In this paper
AbstractIntroductionIllustrative exampleModelBenchmark–Truthful data reportingEquilibrium–Strategic data reportingIntensive-margin enforcementExtensive-margin enforcementValue of dataLiteratureConclusionOmitted resultsTruthful data reportingEnforcement index and information rentsMechanism design and optimal enforcementStrategic data reportingTax-gap comparisons and the value of dataTax-gap comparisons and the value of dataTax gaps across enforcement regimesTax-gap rankingsTargeting value and strategic implementation costThe cost of introducing dataNaive use of manipulable dataAudit returns, shadow values, and the MVPFRelation to the MVPFEmpirical implementationComparative staticsAudit resources and the profit-audit cutoffProfit-audit costsData-verification costs and the global frontierAnalytical examplesAnalytical examplesIntensive-margin illustration: Weibull profitsExtensive-margin illustration: Pareto profitsTax progressivityQuantitative illustrationQuantitative environmentEnforcement regimes and value of dataBaseline resultsThe informativeness of classification dataThe cost of data verificationRobustnessRobustnessExtensive-margin illustrationExtensive-margin illustrationReferencesWorksEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
Optimal hybrid tax enforcement
Abstract
Modern tax design and enforcement rely on classification data reported by taxpayers. Data improve the targeting of tax policy and audits but also open avenues for evasion. How can tax authorities use such data while accounting for their potential strategic distortion? We demonstrate that restoring deterrence generates an endogenous global verification frontier: every report below the frontier is verified through either a profit audit or data verification. Optimal hybrid tax enforcement requires selecting which data classes are subject to profit audits up to the global frontier and which are profit-audited only up to lower class-specific cutoffs, with data verification taking over beyond these cutoffs. This costly data verification requirement limits the benefit from differentiated tax enforcement. Optimal implementation is characterized by profit bunching but involves no data bunching.
Introduction
Modern tax systems make extensive use of self-declared data to differentiate tax obligations and enforcement. Corporate tax returns, for example, contain detailed expense information and balance-sheet items that firms must report under the appropriate categories to claim deductions and exemptions. Such data can improve the targeting of tax policy and audits, thus mitigating the regressivity bias of tax enforcement [21, 24, 31]. Yet, data-driven tax policies also create natural incentives to distort reported information.2
A growing empirical literature documents widespread manipulation of classifications. Firms respond to size-dependent enforcement thresholds by adjusting actual or reported revenue or organizational form, generating sharp distortions and bunching patterns [2, 5, 13] (Almunia et al. 2024). Similarly, a differentiated tax regime across production technologies—such as deductions or exemptions for specific activities—induces misclassification, relabeling of activities, and business splitting [1, 10, 15] (Kuchumova et al. 2025). While such findings are consistent with evidence that reporting behavior responds endogenously to the design of tax policy and enforcement [14, 20, 32, 33], tax theory largely abstracts from strategic data reporting.
In this paper, we study how tax enforcement should optimally account for self-reported data that are both informative and manipulable. The tax authority has two verification instruments: costly profit audits that verify income and cheaper data audits that detect misclassification and may trigger subsequent profit verification. The central tradeoff is that, while data allow the authority to differentiate enforcement across firms, self-classification allows firms to manipulate both enforcement and the tax base. Preserving truthful data reporting thus places significant limits on differentiation.
Our framework provides a systematic approach to studying the structure of optimal enforcement policies under strategic data reporting. We find that restoring deterrence introduces a global verification frontier. When enforcement differs across classes, firms assigned to more strongly enforced classes have an incentive to jointly misreport profits and classification data to access more favorable tax treatment. Eliminating these joint deviations requires that every report below the frontier is verified, either directly through a profit audit or through the verification of the classification data. Firms reporting the same profit may face different forms of enforcement depending on their data class: a profit report may trigger a profit audit in one class and data verification in another.
A practical implication of this frontier structure is that optimal enforcement is inherently nonseparable across data classes and cannot be optimized class by class: differentiated tax treatment generates an endogenous verification requirement that links profit audits and data verification and calls for integration between enforcement functions. For example, the IRS organizes enforcement through specialized units, including Tax Exempt and Government Entities, Large Business and International, and Small Business/Self-Employed, while coordinating across divisions through data-driven workload selection and cross-divisional case classification. Our results highlight the importance of such collaboration and efficient allocation of the enforcement budget across departments.3
More specifically, our characterization reveals the costs and benefits of differentiated enforcement across data classes. Building on Sanchez and Sobel [30], we derive a local enforcement index that captures the marginal gains from extending profit audits within each class. We demonstrate how this relatively overlooked index can be leveraged to assess the efficiency of class-by-class profit-audit allocation under strategic data reporting.4 The index can be readily estimated from administrative data.5
The form of optimal enforcement depends on the shape of the enforcement index. When the index is decreasing in profits (e.g., under a linear tax schedule with a decreasing inverse hazard rate), enforcement operates on the intensive margin. As the audit cutoff rises, each additional audit deters underreporting among fewer high-profit firms, thus generating diminishing returns and favoring class-specific cutoffs. We demonstrate that optimal hybrid tax enforcement combines profit audits and data verification, with the mix of instruments varying across classes. In some classes, profit audits stop at class-specific cutoffs, where data verification takes over and continues up to the global verification frontier. In other classes, the authority relies exclusively on profit audits, thus avoiding the additional costs of data verification on profit reports below the frontier. These alternative outcomes show how the costs of preserving truthful data reporting can outweigh the benefits of differentiated profit-audit cutoffs, despite their promise for improved audit targeting.6
When the enforcement index increases in profits (e.g., under a sufficiently progressive tax schedule), by contrast, enforcement operates on the extensive margin. As the audit cutoff rises, the gains from deterring underreporting increase with profits. Whenever a class is audited, profit audits thus extend all the way up to the global frontier. Conditional on the global verification frontier, the enforcement decision therefore shifts from choosing class-specific audit cutoffs to deciding which classes are audited for profits up to the frontier and which are wholly exempt from profit audits. Importantly, exemption from profit audits does not imply the absence of enforcement altogether: these classes still undergo systematic data verification to prevent firms in profit-audited classes from obtaining weaker enforcement through misclassification. The resulting division between profit-audited and data-verified classes echoes the IRS’s division-based approach to enforcement and highlights how optimal enforcement may involve fundamentally different verification regimes across taxpayer classes.
Our characterization also provides a diagnostic for whether data verification is sufficient. Optimal implementation generates bunching in reported profits at profit-audit cutoffs, but no bunching in classification data: firms respond to the limits of profit enforcement, whereas verification removes the gain from strategically changing data classes. Empirical findings of bunching around size-dependent thresholds and strategic relabeling of activities and expenses [2, 10] may therefore indicate that data-contingent policy is not successfully implemented.
Finally, we provide a measure to quantify the value of self-reported data for enforcement. More informative data improve targeting, but strategic reporting requires costly verification that diverts resources from profit audits. We decompose the gross targeting value of data into the net reduction in the tax gap and the implementation cost. This yields a simple adoption criterion: the targeting value must exceed the implementation cost together with the cost of establishing the information system. Naively conditioning on manipulable data can perform worse than ignoring the data altogether.
Illustrative example
A simple example illustrates the fragility of data-contingent enforcement when classification data are manipulable. Suppose firms self-classify an activity as either eligible for special tax treatment (e.g., R&D expenses) or ordinary (e.g., other expenses). Based on this classification, the tax authority sets a lower profit-audit cutoff, , for eligible activities and a higher cutoff, , for ordinary activities. As shown in Figure 1, this generates two effective tax schedules: the blue solid line for eligible activities and the blue dashed line for ordinary activities.
Figure 1. Data-contingent enforcement
If classification were taken at face value, a firm with an ordinary activity could obtain the more favorable treatment by reporting its activity as eligible and simultaneously reducing its declared tax base to . The firm, therefore, manipulates both dimensions of its report: classification data determine which enforcement schedule it faces, while the profit declaration determines its position on that schedule. Such joint deviations are the central incentive problem in our model.
Credible enforcement of different tax schedules for eligible and ordinary activities requires data verification. With two classes, the higher cutoff, , defines the global verification frontier: every report below it must be verified either through a profit audit or through verification of the reported classification. Ordinary activities are profit-audited up to ; eligible activities are profit-audited up to , while their classification data are verified for to induce truthful reporting.7
The paper is organized as follows. The model is set up in § 2. § 3 studies non-strategic data reporting, and § 4 investigates strategic data reporting. § 5 studies the value of data and compares the tax gap in alternative information environments. § 6 discusses related literature, and § 7 concludes. Proofs and omitted results are in Appendices § 8–§ 10; extensive supplementary material—on MVPF, comparative statics, analytical examples, and a quantitative illustration—is delegated to Appendices § 11–§ 15.
Model
Setup. The economy consists of a unit mass of firms maximizing after-tax profits net of expected penalties for misreporting. A tax authority (hereafter, the IRS) designs an audit policy to minimize the expected tax gap, subject to a budget constraint.
Firms. Each firm has a private type , where denotes taxable profit and denotes correlated self-reported data (e.g., turnover, payroll, asset holdings, expenses within a given category) that are used for improved targeting of tax enforcement.8
Types are drawn from a joint cumulative distribution function with a differentiable density function , supported on . Marginal distributions are denoted by and , and conditional distributions by .9
Reports. After observing its realized type , each firm simultaneously chooses a profit declaration and a data declaration that it reports to the IRS. The declared profit determines the firm’s statutory tax liability , where defines an exogenous, increasing tax schedule. A reporting strategy maps each type into declarations , i.e., and .
Audits. The IRS commits to an audit policy that firms can observe before submitting reports :
where is the probability of a profit audit and is the probability of a data audit for .
Audits impose costs. A profit audit entails a cost , while a data audit entails a lower cost . Data audits are cheaper because they can rely on partially automated cross-checks with third-party information, whereas profit audits require more detailed verification of accounting information. Costless data verification, , provides a natural benchmark in which classification data can be verified without using enforcement resources (§ 3). We depart from this benchmark by allowing data verification to be arbitrarily cheap but costly, (§ 4).
Given reporting strategies , expected audit expenditure is
We assume that audits perfectly detect misreporting in the dimension being verified.
When a data mismatch is detected, the IRS escalates the case to a profit audit, enabling penalties proportional to evaded tax.101112
Penalties. If a firm of type reports , its expected penalty is
where is the marginal penalty per unit of evaded tax.13 As in Yitzhaki [34], the penalty is proportional to the evaded tax, so incentives scale with the extent of profit underreporting. Moreover, following Sanchez and Sobel [30], we assume that firms make truthful reports unless strategic reporting strictly increases expected payoffs. Under this standard assumption, firms either report both dimensions truthfully, misreport only profits, or misreport both profits and data; misreporting data alone does not occur.
A firm’s problem. Each firm chooses a reporting strategy to maximize expected net profits after taxes:
The IRS’ problem. The IRS chooses an audit policy to minimize the expected tax gap subject to a budget constraint:
We assume , so full deterrence via profit audits is infeasible.
Timing. Anticipating firms’ reporting responses, the IRS commits to . Firms observe their private types and submit reports optimally given . The IRS conducts audits according to and enforces taxes and penalties.14
Benchmark–Truthful data reporting
Consider as a benchmark the case where data are truthfully reported. The IRS can then condition enforcement directly on and optimally choose a budget allocated to audit class , with .
In a given class , the optimal audit policy can be represented by a cutoff , with profit reports below audited at the minimal deterrence probability .15 The within-class budget constraint is
and the resulting expected tax gap is
Differentiating the tax gap with respect to the audit budget yields
where
denotes the inverse hazard rate of profits conditional on data . This expression gives an enforcement index, familiar from optimal-audit models with heterogeneous taxpayer classes ([23, 30]),
Up to the common factor , the index measures the reduction in the tax gap from extending audit coverage within class . It combines the marginal tax liability with the information rents generated by private information, summarized by ; Appendix § 8 provides the derivation and incentive-theoretic interpretation.
The enforcement index determines how profit audits are allocated. For interior cutoffs, optimal allocation equalizes marginal enforcement gains across data classes:
where is the shadow value of the audit budget . Thus, the enforcement index summarizes in which classes additional profit-audit coverage is most valuable.
The slope of the index determines the margin of adjustment. As depicted in Figure 2, when is decreasing in , marginal returns decline as audit coverage expands and enforcement adjusts on the intensive margin through class-specific cutoffs satisfying [Panel (a)]. When is non-decreasing, the interior solution satisfying may not be optimal; instead, the IRS chooses between the boundary cutoffs.16 Optimal enforcement then operates on the extensive margin, with some classes fully enforced, , and others exempt from profit audits, [Panel (b)].17
Figure 2. The enforcement index and optimal audit coverage. (a) Intensive margin (b) Extensive margin
Together, the preceding analysis explains how auxiliary data facilitate audit target-
A class is fully enforced if and exempt from profit audits if ; at equality, the IRS is indifferent. With strategic data, the analogous condition depends on the endogenous verification frontier; see § 4. ing by identifying classes in which resources have the highest marginal value. When data become strategic, however, differentiated enforcement creates incentives for firms to misclassify their information into more leniently enforced classes. The upcoming section specifies how data verification resolves this incentive problem while preserving differentiated audit targeting.
Equilibrium–Strategic data reporting
We now allow firms to manipulate the data used for targeting optimal enforcement. As in the truthful-data benchmark, profit deterrence is characterized by class-specific cutoffs : firms report profits truthfully below the cutoff and bunch at above it.
Strategic data reporting introduces a cross-class incentive constraint. When cutoffs differ across classes, a firm assigned to a more strongly enforced class can jointly under-report profits and claim membership in a more leniently enforced class (see the example offered in the introduction). Preventing such deviations requires verification of the reported data wherever a lower-cutoff class would otherwise provide an escape from enforcement.
Let
and call the (global) verification frontier.
Lemma 1 (Global verification frontier) Let . Every report with must be verified in equilibrium through either a profit audit or data verification. Without loss of generality, the optimal hybrid audit policy can be represented as
Proof. By definition, reports with profits below are profit-audited in every data class. Now suppose that some report receives neither form of verification in a given data class . A firm with profit belonging to a class with cutoff could then jointly report data and profit level and escape enforcement. Hence, every report below the global frontier must be covered by either a profit audit or data verification. Data audits need not extend beyond : any firm can report its true data and profit without suffering penalties, and thus cannot gain from reporting , which would carry a higher tax. A profit audit directly deters profit underreporting, while data verification deters joint misreporting by triggering profit verification when a data discrepancy is detected. Under the maintained penalty structure, both instruments provide deterrence at probability , yielding the stated representation.
For a given cutoff schedule, the resulting hybrid policy assigns profit audits to reports
and data verification to
Consequently, the audit technologies jointly cover all reports below the global frontier.
Note also that firms with true profits above their class-specific profit-audit cutoff bunch at that cutoff. Since the bunching report is subject to data verification when , all such firms undergo data verification, including those with true profits above the global frontier. Therefore, the cost of data verification depends on the mass of firms above the class-specific cutoff, rather than merely those with profits between the cutoff and the frontier. However, whenever , the bunching report lies outside the verification region, and no data verification is thus required in that class.
Intensive-margin enforcement
Consider first the case in which the enforcement index is strictly decreasing in profits (e.g., a linear tax schedule and Weibull profits with ). Given a fixed frontier , expected enforcement expenditure is
The first component captures expenditure on profit audits. The second captures data-verification expenditure in classes whose profit-audit cutoff lies below the global frontier.
As firms with profits above their class-specific cutoff bunch at that cutoff, in these classes, data verification applies to the entire upper tail of the profit distribution. When the cutoff coincides with the global frontier, no data verification is required.
For classes with profit-audit cutoffs below the global frontier, the optimal allocation follows the same marginal condition as in the truthful-data benchmark:
whenever the cutoff is interior. The difference is that expanding profit audits now replaces data verification, reducing their marginal cost from to , as reflected in the shadow value of profit-audit coverage .18
However, satisfying this marginal condition need not be globally optimal: extending profit audits to the global frontier eliminates data-verification expenditure altogether. The following proposition characterizes this additional choice.
Proposition 1 (Intensive-margin enforcement) Suppose that is continuous and strictly decreasing in for every data class . For a given global frontier , let be the class-specific cutoff implied by the local enforcement index .
Extending profit audits to the global frontier is preferred to stopping at if and only if
Proposition 1 characterizes the tradeoff between differentiated audit targeting and the cost of preserving truthful data reporting. The left-hand side measures the loss from extending profit audits beyond the cutoff favored by marginal enforcement returns. The right-hand side captures the resulting savings in data-verification expenditure. As in the truthful-data benchmark, diminishing marginal returns favor differentiated, class-specific profit-audit cutoffs. Under strategic data reporting, however, the savings from eliminating data verification may outweigh these gains. Consequently, the optimal policy may combine classes with lower profit-audit cutoffs and data verification with classes in which profit audits extend all the way to the global frontier.
Proposition 2 (Global verification frontier) Suppose that is continuous
and strictly decreasing in for every data class . Let . If the optimal global verification frontier is interior and the set remains unchanged under sufficiently small perturbations of , then
where is the multiplier on the enforcement budget constraint.
The condition balances the marginal gains from extending profit audits against their marginal costs, aggregated over classes audited up to the global frontier. For classes with lower profit-audit cutoffs, the frontier does not directly affect equilibrium reporting or verification expenditure. Thus, Proposition 2 demonstrates that the optimal frontier is determined by the classes that rely exclusively on profit audits.
Figure 3 describes the allocation of audits across data classes and true profits. Profit audits can be concentrated in classes with high enforcement returns, while data verification sustains this differentiation by preventing firms from selecting into more leniently enforced classes. The two instruments also reach different parts of the true-profit distri bution: profit audits tend to target lower-profit firms, whereas data verification reaches higher-profit firms whose reports bunch at class-specific audit cutoffs. As demonstrated by Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo [24], access to data can reverse the regressive bias in tax enforcement. The figure illustrates how hybrid enforcement can mitigate this bias by extending enforcement to higher-profit firms.

Figure 3. Cross-sectional audit allocation by true profit. No audit; Profit audit; Data audit; Frontier .
Table 1 further exemplifies the resulting policy for three classes with
| Reported profit | Class | Class | Class |
| Profit audit | Profit audit | Profit audit | |
| Data audit | Profit audit | Profit audit | |
| Data audit | Data audit | Profit audit | |
| No audit | No audit | No audit |
Table 1. Cross-sectional audit allocation by reported profit.
Within each class, profit and data audits partition the verified region of reported profits: profit audits apply below the class-specific cutoff and data verification between that cutoff and the global frontier. Across classes, firms reporting the same profit may therefore face different audit instruments. The class with the highest cutoff relies exclusively on profit audits, while the remaining classes combine both instruments.
Remark 1 (Implications for bunching patterns) The policy also has a distinctive implication for reporting behavior: profit reports bunch at class-specific audit cutoffs, whereas correctly implemented data verification eliminates incentives to manipulate classification data.
Empirical studies document bunching of declared amounts around tax and enforcement thresholds, with excess mass concentrated on the side favored by the incentives created by the threshold [11, 19, 29]. Our model similarly predicts strategic bunching in profit declarations at the endogenous audit cutoff, on the side that avoids profit auditing. Bunching on the audited side would not be explained by these strategic incentives alone but may reflect optimization. frictions. By contrast, bunching or manipulation in classification data, as documented by Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez [2] and Chen et al. [10], may be consistent with insufficient data verification.
Extensive-margin enforcement
The structure of the hybrid policy changes when the enforcement index is increasing in profits (e.g., truncated Pareto profits under a linear tax schedule, or a sufficiently progressive tax schedule), favoring boundary cutoffs. With strategic data reporting, however, the choice is between profit auditing up to the global verification frontier and relying entirely on data verification within a class.
For this comparison, define the frontier-dependent average enforcement index
This index measures the average return to profit auditing over the region below the global verification frontier. Classes with sufficiently high average enforcement returns are profit-audited up to the frontier, whereas classes with lower returns rely on data verification. Unlike in the truthful-data benchmark, the choice also depends on the relative costs of the two enforcement technologies.
Proposition 3 (Extensive-margin enforcement) Suppose that is continuous and strictly increasing in for every data class . For a given global frontier , a class is either profit audited up to the frontier or instead subject to data verification.
Profit auditing up to the global frontier is preferred to data verification if and only if
The global verification frontier and the allocation of enforcement across classes are determined jointly, subject to the aggregate budget constraint. The proposition reveals
a distinction between the two enforcement technologies. Without profit audits, all firms in a class bunch at the lowest profit report. Their reports are hence subject to data verification, making the resulting verification expenditure independent of the global frontier. By contrast, profit-audit expenditure also depends on the fraction of firms below the frontier whose profits are audited. Consequently, other things equal, profit auditing becomes more attractive in classes with a smaller fraction of firms below the global frontier. Profit audits thus concentrate in higher-profit classes while targeting lower-profit firms within them.
Example 1 (Extending enforcement across classes or profit levels) Consider two equally likely classes , with profits and conditional distributions
| 0.6 | 0.2 | 0.2 | |
| 0.8 | 0.2 | 0 |
Table 6.
Let , , , , , and . Profit reports strictly below the audit cutoff are audited, while firms with higher profits bunch at the cutoff.
Suppose initially that , with profit-audited up to the frontier and subject to data verification. The IRS can either extend profit auditing to or raise the frontier to , retaining the original class allocation. Both expansions cost 0.10 in aggregate, but their reductions in the aggregate tax gap are, respectively, and . Thus, extending the frontier yields the greater return. If instead , this benefit falls to 0.05, reversing the ranking in favor of expanding audits across classes.
While the shape of the enforcement index determines how profit audits are allocated, Propositions 1 and 3 reveal a common principle. The verification frontier is driven by the cross-class incentive constraint: whenever taxpayers can manipulate the tax base by misreporting their class, targeted enforcement requires data verification in more leniently enforced classes.
Remark 2 (Profit-audit exemptions) *With strategic data, exemption from profit audits
dits does not imply the absence of enforcement. An unverified class otherwise creates an enforcement loophole, because firms can avoid profit-audits through data misclassification. Exempt classes must, therefore, be data-verified wherever they provide an escape from profit audit.19
Our characterization identifies both the benefit and the cost of data-contingent enforcement. Data improve targeting by allowing profit audits to be directed toward classes with higher enforcement returns. When data are strategic, however, sustaining this differentiation requires additional verification. The following section investigates this tradeoff more closely.
Value of data
We characterize the value of introducing self-reported data into enforcement by comparing the expected tax gap across three enforcement regimes: when the IRS ignores data, when data are truthful, and when data are strategic and optimally verified. The corresponding tax gaps are
and, for ,
where the cutoffs and are characterized in § 3 and § 4, respectively. Formal derivations are provided in Appendix § 10.
Because the IRS can always ignore classification data, and truthful data relax the incentive constraints imposed by strategic reporting,
The difference between and identifies the targeting value of data:
It measures the reduction in the tax gap attainable when classification data can be used without cost to direct profit audits toward classes with the highest enforcement returns.
When data are strategic, part of this targeting value must be sacrificed to make differentiated enforcement incentive compatible. Under the optimal hybrid policy, the enforcement budget is divided between profit audits,
and data verification,
with . The opportunity cost of this verification for the IRS is
Hence, the net enforcement value of strategic data admits the decomposition
Proposition 4 (Value of data) The tax gaps under truthful data, optimally verified strategic data, and no data satisfy
The gross targeting value of classification data is , while their net enforcement value under strategic reporting is
Example 2 (Informative data without enforcement value) Consider two equally likely data classes, and , with profits distributed as follows:
| 0.40 | 0.05 | 0.55 | |
| 0.90 | 0.01 | 0.09 |
Let , , , , and . Reports are restricted to the three profit levels, and profit reports strictly below the cutoff are audited.
Without data, the optimal uniform cutoff is 1, yielding . With truthful data, the IRS instead chooses and , yielding .
When data are strategic, however, every differentiated cutoff allocation requires data verification and exceeds the budget. The IRS therefore retains the uniform cutoff 1, implying . Thus, informative classification data can have no enforcement value when reporting is strategic.
Suppose, in addition, that introducing classification data into the enforcement system entails a fixed cost . This may capture any costs of data administration or IT infrastructure not included in the audit budget. Data should then be introduced if and only if
Thus, introducing informative data into tax enforcement is not necessarily valuable to the authority: their targeting gains must be sufficiently large to compensate both for the resources required to sustain truthful classification and for the cost of introducing the data.
Verification is essential for realizing targeting gains. If the IRS conditions enforcement on manipulable data without verifying them, firms select into the most leniently enforced class. Writing the resulting pooling cutoff as , the tax gap becomes
For a budget-feasible pooling policy, . The first inequality follows because budget feasibility requires , with strict inequality whenever . Thus, naive reliance on manipulable data can perform worse than ignoring them altogether.
Corollary 1 Introducing manipulable data at cost is optimal if and only if
If data are used naively without verification, then .
Figure 4. Tax gaps across enforcement regimes.
Figure 4 describes the tax-gap comparisons in Proposition 4 and Corollary 1, based on the calibrated quantitative illustration in Appendix § 15. Moving from the no-data benchmark (A) to the truthful-data benchmark (B) reduces the tax gap from to , yielding a gross targeting value of 0.011. Under strategic reporting, optimal verification (C) yields , whereas naive reliance on unverified data (D) yields . At the baseline relative verification cost , verification hence absorbs about 9.5 percent of the enforcement budget, and strategic reporting dissipates approximately 67 percent of the gross targeting value of classification data. Interestingly, as illustrated in Figure 5, the optimal policy tailored for strategic data reporting features partial pooling of enforcement cutoffs: two of the three classes share a profit-audit cutoff, while the third is treated differently. Thus, verification costs affect not only the value of data but also the optimal degree of class-by-class differentiation.

Figure 5. Profit-audit cutoffs across enforcement regimes.
Literature
Our analysis builds on the literature studying how auxiliary information can improve the design of tax enforcement. Scotchmer (1987) shows that audit probabilities should condition on taxpayer characteristics and bounds the maximum audit probability by the inverse of penalties. Sanchez and Sobel (1993) establishes the familiar cutoff structure in which evasion is deterred up to an income threshold, above which taxpayers are not audited. Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (1997) extends the analysis to multiple income sources: audit policies differ across sources, while within each source only incomes below a source-specific cutoff are audited. Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (2002) further demonstrate how signals correlated with income can be used to target audits and may reverse the standard regressive bias of optimal enforcement policy. Cremer and Gahvari (1996), Aronsson and Xu (2026), and Canta et al. (2024) study optimal taxation with tax evasion in the Mirrleesian tradition with multiple taxpayer types.
Our model bridges the cutoff structure of Sanchez and Sobel [30] and the differentiated enforcement of Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo [24]. As in Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo [24], auxiliary information allows profit enforcement to differ across data classes. Once the information used for targeting can itself be manipulated, however, these class-specific policies can no longer be chosen independently. Cross-class incentive compatibility generates a single global verification frontier, much like in Sanchez and Sobel [30]: every report below this frontier must be verified. Data verification connects differentiated profit enforcement to this common frontier. When marginal returns to profit auditing are decreasing, profit audits extend to class-specific cutoffs, with data verification filling the remaining gap to the frontier. When marginal returns are increasing, the hybrid structure instead operates class by class: some classes are profit-audited up to the frontier, while others are enforced through cheaper data verification.20
Kuchumova [21] also endogenizes the information available for enforcement by allowing the tax authority to invest in the accuracy of external information reporting.21 The authority must then decide how much of a limited enforcement budget to devote to improving information and how much to audits. More accurate information improves targeting, but its value falls with audit coverage. Our approach instead takes the informativeness of classification data as given but allows taxpayers to manipulate the information used for targeting. Data verification then has a direct implementation role: it prevents taxpayers from selecting into more leniently enforced classes and thereby sustains differentiated profit enforcement. This creates a tradeoff between the targeting gains from classification data and the verification resources required to use them. We characterize the resulting net value of data by comparing optimal enforcement with strategic data to the implementable benchmark in which the authority ignores classification data.
Our treatment of classification data is motivated by a broad empirical literature on bebehavioral responses to the design of tax policy and enforcement. This literature indicates that taxpayers respond to different policies not only along the conventional margin of income misreporting, but also by changing reported characteristics on which tax rates, deductions, exemptions, and audit treatment are later conditioned [1, 2, 5, 10, 13, 15] (Almunia et al. 2024; Kuchumova et al. 2025).
Conclusion
How can tax authorities use detailed taxpayer data without introducing new opportunities for evasion? When classification data are potentially manipulable, we demonstrate that optimal enforcement is organized around a global verification frontier, with data verification preventing firms from dodging enforcement through misclassification. The structure of optimal hybrid tax enforcement depends on whether profit auditing operates on the intensive or extensive margin, with the costs of data verification restricting differentiation across data classes. Data are therefore valuable only when the associated targeting gains exceed the costs of verification and those of introducing data into enforcement; without credible verification, reliance on self-classified data can perform worse than disregarding data altogether. When successfully implemented, the optimal policy generates bunching in profits but involves no data bunching, providing an empirical diagnostic for insufficient data verification. Taken together, these results provide the first unified account of how the possibility of manipulating classification data affects optimal tax enforcement and the resulting patterns of reporting behavior.
Omitted results
Truthful data reporting
For completeness, the following analysis derives the enforcement index and information rents directly from the IRS problem (Appendix § 8.1.1) and then provides the mechanism-design interpretation of optimal audit policy (Appendix § 8.1.2).
Enforcement index and information rents
Fix a data class and write . From
Differentiating this using Leibniz’s rule gives
and hence
Increasing the cutoff by raises the reported tax liability of every firm above the cutoff by approximately . The mass of these firms is . The boundary term vanishes because a firm at the cutoff has no tax gap.
The within-class budget satisfies
which gives
The same expression gives the information-rent interpretation of the index. A marginal increase in the cutoff by reduces the reporting rent of every firm above by approximately . The mass of these inframarginal firms is , while the marginal mass that must be brought under audit coverage is . Thus the rent reduction per marginal firm brought under enforcement is
The inverse hazard rate therefore summarizes the information rents generated by incomplete enforcement.
Mechanism design and optimal enforcement
The optimal profit-audit policy can also be derived using standard mechanism-design arguments.
Fix a data class . Consider a firm with profit contemplating a lower profit report . Relative to truthful reporting, underreporting of profit yields
As is increasing, tax evasion is deterred if and only if
Because audits are costly, the IRS applies the minimum audit probability required for deterrence on enforced reports and otherwise sets a zero probability. Therefore, in an optimal audit policy,
Incentive compatibility further requires the profit-audit probability assigned to equilibrium reports to be non-increasing in profits. To see this, consider . The two incentive constraints imply
Adding these constraints and using the definition of gives
Since taxes are increasing,
Together with , this implies a cutoff rule: for and for .
The envelope theorem applied to the firm’s problem yields
Integrating from to ,
Thus, when profit auditing is positive at over , it reduces the information rent of type by .
For a fixed data class, minimizing the tax gap is equivalent to maximizing expected reported tax payments, since the statutory tax liability is fixed.
From the firm’s equilibrium payoff,
Substituting the envelope representation and taking expectations gives
Applying Fubini’s theorem,
Under the optimal implementation, expected penalties vanish on path: profit-audited reports are truthful, while reports involving profit understatement are not audited. Hence,
Consequently, apart from the lowest type’s payoff, the IRS’s objective assigns profit-audit coverage the mechanism-design weight
The term captures the marginal tax liability, while reflects the information rents reduced by extending enforcement at profit .
In other words, the enforcement index measures the return to extending profit-audit coverage. Let denote the shadow value of the aggregate enforcement budget. With a decreasing index, the IRS acts on these returns pointwise, extending profitaudit coverage until
With an increasing index, an interior class-specific cutoff is not optimal. The IRS instead chooses between the boundary policies,
so that a class is either fully profit-audited or exempt from profit audits. The choice is governed by the average enforcement index
A class is fully enforced if and exempt from audits if , with indifference at equality.22 Thus, the same enforcement index governs both margins: pointwise returns determine the intensive-margin allocation, whereas their average determines the extensive-margin allocation across classes.
Strategic data reporting
Proof of Proposition 1. Fix the global frontier and a data class . For a profit-audit cutoff , expected enforcement expenditure is
Increasing replaces data verification by profit auditing. The marginal reduction in the tax gap is
while the marginal resource cost is
Let denote the class-specific Lagrangian, where is the expected tax gap and is the multiplier on the aggregate enforcement budget. For , its derivative is
Since is strictly decreasing, the Lagrangian decreases where and increases where . Thus, the preferred cutoff below the frontier is uniquely determined by
if interior, or by the corresponding lower boundary. If the Lagrangian is decreasing throughout the interval below the frontier, extending profit audits to the frontier is optimal.
At the global frontier, data-verification expenditure is eliminated altogether, so that
Since the tax gap is continuous in the cutoff, the Lagrangian has a downward jump at the frontier of size . This may make extending profit audits to preferable to the cutoff implied by the enforcement index. Comparing these two cutoffs gives
Thus, extending profit audits to the global frontier is preferred if and only if this difference is nonpositive, yielding the stated condition.
Proof of Proposition 2. By Proposition 1, conditional on the global frontier , each class either chooses a lower cutoff or extends profit audits to the frontier.
Consider a local change in . For classes in , the optimal cutoff is determined by , or by the corresponding lower boundary, and is independent of . Their contribution to the Lagrangian therefore remains unchanged.
For classes in , the profit-audit cutoff equals and no data verification is required. Using the class-specific Lagrangian defined in the proof of Proposition 1, we obtain
Since the allocation of classes between the two regimes is locally unchanged, the derivative of the aggregate Lagrangian is obtained by integrating this expression over . At an interior optimum, this derivative must vanish, yielding the stated condition.
Proof of Proposition 3. Fix the global verification frontier and a data class . For any cutoff , expected enforcement expenditure is
Let
denote the class-specific Lagrangian, where is the expected tax gap and is the multiplier on the aggregate enforcement budget.
For cutoffs below the frontier, differentiation gives
Since is strictly increasing, any interior stationary point is a local maximum rather than a minimum. Hence, the preferred cutoff among those below the frontier lies at a boundary, either or the limit as approaches from below.
Tax-gap comparisons and the value of data
At the global frontier, data verification is no longer required, so that
The tax gap is continuous in the cutoff, while the enforcement cost falls discontinuously at by
Consequently, the frontier cutoff dominates the limit from below, leaving only two candidates:
At the lower cutoff, no profit audits are conducted. All firms bunch at and undergo data verification, giving
The reduction in the tax gap from choosing profit auditing up to the frontier instead is
The corresponding difference in enforcement expenditure is
Thus,
Profit auditing up to the global frontier is preferred to data verification if and only if this difference is nonpositive, yielding the stated condition.
Tax-gap comparisons and the value of data
This appendix derives the tax-gap expressions used in § 5 and proves Proposition 4. We consider the four enforcement regimes introduced in the main text.
Tax gaps across enforcement regimes
Regime A: no data. When the IRS ignores classification data, all firms face the same profit-audit cutoff . The budget constraint is
Equilibrium profit reporting is
Firms below the cutoff report truthfully and generate no tax gap, whereas firms above the cutoff report . Hence
Regime B: truthful classification data. When classification data are truthful, the IRS can condition profit audits directly on . Let denote the optimal class-specific cutoff. Equilibrium reporting is
Therefore
The cutoff schedule is chosen subject to
Regime C: strategic classification data with optimal verification. Under strategic reporting, let denote the optimal profit-audit cutoff and let
denote the associated global verification frontier. Proposition 1 and Proposition 3 imply the equilibrium reporting rule
The resulting tax gap is therefore
The hybrid policy uses profit audits below and data verification between and . Its budget constraint is
Equivalently, expenditure can be decomposed as
Thus is the direct resource expenditure on data verification. Its opportunity cost in terms of the IRS’s objective is instead measured by the difference between the tax gaps under strategic and truthful data,
Regime D: strategic data without verification. Finally, suppose that the IRS conditions profit auditing on classification data but does not verify those data. Firms can then select into the most leniently enforced class. Let
denote its profit-audit cutoff. The resulting reporting rule is
and the tax gap is
Tax-gap rankings
We first establish the ordering among the optimally designed regimes.
Because Regime A is feasible when data are truthful—the IRS can simply ignore and apply the uniform cutoff —Regime B optimizes over a weakly larger set of policies. Hence
Similarly, Regime A is feasible under strategic data: the IRS can ignore classification reports altogether, in which case no data verification is required. Therefore
Conversely, the truthful-data problem is a relaxation of the strategic-data problem. Any policy feasible under strategic reporting must satisfy the additional incentive constraints required to prevent firms from manipulating their classification, whereas these constraints are absent under truthful data. Removing them cannot increase the minimized tax gap. Therefore
Combining the three comparisons gives
Thus
Targeting value and strategic implementation cost
The gross targeting value of classification data is the improvement that would be attainable if the classification were truthful:
Strategic reporting imposes an additional implementation constraint. Its opportunity cost in terms of the tax gap is
It follows immediately that
Notice that in (18) and in (25) are different objects. The former is the direct expenditure on data verification, while the latter is its equilibrium opportunity cost: the increase in the minimum attainable tax gap caused by having to make data-contingent enforcement incentive compatible.
The cost of introducing data
Suppose that introducing classification data into enforcement entails an additional fiscal cost , measured in the same monetary units as the tax gap. This can capture data administration, information systems, or other fixed costs that are not included in the enforcement budget .
Relative to ignoring data, adoption generates the net gain
Hence introducing strategic classification data is optimal if and only if
Using (26), this condition can equivalently be written as
Thus the gross targeting value must cover both the strategic implementation cost and the additional cost of introducing the data system.
Naive use of manipulable data
It remains to compare Regime D with the no-data benchmark. Define
Then
so the tax gap is strictly decreasing in the effective profit-audit cutoff.
Under Regime A, the budget is exhausted at :
Under Regime D, all firms select into the lowest-cutoff class. Feasibility of the induced policy therefore requires
Since is increasing,
Consequently,
with strict inequality whenever . Together with , this gives
Proof of Proposition 4. Equations (20)–(22) establish
Hence the gross targeting value is , the strategic implementation cost is , and
If introducing data entails an additional cost , adoption is optimal if and only if
which is equivalent to
Finally, (28) gives whenever , while optimality of Regime C gives . This establishes all claims.
Audit returns, shadow values, and the MVPF
This appendix relates the enforcement index in § 3 to empirical measures of audit returns and the marginal value of public funds (MVPF). The key distinction is between the fiscal return from auditing a marginal taxpayer and the marginal return from expanding enforcement. In our model, the latter also includes the information rents eliminated among taxpayers above the enforcement cutoff.
Consider an interior cutoff . An increase in the class-specific audit budget expands the set of deterred firms at the cutoff, but also raises the reported profits of all firms above it. From (4),
The numerator measures the mass of firms whose reporting rents are reduced when the cutoff rises, while measures the marginal mass that must be brought under audit coverage. The inverse hazard rate
therefore converts the fiscal stakes at the cutoff into the return from expanding enforcement.
This distinction complements the empirical evidence in Boning et al. [6]. They estimate both average and marginal fiscal returns to IRS audits and document substantial heterogeneity across the income distribution. They also show that the fiscal consequences of an audit extend beyond the revenue collected in the audited return: individual deterrence generates additional tax payments for many years after the audit. Our model captures a different spillover from enforcement. Tightening enforcement at a cutoff changes the reporting incentives of firms that are not themselves marginally added to the audit pool. Consequently, observed returns to the marginal audited taxpayer need not by themselves identify the marginal value of expanding enforcement.
This distinction has an immediate allocation implication. Let denote the shadow value of the aggregate enforcement budget. For classes with interior cutoffs,
and hence, for any two such classes and ,
Thus heterogeneity in fiscal returns across taxpayer groups need not by itself indicate misallocation. What must be equalized is the marginal value of enforcement resources, which also depends on the information rents generated by the conditional profit distribution.
Relation to the MVPF
The distinction from the MVPF is equally important. The framework of Hendren and Sprung-Keyser [17] evaluates a marginal policy change by comparing individuals’ willingness to pay with its net fiscal cost. Applying this framework to tax enforcement, Boning et al. [6] incorporate audit costs, revenues, deterrence, and taxpayer compliance burdens to evaluate the welfare consequences of marginal audit expansions.
Our enforcement index answers a different question. Taking the enforcement budget and the tax schedule as given, it identifies where marginal enforcement resources have the greatest effect on the tax gap. It is therefore an allocation statistic rather than a welfare statistic. A complete welfare analysis could in principle place the enforcement effects characterized here inside an MVPF calculation, but would additionally require taxpayer welfare, compliance costs, and the incidence of enforcement.
Empirical implementation
The allocation condition is empirically operational. The tax schedule identifies , while administrative data on profits conditional on the classification variables identify
Together they identify
At observed interior audit cutoffs, optimal allocation requires the index to be equalized across data classes. Systematic differences in therefore provide a diagnostic for the allocation of profit-audit resources.
This also clarifies what additional information is needed beyond estimates of audit returns. Evidence such as Boning et al. [6] disciplines the fiscal consequences of marginal audit expansions; evaluating targeting across data classes additionally requires the conditional profit distributions that determine the information rents affected by enforcement.
Comparative statics
This section records several comparative statics implied by the optimal audit policy. The benchmark results follow directly from the cutoff representation. Under strategic data reporting, audit costs additionally affect the allocation between profit audits and data verification and, through this channel, the global verification frontier.
Audit resources and the profit-audit cutoff
Fix a data class . In the truthful-data benchmark, the within-class budget constraint is
Differentiating with respect to gives
A larger class-specific budget therefore extends profit-audit coverage further into the profit distribution. The response is larger where the conditional density at the cutoff is low.
Combining (29) with
yields
Thus, the enforcement index determines the marginal reduction in the tax gap generated by additional audit resources. Classes with a higher index have a larger marginal return to profit-audit spending.
Profit-audit costs
Holding the class-specific budget fixed, differentiation of the budget constraint with respect to gives
Higher profit-audit costs therefore reduce audit coverage. The magnitude of the response depends on the mass already covered relative to the density at the cutoff.
Under strategic data reporting, the marginal cost of increasing a class-specific profit-audit cutoff depends on whether the class is subject to data verification. In a verified class, raising the cutoff replaces data verification with profit auditing, so its incremental resource cost is . In an unverified class, the marginal cost is . For a verified class with an interior cutoff, the optimality condition
shows that, holding the multiplier and verification status fixed, a larger lowers the cutoff when is decreasing. This is a conditional response: the optimal multiplier and the set of verified classes may also change.
Data-verification costs and the global frontier
Strategic reporting introduces an additional cost margin because all reports above the profit-audit cutoff in a verified class are subject to data verification. Write
for the indicator that class is verified. Total enforcement expenditure is
Thus, unlike a policy that verifies only reports between and , the verification expenditure depends on the entire upper tail of reports in each verified class.
Holding the cutoff schedule and verification status fixed, the direct resource effect of a higher verification cost is
with strict inequality whenever verified reports have positive mass. Likewise, the marginal expenditure from raising a cutoff within a class, without changing its verification status, is
where the expression is understood as the class-specific integrand of the aggregate budget (and is weighted by the class probability for a discrete distribution of classes).
Analytical examples
The global frontier determines which classes require verification, but it is not an upper limit on the reports verified in those classes. Consequently, holding the cutoff schedule and the set of verified classes fixed, expenditure has no direct dependence on . When the frontier crosses a class-specific cutoff, verification status changes and the budget can change discontinuously. It would therefore be incorrect to obtain the response of the optimal frontier to by differentiating the budget constraint with respect to while holding the cutoffs fixed.
In the full optimization problem, a change in verification costs may alter the cutoffs, the verification status of classes, and the optimal global frontier. The resulting comparative statics are therefore conditional on the prevailing enforcement regime; in particular, the optimal policy may switch between differentiated enforcement, partial pooling, and ignoring classification data.
Remark 3 (Comparative statics and the enforcement index) The comparative statics emphasize two distinct roles of the profit distribution. First, the density at the cutoff determines how far a given change in audit resources moves the enforcement boundary. Second, the enforcement index
determines the resulting marginal reduction in the tax gap.
Under strategic reporting, profit auditing in a verified class replaces data verification, giving it incremental resource cost . Verification itself applies to the entire upper tail above the class-specific cutoff. Its cost therefore affects not only the allocation between enforcement instruments but also which classes are verified and how far their profit-audit cutoffs can be differentiated.
Analytical examples
This appendix provides analytical examples of the enforcement index and the intensive- and extensive-margin enforcement regimes characterized in the paper. The exercise is not intended as a structural calibration. Rather, it indicates how empirically meaningful differences in profit distributions and tax schedules map into optimal enforcement.
We consider three data classes, denoted by , corresponding loosely to small, medium, and large firms. Representative profit levels are normalized to
Throughout, the enforcement index is
The exercise emphasizes that the shape of the conditional profit distribution determines whether enforcement operates primarily on the intensive or extensive margin.
Intensive-margin illustration: Weibull profits
Suppose profits conditional on data class follow a Weibull distribution with shape parameter and scale parameter :
The inverse hazard rate is
which is strictly decreasing in . Under a linear tax schedule, , the enforcement index is therefore
and is decreasing within every data class. This is the intensive-margin case characterized in Proposition 1.
For example, set
and choose the scale parameter in each class so that its mean equals the representative profit . Since the mean of a Weibull random variable is , this gives
Evaluating the enforcement index at a common relative position in each class illustrates how differences in the conditional profit distribution translate into differences in marginal enforcement returns.
More generally, Proposition 1 implies that interior profit-audit cutoffs satisfy
For the Weibull specification with , this gives the explicit cutoff
Thus, classes with larger scale parameters receive higher profit-audit cutoffs at a given shadow value . The numerical exercise therefore shows the intensive-margin targeting mechanism directly: information about the conditional profit distribution generates differentiated audit coverage across data classes.
Extensive-margin illustration: Pareto profits
As a contrasting case, suppose profits conditional on class follow a Pareto distribution with shape parameter and scale parameter :
Its inverse hazard rate is
Under a linear tax schedule,
which is increasing in profits. The Pareto specification therefore provides a simple illustration of the extensive-margin case in Proposition 3.
Conditional on a global verification frontier , the authority does not optimally choose an interior profit-audit cutoff in the extensive-margin case. Instead,
subject to the support of the conditional profit distribution. A class with receives profit audits below the frontier and does not require data verification. A class assigned the lower cutoff is instead sustained by verifying all reports above that cutoff, including reports exceeding .
The selection of classes for profit auditing consequently reflects both their enforcement returns and the full resource cost of verification. For a candidate class with lower cutoff , replacing verification above by profit auditing up to changes enforcement expenditure by
provided the alternative with profit auditing up to does not require verification. The second term includes the entire upper tail, not merely reports below the frontier. Thus, although the increasing enforcement index still favors concentrating profit audits on classes with high enforcement returns, class selection must account for the full verification expenditure.
The Pareto example therefore showcases a qualitatively different use of classification data. Rather than determining how far profit auditing extends within every class, data help determine which classes receive profit audits and which are sustained through data verification.
Tax progressivity
The tax schedule provides a second source of heterogeneity in enforcement returns. Since
higher marginal tax rates increase the enforcement value of the corresponding profit levels.
For instance, consider the stylized three-bracket schedule
Relative to a linear tax rate of 25 percent, this schedule lowers the enforcement index at low profits and raises it at high profits:
Hence
Progressivity therefore rotates enforcement incentives toward high-profit firms. In the intensive-margin case this changes the relative audit cutoffs across classes; in the extensive-margin case it changes the ranking of classes according to their average enforcement gains.
Quantitative illustration
This section provides a quantitative illustration of the model. The exercise corroborates the main theoretical results and assesses their quantitative importance. In particular, we quantify how much classification data can improve the targeting of profit audits, how much of this gain is lost when the data are strategically reported, and how the resulting value of data depends on their informativeness and the cost of verification.
It should be noted that the exercise is not intended as a structural estimation of a particular tax administration. We instead discipline the main parameters using estimates from the empirical tax literature and examine the robustness of the results over plausible parameter ranges. This allows us to put magnitudes on the mechanisms characterized in the paper while retaining the transparency of the theoretical model.
Quantitative environment
We take the intensive-margin environment as our baseline setting. Conditional on data class , profits follow a Weibull distribution,
with . Under a linear tax schedule , the enforcement index is
which is strictly decreasing in profits. Hence optimal enforcement follows the intensive-margin characterization of Proposition 1.
We consider three equally likely data classes,
and parameterize the scale of the conditional profit distribution as
The parameter controls heterogeneity in the conditional profit distribution across data classes. The normalization keeps average profits fixed as varies. When , profits have the same distribution in every class and classification data have no targeting value. As increases, the conditional profit distributions become more differentiated, increasing the potential value of conditioning enforcement on .
We set the linear corporate tax rate to , a representative statutory corporate tax rate in advanced economies (OECD, 2023). We normalize the cost of a profit audit to and parameterize the relative cost of data verification by
Because the two enforcement technologies are difficult to map directly into existing administrative cost estimates, we treat as a sensitivity parameter. Our baseline uses a relatively inexpensive data-verification technology and we report results over a broad range of values.
Empirical evidence suggests substantial heterogeneity in both enforcement returns and responses to classification thresholds. Boning et al. [6] for example, estimate total revenue returns to audit spending that differ by more than a factor of two across taxpayer groups, while Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez [2] document economically significant reporting responses around the Spanish Large Taxpayer Unit threshold. We use this evidence to discipline the range of heterogeneity across data classes rather than to estimate directly.
Our baseline setting uses , as in the analytical Weibull illustration above. We normalize the aggregate enforcement budget to . Together with and , this generates a nondegenerate allocation of audit coverage across classes. The baseline is chosen to generate meaningful cross-class heterogeneity while remaining in the interior hybrid region in which both profit auditing and data verification are used. None of the main conclusions relies on this particular choice, as shown by the sensitivity exercises below.
In summary, our baseline sets
The scale normalizations are without loss for the comparative exercise. The value is representative of statutory corporate tax rates, while follows the baseline used in related numerical tax-enforcement exercises. The baseline values of and generate an interior hybrid policy with both profit auditing and data verification.
| Parameter | Symbol | Baseline | Range | Discipline |
| Weibull shape | 2 | 1.5–3 | analytical benchmark | |
| Mean-profit scale | 1 | — | normalization | |
| Class heterogeneity | 0.35 | 0–0.70 | empirical literature | |
| Tax rate | 0.25 | — | OECD (2023) median | |
| Penalty parameter | 2 | 1.5–3 | numerical benchmark | |
| Profit-audit cost | 1 | — | normalization | |
| Relative verification cost | 0.03 | 0–0.20 | sensitivity parameter | |
| Enforcement budget | 0.05 | 0.03–0.08 | interior hybrid allocation |
Table 2. Baseline parameters
Enforcement regimes and value of data
For each parameterization, we solve the four enforcement regimes introduced in § 5. Regime ignores classification data and chooses a common profit-audit cutoff. Regime conditions profit audits on truthful classification data. Regime allows classification data to be strategically reported and optimally combines profit audits with data verification. Regime conditions profit auditing on classification data without verifying those data.
Let the corresponding optimized tax gaps be
As established in § 5,
The quantitative exercise therefore focuses not on this ranking itself, but on the magnitudes of the wedges between the regimes.
We decompose the value of classification data as
Here is the gross targeting value of classification data, is the implementation cost generated by strategic reporting, and is the net enforcement value of strategically reported data.
A useful summary statistic is
whenever . The statistic measures the share of the potential targeting value of classification data that survives once strategic manipulation and the associated verification requirements are taken into account.
Baseline results
Table 3 reports the optimized tax gaps and enforcement allocations under the four regimes. The truthful-data benchmark isolates the targeting value created by conditioning profit audits on the classification variable. Moving from Regime to Regime then measures the amount of this targeting gain that must be sacrificed to make the classification incentive compatible.
| Regime | Regime | Regime | Regime | |
| Tax gap | 0.151 | 0.140 | 0.148 | 0.186 |
| Profit-audit expenditure | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.045 | 0.013 |
| Data-verification expenditure | 0 | 0 | 0.005 | 0 |
| Profit-audit cutoff, | 0.290 | 0.144 | 0.146 | 0.144 |
| Profit-audit cutoff, | 0.290 | 0.290 | 0.386 | 0.144 |
| Profit-audit cutoff, | 0.290 | 0.585 | 0.386 | 0.144 |
| Global frontier | 0.290 | — | 0.386 | — |
Table 3. Quantitative illustration: baseline results
The baseline results illustrate all three forces emphasized by the theory. First, truthful classification data improve the targeting of profit audits. Relative to ignoring data, the tax gap falls from to . The corresponding gross targeting value of data is
or 7.3 percent of the no-data tax gap.
Second, strategic data reporting limits but does not eliminate this targeting value. Under optimal verification, the tax gap is , implying an implementation cost of approximately . The remaining net value is approximately , or 32.9 percent of the gross targeting value. Thus strategic reporting dissipates about 67.1 percent of the potential benefit of classification data.
The enforcement allocation reveals how this loss arises. With truthful data, the entire enforcement budget is devoted to profit audits, with cutoffs
With strategic reporting, approximately is devoted to profit audits and to data verification. The optimal cutoffs become
The two upper classes therefore share a profit-audit cutoff, while the lowest class is treated differently. Strategic reporting induces partial pooling rather than a uniform reduction in audit coverage across classes. Verification absorbs about 9.5 percent of the enforcement budget, while the loss in targeting value is substantially larger. This illustrates how verification expenditure and the incentive constraints associated with strategic reporting jointly restrict differentiated enforcement.
Finally, using manipulable classification data without verification performs substantially worse than ignoring the data. Under Regime , firms select into the most leniently enforced class, yielding . The resulting tax gap is about 23 percent larger than under Regime . Hence, the baseline describes both sides of the value of data: classification can materially improve enforcement when it is used together with appropriate verification, but naive reliance on manipulable data can make enforcement less effective.
The informativeness of classification data
We next vary , which determines how strongly the conditional profit distribution varies across data classes. This exercise isolates the central tradeoff in the value of classification data.
When , the conditional profit distributions coincide. The IRS then has no reason to differentiate profit-audit coverage across data classes, so classification data have no targeting value:
As increases, classification becomes more useful for targeting profit audits. At the same time, the resulting differentiation in enforcement creates stronger incentives to manipulate classification reports and therefore increases the need for data verification.
Figure 6 plots

Figure 6. The value of data and their informativeness
as functions of . Normalizing by the no-data tax gap makes the magnitudes comparable across parameterizations.
Greater heterogeneity increases the potential value of targeting profit audits, but strategic reporting can eliminate that value at low levels of informativeness. At , the gross targeting value is approximately 2.6 percent of the no-data tax gap, yet optimal strategic enforcement ignores data. At the baseline , the gross targeting value is 7.3 percent, of which 4.9 percentage points are dissipated by strategic implementation, leaving a net gain of 2.4 percent. At , the corresponding gross, implementation, and net values are 21.6, 5.2, and 16.5 percent.
Near , however, the value of differentiated enforcement emerges more slowly than its verification requirement. To see this, write . The normalized scale parameter satisfies
Under truthful data, an interior cutoff satisfies
For Weibull profits this gives
Because the first-order changes in average to zero across the three symmetric classes, the budget condition implies . Therefore,
The dispersion in class-specific cutoffs is consequently first order in . For a differentiated cutoff allocation with a first-order spread, verification between local cutoffs and the global frontier entails expenditure of order
By contrast, when the conditional profit distributions coincide and the uniform no-data allocation is already optimal. The envelope theorem therefore implies that a symmetric perturbation generates no first-order targeting gain:
Hence, for sufficiently small , the second-order targeting gain cannot justify the first-order verification requirement of differentiated enforcement, and the IRS optimally ignores classification data. In the baseline parameterization, differentiated strategic-data enforcement becomes optimal at approximately
Once this threshold is crossed, the targeting value can exceed the cost of implementing differentiated enforcement. The retained share
is zero at , approximately 0.33 in the baseline, and about 0.76 at . Thus greater informativeness can eventually make differentiated enforcement worthwhile despite the verification requirement.
The cost of data verification
We next vary the relative cost of data verification,
The truthful-data benchmark and the no-data benchmark are independent of . Hence the gross targeting value
is constant in , and changes in the value of strategic data operate entirely through their implementation cost.
Figure 7 plots the retained share
as a function of .
Robustness

Figure 7. The value of data and the cost of verification
When data verification is costless, strategic classification can be implemented without sacrificing profit-audit resources, so
As verification becomes more costly, the implementation cost rises and the net value of classification data falls. At , approximately 53.5 percent of the gross targeting value is retained. At the baseline , this share is 32.9 percent, while at it is about 9.2 percent.
The retained share reaches zero as the cost of verification rises beyond approximately in the numerical grid. The IRS then optimally disregards classification data, yielding and . This illustrates the adoption criterion in Corollary 1: classification data are worth using only when the targeting gains exceed the cost of sustaining truthful classification.
The gross targeting value remains 7.3 percent of the no-data tax gap throughout this exercise. The implementation cost rises from 3.4 percent of that gap at to 4.9 percent at the baseline and 6.7 percent at . Correspondingly, the net value falls from 3.9 to 2.4 and then to 0.7 percent of the no-data tax gap.
Robustness
Table 4 varies the Weibull shape parameter, the enforcement budget, and the penalty parameter around the baseline. The main quantitative conclusions are robust across all specifications.
| Specification | ||||
| Baseline | 0.073 | 0.049 | 0.024 | 0.329 |
| 0.049 | 0.037 | 0.011 | 0.229 | |
| 0.141 | 0.062 | 0.079 | 0.562 | |
| 0.053 | 0.048 | 0.005 | 0.090 | |
| 0.101 | 0.043 | 0.058 | 0.572 | |
| 0.061 | 0.048 | 0.013 | 0.210 | |
| 0.096 | 0.044 | 0.052 | 0.540 |
Table 4. Robustness of the quantitative illustration
Across these robustness exercises, the retained share ranges from approximately 0.09 to 0.57, compared with 0.33 in the baseline. Strategic reporting therefore absorbs a substantial fraction of the gross targeting value, although the extent varies considerably across specifications.
Changes in the Weibull shape parameter have a large quantitative effect. At , the gross targeting value is 14.1 percent of the no-data tax gap, of which approximately 56 percent survives strategic reporting. At , the gross targeting value is 4.9 percent and the retained share is about 23 percent.
The value of classification data also rises with the enforcement budget and with the penalty parameter in these exercises. Increasing the budget from to raises the net value from 0.5 to 5.8 percent of the no-data tax gap, and the retained share from 0.09 to 0.57. Increasing from 1.5 to 3 raises the net value from 1.3 to 5.2 percent and the retained share from 0.21 to 0.54. In all reported specifications, optimally verified strategic-data enforcement remains strictly preferable to ignoring classification data.
The results indicate that the baseline magnitudes are sensitive to the parameters governing enforcement returns and resources, while the qualitative distinction between gross targeting gains and the cost of strategic implementation persists.
As an additional distributional robustness check, we replace the Weibull distribution by a lognormal conditional profit distribution, preserving the same class-specific mean structure and baseline enforcement parameters. Across log standard deviations between 0.35 and 1, the retained share ranges from approximately 0.04 to 0.62. The value of strategic data therefore remains positive in these specifications, although the retained share is highly sensitive to the distributional parameters.
The baseline uses three equally likely data classes for transparency. As a robustness check, we allow the class shares to be asymmetric. Holding the high-return class at , we vary the relative masses of the remaining two classes. The value of strategically reported classification data is non-monotone in the class composition. Over an intermediate range of class shares, differentiated enforcement remains worthwhile, but when the classification becomes sufficiently unbalanced, the verification requirement exhausts the targeting gain and the authority optimally disregards the data.
Extensive-margin illustration
| Equal shares | 0.151 | 0.140 | 0.148 | 0.186 | 32.9% | 9.5% | |
| Weak asymmetry | 0.132 | 0.125 | 0.131 | 0.156 | 9.5% | 11.3% | |
| Moderate asymmetry | 0.123 | 0.117 | 0.123 | 0.141 | 0.0% | 0.0% | |
| Strong asymmetry | 0.119 | 0.113 | 0.119 | 0.133 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
Table 5. Robustness to asymmetric class shares
For example, with
truthful classification reduces the tax gap from to . Under strategic reporting, however, optimal enforcement reverts to the no-data policy, so that
Hence, in this quantitative illustration with a discrete number of classes, the targeting value of data can be entirely dissipated by the cost of sustaining truthful classification.
Extensive-margin illustration
The baseline quantitative exercise focuses on the decreasing-index case. To study the extensive-margin result, we retain the same three data classes, profit distributions, enforcement costs, and budget, but replace the linear tax schedule by the progressive schedule
With , the enforcement index becomes
which is strictly increasing in profits. Proposition 3 therefore applies.
Under the baseline parameter values, the optimal policy profit-audits only class , up to the global frontier
while classes and are sustained through data verification. At this frontier, the average enforcement indices are
Thus the class with the highest average enforcement return is selected for profit auditing, as characterized in Proposition 3.
The resulting tax gap is 0.387. By comparison, profit-auditing classes yields a tax gap of 0.401, while profit-auditing all three classes yields 0.407. The numerical exercise therefore illustrates the extensive-margin logic: when enforcement returns increase in profits, concentrating profit audits on the highest-return classes can dominate spreading audit coverage across all classes, with data verification sustaining the resulting cross-class differentiation. This mechanism is qualitatively consistent with the substantial cross-group heterogeneity in fiscal audit returns documented by [6], although their empirical return measure is not identical to the enforcement index used here.
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