WorksComputer Science
Revisiting the Fairness of Pure Nash Equilibria of Round-Robin
Abstract
We prove that for additive valuations, not every pure Nash equilibrium of the Round-Robin mechanism induces an allocation that is envy-free up to one good (EF1) with respect to the agents' true valuations. This corrects an earlier claim of Amanatidis et al. (WINE 2021; Math. Oper. Res. 2024). On the positive side, every pure Nash equilibrium of every fixed recursively balanced picking sequence mechanism induces an allocation that is -EF1 and proportional up to one good (PROP1). We prove the approximate EF1 guarantee through a potential function comparing two executions, and the proportionality guarantee via a deviation that preserves the agent's most valuable goods. We also give a family of Round Robin equilibria showing that it is not possible to have a strictly better guarantee than -EF1 for all equilibria.
Introduction
In the fair division of indivisible goods, envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) is one of the central fairness notions, and the Round-Robin algorithm [7], in which agents take turns picking their favourite remaining good, is the simplest way to achieve it: when agents report their valuations truthfully, Round-Robin always returns an EF1 allocation [8].
Strategic agents, however, may misreport (see, e.g., [9, 5]). Amanatidis et al. [1, 2] claim that, for additive nonnegative valuations, every pure Nash equilibrium of the Round-Robin reporting mechanism still induces an allocation that is EF1 with respect to the true valuations [2, Theorem 4]. We give a counterexample under the reporting model stated in their paper.
Despite the failure of exact EF1, we prove that two guarantees survive: every pure Nash equilibrium is -EF1 and proportional up to one good (PROP1). Both statements hold for the larger class of fixed recursively balanced picking sequences [4], in which the order of the agents may change between rounds. The -EF1 guarantee is already known for Round-Robin as a special case of the result of Amanatidis et al. for subadditive cancelable valuations [3 Theorem 8]. We give a direct proof for additive valuations and extend the guarantee to every fixed recursively balanced sequence. The existence of a pure Nash equilibrium for any recursively balanced picking sequence mechanism follows from the bluff profile of Aziz et al. [6]; see the discussion at the end of § 4. Finally, we give a more elaborate family of Round-Robin equilibria showing that no factor strictly greater than can be guaranteed with respect to approximate EF1 for all equilibria.
Our contributions
We first show that exact EF1 need not hold at equilibrium, even with three agents and eight goods (Proposition 1). In our example, two agents value all goods equally, and the third uses only three distinct values. All reports are strict, so the example is independent of any tie-breaking rule used.
Our main positive result (Theorem 1) combines -EF1 and PROP1 for every fixed recursively balanced sequence. The pairwise guarantee follows from a potential function that compares the equilibrium execution with a deviation targeting another agent’s bundle. It requires only that the agent whose envy we examine best responds to the other reports. The proportionality guarantee uses a different deviation, in which the agent first takes all goods that she values more than every good she does not receive, and then picks truthfully. Again, this only requires that her report is a best response.
Finally, Theorem 2 gives a family of Round-Robin equilibria ruling out every universal EF1 approximation factor greater than . All agents except the one whose envy we examine have identical unit valuations, and the latter uses only three distinct values. The main step is to show that the agent whose envy we examine best responds, and this reduces to a counting argument: for every two goods that she takes from the bundle she envies, she loses at least three of her own goods.
Setting
An instance consists of a set of agents, a set of indivisible goods with , and, for each agent , an additive valuation with for every and for every . An allocation is a partition of , where is the bundle of agent .
Definition 1 (-EF1). For , an allocation is -EF1 if, for every pair with , there is a good such that
When we just say that the allocation is EF1.
Definition 2 (PROP1). An allocation is proportional up to one good if, for every agent , either or there is a good such that .
For nonnegative additive valuations, an EF1 allocation is also PROP1.
Sequential mechanisms. Each agent reports a bid vector , which need not coincide with . A picking sequence, fixed independently of the reports, specifies the active agent at each turn, and the active agent receives the available good with her highest reported bid; ties are broken lexicographically. The reports are submitted once, before the allocation begins, and remain fixed throughout the execution. A picking sequence is recursively balanced if it consists of complete rounds, each of which is a permutation of , followed possibly by an incomplete round in which no agent appears twice. Round-Robin repeats the order , truncating the last round when all goods have been allocated.
Under truthful reports, a recursively balanced sequence produces an EF1 allocation: for every , the good that agent picks at her th turn is at least as valuable to her as the good that any other agent picks at the th turn of ; so, removing the first good of ’s bundle eliminates the envy of agent towards . Hence, it also produces a PROP1 allocation. For Round-Robin, see also [8].
Since the outcome depends on a report only through the strict ranking of goods that it induces after tie-breaking, and every strict ranking is induced by some bid vector, we identify each report with a strict ranking of , as in [2].
Definition 3 (Pure Nash equilibrium). A report profile is a pure Nash equilibrium if no agent can obtain a bundle of strictly higher true value by unilaterally changing her report.
Not every pure Nash equilibrium induces an EF1 allocation
Proposition 1. There is a three-agent, eight-good additive instance with strictly positive valuations and a pure Nash equilibrium of the Round-Robin reporting mechanism whose outcome is not EF1.
Proof. Let , and let the picking sequence be . Agents 1 and 3 value every good at 1. Agent 2’s values are
| 8 | 8 | 8 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 2 |
Table 1.
and the reported rankings are
These are strict rankings, and can be implemented by strictly decreasing bids. Thus no tie-breaking is needed. The goods are picked in the order , giving
Agents 1 and 3 always receive three and two goods, respectively, so neither can improve her utility. Agent 2 receives value 15. To verify that she also has no profitable deviation, first observe that is always taken immediately. Moreover, she can receive at most one of , and only on her first or second turn. Indeed, agent 3 never takes or , since she ranks them last and at least three goods are available at each of her turns. So, if agent 2 takes one of on her first turn, agent 1 takes the other on her second turn; otherwise, agent 1 takes on her second turn and on her third turn, unless agent 2 has already taken it.
Without , agent 2 can obtain value at most 15. With one of and at most one of , her value is at most . It remains to exclude a bundle containing one of and two of . For such a bundle, her first two picks must consist of one good from each of these two sets. At that point, agent 1 has taken and the other good from , and agent 3 has taken . Only and two goods from remain. At least one of these two goods is or , which agent 3 ranks above , so agent 3 takes one of them on her second turn. Agent 1 ranks the other above and takes it on her third turn. Agent 2 must therefore take on her third turn, a contradiction. This proves that the profile is a pure Nash equilibrium.
Finally, , whereas for every . Thus the outcome is not EF1. ∎
Remark 1. The gap in the argument of Amanatidis et al. [2] (which also appears in [1]) occurs in the proof of their Lemma 2, at inequality (2). Their recursive construction replaces by intermediate valuation functions , but the best-response condition invoked at that point holds only for the original valuation function . Preserving the total value of and the values of all goods outside , as the construction does, does not preserve the values of deviating bundles that contain only some of the goods of .
Equilibrium guarantees for recursively balanced sequences
Although EF1 can fail at equilibrium, every pure Nash equilibrium is still 1/2-EF1 and PROP1. This remains true even when the order of the agents changes between rounds.
Theorem 1. For nonnegative additive valuations, every pure Nash equilibrium of every fixed recursively balanced picking sequence mechanism induces an allocation that is 1/2-EF1 and PROP1 with respect to the agents’ true valuation functions.
We prove the two guarantees separately. The first proposition gives a quantitative proportionality bound. The second gives the pairwise bundle value comparison needed for 1/2-EF1.
Proposition 2. Let be the allocation induced by a report profile for a fixed recursively balanced picking sequence in which agent ’s report is a best response to the other reports. Let , where the maximum is defined as zero if is empty. Then .
A natural approach would be to compare with the bundle that agent would get by reporting truthfully, as in the standard proof that recursively balanced picking sequences produce EF1 allocations under truthful reports. However, a truthful report may cost agent some of her most valuable goods. Instead, we let her first secure all goods that she values more than every good she does not receive in , and only then pick truthfully. The next lemma shows that such a deviation is always possible.
Lemma 1. Fix a picking sequence and the reports of the other agents. Let be any distinct goods that agent receives under report , listed in the order she acquires them, and let be any report ranking first, in this order. Then under agent receives at her th turn, for every $r \le c.
Proof. If , the statement is vacuous. Suppose . Let and be the sets of goods allocated before turn under and . We show by induction on , up to agent ’s th turn, that she has received at her turns before and that , where is the number of her turns before . Initially , so the invariant holds. Assume it holds immediately before turn .
If turn is agent ’s, then , since under she acquires at her th turn or later, and . So is available, and as are gone, it is the highest-ranked available good of ; she takes it. Adding to and to the list of promoted goods preserves the inclusion at the next turn. If turn belongs to , let be ’s pick under . Then and , since these goods are allocated to agent under . The induction hypothesis therefore implies that is available under . Hence takes or a good ranked above . Any such higher-ranked good belongs to , since otherwise would have taken it under . Thus the new pick belongs to , preserving the invariant.
We now prove the quantitative bound.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let . By the definition of , , and every good outside is worth at most to agent . Let be the goods of in the order agent acquires them. Recursive balance gives two facts: every agent’s th turn lies in round , and the numbers of turns of any two agents differ by at most one.
To exploit the best-response condition, we consider a unilateral deviation by agent , while keeping all other reports fixed. We construct this deviation so that, denoting its resulting allocation by , all but one good of every can be paired with distinct goods of that agent values at least as much. The remaining good is worth at most . This gives a lower bound on ; because the original report is a best response, agent values her actual bundle at least as much as .
Consider the report ranking first, in this order, followed by the remaining goods in non-increasing order of , breaking ties lexicographically, and denote the resulting allocation by . By Lemma 1, agent receives at her th turn for ; at every later turn all of is gone, so she takes a most valuable available good. Let be her th pick.
Fix . We pair every good of except its first with an earlier pick of agent . If , then is immediate. Otherwise, list the goods of in allocation order as , where . We claim for . If , then is worth more than , while is worth at most . If , then is taken in round , hence is still available at agent ’s th turn, where she takes a most valuable available good. Therefore in this case as well.
Since , we have , and thus
Here, the first inequality uses for every . For the second inequality, recall that , so form a subset of ; the inequality therefore follows from the nonnegativity of the valuations.
Since partitions ,
Hence,
Finally, because the original report is a best response. Hence,
For the pairwise guarantee, we show -EF1 by considering the deviation in which agent ranks the goods of first, from the most to the least valuable to her. The difficulty is that this deviation may change the picks of the other agents, and such changes may propagate until the end of the execution. To control them, we compare the two executions turn by turn, using a potential function that can increase only at the turns of agents and . Roughly speaking, each good of that agent takes in the deviation pays for at most two turns of agent in the original execution, while the first turn of agent is paid for by a most valuable good of , i.e., by the good that is removed in the EF1 comparison. This is where the factor comes from.
Proposition 3. Fix a recursively balanced picking sequence independently of the reports. If agent ’s report is a best response to the other reports and the resulting allocation is , then, for every with ,
Proof. Fix with , and set . Suppose that agent deviates to a strict ranking that places all goods of first in nonincreasing order of , breaking ties lexicographically, followed by the goods outside in any strict order. We denote the deviating allocation by .
Let be the number of turns of , and let be her deviating pick on her th turn, for . Define
Whenever a good of is available, takes a most valuable such good. If she takes a good outside , no good of remains. Since available sets only shrink, it follows that
After her th turn, every remaining good of has adjusted value at most . Additivity and nonnegativity also give
These statements also apply when , with empty sums.
Both executions use the same picking sequence and allocate one good at each turn. We synchronize them and write for the respective sets of remaining goods in the original and deviating executions, respectively. For a nonnegative level , define
The first term records the value allocated to in the original execution. The second term assigns a residual value to every good that is still available in the original execution but not in the deviating one. The level ensures that each such good has residual value at least , even if it is not a good of .
Initially set . Immediately before ’s th turn, change the level to , and retain this level until her next turn. Every level change is a decrease, so it does not increase right at that moment. Initially , hence . Below, we bound the change of at each turn, for the level that is in effect at that turn.
A turn of agent : Let be her original pick. Since , we have , so the first term of the potential does not change. The new residual value set is
Thus a residual value term may be removed, and at most one is added, for (only if it remains available in the original execution, i.e., if ). Because , the added residual value equals . This turn therefore increases by at most .
A turn of an agent : Let and be her original and deviating picks. Every good satisfies . Before ’s first turn this follows from ; subsequently, it follows from the bound on goods remaining after her most recent deviating pick.
If , the two goods cannot both be in ; otherwise the unchanged strict ranking would have to rank above in the original execution and above in the deviating execution. So, if , then either or ; in both cases the set does not change. If , then the residual value of is removed, and , as . In this case, no residual value is added if , whereas a residual value of is added if .
If , then . The first term of is unchanged. In the case where , the residual values are unchanged, whereas in the case where , a residual value of is removed and at most a residual value of is added. Thus this turn does not increase .
If , then and the first term increases by . When , this is at most , and residual values are unchanged. Otherwise (i.e., when ), by the discussion above, the total increase is at most
Hence, every turn of increases by at most its current level.
Now we may bound the final value of by summing over turns. Let be the total number of turns of ; by recursive balance, we have . Before ’s th turn, suppose that has taken turns; again, by recursive balance, we have . The current level is , and therefore
Note that this includes , as .
At termination , so the final potential is . Summing the turn increases, including the nonpositive level changes, and then using , we obtain
The second to last inequality is (1), whereas the last one uses the best-response condition for . Rearranging the terms gives the claimed inequality.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1 using the two propositions above.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let be an allocation induced by a pure Nash equilibrium. Every agent is a best responder, so Proposition 3 applies to every ordered pair of distinct agents. For , choose a good maximizing . By additivity,
Thus is 1/2-EF1.
For PROP1, fix and use from Proposition 2, i.e., . If , proportionality already holds; otherwise, must be nonempty. Consider a good with . Proposition 2 and nonnegativity give
Thus is also PROP1.
Corollary 1. For two agents with nonnegative additive valuations, every pure Nash equilibrium of every fixed recursively balanced picking sequence mechanism induces an EF1 allocation.
Proof. For , Proposition 2 with gives . Since , choosing a most valuable good of a nonempty proves EF1.
For Round-Robin, this was already known from [2 Theorem 3].
Approximate equilibria. The proofs above also give bounds when best responses are approximate, using the exact same analysis. For , suppose that the report profile is a -approximate pure Nash equilibrium, i.e., every agent satisfies for every unilateral deviation with resulting allocation . The same deviations then give
and
Thus the allocation is -EF1, and each agent can reach at least by adding at most one outside good. For Round-Robin, the pairwise guarantee is already known due to [3 Theorem 8].
Our counterexample separates exact EF1 from the two equilibrium guarantees of Theorem 1. EF1 may fail, whereas 1/2-EF1 and PROP1 hold for every pure Nash equilibrium of every fixed recursively balanced mechanism. There also always exists an EF1 pure Nash equilibrium: the bluff profile reproduces the truthful allocation [6 Theorem 2].
Theorem 2 of Aziz et al. [6] is stated for positive values that induce strict rankings, but it extends to our setting. Refine true-value ties lexicographically and let be a good’s rank, with rank 1 denoting the most valuable good. For , replace by . The true strict rankings, truthful allocation, and bluff profile are unchanged. The profile is a pure Nash equilibrium for every ; taking in each best-response inequality proves that it is a pure Nash equilibrium for the original values as well. For Round-Robin, this was also shown in [2 Theorem 10].
An upper bound of 2/3 for Round-Robin
The counterexample in Proposition 1 already gives an upper bound of 15/16: agent 2 receives value 15, while every deletion from agent 1’s bundle leaves value 16. This ratio is close to one. The example establishes the failure of exact EF1 with very few goods, but leaves open how much envy an equilibrium can sustain.
We now improve this upper bound to 2/3. The construction has two principal agents, agent 1 and agent 2. Agent 2 is the agent whose envy we examine; she receives goods that she values at 2, whereas agent 1 receives goods that agent 2 values at 3. Agent 1 picks before agent 2 in every round and ranks her own goods first. So, if agent 2 takes some of these goods, then agent 1 runs out of them earlier and starts taking the goods of agent 2. At the same time, each of the remaining agents, whom we call auxiliary, removes a specific good of agent 2 by a prescribed deadline, unless agent 2 has already taken it. Together, these two effects force agent 2 to lose at least three of her own goods for every two goods of agent 1 that she takes. Therefore, no deviation is profitable for her.
The auxiliary agents implement the deadlines through fixed reports, while goods that only they value fill their remaining turns without disturbing the intended allocation. Giving unit valuations to all agents other than agent 2 makes their equilibrium conditions immediate. This leaves a single best-response condition to verify, namely that of agent 2.
Theorem 2. For every integer , there is an additive instance with agents and goods, and a pure Nash equilibrium of Round-Robin whose allocation is not -EF1 for any
Consequently, it is not possible to guarantee -EF1 for every pure Nash equilibrium of Round-Robin for any constant .
Proof. We begin by describing the instance. There are agents: the principal agents 1 and 2, and the auxiliary agents 3, , , who pick in this order in every round. The set of goods is , where
and all these sets are pairwise disjoint. The goods of are meant for agent . We have , so there are exactly complete rounds and every agent receives exactly goods, regardless of the reports. The valuation function of agent 2 is additive with
whereas every other agent values every good at 1.
For the reports of the agents, we first fix an arbitrary strict ranking of . Every ranking displayed below is completed by appending all unlisted goods to its right, in this fixed order. The reports are
where, for , no good of precedes in agent 3’s ranking. These are strict rankings and, as discussed in § 2, they can be implemented by bid vectors.
We first argue about the resulting allocation. We claim that, in every round , agent 1 takes , agent 2 takes , and agent takes , for every . We use induction on . Suppose that the claim holds for all rounds before round ; for this assumption is vacuous. Then the goods allocated before round are exactly , , and , for and . In particular, and are available at the beginning of round , whereas all goods that precede them in and , respectively, have been allocated. Hence agent 1 takes and agent 2 takes . Now consider agent . Since the agents before her in round have taken , , and goods of , the goods of that are not available at her turn are exactly ; in particular, is available. If , the goods that she ranks above are . If , these are and , where has been taken by agent 2 in round . In both cases, all goods that she ranks above are unavailable, so she takes . This completes the induction. Therefore,
and, in particular, .
Next, we show that the profile above is a pure Nash equilibrium. Every agent other than agent 2 receives goods of value 1 to her. As every agent receives exactly goods under every report profile, this is the maximum value she can obtain, and thus her report is a best response. It remains to show that is a best response for agent 2. To this end, consider any report of agent 2, keep the reports of all other agents fixed, and let be the resulting allocation. We are going to show that .
We begin by showing that, for every , the good is allocated by the end of round . If is not available at the turn of agent in round , then it has already been allocated. So, suppose that is available at that turn. Then was also available at each of her earlier turns, so at each of these turns she took a good that she ranks above , i.e., one of . These distinct picks exhaust , and therefore is the highest-ranked available good of agent in round ; hence, she takes it. Note that this argument applies to every report of agent 2, including reports under which she takes goods of in order to change the later picks of agent .
If , then . So, assume that . As agent 1 ranks the goods of first, at each of her turns she takes a good of if and only if such a good is available. Since the set of available goods only shrinks, the rounds in which a good of is available at agent 1’s turn are the first few rounds. As agent 1 has one turn per round and receives goods of , these are exactly the rounds . Moreover, as agent 1 picks before agent 2 in every round, if agent 2 takes a good of in some round , then this good was available at agent 1’s turn in round , and thus . Since agents 1 and 2 receive distinct goods of , we have ; in particular, .
We now bound . In rounds , agent 2 has exactly turns, and, by the above, she takes all goods of at these turns. So, she receives at most goods of in these rounds. Next, consider rounds . As , the goods have been allocated by the end of round , and thus every good of allocated in these rounds belongs to . Suppose that agent 2 takes some in a round . Then was available at agent 1’s turn in round , whereas no good of was, since . As agent 1 ranks the goods of right after those of , she took a good of at that turn, which is different from , since was still available afterwards. That is, in every round in which agent 2 receives a good of , agent 1 also receives a good of . As every agent receives one good per round, in rounds agent 1 receives at least as many goods of as agent 2 does. All these goods are distinct and belong to , so agent 2 receives at most goods of in these rounds. Combining the above, we get
where the last inequality follows from .
Since , the report is a best response for agent 2. Together with the best responses of the other agents, this shows that the profile is a pure Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we show that the allocation fails to be -EF1 for sufficiently large . Every good of is worth 3 to agent 2. Thus, for every , we have , while . That is, the allocation is not -EF1 for any , and, since , we have . Note that
So, given any , we may choose an integer so that , and the corresponding pure Nash equilibrium is not -EF1.
Note that the upper bound also holds for strictly positive valuations. For each , we may increase the value of agent 2 for each good by , leaving the reports and all other valuations unchanged. Since agent 2 receives exactly goods under every report profile, the value of every bundle she may receive increases by exactly 1, and thus the profile remains an equilibrium. The EF1 comparison now gives
as . Hence, even strictly positive instances rule out every factor strictly greater than .
Discussion and open problems
Our results leave a gap between the guaranteed factor of and the upper bound of established here with respect to EF1. To state the question precisely, let be the largest factor guaranteed at every pure Nash equilibrium of every Round-Robin instance, and let be the corresponding factor for all fixed recursively balanced sequences. Since Round-Robin belongs to the latter class,
Our central open question is to determine these factors. In particular, does allowing the order to change between rounds affect the sharp guarantee? The lower-bound proof uses only that no agent is more than one turn ahead of another, whereas the upper-bound construction uses the same order in every round.
The dependence on the number of agents is another natural question. For two agents, the quantitative proportionality bound gives exact EF1 (Corollary 1). The small counterexample shows that this fails already for three agents, but the family approaching uses a growing number of auxiliary agents. Determining the best guaranteed factor for each fixed number of agents could distinguish which part of the gap comes from additional strategic interaction and which part comes from the number of rounds.
There is also a useful distinction between equilibrium existence and a guarantee for every equilibrium. The bluff profile provides an EF1 equilibrium, while the examples show that other equilibria can sustain envy after every deletion. It would be interesting to identify conditions on reports or valuations that force all equilibria to satisfy a stronger guarantee, without restricting the agents to truthful reports.
Acknowledgments
Rebecca Reiffenhäuser was partially supported by the NWO grant Fair Allocation for Strategic Agents (FAStA), grant ID https://doi.org/10.61686/AZZOJ38639.
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