned}

where

ci:=rirk(wk+wi)(1−rk)wk=wi(wi+wk)(∑iwi)(∑i≠kwi)≥0.c_i:=\frac{r_i r_k(w_k+w_i)}{(1-r_k)w_k}=\frac{w_i(w_i+w_k)}{(\sum_i w_i)(\sum_{i\ne k}w_i)}\ge0.

Then, adding the constants up we have

∑i≠kci=∑i≠kwi2+wk∑i≠kwi(∑iwi)(∑i≠kwi)=∑i≠kwi2(∑iwi)(∑i≠kwi)+wk∑i≠kwi(∑iwi)(∑i≠kwi)≤(∑i≠kwi)2(∑iwi)(∑i≠kwi)+wk∑iwi=1.\begin{aligned} \sum_{i\ne k}c_i=\frac{\sum_{i\ne k}w_i^2+w_k\sum_{i\ne k}w_i}{(\sum_i w_i)(\sum_{i\ne k}w_i)} \\ &=\frac{\sum_{i\ne k}w_i^2}{(\sum_i w_i)(\sum_{i\ne k}w_i)} +\frac{w_k\sum_{i\ne k}w_i}{(\sum_i w_i)(\sum_{i\ne k}w_i)} \\ &\le\frac{(\sum_{i\ne k}w_i)^2}{(\sum_i w_i)(\sum_{i\ne k}w_i)} +\frac{w_k}{\sum_i w_i}=1. \end{aligned}

where the last inequality comes from Jensen’s inequality (∑i≠kwi2≤[∑i≠kwi]2)(\sum_{i\ne k}w_i^2\le[\sum_{i\ne k}w_i]^2). Thus, sks_k can be written as a convex combination of tg(xk,xi)t_g(x_k,x_i) for i≠ki\ne k and 00, which proves that S⊆conv⁡TS\subseteq\operatorname{conv}T. (13) follows directly from Lemma 1.

For a finite public domain of size ∣K∣=m|K|=m, at most m(m−1)m(m-1) nonzero constraints suffice for an exact finite SDP, despite the unbounded dataset size. Explicitly, the constraint of dataset mean shifts can be represented with the m(m−1)m(m-1) unique tgt_g terms generated from finite domain KK.

Corollary 1 (Uniformly over all query inputs). If a single covariance must work for every g∈Rdg\in\mathbb{R}^d, then

sup⁡g,D,ksk(g;D)TΣ−1sk(g;D)=sup⁡x,y∈K(x−y)TΣ−1(x−y).(14)\sup_{g,D,k}s_k(g;D)^{\mathsf T}\Sigma^{-1}s_k(g;D)=\sup_{x,y\in K}(x-y)^{\mathsf T}\Sigma^{-1}(x-y). \tag*{(14)}

Proof. Clearly, 00 is in both the convex hull the set R={(x−y):x,y∈K}R=\{(x-y):x,y\in K\}, and any element t(x,y)∈T={tg(x,y):x,y∈K}t(x,y)\in T=\{t_g(x,y):x,y\in K\} is a convex combination of 00 and (x−y)(x-y) in RR, so T⊆conv⁡RT\subseteq\operatorname{conv}R, so from Theorem 1 we get that sup⁡g,D,ksk(g;D)TΣ−1sk(g;D)≤sup⁡x,y∈K(x−y)TΣ−1(x−y)\sup_{g,D,k}s_k(g;D)^{\mathsf T}\Sigma^{-1}s_k(g;D)\le\sup_{x,y\in K}(x-y)^{\mathsf T}\Sigma^{-1}(x-y). Fix x≠y∈Kx\ne y\in K. Denote gγ(x−y)=γ(x−y)g_\gamma(x-y)=\gamma(x-y) for γ>0\gamma>0. Then it holds that

tgγ(x,y)=11+exp⁡(−(2γ+1)∥x−y∥22σ2)(x−y).t_{g_\gamma}(x,y)=\frac{1}{1+\exp\left(-\frac{(2\gamma+1)\lVert x-y\rVert^2}{2\sigma^2}\right)}(x-y).

As γ→∞\gamma\to\infty, tgγ(x,y)→(x−y)t_{g_\gamma}(x,y)\to(x-y). Since the quadratic product vTΣ−1vv^{\mathsf T}\Sigma^{-1}v is continuous, it holds that any product (x−y)TΣ−1(x−y)(x-y)^{\mathsf T}\Sigma^{-1}(x-y) can be written as a limit of terms tg(x,y)TΣ−1tg(x,y)t_g(x,y)^{\mathsf T}\Sigma^{-1}t_g(x,y), which by Theorem 1 is bounded above by sup⁡g,D,kskTΣ−1sk\sup_{g,D,k}s_k^{\mathsf T}\Sigma^{-1}s_k. Since limits preserve inequality, it holds that sup⁡g,D,ksk(g;D)TΣ−1sk(g;D)≥sup⁡x,y∈K(x−y)TΣ−1(x−y)\sup_{g,D,k}s_k(g;D)^{\mathsf T}\Sigma^{-1}s_k(g;D)\ge\sup_{x,y\in K}(x-y)^{\mathsf T}\Sigma^{-1}(x-y).

For a chosen adjacency relation, write PDP_D for the output distribution and let SS be the full neighboring mean difference set (e.g., Equation (9)), or a set with the same closed symmetric convex hull. For α>1\alpha> 1,

Dα(P∥Q)=1α−1log⁡∫(dPdQ)αdQ.(15)D_{\alpha}(P\|Q) = \frac{1}{\alpha-1}\log\int\left(\frac{dP}{dQ}\right)^{\alpha}dQ. \tag*{(15)}

A mechanism is (α,ϵα)(\alpha,\epsilon_{\alpha})-RDP if Dα(PD∥PD′)≤ϵαD_{\alpha}(P_D\|P_{D'})\leq\epsilon_{\alpha} for every ordered neighboring pair [16]. It is (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon,\delta)-DP if PD(A)≤eϵPD′(A)+δP_D(A)\leq e^\epsilon P_{D'}(A)+\delta for every such pair and measurable AA [6].

Theorem 2 (Exact Gaussian privacy curve). For a common positive definite covariance, set ρ∗(Σ)=sup⁡s∈SsTΣ−1s\rho_*(\Sigma)=\sup_{s\in S}s^{\mathsf{T}}\Sigma^{-1}s. The smallest valid RDP parameter at every order is

ϵα∗(Σ)=α2ρ∗(Σ).(16)\epsilon_\alpha^*(\Sigma)=\frac{\alpha}{2}\rho_*(\Sigma). \tag*{(16)}

Thus, one order-α\alpha budget is equivalent to ρ∗≤2ϵα/α\rho_*\leq2\epsilon_\alpha/\alpha, and several budgets are equivalent to ρ∗≤inf⁡α∈A2ϵα/α\rho_*\leq\inf_{\alpha\in A}2\epsilon_\alpha/\alpha, where AA is the collection of Rényi orders being considered. The same mechanism is exactly (ρ∗/2)(\rho_*/2)-zCDP and ρ∗\sqrt{\rho_*}-GDP in the sense of their smallest parameters [17, 18].

Proof. The Rényi divergence between two Gaussian distributions with common covariance matrix has closed form [16, 34]

Dα(N(μ1,Σ)∥N(μ2,Σ))=α2(μ1−μ2)TΣ−1(μ1−μ2),D_\alpha\left(\mathcal{N}(\mu_1,\Sigma)\|\mathcal{N}(\mu_2,\Sigma)\right)=\frac{\alpha}{2}(\mu_1-\mu_2)^{\mathsf{T}}\Sigma^{-1}(\mu_1-\mu_2),

for all orders α\alpha. Thus, the Rényi divergence for specific α\alpha between noised outputs of adjacent datasets has lowest upper bound of α2ρ∗(Σ)\frac{\alpha}{2}\rho_*(\Sigma). A mechanism satisfies ρ\rho-zCDP if and only if its Rényi Divergence between neighboring outputs is bounded by ρα\rho\alpha for every α>1\alpha>1 [17], which means we directly get that the mechanism satisfies (ρ∗/2)(\rho_*/2)-zCDP. GDP measures privacy by how well the best possible hypothesis test can distinguish a mechanism’s output on two neighboring datasets, and says a mechanism is μ\mu-GDP if that best test is never more powerful than distinguishing N(0,1)\mathcal{N}(0,1) and N(μ,1)\mathcal{N}(\mu,1). Testing N(μ1,Σ)\mathcal{N}(\mu_1,\Sigma) vs. N(μ2,Σ)\mathcal{N}(\mu_2,\Sigma) is equivalent by invertible whitening map Σ−1/2\Sigma^{-1/2} to testing two isotropic Gaussians separated by ∥Σ−1/2(μ1−μ2)∥\|\Sigma^{-1/2}(\mu_1-\mu_2)\|. The worst case neighbor mean shift is captured exactly by ρ∗(Σ)\sqrt{\rho_*(\Sigma)} so the mechanism satisfies ρ∗\sqrt{\rho_*}-GDP.

A general RDP guarantee implies (ϵα+1α−1log⁡(1/δ),δ)(\epsilon_\alpha+\frac{1}{\alpha-1}\log(1/\delta),\delta)-DP for 0<δ<10<\delta<1 [16]. Define Λ:=log⁡p(x)q(x)\Lambda:=\log\frac{p(x)}{q(x)}, regarded as a log-likelihood random variable for two Gaussian laws p,qp,q representing mechanisms characterized by adjacent datasets. Optimizing this conversion over (16) gives the budget

ϵ=ρ∗/2+2ρ∗log⁡(1/δ).(17)\epsilon=\rho_*/2+\sqrt{2\rho_*\log(1/\delta)}. \tag*{(17)}

Let Φ\Phi the standard Gaussian CDF. For P=N(sj,Σ)P=\mathcal{N}(s_j,\Sigma) and Q=N(0,Σ)Q=\mathcal{N}(0,\Sigma), the log-likelihood ratio Λ\Lambda is affine in a Gaussian, so for q:=sjTΣ−1sjq:=s_j^{\mathsf{T}}\Sigma^{-1}s_j it holds that Λ∣P∼N(q/2,q)\Lambda|P\sim\mathcal{N}(q/2,q), Λ∣Q∼N(−q/2,q)\Lambda|Q\sim\mathcal{N}(-q/2,q). Each tail probability is then a single Gaussian CDF:

P(Λ>ϵ)=Φ(q2−ϵq),Q(Λ>ϵ)=Φ(−q2−ϵq).P(\Lambda>\epsilon)=\Phi\left(\frac{\sqrt{q}}{2}-\frac{\epsilon}{\sqrt{q}}\right),\qquad Q(\Lambda>\epsilon)=\Phi\left(-\frac{\sqrt{q}}{2}-\frac{\epsilon}{\sqrt{q}}\right).

( ϵ,δ\epsilon,\delta)-DP requires that δ≥sup⁡A[P(A)−eϵQ(A)]\delta\geq\sup_A[P(A)-e^\epsilon Q(A)], so we define

hϵ(q):=Φ(q2−ϵq)−eϵΦ(−q2−ϵq),hϵ(0)=0.(18)h_\epsilon(q):=\Phi\left(\frac{\sqrt{q}}{2}-\frac{\epsilon}{\sqrt{q}}\right)-e^\epsilon\Phi\left(-\frac{\sqrt{q}}{2}-\frac{\epsilon}{\sqrt{q}}\right),\qquad h_\epsilon(0)=0. \tag*{(18)}

The maximizing event AA in P(A)−eϵQ(A)P(A)-e^\epsilon Q(A) is {Λ>ϵ}\{\Lambda>\epsilon\}. For ϵ≥0\epsilon\geq0, hϵh_\epsilon increases continuously from zero to one, since

hϵ′(q)=ϕ(q2−ϵq)2q>0.h_\epsilon'(q)=\frac{\phi\left(\frac{\sqrt{q}}{2}-\frac{\epsilon}{\sqrt{q}}\right)}{2\sqrt{q}}>0.

Thus, the exact worst-case δ\delta is hϵ(ρ∗)h_\epsilon(\rho_*). We conclude that (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon,\delta)-DP is exactly given by ρ∗≤hϵ−1(δ)\rho_*\leq h_\epsilon^{-1}(\delta) when 0<δ<10<\delta<1. For any nonzero shift, Λ\Lambda has an unbounded upper tail, i.e., finite Gaussian covariance cannot give pure DP at finite ϵ\epsilon.

The Covariance Primal and Its Conic Dual

Let s1,…,sJ∈Rds_1,\ldots,s_J\in\mathbb{R}^d describe the full symmetric convex hull of a specified sensitivity set. Take ρ>0\rho>0, W≻0W\succ0, and a public noise floor η≥0\eta\geq0. All matrices are real and symmetric, and ⟨A,B⟩=tr⁡(ATB)\langle A,B\rangle=\operatorname{tr}(A^{\mathsf{T}}B).

The primal is

vη(ρ)=min⁡Σ∈Sd⟨W,Σ⟩s.t.Σ−ηI⪰0,v_\eta(\rho)=\min_{\Sigma\in\mathbb{S}^d}\langle W,\Sigma\rangle\quad\text{s.t.}\quad\Sigma-\eta I\succeq0,
Fj(Σ):=[ΣsjsjTρ]⪰0,j=1,…,J.F_j(\Sigma):= \begin{bmatrix} \Sigma& s_j\\ s_j^{\mathsf{T}} & \rho \end{bmatrix}\succeq0,\qquad j=1,\ldots,J.

For η>0\eta>0 the ordinary Schur complement gives sjTΣ−1sj≤ρs_j^{\mathsf{T}}\Sigma^{-1}s_j\leq\rho. For η=0\eta=0, the generalized Schur complement gives both sj∈range⁡Σs_j\in\operatorname{range}\Sigma and sjTΣ†sj≤ρs_j^{\mathsf{T}}\Sigma^\dagger s_j\leq\rho. Equivalently, Σ⪰sjsjT/ρ\Sigma\succeq s_js_j^{\mathsf{T}}/\rho. With ρ=2ϵα/α\rho=2\epsilon_\alpha/\alpha, (Pρ,η)(P_{\rho,\eta}) exactly minimizes the loss among the specified common covariance Gaussian mechanisms satisfying RDP when the sensitivity hull is exact. Theorem 1 makes a finite public KK exact for a single fixed query; Corollary 1 handles a uniform-query covariance.

Theorem 3 (Conic dual, gap, and strong duality). Introduce

Zj=[AjbjbjTγj]⪰0,H⪰0.Z_j= \begin{bmatrix} A_j & b_j\\ b_j^{\mathsf{T}} & \gamma_j \end{bmatrix}\succeq0,\qquad H\succeq0.

A dual of (Pρ,η)(P_{\rho,\eta}) is

dη(ρ)=max⁡ ηtr⁡H−2∑jbjTsj−ρ∑jγjd_\eta(\rho)=\max\ \eta\operatorname{tr}H-2\sum_j b_j^{\mathsf{T}}s_j-\rho\sum_j\gamma_j
s.t.∑jAj+H=W,Zj⪰0,H⪰0.\text{s.t.}\quad\sum_j A_j+H=W,\qquad Z_j\succeq0,\quad H\succeq0.

For any feasible pair, its objective gap equals

∑j⟨Zj,Fj(Σ)⟩+⟨H,Σ−ηI⟩≥0.(19)\sum_j\langle Z_j,F_j(\Sigma)\rangle+\langle H,\Sigma-\eta I\rangle\geq0. \tag*{(19)}

For finite JJ, W≻0W\succ0, ρ>0\rho>0, and finite shifts, both programs attain their optima and their values agree.

Proof. We first show a block-trace identity. Block multiplication gives

ZjFj(Σ)=[AjΣ+bjsjTAjsj+bjρbjTΣ+γjsjTbjTsj+γjρ],Z_jF_j(\Sigma)= \begin{bmatrix} A_j\Sigma+b_js_j^{\mathsf{T}} & A_js_j+b_j\rho\\ b_j^{\mathsf{T}}\Sigma+\gamma_js_j^{\mathsf{T}} & b_j^{\mathsf{T}}s_j+\gamma_j\rho \end{bmatrix},

so ⟨Zj,Fj(Σ)⟩=⟨Aj,Σ⟩+2bjTsj+γjρ\langle Z_j,F_j(\Sigma)\rangle=\langle A_j,\Sigma\rangle+2b_j^{\mathsf T}s_j+\gamma_j\rho. We dualize the constraints Fj(Σ)⪰0F_j(\Sigma)\succeq0 each with Zj⪰0Z_j\succeq0 and Σ−ηI⪰0\Sigma-\eta I\succeq0 with H⪰0H\succeq0 and, giving us the Lagrangian

L(Σ;H,{Zj})=⟨W,Σ⟩−∑j⟨Zj,Fj(Σ)⟩−⟨H,Σ−ηI⟩.\mathcal{L}(\Sigma;H,\{Z_j\})=\langle W,\Sigma\rangle-\sum_j\langle Z_j,F_j(\Sigma)\rangle-\langle H,\Sigma-\eta I\rangle.

We can simplify using our block-trace identity

L=⟨W−H−∑jAj,Σ⟩+ηtr⁡H−2∑jbjTsj−ρ∑jγj.\mathcal{L}=\left\langle W-H-\sum_j A_j,\Sigma\right\rangle+\eta\operatorname{tr}H-2\sum_j b_j^{\mathsf T}s_j-\rho\sum_j\gamma_j.

The dual function is g(H,{Zj})=inf⁡ΣL(Σ;H,{Zj})g(H,\{Z_j\})=\inf_\Sigma\mathcal{L}(\Sigma;H,\{Z_j\}). However, in the dual function Σ\Sigma is unconstrained so unless the coefficient with Σ\Sigma is zero the infimum is −∞-\infty, giving us the constraint ∑jAj+H=W\sum_j A_j+H=W. When the constraint holds, g(H,{Zj})=ηtr⁡H−2∑jbjTsj−ρ∑jγjg(H,\{Z_j\})=\eta\operatorname{tr}H-2\sum_j b_j^{\mathsf T}s_j-\rho\sum_j\gamma_j, demonstrating that (Dρ,η)(D_{\rho,\eta}) is the Lagrangian dual of (Pρ,η)(P_{\rho,\eta}). Let Σ\Sigma be primal-feasible and (H,{Zj})(H,\{Z_j\}) be dual-feasible, so in particular H+∑jAj=WH+\sum_j A_j=W. We get that ⟨W,Σ⟩=⟨H,Σ⟩+∑j⟨Aj,Σ⟩\langle W,\Sigma\rangle=\langle H,\Sigma\rangle+\sum_j\langle A_j,\Sigma\rangle, writing ⟨H,Σ⟩=⟨H,Σ−ηI⟩+ηtr⁡H\langle H,\Sigma\rangle=\langle H,\Sigma-\eta I\rangle+\eta\operatorname{tr}H and using the block-trace identity we write ⟨W,Σ⟩\langle W,\Sigma\rangle as:

⟨H,Σ−ηI⟩+ηtr⁡H+∑j⟨Zj,Fj(Σ)⟩−2∑jbjTsj−ρ∑jγj.\langle H,\Sigma-\eta I\rangle+\eta\operatorname{tr}H+\sum_j\langle Z_j,F_j(\Sigma)\rangle-2\sum_j b_j^{\mathsf T}s_j-\rho\sum_j\gamma_j.

Moving the dual-objective terms to the left-hand side gives us (19) for any feasible pair. We are left with the strong duality claim. Slater’s condition tells us that in a convex program if there exists a point in the primal with strict feasibility and the primal has boundedness from below then the primal and dual optimum exist and agree [35]. Since W≻0W\succ0 and Σ⪰0\Sigma\succeq0 clearly vη(ρ)≥0v_\eta(\rho)\geq0, so we have boundedness from below. Consider Σ=cI\Sigma=cI for some constant c>max⁡{η,max⁡j∥sj∥2/ρ}c>\max\{\eta,\max_j\lVert s_j\rVert^2/\rho\}. Clearly Σ−ηI≻0\Sigma-\eta I\succ0 and Fj(Σ)≻0F_j(\Sigma)\succ0 for all jj so we have strict feasibility. ⟨W,Σ⟩→∞\langle W,\Sigma\rangle\to\infty as ∥Σ∥→∞\lVert\Sigma\rVert\to\infty along any direction in the closed feasible set, so we conclude that the optimum is attainable by Extreme Value Theorem [36].

MI-DP: Exact Programs

Definition and conditional channel capacity

Fix a database size NN and product domain X=∏iXi\mathcal{X}=\prod_i\mathcal{X}_i (for the denoiser, KNK^N). For random XX, Cuff–Yu MI-DP is

I(M):=sup⁡PXI(Xi;M(X)∣X−i)≤κ.(20)\mathcal{I}(M):=\sup_{P_X} I(X_i;M(X)\mid X_{-i})\leq\kappa. \tag*{(20)}

All information is in nats. The supremum includes all joint priors, with arbitrary record dependence [37].

Let β=(i,u)\beta=(i,u) where ii is the coordinate/record whose privacy we are measuring and uu is the fixed value of all the other records X−iX_{-i}. Let WβW_\beta be the channel a↦M(u,a)a\mapsto M(u,a). Here a∈Xia\in\mathcal{X}_i is the channel input, i.e. the value of record ii, and the output is M(u,a)M(u,a), the mechanism run on the dataset with record ii equal to aa and all other records fixed by uu. Let π\pi be a probability distribution on Xi\mathcal{X}_i, and let A∼πA\sim\pi and Y:=M(u,a)Y:=M(u,a). Then

I(M)=sup⁡βC(Wβ),C(Wβ)=sup⁡πIπ(A;Y).(21)\mathcal{I}(M)=\sup_\beta C(W_\beta),\qquad C(W_\beta)=\sup_\pi I_\pi(A;Y). \tag*{(21)}

This is easy to see if one conditions any prior on X−i=uX_{-i}=u: the conditional information is an average of channel informations, each at most the corresponding capacity. Conversely, choose X−iX_{-i} deterministically and any distribution π\pi for the remaining record. Taking suprema leads to (21).

Exact binary record calibration and its dual

Suppose every record has two possible values. Then when the Gaussian means differ by ss, we let q=sTΣ−1sq=s^{\mathsf T}\Sigma^{-1}s. Whitening and translating reduces its (informative) coordinate to

Y=qB/2+Z,Z∼N(0,1),B∈{−1,1}.Y=\sqrt{q}B/2+Z,\qquad Z\sim\mathcal{N}(0,1),\qquad B\in\{-1,1\}.

By reflection symmetry and concavity of mutual information in the input distribution, we know that the uniform sign is capacity-achieving. Its capacity is

ψ(q)=log⁡2−EZlog⁡(1+e−q/2−qZ).(22)\psi(q)=\log2-\mathbb{E}_Z\log\left(1+e^{-q/2-\sqrt{q}Z}\right). \tag*{(22)}

The real Gaussian I–MMSE identity [23] gives

ψ′(q)=18mmse⁡(B∣qB/2+Z)>0.(23)\psi'(q)=\frac{1}{8}\operatorname{mmse}\left(B\mid\sqrt{q}B/2+Z\right)>0. \tag*{(23)}

Also ψ(0)=0\psi(0)=0 and ψ(q)→log⁡2\psi(q)\to\log2 as q→∞q\to\infty: a sign detector has vanishing error, so its conditional entropy vanishes. Thus, for 0<κ<log⁡20<\kappa<\log2,

κ-MI-DP⟺sup⁡s∈SrepsTΣ−1s≤ψ−1(κ).(24)\kappa\text{-MI-DP}\quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad\sup_{s\in S^{\mathrm{rep}}}s^{\mathsf T}\Sigma^{-1}s\leq\psi^{-1}(\kappa). \tag*{(24)}

This gives an exact instance of (Pρ,η)(P_{\rho,\eta}) and (Dρ,η)(D_{\rho,\eta}) using the full replacement sensitivity set. For singular covariance define qΣ(s)=sTΣ†sq_\Sigma(s)=s^{\mathsf T}\Sigma^{\dagger}s when s∈range⁡Σs\in\operatorname{range}\Sigma, and qΣ(s)=+∞q_\Sigma(s)=+\infty otherwise. The same equivalence uses qΣq_\Sigma in place of the inverse quadratic: disjoint supports give ψ(+∞)=log⁡2\psi(+\infty)=\log2, and common supports reduce to the nonsingular Gaussian channel. For add/remove adjacency, the choice of 4ρar≤ψ−1(κ)4\rho_{\mathrm{ar}}\leq\psi^{-1}(\kappa) suffices for N≥1N\geq1, following directly from the triangle inequality in Equation (11).

Conclusion

We characterized the optimal privacy-utility tradeoff for releasing the ideal diffusion denoiser through a Gaussian mechanism with a general covariance. The worst-case sensitivity over datasets of any size is generated by pairs of records, specifically the largest Mahalanobis distance between two points of the data domain. This sensitivity quantity fixes the mechanism’s Rényi, zCDP, Gaussian, and approximate DP guarantees exactly, as well as its mutual-information privacy for binary records. Finding the least-error covariance under any of these budgets is a semidefinite program whose strong dual certifies global optimality. Together, these results replace conservative sensitivity bounds with exact privacy accounting and provably optimal noise design for privacy-preserving diffusion denoisers.

AI Use Acknowledgment

In this work, we used generative AI tools to generate and optimize the code that was used to run the simulation and experiments (Figure 1).

Histogram of the ratio of naive sensitivity bound to theoretical diffusion-specialized sensitivity bound

Figure 1. Histogram of the ratio of naive sensitivity bound (diam⁡(K)2⋅λmax⁡(Σ−1))(\operatorname{diam}(K)^2 \cdot\lambda_{\max}(\Sigma^{-1})) to theoretical diffusion-specialized sensitivity bound over Gaussian mechanisms with random covariance matrices Σ\Sigma for a simulated convex hull K=[0,1]dK = [0,1]^d. Our theoretical bound achieves sensitivity analysis on average 1.45×1.45\times tighter with up to 2.5×2.5\times gain in tail cases.

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