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Traceable Quantum Secret Sharing

Abstract

Quantum secret sharing protects distributed quantum information against unauthorized reconstruction, yet existing schemes provide no intrinsic accountability when shares are leaked or forged. This missing capability is particularly relevant in realistic distributed settings, where compromised participants may either expose valid shares or maliciously interfere with reconstruction. Here we establish a framework for traceable quantum secret sharing under these two threat models. We introduce leakage-verifiable and traceable quantum secret sharing (LVT-QSS), which attributes leaked shares through an explicit leakage verification mechanism, and malicious-traceable and accountable quantum secret sharing (MTA-QSS), which identifies participants who submit forged shares during reconstruction. We formulate security definitions for both settings and prove that the proposed protocols satisfy the corresponding guarantees against the relevant adversaries. Numerical simulations under per-share depolarizing noise further quantify the robustness of the proposed schemes and identify verification as the dominant noise sensitive stage. These results incorporate accountability into quantum secret sharing and provide a foundation for traceable distributed quantum cryptography.

Introduction

Quantum secret sharing (QSS) is a central primitive for protecting distributed quantum information and has broad relevance to multiparty quantum cryptography [1], quantum networks [2], and distributed quantum computation [3]. In a threshold secret sharing scheme, a dealer distributes a secret among nn participants such that any authorized set of at least kk parties can reconstruct it, whereas any unauthorized set of fewer than kk parties learns nothing about the secret. Since the first QSS protocol based on Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger states was introduced by Hillery et al. [4], and threshold constructions based on quantum error-correcting codes (QECCs) were developed by Cleve et al. [5], QSS has become a basic tool for secure distributed quantum information processing.

Existing QSS schemes are primarily designed to guarantee correctness and confidentiality: authorized sets can recover the secret, while unauthorized sets obtain no information about it. In realistic distributed settings, however, this is not always sufficient. Valid shares may be leaked, resold, or otherwise exposed by compromised participants, and malicious parties may interfere with reconstruction by submitting forged shares. In either case, conventional QSS provides no intrinsic mechanism to identify the source of compromise or to assign accountability. As a result, QSS remains a confidentiality-oriented primitive even in settings where attribution of leakage or misconduct is operationally essential.

This missing accountability layer is particularly significant in quantum settings. QSS is intended for scenarios in which quantum information is protected across multiple locations or parties, often in environments where trust is limited and failures may be adversarial rather than merely accidental. In such settings, one would like not only to preserve secrecy below threshold, but also to determine which participants are responsible when valid shares are leaked or when the reconstruction process is deliberately corrupted. This motivates the study of traceable QSS, in which attribution and accountability become explicit security objectives.

In the classical setting, this question has recently been formalized through traceable secret sharing (TSS). Goyal et al. [6] introduced the basic notion of TSS, aiming to enable provable attribution of leaked shares. Boneh et al. [7] subsequently refined the formal framework and identified stronger security requirements, and later work extended these definitions and constructions to more general access structures [8]. At a high level, TSS requires that if an unauthorized coalition aggregates its shares into a reconstruction box that reconstructs the secret when supplied with sufficiently many additional shares, then an efficient tracing procedure, given only black-box access to this box, can identify the parties responsible for constructing it. Beyond traceability, TSS also requires protections such as non-implicability, which prevents a malicious tracer from falsely implicating honest parties, and tracer secrecy, which requires that tracing itself not compromise secrecy; in particular, access to the tracing key should reveal no additional information about the secret.

Despite this progress, existing work on TSS has focused almost exclusively on classical secret sharing. Extending traceability to QSS is nontrivial. The shared objects may themselves be quantum states, reconstruction is governed by quantum operations, and accountability must be formulated in a way that is compatible with distributed quantum information processing. To the best of our knowledge, no existing QSS scheme in the literature provides a systematic notion of traceability together with publicly verifiable accountability. Consequently, tracing leaked quantum shares and identifying malicious participants during reconstruction remain open problems.

In this work, we establish a framework for traceable quantum secret sharing under two realistic threat models: one in which participants follow the protocol but leak or resell valid shares, and another in which malicious participants deviate during reconstruction by submitting forged shares. We make three main contributions: (i) we introduce leakage-verifiable and traceable quantum secret sharing, which attributes leaked shares through an explicit leakage-verification mechanism; (ii) we propose malicious-traceable and accountable quantum secret sharing, which identifies participants who submit forged shares during reconstruction and supports publicly verifiable accountability; and (iii) we formulate security definitions for both settings, prove that the proposed protocols achieve the corresponding security guarantees against the relevant adversaries, and perform numerical simulations under per-share depolarizing noise to evaluate their robustness. Our results extend QSS beyond confidentiality alone by incorporating accountability as a security objective, and provide a foundation for traceable quantum secret sharing and accountable multiparty quantum cryptographic primitives.

Threat-model overview

We consider two operational threat models for traceable quantum secret sharing.

Honest-but-leaky model. In the first setting, participants follow the protocol honestly, but an unauthorized coalition may leak or resell its valid quantum shares to a third party. These leaked shares can then be embedded into a reconstruction box that outputs the secret once it receives sufficiently many additional shares from outside the coalition. The tracing goal is to identify, using only black-box access to this box, the participants whose shares were used to construct it. We focus on coalitions smaller than the reconstruction threshold, since larger coalitions can reconstruct and leak the secret on their own without leaving a meaningful tracing target.

Malicious-but-accountable model. In the second setting, malicious participants actively deviate during reconstruction by submitting forged shares. Here the threat is not passive leakage but corruption of the reconstruction procedure itself. Because the submitted shares may be inconsistent with the prescribed protocol, we do not use the reconstruction-box abstraction in this case. Instead, tracing is performed directly from the auxiliary information generated during reconstruction. The objective is to identify the participants responsible for the forged shares while providing evidence that can be independently verified by other parties. As in the leakage setting, we restrict attention to adversarial sets smaller than the reconstruction threshold, since larger sets can reconstruct and leak the secret without requiring any additional honest shares.

Quantum secret sharing has developed along two main directions: constructions based on quantum error-correcting codes (QECCs) and protocols based on multipartite entanglement. In the QECC-based approach, a secret quantum state is encoded into distributed shares and recovered by authorized sets through decoding. Cleve et al. [5] gave the first general threshold construction, and Gottesman [9] later developed a broader theoretical framework for QSS. Subsequent work explored variants emphasizing coding efficiency, verifiability, and communication efficiency [10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. In parallel, entanglement-based schemes—beginning with the GHZ-state protocol of Hillery et al. [4]—use multipartite correlations rather than explicit QECC decoding, and have been extended to continuous-variable, measurement-device-independent, and networked settings [15, 16, 17, 18, 19].

These works have substantially advanced the confidentiality, robustness, and efficiency of QSS. However, they do not address a different question that becomes important in realistic distributed settings: how to attribute responsibility when valid shares are leaked or when malicious participants submit forged shares during reconstruction. In most existing schemes, leakage is treated either as a generic failure event or as part of an adversarial model dominated by external eavesdropping, rather than as a source of ex post accountability. As a result, current QSS frameworks do not provide systematic notions of traceability, non-repudiation, or publicly verifiable attribution in the presence of leaked or forged shares.

Related ideas have recently been developed in the classical setting under the framework of traceable secret sharing [6, 7, 8]. To the best of our knowledge, however, no existing QSS scheme provides a corresponding framework for traceability together with publicly verifiable accountability under the threat models considered here. This gap motivates the present work.

Preliminaries

Notation

We consider a threshold setting with parameter kk and m=2k−1m = 2k - 1 parties, indexed by [m]={0,…,m−1}[m] = \{0,\ldots,m - 1\}. The secret is a quantum state ∣ψ⟩∈Hλ|\psi\rangle\in\mathcal{H}_{\lambda}, where Hλ\mathcal{H}_{\lambda} is a dd-dimensional Hilbert space and λ\lambda is the security parameter. We work over the finite field F=Zq\mathbb{F} = \mathbb{Z}_q, where qq is a prime satisfying q≥max⁡{m,d}q \ge\max\{m,d\}.

We further assume a post-quantum symmetric-key encryption scheme ΠSKE=(Enc,Dec)\Pi_{\mathrm{SKE}} = (\mathrm{Enc},\mathrm{Dec}) with message space F\mathbb{F} and ciphertext space C\mathcal{C}, together with a quantum-secure collision-resistant and one-way hash function H:F→FH : \mathbb{F} \to\mathbb{F}, as defined in Appendix A.

Quantum information

In this section, we briefly recall several standard notions from quantum information; for a comprehensive treatment, see Ref. [20].

A quantum channel F\mathcal{F} is a completely positive and trace-preserving (CPTP) map from register xx to register yy. That is, for any input density operator ρx\rho_x, the channel F\mathcal{F} outputs a state τy\tau_y on register yy, namely F(ρx)=τy\mathcal{F}(\rho_x) = \tau_y. When the input is part of a larger joint state ρxz\rho_{xz}, the channel F\mathcal{F} acts nontrivially only on register xx, producing an output on register yy while leaving the other registers, such as zz, unchanged.

A projector Π\Pi is a Hermitian operator satisfying Π2=Π\Pi^2 = \Pi. A projective measurement is specified by a collection of projectors {Πj}j\{\Pi_j\}_j such that ∑jΠj=Id\sum_j \Pi_j = \mathop{\mathrm{Id}}. Given a quantum state ρ\rho, the probability of obtaining outcome jj is pj=Tr⁡(Πjρ)p_j = \operatorname{Tr}(\Pi_j\rho), and the corresponding post-measurement state is ρj=ΠjρΠjpj\rho_j = \frac{\Pi_j\rho\Pi_j}{p_j}. For registers xx and yy, the partial trace Tr⁡y\operatorname{Tr}_y is the unique linear map satisfying Tr⁡y(Ax⊗By)=Tr⁡(By)Ax\operatorname{Tr}_y(A_x \otimes B_y) = \operatorname{Tr}(B_y)A_x for all operators AxA_x and ByB_y. For any joint state ρxy\rho_{xy}, we write ρx:=Tr⁡y(ρxy)\rho_x := \operatorname{Tr}_y(\rho_{xy}).

The trace distance between two quantum states ρ\rho and τ\tau, denoted by Td⁡(ρ,τ)\operatorname{Td}(\rho,\tau), is defined as

Td⁡(ρ,τ)=12∥ρ−τ∥1=12Tr⁡((ρ−τ)†(ρ−τ)).(1)\operatorname{Td}(\rho,\tau) = \frac{1}{2}\lVert\rho-\tau\rVert_1 = \frac{1}{2}\operatorname{Tr}\left(\sqrt{(\rho-\tau)^\dagger(\rho-\tau)}\right). \tag*{(1)}

where ∥ρ−τ∥1\lVert\rho-\tau\rVert_1 is the trace norm, i.e., the sum of the singular values of ρ−τ\rho-\tau. The trace distance quantifies the operational distinguishability of two quantum states. In particular, the Helstrom theorem states that if ρ\rho and τ\tau are given with equal prior probabilities, then the optimal success probability for distinguishing them is 12(1+Td⁡(ρ,τ))\frac{1}{2}(1+\operatorname{Td}(\rho,\tau)). When τ\tau is pure, i.e., τ=∣Φ⟩⟨Φ∣\tau= \lvert\Phi\rangle\langle\Phi\rvert, the Fuchs–van de Graaf inequalities imply

1−⟨Φ∣ρ∣Φ⟩≤Td⁡(ρ,τ)≤1−∣⟨Φ∣ρ∣Φ⟩∣2.(2)1-\langle\Phi\lvert\rho\lvert\Phi\rangle\le\operatorname{Td}(\rho,\tau) \le\sqrt{1-\lvert\langle\Phi\lvert\rho\lvert\Phi\rangle\rvert^2}. \tag*{(2)}

A nonuniform quantum polynomial-time (QPT) machine {Aλ}λ∈N\{A_\lambda\}_{\lambda\in\mathbb{N}} is a family of polynomial-size quantum circuits, where each circuit AλA_\lambda is provided with a polynomial-size quantum advice state ∣αλ⟩\lvert\alpha_\lambda\rangle. Each AλA_\lambda induces a CPTP map. More generally, an interactive quantum machine can be modeled as a sequence of quantum channels acting on designated input, output, and internal registers.

Two probability distributions XX and YY are computationally indistinguishable if there exists a negligible function negl⁡(λ)\operatorname{negl}(\lambda) such that, for every QPT algorithm AλA_\lambda, it holds that

∣Pr⁡[1←Aλ(x):x←X]−Pr⁡[1←Aλ(y):y←Y]∣≤negl⁡(λ).(3)\left|\Pr[1 \leftarrow A_\lambda(x) : x \leftarrow X] - \Pr[1 \leftarrow A_\lambda(y) : y \leftarrow Y]\right| \le\operatorname{negl}(\lambda). \tag*{(3)}

If the same condition holds for all, possibly unbounded, quantum algorithms, then XX and YY are said to be statistically indistinguishable.

Technical assumptions

Definition 1 (Sparse-hit property). Let ΠSKE=(Enc,Dec)\Pi_{\mathrm{SKE}} = (\mathrm{Enc},\mathrm{Dec}) be a symmetric-key encryption scheme with ciphertext space C\mathcal{C}. We say that ΠSKE\Pi_{\mathrm{SKE}} satisfies the sparse-hit property with parameter αmax⁡(λ)\alpha_{\max}(\lambda), if, for every security parameter λ\lambda, every key k∈{0,1}λk \in\{0,1\}^{\lambda}, and every polynomial-size subset S⊆CS \subseteq\mathcal{C},

Pr⁡x[Dec(x,k)∈S]≤∣S∣αmax⁡(λ),(4)\Pr_x[\mathrm{Dec}(x,k) \in S] \le\lvert S\rvert\alpha_{\max}(\lambda), \tag*{(4)}

where the probability is taken over a random variable xx taking values in C\mathcal{C}.

Results

Honest-but-leaky model

In our protocol, the secret quantum state ∣ψ⟩\lvert\psi\rangle is encoded into mm quantum shares {∣shi⟩}i∈[0,m−1]\{\lvert\mathrm{sh}_i\rangle\}_{i\in[0,m-1]}, each associated with a unique tag {tagi}i∈[0,m−1]\{\mathrm{tag}_i\}_{i\in[0,m-1]}. These tags, stored in the auxiliary registers, serve as identifiers for the shares and are critical for subsequent leakage tracing and evidence verification. A set of at least kk shares is sufficient to reconstruct the original secret ∣ψ⟩\lvert\psi\rangle.

The leakage tracing procedure proceeds as follows: Assume a reconstruction box R\mathcal{R} that contains ff leaked shares and, given an additional k−fk-f shares, reconstructs the secret ∣ψ⟩\lvert\psi\rangle along with the associated auxiliary registers. Let Iidx⊆[m]\mathcal{I}_{\mathrm{idx}} \subseteq[m] denote the index set of the leaked shares, and let T:={tagi∣i∈Iidx}\mathcal{T} := \{\mathrm{tag}_i \mid i \in\mathcal{I}_{\mathrm{idx}}\} be the corresponding tag set. The verifier invokes R\mathcal{R}, then uses the tracing key to decrypt the auxiliary registers and recover the corresponding tags, obtaining an evidence set T′\mathcal{T}'.

Finally, the verifier checks whether T′\mathcal{T}' satisfies the protocol’s verification conditions. If successful, T′\mathcal{T}' is accepted as valid evidence of the leaked shares, identifying the participants responsible for the leakage based on the uniqueness of the tags.

Security definitions

We define an LVT-QSS scheme that allows for the secure sharing of a quantum state ∣ψ⟩\lvert\psi\rangle among mm partic- icipants. ipants. The scheme is required to support secret reconstruction from any authorized subset of at least kk shares, as well as leakage tracing and evidence verification through auxiliary tag information.

Formally, we model an LVT-QSS scheme by five QPT algorithms, Setup, GenSecretShares, SecretRecover, SecretTrace, and SecretVerify. Whenever convenient, we use assignment notation for their execution, e.g., (tk,Tags)←Setup(1λ,m)(tk, Tags) \leftarrow Setup(1^{\lambda}, m).

  • Setup: Given the security parameter 1λ1^{\lambda} and the number of parties mm, the trusted authority generates a tracing key tktk and a tag set Tags={tagi}i=0m−1Tags = \{tag_i\}_{i=0}^{m-1}.

  • GenSecretShares: Given a quantum state ∣ψ⟩\lvert\psi\rangle, the number of parties mm, a threshold kk, a tag set TagsTags, and the tracing key tktk, the dealer generates mm quantum shares {∣shi⟩}i=0m−1\{\lvert sh_i\rangle\}_{i=0}^{m-1} and the corresponding verification keys {vki}i=0m−1\{vk_i\}_{i=0}^{m-1}.

  • SecretRecover: Given a set of shares {∣shi⟩}i∈P\{\lvert sh_i\rangle\}_{i\in P} with P⊆[m]P \subseteq[m], the algorithm attempts to reconstruct the secret state ∣ψ⟩\lvert\psi\rangle. If reconstruction fails, it outputs ⊥\bot.

  • SecretTrace: Given the tracing key tktk and a set of quantum shares {∣shi⟩}i∈Q⊆[m]∖Iidx\{\lvert sh_i\rangle\}_{i\in Q\subseteq[m]\setminus I_{\mathrm{idx}}} with ∣Q∣=k−f\lvert Q\rvert= k-f for some f<kf<k, and oracle access to a reconstruction device R\mathcal{R} built from ff leaked shares, the tracer outputs a candidate evidence set I′\mathcal{I}'.

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