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Information Elicitation by Ordinal Agreement

Abstract

Ordinal information is central to tasks ranging from conference peer review to Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback for large language models. In many such settings, there is no objective ground truth against which reports can be directly verified, making incentive-compatible elicitation challenging. Peer-prediction mechanisms have been designed to achieve truthful elicitation despite the lack of ground-truth verification. However, existing peer-prediction methods do not provide incentives for agents to truthfully compress rich private information (e.g. reviews) into coarser ordinal reports (e.g. rankings) requested by the mechanisms. We propose a simple ordinal peer-prediction mechanism that rewards agents based on pairwise agreement, measured by Kendall tau. Under a broad class of Bayesian Stochastically Order Consistent models—which includes classical models such as Mallows and Thurstone—we prove that truthful reporting is stochastically dominant, and strongly truthful under index-equivariant strategies. This provides robust incentives even for agents with non-linear utility functions, such as risk aversion. Our mechanism further accommodates heterogeneous agents, top-K reports, and subset assignments, where each agent is scored against one randomly drawn peer. Experiments on synthetic Mallows and Thurstone data, together with a real-data stress test on the SUSHI preference dataset, show right-shifted truthful-payment distributions and the highest normalized sensitivity among tested baselines.

Introduction

Many important evaluation tasks require eliciting ordinal information. Conference program committees rank submissions for acceptance; platforms collect human feedback to compare the quality of LLM responses; and instructors use peer assessment to ask students to rank a small set of assignment submissions. These settings share a common structure: (1) Evaluators often have informative but imperfect signals to judge relative quality. (2) Investing more effort leads to higher-quality judgments. (3) There is often no objective ground truth against which reports can be directly verified.

This absence of ground truth creates a fundamental incentive problem. Without appropriate incentives, agents may invest little effort in evaluation or report strategically. Directly rewarding “correct” answers is not possible when correctness cannot be verified. The peer-prediction literature addresses the challenge of elicitation without ground truth by rewarding agents based on the statistical relationships among their reports. When properly designed, such mechanisms make truthful reporting an equilibrium even in the absence of verifiable outcomes. However, most existing peer-prediction mechanisms require agents to report all of their private information [21, 24, 14], typically as a numerical or categorical signal, and their incentive guarantees can fail when agents observe richer information than they are asked to report [8]. This creates a mismatch in many evaluation settings: agents may observe rich private information, such as detailed reviews, latent quality assessments, or noisy cardinal scores, while the designer only wants a coarser ordinal report, such as a ranking or a set of pairwise comparisons.

This paper studies peer prediction for coarse ordinal elicitation. Agents may observe rich private information about item quality, but the mechanism asks them to report only ordinal information. We allow several natural ordinal report formats, including full rankings, fixed-shape bucket orders such as top-KK sets and tiered reports, and rankings over assigned subsets of items. Our goal is to design incentives for truthful ordinal reporting without requiring agents to reveal their full private information. To do so, we leverage the fact that ordinal reports naturally encode pairwise comparisons among items.

This suggests a simple agreement-based mechanism: reward agents according to whether their reported pairwise comparisons agree with those of their peers, equivalently through a Kendall tau-based pairwise-agreement score. Such an approach is attractive because it is simple, transparent, and directly aligned with the ordinal information the designer wants to elicit. In general elicitation settings, however, rewarding agents for agreement can encourage them to suppress private information when they believe their signal is likely to be in the minority [15]. For example, if an evaluator believes that most peers will mark nearly every submission as acceptable, then a reward based only on agreement may induce the evaluator to report “acceptable” even for a submission they privately judge to be weak. This is why agreement mechanisms typically require strong self-dominance conditions—after observing a signal, an agent must believe that other agents are more likely to report the same signal than any alternative [31]—to have a truthful reporting equilibrium.

Our key observation is that, although such self-dominance conditions are generally strong for arbitrary signals, they become natural at the level of pairwise ordinal comparisons. We identify a broad class of Bayesian Stochastically Order Consistent (Bayesian SOC) information structures under which each truthful pairwise comparison is more likely to agree with a peer’s comparison than to disagree, even after conditioning on the agent’s richer private information. Under this condition, the Kendall tau mechanism makes truthful ordinal reporting stochastically dominant, despite eliciting only a coarse ordinal summary of the agent’s information.

Contributions. We introduce a peer-prediction mechanism for coarse ordinal reports based on Kendall tau distance and its pairwise-agreement extension. The mechanism applies to several natural reporting formats, including full rankings, fixed-shape bucket orders [5], and rankings over assigned subsets of items. The bucket-order setting covers full rankings and top-KK sets as special cases and also captures tiered reports. Its reward rule is simple and transparent: agents are paid according to agreement with peers on the pairwise comparisons induced by their reports. This simplicity is useful both theoretically and practically. When evaluators are already comparing a small set of alternatives, ordinal reports can be easier to specify and audit than calibrated cardinal scores, consistent with a long line of work in psychometrics on comparative judgment [27, 26, 19].

We provide strong incentive guarantees for this mechanism under a class of Bayesian Stochastically Order Consistent (Bayesian SOC) information structures. Bayesian SOC ensures that each truthful pairwise comparison is more likely to agree with a peer’s comparison than to disagree, even after conditioning on the agent’s richer private information. This class includes classical ranking information structures, such as the Thurstone and Mallows models. Under Bayesian SOC, truthful ordinal reporting is stochastically dominant: truth-telling not only maximizes expected payment, but yields a payment distribution that first-order stochastically dominates the distribution under any unilateral deviation. This is stronger than standard equilibrium guarantees based only on expected utility and provides robustness to agents with nonlinear utility functions, such as risk aversion. Moreover, we show that the mechanism is strongly truthful if agents’ strategies cannot coordinate on an external indexing of items.

We also study the measurement accuracy of the mechanism, namely how well payments track the quality of an agent’s report [4]. This property is important in practice for fairness [2], motivation [29], and trust in the mechanism. Prior work has shown that strong stochastic-dominance incentives can come at a substantial cost to accuracy [31]. In contrast, our experiments on synthetic data from Mallows and Thurstone models, together with a real-data stress test on the SUSHI preference dataset [10], suggest that the Kendall tau mechanism remains sensitive to report quality in the ordinal settings we study.

Relation to Prior Work

Peer prediction began with mechanisms such as Bayesian Truth Serum [21] and has developed into a broad literature on eliciting unverifiable information from correlated reports. A central difficulty is that simple agreement can make agents coordinate on common or focal reports rather than reveal their private information [15]. Many later mechanisms therefore reward reports through prediction, correlation, or mutual-information-style quantities, including informed-truthful and multi-task mechanisms [24, 14, 12, 22, 7]. These mechanisms typically operate on categorical or numerical reports, often require agents to report a sufficiently rich representation of their signal, or learn/estimate statistical relationships across tasks (items). Our mechanism instead asks for ordinal reports and uses a fixed, transparent pairwise-agreement score.

Our setting connects most directly to the bonus-penalty payment (BPP) mechanism for binary pairwise comparisons [3], which operates under Bayesian Strong Stochastic Transitivity (Bayesian SST). BPP has a three-agent structure: an agent evaluates one pair and is scored using signals from two other agents on related pairs. This makes BPP well suited to sparse pairwise-comparison assignments. By contrast, our mechanism asks agents for richer ordinal reports—full rankings, top-KK sets, bucket orders, and subset assignments—and scores them by all-pairs agreement on overlapping item pairs. Thus our framework is less general in assignment structure, because pairs must be reviewed by more than one agent, but it handles richer reports directly.

The modeling assumptions are also different. BPP is designed for homogeneous pairwise signals, whereas Bayesian SOC allows heterogeneous agents and full signal vectors. For instance, different reviewers may have different noise levels in a Thurstone or Mallows model. The two frameworks are not compatible. Appendix § 13 compares SOC with SST in detail.

Our stochastic-dominance guarantee is related to recent stochastically dominant peer prediction for multi-task categorical reports [31]. Their mechanisms use task partitions to obtain stochastic dominance for categorical signals. Here, the ordered structure of rankings and Bayesian SOC allow a simpler Kendall tau-based pairwise-agreement score: the proof turns a deviation into adjacent pair corrections, each improving the score distribution. Technically, the proof controls weighted peer-alignment margins rather than independent categorical tasks.

Conceptually, our framework also connects to property elicitation [16]: the target function maps a rich private signal vector to the ordinal property we want to elicit, such as a ranking, top set, or bucket order. From this perspective, Kendall tau-based pairwise agreement is a scoring rule for an ordinal projection of the agent’s information rather than for the full signal. This distinction is important in settings such as review, peer assessment, and RLHF, where the platform often wants a tractable ordinal judgment even though agents may observe richer cardinal evidence.

Paper organization. § 2.1 introduces the Bayesian SOC framework and § 2.2 formalizes ordinal peer prediction. § 3 proves the full-ranking Kendall tau mechanism is truthful and stochastically dominant truthful. § 4 gives the subset-assignment and bucket-order extensions, the latter also implying the top-KK result. § 5 reports the main empirical comparison; proofs, specialized top-set details, and additional experiments are in the appendices.

Problem Formulation

We consider a collection of MM items and a set of N≥2N \ge2 strategic agents. Each agent privately observes noisy signals for the items. Our goal is to design mechanisms to elicit agents’ ordinal information from private signals truthfully. We introduce the joint distributions of agents’ private signals in § 2.1 and then define the information elicitation problem in § 2.2.

We first define Kendall tau distance between two item rankings. Given two items ii and j∈[M]j \in[M] and an ordering r:[M]→[M]r : [M] \to[M] of them, the sign function is

sign⁡(r(i),r(j))={1if r(i)<r(j)−1if r(i)>r(j)0otherwise\operatorname{sign}(r(i),r(j)) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } r(i) < r(j) \\ -1 & \text{if } r(i) > r(j) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}

where r(i)r(i) is the rank of the item ii in the ordering rr. For notation brevity, given two rankings, rr and r′r', we further set

sign⁡(r(i),r(j);r′(i),r′(j))=sign⁡(r(i),r(j))sign⁡(r′(i),r′(j)).\operatorname{sign}(r(i),r(j);r'(i),r'(j)) = \operatorname{sign}(r(i),r(j))\operatorname{sign}(r'(i),r'(j)).

We say rr and r′r' are order consistent at (i,j)(i,j) if sign⁡(r(i),r(j);r′(i),r′(j))≥0\operatorname{sign}(r(i),r(j);r'(i),r'(j)) \ge0, and strictly order consistent if sign⁡(r(i),r(j);r′(i),r′(j))>0\operatorname{sign}(r(i),r(j);r'(i),r'(j)) > 0.

Definition 2.1. Given two full rankings r,r′∈SMr, r' \in\mathcal{S}_M, the Kendall tau distance between them counts how many pairs of items are ordered differently in rr and r′r'. That is,

dτ(r,r′):=12∑i<j(1−sign⁡(r(i),r(j);r′(i),r′(j))).(1)d_{\tau}(r,r') := \frac{1}{2}\sum_{i<j}\left(1-\operatorname{sign}(r(i),r(j);r'(i),r'(j))\right). \tag*{(1)}

Bayesian Stochastically Order Consistent Models

Given the set of MM items, each item i∈[M]i \in[M] has an underlying unknown state θi∈Θ\theta_i \in\Theta, where Θ\Theta is a (strictly) ordered set defined in Appendix § 7. The vector of states θ=(θ1,…,θM)\boldsymbol{\theta} = (\theta_1,\ldots,\theta_M) is drawn from a prior μ\mu. Depending on the model, θ\boldsymbol{\theta} may represent either a reference ranking or underlying item costs.

For each item, each agent gets a signal from a (strictly) ordered set X\mathcal{X}. Conditioned on a realized θ\boldsymbol{\theta}, each agent n∈[N]n \in[N] independently receives a private signal vector xn∈XM\boldsymbol{x}_n \in\mathcal{X}^M from a distribution Pn(⋅∣θ)P_n(\cdot\mid\boldsymbol{\theta}) over these vectors of signals. Let X=(xn)n∈[N]\mathbf{X} = (\boldsymbol{x}_n)_{n\in[N]} be the random matrix of all agents’ signals, where each agent nn receives a signal vector xn=(xn,1,…,xn,M)\boldsymbol{x}_n = (x_{n,1},\ldots,x_{n,M}). When realized, these values are denoted as X\mathbf{X} for the matrix, xn\boldsymbol{x}_n for the row of agent nn, and xn,ix_{n,i} for the entry for agent nn and item ii.

An information structure consists of a prior μ\mu on θ\boldsymbol{\theta} and the collection of conditional signal distributions P=(Pn)n∈[N]\mathbf{P} = (P_n)_{n\in[N]}. Given i,j∈[M]i,j \in[M] and strictly ordered sets Y,Z\mathcal{Y},\mathcal{Z}, y∈YM\boldsymbol{y} \in\mathcal{Y}^M, z∈ZM\boldsymbol{z} \in\mathcal{Z}^M are order consistent at (i,j)(i,j) if their relative orderings at those indices match.

Definition 2.2 (Kleinberg et al. [11]). Given MM, and ordered sets Θ\Theta and X\mathcal{X}, a conditional probability P:ΘM→Δ(XM)P:\Theta^{M}\to\Delta(\mathcal{X}^{M}) is stochastically order consistent (SOC) if for any distinct i,j∈[M]i,j\in[M], state vector θ∈ΘM\theta\in\Theta^{M}, and signal vector x∈XMx\in\mathcal{X}^{M} which are order consistent at (i,j)(i,j),

P(x=x∣θ)≥P(x=σij(x)∣θ)P(x=x\mid\theta)\ge P(x=\sigma_{ij}(x)\mid\theta)

where σij(x)\sigma_{ij}(x) denotes the vector xx with the ii-th and jj-th components swapped.2 Moreover, the inequality is strict when θ\theta and xx are strictly order consistent at (i,j)(i,j).

Intuitively, for any two items ii and jj, it is more probable that their order in the signal is consistent with their true order in θ\theta than the reverse, regardless of the realizations of the other items. We discuss the connection to order independence in Appendix § 13.

Definition 2.3 (Bayesian stochastically order-consistent). An information structure (μ,P)(\mu,P) is Bayesian stochastically order-consistent (Bayesian SOC) if it satisfies:

  • Ex-ante identical: θ\theta is drawn from an exchangeable prior μ\mu.

  • Neutrality: For each agent nn, the conditional probability PnP_n is invariant to permutations of the items. For all permutations σ∈SM\sigma\in\mathcal{S}_M, xx, and θ\theta, Pn(x∣θ)=Pn(σ(x)∣σ(θ))P_n(x\mid\theta)=P_n(\sigma(x)\mid\sigma(\theta)).

  • Stochastic consistency: Each conditional signal distribution PnP_n is SOC (Definition 2.2), so the signals are more likely to be order consistent with the true underlying order.

A Bayesian SOC model is strict if there are no ties: Pr⁡[xn,i=xn,j]=0\Pr[x_{n,i}=x_{n,j}]=0 and Pr⁡[θi=θj]=0\Pr[\theta_i=\theta_j]=0 for all n∈[N]n\in[N] and i≠j∈[M]i\ne j\in[M]. Finally, PP has full support if Pn(⋅∣θ)P_n(\cdot\mid\theta) assigns positive probability to the same set of signals for all nn and θ\theta.

As shown in Examples 2.4 to 2.6, several classical ranking models embody this setting and satisfy Bayesian SOC, including the Mallows model [18], the Thurstone model [27], and additive random utility models [27, 25, 1].

Example 2.4 (Mallows model [18]). Here the vector of item states θ\theta and agent nn’s signal vector xnx_n are each rankings of the items. The signal for each item is then its order in the ranking, so Θ=X=[M]\Theta=\mathcal{X}=[M]. Because the full signal is a permutation, the vectors lie in the smaller set SM⊂ΘM=XM\mathcal{S}_M\subset\Theta^M=\mathcal{X}^M. For the Mallows model with η\eta, θ∈SM\theta\in\mathcal{S}_M is a reference ranking (e.g., the ground-truth ordering of items) and η=(η1,…,ηN)∈R>0N\eta=(\eta_1,\ldots,\eta_N)\in\mathbb{R}_{>0}^{N} is a noise parameter vector, allowing each agent to have their own “ranking noise.”

In this model, agent nn’s observed ranking x∈SMx\in\mathcal{S}_M is generated with probability

Pn(xn=x∣θ)∝exp⁡(−1ηndτ(θ,x))P_n(x_n=x\mid\theta)\propto\exp\left(-\frac{1}{\eta_n}d_\tau(\theta,x)\right)

where dτd_\tau is Kendall’s tau distance (see Definition 2.1), which measures the number of pairwise disagreements between two rankings.

In the Mallows model, smaller ηn\eta_n yields rankings closer to the reference θ\theta, while larger ηn\eta_n produces noisier (more random) rankings.

Example 2.5 (Thurstone model [27]). Let Θ=X=R\Theta= \mathcal{X} = \mathbb{R}. The latent state θ\boldsymbol{\theta} is a vector in RM\mathbb{R}^{M}, each coordinate θi\theta_i being the true cost of item ii. We assume an exchangeable prior with pairwise distinct costs almost surely, for example, i.i.d. standard Gaussian costs.

Each agent nn then sees a noisy version of each θi\theta_i: they observe Gaussian signals xn,ix_{n,i}, where

xn,i∣θ∼N(θi,ηn)x_{n,i} \mid\boldsymbol{\theta} \sim\mathcal{N}(\theta_i,\eta_n)

with ηn>0\eta_n > 0 specifying the noise level for agent nn. Conditional on θ\boldsymbol{\theta}, the signals are independent across items and agents.

In the Thurstone model, each agent sees noisy measurements of the underlying item costs, with more reliable agents having lower ηn\eta_n. The Thurstone model is a classical foundation for statistical models of ranking and paired comparison. While agents ultimately report an ordering (ranking) derived from these perturbed costs, unlike the Mallows model, in the Thurstone model the agent signal is not a ranking per se.

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