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WorksEconomics, Econometrics and Finance

Chaining Tasks, Redefining Work: A Theory of AI Automation

Abstract

We study the automation and productivity effects of AI when production is a sequence of interdependent steps with a Leontief structure. Each step can be executed manually by labor, augmented with AI, or automated within contiguous AI-executed steps called "chains." By characterizing the firm's cost-minimizing assignment of steps to humans and AI, we show that chaining can overturn comparative advantage logic, since human-advantaged steps may be optimally assigned to AI as part of a chain. Chaining also makes gains from automation depend on how AI-exposed steps cluster in the workflow beyond just how many there are, and can make the returns to improving AI quality non-monotone in a pattern resembling the productivity J-curve. Empirically, we show that existing automation patterns are consistent with the model's predictions: a step is more likely to be AI-executed when its neighbors are, and AI execution is more common where AI-exposed steps cluster in the workflow.

Introduction

A growing body of evidence shows that artificial intelligence (AI) tools raise productivity at the task level [50, 17, 25]. Although these gains may be substantial, the larger and likely longer run effects will come from reorganizing production, including shifts in the skill mix of tasks, human capital requirements, and the definition and design of jobs [19]. The workhorse framework in economics for studying the impacts of automation technologies is the task-based model, which represents production as the completion of a set of independent tasks [e.g. 13, 2, 4, 5, 6]. In these models, what matters is each task’s amenability to substitution by, or complementarity with, automation technologies (e.g., computers, robots, or AI). This approach, however, abstracts from the order in which tasks are performed and from their grouping into jobs. We argue that this sequencing is economically consequential, because it changes equilibrium predictions about how jobs are reorganized and which units of work are automated when technologies such as AI enter production.

We model production as a Leontief technology over an ordered sequence of exogenously specified steps, and treat the definition of tasks and their partitioning across jobs as endogenous outcomes. A step is the primitive unit of work in our framework, corresponding to what classic models call a “task.” We instead reserve the term task for a contiguous block of steps that the firm endogenously designates for joint execution by a human worker, potentially with the aid of AI. In the absence of AI, tasks optimally collapse to single-step blocks so that steps and tasks coincide. With AI, some steps are chained together and automated, creating a meta-task whose output a human worker validates.

The firm seeks to minimize production costs by choosing which steps of the sequence to delegate to AI and which to assign to human workers. As the AI technology improves, the firm might choose to automate many of these steps, hiring a single, potentially lower-skill worker to verify the output of that automation. Whether this strategy is optimal depends not only on the effectiveness of the AI technology at accomplishing individual production steps, but also on the sequential relationship between steps, the relative ease of verification versus manual execution, wages, and coordination costs between workers. These determinants are what set AI apart from earlier waves of automation. Its capabilities are broad but jagged, varying sharply even across adjacent steps in a workflow [23], which makes the sequencing of work central to the deployment decision. As a result, improvements in AI can shift deployment decisions at multiple points across the production chain at once, triggering discrete changes in overall production strategy.

Notes: This table summarizes how the firm’s problem differs across the two horizons studied in the paper. In the short run the firm takes job boundaries and wages as given and chooses only its AI deployment; in the long run job boundaries are chosen jointly with AI deployment, and wages adjust to the skills each job then demands.

We distinguish two horizons in our framework by how much of its organization the firm is free to adjust, and study how AI affects production in each, as summarized in Table 1. In the short run, the firm takes its workers and their job boundaries as given, along with what those jobs pay, and deploys AI to minimize the time cost of production. In the long run, in tandem with AI deployment, the firm can also redraw the boundaries of jobs, which changes the skills each job demands and hence the wage it commands.

Time HorizonAI DeploymentJob DesignWorker WagesComments
Short runOptimizedFixedFixedProductivity gains by automating existing workflows
Long runOptimizedOptimizedAdjust to AI deployment and job designJoint optimization of AI deployment and job design to minimize total labor costs

Table 1. Summary of AI’s Impact in the Short and Long Run

Automation versus Augmentation. Central to our framework is the distinction between full automation of a production step versus worker augmentation. In our model, three modes of step completion are recognized: manual, augmented, and automated. Manual completion of a step means that a human carries out the work without any AI assistance. Augmented completion involves a human performing the step with the use of AI. For example, a human describes the requirements of a step to an AI tool, the AI then executes the step, and its output is verified by the human. In contrast, we say a step has been automated if it is completed by AI end-to-end without any direct human intervention. We view AI automation as a way of putting certain production steps “under the hood” of a logical meta-task that a worker is attempting to complete.

To fix ideas, think of the workflow of a data scientist whose job requires completing five steps: defining the business question (Step 1), finding and fetching data needed for answering the question (Step 2), building an analysis pipeline (Step 3), drafting a report (Step 4), and presenting the findings (Step 5). As part of an AI-augmented request to complete one of these steps (such as Step 4: drafting a report), the AI might also be assigned to complete one or more preceding steps (such as Step 3: running the analysis, or Steps 2 and 3: finding data and running the analysis) as part of that single request. Any such preceding step is said to be automated, and the set of all such automated steps, plus the final step that the worker is actively engaged with, can be thought of as a single worker task which we term an AI chain. By choosing which steps to automate, augment, or perform manually, the firm implicitly designs the set of tasks exposed to its workers.

Although augmented and automated production steps both involve AI, they differ in whether a human verifies the AI’s output, which augmentation requires and automation does not. Figure 1 illustrates these concepts using the five-step data scientist workflow described earlier. Steps 1 and 5 are performed manually by a human. Steps 2, 3, and 4 form an AI chain and are done using AI. Steps 2 and 3 are automated because their outputs feed directly into subsequent AI steps without human review. Step 4 is augmented because its output is verified by a human before proceeding. The worker’s job therefore consists of three tasks: the manual step 1, the AI chain spanning steps 2–4, whose only human input is verifying the output of step 4, and the manual step 5.

Illustrative Example for Division of Labor

Figure 1. Illustrative Example for Division of Labor. Notes: This figure illustrates division of labor across five steps: Steps 1 and 5 are manual; Steps 2 and 3 are AI-automated (done without direct human intervention); Step 4 is AI-augmented (done with AI but requiring a human to verify its output). Lines from the AI box indicate steps involving AI, and lines from the Human box indicate steps requiring human execution or verification. Dashed boxes group steps according to their task assignments: Steps 1 and 5 form separate human tasks, while Steps 2–4 form an AI chain task.

Automation is therefore available only inside a chain. A lone AI step must have its output verified, so chaining is what lets AI work unsupervised. This is potentially a source of large productivity gains, but it requires AIs that can perform each step with a high probability of success. In this sense, the model’s basic setup is conceptually close to the O-ring model of production [42, 32].

Optimizing Automation and Fragmentation. The decision to deploy AI on a given production step compares the cost of manual execution to the unified AI-based execution cost, which is not the same as assigning each step to whichever factor of production has comparative advantage in it. Chaining overturns the comparative advantage logic because a human verifies only the output of the chain’s last step, so verification is a fixed cost of the chain rather than a marginal cost that scales with its length. Appending a neighboring step to an existing chain therefore costs only a lower probability of end-to-end success, whereas assigning that step to a human terminates the chain and creates an additional checkpoint, entailing another verification or the cost of manual execution. When AI is sufficiently reliable on the marginal step, avoiding this checkpoint can dominate, pulling the step into AI execution even if manual execution is preferred for it in isolation. In the data scientist workflow, for instance, verifying a report produced after AI executes Steps 3–4 takes the same effort as verifying one produced after AI executes Step 4 alone; the AI is just less likely to succeed at the former. What tips a step into automation is therefore not just its own characteristics but also those of its neighbors.

More generally, we should expect the gains from AI automation to be greater when AI-able steps co-occur in the workflow. A job is more or less “fragmented” in its AI exposure depending on whether the steps where AI is most effective are clustered together or dispersed throughout the workflow. We formalize this idea in a fragmentation index, the expected cost of a simple execution plan endowed with foresight into AI’s successes and failures, and show analytically that it approximately tracks the cost of optimal AI deployment. We then provide empirical evidence that, in practitioner-documented business processes, workflows with higher fragmentation see a weaker translation from AI exposure to AI execution.

Because chaining makes the cost of automating a step depend on its neighbors, the firm cannot settle each step’s execution mode in isolation, and its problem ranges over all possible configurations of production. As the number of feasible arrangements grows exponentially in the number of steps, whether the firm can calculate its optimum is not obvious. We show the firm can indeed solve this optimization, exactly in the short run and to any desired accuracy once wages and job boundaries are also chosen in the long run.

Non-Monotone Effects of AI Improvements. The AI chaining feature of the model implies that improvements in AI quality can generate non-monotone productivity effects. For any fixed production arrangement, better AI reduces costs smoothly by raising AI success probabilities and lowering expected execution times. However, firms can optimize AI deployment over a discrete set of options, and the cost-minimizing configuration can switch at particular AI quality thresholds. As a result, marginal improvements in AI may have little effect when they do not change the optimal production arrangement, which is especially likely in the early days of adoption when AI quality is low. Once AI quality crosses a threshold, longer AI chains become viable and the optimal deployment shifts abruptly, reallocating steps between humans and AI. Our framework thus provides a micro-foundation for the productivity J-curve phenomenon [19] and yields testable predictions on when and how AI-driven productivity gains trigger structural reorganization in labor markets.

Long-Run Job Design. As the firm can freely reorganize its production around what AI can do over longer horizons, AI changes what workers do and not just how quickly they do it, and through that, wages and labor demand. How broadly to define each job involves a trade-off: adding more tasks to a worker’s job raises the wage that job must pay, since the worker has to acquire the skills all of those tasks require, while dividing them across more jobs adds coordination cost, since every job boundary forces a hand-off of intermediate output among workers.

Which way improvements in AI move job boundaries is ambiguous, because it presses on both sides of this trade-off. Absorbing steps into chains strips skill out of the tasks a worker retains, making broad jobs cheaper to sustain, while the same reduction, together with any direct saving in coordination costs, makes each boundary cheaper to draw. Our framework thus supplies not a prediction about job breadth but an account of what determines it, and of what would have to be measured to settle the question empirically.

Aggregate Production. Although we develop these results at the level of a single firm, we show that, under additional assumptions, firm-level production aggregates across the economy to a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) representation. Our framework can thus serve as a micro-foundation for economy-wide production functions and be used to study the aggregate effects of AI on labor markets and productivity.

Empirical Evidence. We complement our theoretical analysis with new empirical evidence that speaks directly to the core mechanisms emphasized by the model. Taking the model to data requires three things about every step: AI’s ability to perform it, the extent to which AI currently executes it, and where it sits in the production sequence. The first two we draw from existing sources, linking ONET tasks to human assessments of AI exposure [27] and to realized AI execution outcomes from Anthropic’s Economic Index [37]. The third, the sequence in which tasks are performed, is not recorded in ONET, so we take two approaches. First, we use the Process Classification Framework (PCF) of the American Productivity & Quality Center, whose member working groups document the activities of each business process in the order practitioners perform them. Because the PCF covers only operational business processes rather than the full range of occupations, we also generate the ordering of each O*NET occupation’s tasks ourselves, and we report our results using both.

We test, and find evidence consistent with, three key predictions of the model. First, the chaining mechanism implies that AI-executed steps should appear in contiguous blocks rather than scattered across the workflow. This is what we find in both datasets, where AI execution operates over consecutive steps far more often than chance would produce. Second, chaining also creates strong local complementarities in AI automation decisions within a workflow, so that a step positioned next to AI-executed neighbors may be pulled into AI execution by the gains from automating it as part of a chain, even if human execution would be preferred for that step in isolation. We find that when conceptually similar steps appear across different workflows, a given step is more likely to be executed by AI in the workflow where its neighboring steps are also AI-executed. Third, the model emphasizes that fragmentation of AI-exposed steps plays a central role in determining the returns to AI automation. Controlling for the share of steps exposed to AI, workflows whose AI-exposed steps are more dispersed across the production sequence execute a lower share of their steps with AI.

Because our O*NET results rest on a task ordering that we generate with a language model, we show that they are robust to how that sequence is constructed. First, we show that the estimates we obtain are not artifacts of the particular prompt we use to elicit workflow sequences from an LLM (Appendix SA.D). Second, they are not artifacts of the particular way O*NET lists occupation tasks (Appendix SA.E). Third, our sequencing procedure recovers to a substantial degree the orderings of two corpora that no language model ordered, the PCF’s practitioner-documented processes and process-mining event logs recorded as the work was carried out (Appendix SA.F).

Taken together, these results show that the sequencing logic at the heart of the model is already visible in how firms use AI at this early stage of adoption. What AI executes depends not only on comparative advantage and step-level characteristics, but also on where a step sits relative to its neighbors. This is why the share of steps exposed to AI can be a misleading predictor of occupational impacts when production steps are technologically interdependent. As adoption widens and AI becomes reliable enough to sustain longer chains, we expect these patterns to grow more pronounced.

Related Literature

Task Interdependence in Task-based Models of Automation. Our framework relates to the literature on task-based models of technical change, which generally view tasks as predetermined and technologically independent objects combined through a CES production function ([2, 4, 5, 3]). We depart from this literature by modeling production as a sequence of technologically interdependent steps, where AI chaining creates complementarities across adjacent steps that can overturn comparative advantage as the driver of who does what.2 Chaining also lets step-level decisions aggregate into the system-level substitution that Autor et al. [13], Acemoglu and Restrepo [5], and Bresnahan et al. [16] emphasize, since entire chains can be automated in a single leap rather than step by step.

Complementarities, O-Ring Dynamics, and the Productivity J-Curve. Our work contributes to the literature on friction-laden technology adoption and organizational complementarities, in which information technologies raise productivity mainly alongside complementary organizational change ([16, 15]).3 We micro-found these complementarities through the O-ring theory of production ([42]). Chaining makes the payoff to automating a step depend on whether its neighbors can join the same AI block, so the returns to improving any one step turn on performance elsewhere and arrive only once AI quality crosses a threshold that makes longer chains worthwhile. Our results align with Gans and Goldfarb [32], who likewise emphasizes task interdependence in O-ring production and obtains lumpy automation through time reallocation rather than workflow adjacency. Because these returns arrive only once AI quality passes such a threshold, the marginal benefit of improving AI is non-monotone, and in this sense our framework provides a micro-foundation for the “productivity J-curve” pattern of technology adoption ([19, 47, 31, 51, 46]).

Division of Labor and the Boundary of the Job. Our work also connects to the literature on the division of labor within a firm. The Coase–Williamson logic, in which economic boundaries are shaped by coordination, transaction, and governance costs ([20, 57, 58]), applies to the “boundary of the job” as well, in that the firm chooses how many and which tasks to bundle into a worker’s role, making the degree of specialization endogenous ([48, 14, 26]). Our hand-off costs are the intra-firm analogue of the transaction costs that AI cannot fully subsume, capturing the tacit or social knowledge aspect of work ([24]), and playing the role that the cost of unbundling tasks plays in Garicano et al. [34]. AI nonetheless redraws job boundaries by stripping skill out of the steps it absorbs, effectively changing the skill requirements of jobs ([9, 11, 10]).4

Measuring AI Exposure and Realized Execution. A rapidly growing literature has sought to quantify the impact of new automation technologies on the labor market. Early work studies the susceptibility of occupations to computerization [30], and more recent work develops measures of occupational exposure to AI [18, 56, 29, 27, 36, 52], typically by mapping technologies to specific tasks and then aggregating these task-level mappings to construct occupation-level indices. We build on these measures by showing how, in addition to the share of tasks exposed to AI, the arrangement of those tasks in a workflow also governs the gains from automation.

AI Chaining and Production in the Short Run

In this section and the next we consider the firm’s production in the short run. A firm’s production consists of a sequence of steps S=(s1,…,sm)\mathcal{S} = (s_1, \ldots, s_m), every one of which must be completed to produce a unit of output.5 The firm can assign each step either to a human worker or to AI. A step assigned to a human takes worker time and demands skill. A step assigned to AI succeeds only with some probability, and its output may need to be reviewed by a human worker before it is accepted.

In the short run, job boundaries are already drawn, so each worker’s job covers a fixed block of steps; workers have acquired the skills their roles require; and the firm has hired them at wages agreed in advance. The firm’s only margin of adjustment is AI deployment, that is, which steps it assigns to AI. That choice sets how much time each worker spends completing steps, and hence the wage bill the firm pays. Given these short-run assumptions, we assume without loss of generality that there is a single worker type whose wage is normalized to 1. § 5 relaxes these, letting the firm divide the steps among workers so that the skill a job demands, and hence the wage it commands, becomes endogenous. Table A.1 in Appendix § 9 summarizes our notation.

Steps

Steps are the smallest unit of work in our framework, and each is executed in one of three modes: manually, augmented, or automated. If the firm assigns step ii to manual execution (denoted by M), a human worker spends time tiMt_i^{M} completing the step without AI. Alternatively, the firm may assign the step to AI (denoted by A), in which case a worker spends time tiAt_i^{A} prompting and verifying the output of one AI attempt at it.67 Such an attempt succeeds independently with some (step-dependent) probability qi=αdiq_i = \alpha^{d_i}, where α\alpha is the quality of the general-purpose AI technology and did_i represents how “difficult” step ii is for AI, and it must be repeated until it succeeds. Since the worker repeats prompting and verifying AI’s output until success, the expected time cost of verification across trials is tiA/qit_i^A/q_i. Definitions 1 and 2 formalize these two modes of execution.

Definition 1 (Manual Step). A step ii is performed manually if it is executed entirely by a human worker without AI assistance. The time cost of a manual step is denoted by tiMt_i^M.

Definition 2 (Augmented Step). A step ii is augmented if it is executed by AI, after which a human worker verifies its output. The expected time cost of verifying a single augmented step is tiA/qit_i^A/q_i, where qi=αdi∈(0,1]q_i = \alpha^{d_i} \in(0,1] is the AI’s success probability on the step, increasing in the quality α\alpha of the general-purpose AI technology and decreasing in the step’s difficulty did_i for AI.

In the top layer of Figure 2, Step 1, for example, is a manual step, whereas Step 2 is an augmented step performed by the AI and verified by a human.

Bundling Steps into Tasks via AI Strategy

Figure 2. Notes: The top layer shows seven production steps, each completed in manual (gray), automated (green), or augmented (orange) mode; dashed boxes group contiguous steps into tasks. The bottom layer shows the resulting tasks: a run of automated steps ending in an augmented step forms an AI chain (blue; here steps 4–6 become Task 4), and a lone augmented step is an AI chain of length one (here step 2 becomes Task 2), while a step performed manually on its own is a human task (olive). Horizontal arrows show the production flow within each layer, and each colored vertical arrow shows which dashed block of steps becomes which task.

Manual and augmented execution specify the mode of a step in isolation. There is a third mode, which we call automation, that the firm obtains by assigning multiple consecutive steps to AI. In this case, the AI attempts to complete the entire run of steps without a human reviewing the intermediate outputs, and the worker verifies only the output of the last step. Every step before the last is then automated, since no human is involved in it, while the last step is augmented. Chaining steps in this way lowers the probability that an AI attempt succeeds, since the AI must complete every step in the run successfully, but it economizes on human time, since the output is verified only once. We call such a contiguous run of AI-executed steps an AI chain.

More precisely, an AI chain spans steps (sℓ,…,sr)(s_\ell,\ldots,s_r), where the worker verifies only the output of the final step srs_r. One attempt at the chain therefore costs the same as verifying the last step srs_r, namely time trAt_r^A.8 Assuming independent failures across steps, an AI attempt succeeds with probability ∏i=ℓrqi\prod_{i=\ell}^{r} q_i, and the chain is retried until it succeeds, for a total expected time of trA/∏i=ℓrqit_r^A/\prod_{i=\ell}^{r} q_i. Since qi=αdiq_i=\alpha^{d_i}, the chain succeeds with probability α∑i=ℓrdi\alpha^{\sum_{i=\ell}^{r}d_i}, so ∑i=ℓrdi\sum_{i=\ell}^{r}d_i is the chain’s total difficulty, aggregating additively over its steps.

Note that a chain may consist of a single step, with ℓ=r\ell=r, in which case the chain is simply an augmented step, so an augmented step is equivalent to an AI chain of length one, a convention we adopt throughout the paper. We now give the formal definitions of automated steps and AI chains.

Definition 3 (Automated Step). A step is automated if it is executed by AI end-to-end, with no human verifying its output, so that its direct human time cost is zero.9

Definition 4 (AI Chain). An AI chain is a contiguous block of one or more sequential steps executed by AI, in which all steps but the final one are automated and the final step is augmented. An AI chain spanning steps (sℓ,…,sr)(s_\ell,\ldots,s_r) has steps (sℓ,…,sr−1)(s_\ell,\ldots,s_{r-1}) automated and step srs_r augmented, with expected time cost trA/∏i=ℓrqit_r^A/\prod_{i=\ell}^{r}q_i.

In Figure 2, Steps 4–6 form an AI chain. The human prompts the AI for the entire chain, but verifies the output of only Step 6, the augmented step. Steps 4 and 5 are hence performed without any direct human intervention and are automated. Step 2 forms an AI chain (of length one) on its own as well, containing only a single augmented step.

Tasks

If steps are the smallest unit of work, tasks are the smallest unit of human work. The distinction follows from the execution modes of steps above. A worker is involved in a step only when they perform it manually or verify what the AI returns at the end of a chain, whereas an automated step runs inside the chain entirely beneath their awareness. Every point at which a worker executes or verifies work therefore opens a task for them, and that task absorbs whatever the AI has run automatically since the previous such point. The steps of a workflow map into tasks accordingly. A manual step is a task on its own, and an entire AI chain is a single composite task, delegated to the AI at its start and received back at its augmented endpoint.

The firm’s choice of where to place chains is therefore what creates the tasks its workers hold, and we record that choice as an AI deployment strategy.

Definition 5 (AI Deployment Strategy). An AI deployment strategy (or AI strategy for short) is a partition of the step sequence S=(s1,…,sm)\mathcal{S} = (s_1,\ldots,s_m) into contiguous blocks, each of which is either a single manual step or an AI chain (automated or augmented). The blocks of the partition are the firm’s tasks, forming the task sequence T=(T1,…,Tn)\mathcal{T} = (T_1,\ldots,T_n), and each task TbT_b carries an expected time cost tbt_b: tiMt_i^{M} for a manual step sis_i, and trA/∏i=ℓrqit_r^{A}/\prod_{i=\ell}^{r}q_i for a chain spanning (sℓ,…,sr)(s_\ell,\ldots,s_r).

The AI deployment strategy in Figure 2 maps the seven steps in the top row into five tasks in the bottom row: two AI chains (a length-three chain of Steps 4–6 and a length-one chain of Step 2) and three manual tasks.

Short-Run Production

The firm employs human labor to perform tasks and produce the output, and labor is the only input used in production.10 The worker carries out the entire step sequence S=(s1,…,sm)\mathcal{S} = (s_1,\ldots,s_m), which the firm’s AI strategy organizes into the task sequence T=(T1,…,Tn)\mathcal{T} = (T_1,\ldots,T_n), and is paid at the normalized rate of w=1w = 1 per unit of time for the whole time production takes. The cost of production is therefore the total expected time requirement of the workflow’s tasks, and the firm chooses the AI deployment strategy that minimizes

min⁡T∑Tb∈Ttb.(1)\min_{\mathcal{T}} \sum_{T_b\in\mathcal{T}} t_b. \tag*{(1)}

Problem (1) defines the firm’s short-run cost minimization problem. In the short run, AI is purely productivity-improving, compressing the time a fixed set of steps takes by letting the firm minimize cost through a combination of augmented and automated steps.

AI chaining makes solving this problem non-trivial. Because a chain links several steps into a single unit of execution, the firm cannot solve the problem in (1) separately for each step; the choice instead ranges over all feasible arrangements of the workflow. This linkage gives rise to rich dynamics in how AI is deployed across production, and hence in how automation affects it. We discuss these implications next.

Implications of Chaining

In this section we draw out three implications of AI chaining in the model. First, we show that chaining can overturn comparative advantage logic, in that a step that is cheaper to perform manually in isolation may nonetheless be executed by AI in the optimal configuration of production (§ 4.1). Second, we introduce a fragmentation index that captures how dispersed a workflow’s AI-able steps are, and show that it approximates the cost of the firm’s optimal AI strategy, so that the gains from AI depend on the arrangement of AI-able steps (§ 4.2). Third, we show that the marginal gains from improving AI quality are non-monotone, abruptly rising whenever improvements in AI quality make redesigning workflows worthwhile (§ 4.3). All proofs are collected in Appendix § 10.

Overturning of Comparative Advantage

For a single step, the decision whether to deploy AI depends simply on whether the manual execution cost exceeds the AI augmentation cost. With more than one step, however, the optimal deployment of AI depends on more than each step’s own characteristics, because of the benefits of automating multiple steps together in an AI chain. As a result, the factor of production holding the comparative advantage on a step in isolation need not be the one that performs it in the optimal production configuration. That is, a step that is cheaper to perform manually may still be executed by AI as part of a chain.

Consider a step kk on which the human holds the comparative advantage, so that tkM<tkA/qkt_k^M < t_k^A/q_k, together with its immediate neighbors: a predecessor k−1k-1, and a successor k+1k+1 executed as a standalone augmented step.11 Ask what it costs to admit k−1k-1 and kk into the chain that ends at k+1k+1, holding the rest of the workflow fixed. The marginal cost of admitting the two is the chain’s cost beyond verifying step k+1k+1 alone,

tk+1Aqk−1qkqk+1⏟cost of chain over {k−1,k,k+1}−tk+1Aqk+1⏟cost of augmenting k+1 alone=tk+1A(1−qk−1qk)qk−1qkqk+1⏟marginal cost of folding the pair {k−1,k} in.\underbrace{\frac{t_{k+1}^{A}}{q_{k-1}q_kq_{k+1}}}_{\text{cost of chain over }\{k-1,k,k+1\}} - \underbrace{\frac{t_{k+1}^{A}}{q_{k+1}}}_{\text{cost of augmenting }k+1\text{ alone}} = \underbrace{\frac{t_{k+1}^{A}(1-q_{k-1}q_k)}{q_{k-1}q_kq_{k+1}}}_{\text{marginal cost of folding the pair }\{k-1,k\}\text{ in}}.

Writing the joint failure risk as 1−qk−1qk=(1−qk−1)+qk−1(1−qk)1-q_{k-1}q_k=(1-q_{k-1})+q_{k-1}(1-q_k) splits this marginal cost into a share for each admitted step separately,

tk+1A(1−qk−1qk)qk−1qkqk+1⏟marginal cost of folding the pair {k−1,k} in=tk+1A(1−qk−1)qk−1qkqk+1⏟step k−1’s share+tk+1A(1−qk)qkqk+1⏟step k’s share.(2)\underbrace{\frac{t_{k+1}^{A}(1-q_{k-1}q_k)}{q_{k-1}q_kq_{k+1}}}_{\text{marginal cost of folding the pair }\{k-1,k\}\text{ in}} = \underbrace{\frac{t_{k+1}^{A}(1-q_{k-1})}{q_{k-1}q_kq_{k+1}}}_{\text{step }k-1\text{’s share}} + \underbrace{\frac{t_{k+1}^{A}(1-q_k)}{q_kq_{k+1}}}_{\text{step }k\text{’s share}}. \tag*{(2)}

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