Hardness Amplification for Approximate Nash Equilibrium with Constantly Many Players

For every fixed $\varepsilon\in(0,1)$ and $η\in[0,1)$, we prove that computing an $(\varepsilon,η)$-weak approximate Nash equilibrium requires quasipolynomial time assuming deterministic PPAD-ETH, even in symmetric binary-payoff games with a constant number of players. The games are given by complete payoff tables, and the player count depends only on the tolerances. The weak approximate Nash equilibrium allows at most an $η$ fraction of players to gain more than $\varepsilon$ by deviating unilaterally. The main technical result is an unconditional error-amplification reduction from bimatrix games. For every fixed $δ\in(0,1)$, it transforms a rational bimatrix game with payoffs in $[0,1]$ into a symmetric binary-payoff game with a polynomial-size complete table and a player count depending only on $δ,\varepsilon,η$. Every $(\varepsilon,η)$-weak approximate equilibrium of the constructed game yields a $δ$-approximate Nash equilibrium of the bimatrix game. Construction and recovery take polynomial time in their explicit inputs. Combining this reduction with the bimatrix hardness result of Rubinstein [FOCS 16] gives a deterministic worst-case running-time lower bound of $N^{(\log N)^{1-o(1)}}$, where $N$ is the constructed table's binary encoding length.