betaFeedback

WorksEconomics, Econometrics and Finance

Platform Recommendation and Competition in Search Markets

Abstract

Recommendation rules affect both sellers' incentives and the alternatives consumers expect to find. We develop a framework for evaluating these rules with heterogeneous sellers, endogenous pricing and advertising, and costly consumer search. For a broad class of separable recommendation scores, we establish conditions under which a unique market equilibrium exists. Three applications illustrate the use of the framework. A stronger reward for low prices does not necessarily lower equilibrium prices and benefit consumers when products are sufficiently differentiated in qualities. Quality guidance can lower the price of each product and benefit consumers while raising the average transaction price. With heterogeneous match distributions, a reward for the best initial inspection can help consumers with advertising fixed and harm them when advertising adjusts. A two-type design extension shows that no finite optimum over implementable outcomes uses positive weights on both quality and low prices, even when the platform values consumer surplus.

Paper details

vlnc:W_gyz9hwqg
Version
v1 · latest
Published
Fresh — added to the Hub within the last 30 days
Added
License
arXiv nonexclusive license
Usage

views · 0

downloads · 0

A view counts once per browser per day, a download each time the PDF is requested.

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Not recorded for this paper

View statement
Looking for related papers…