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WorksPhysics and Astronomy

Quantum Advantage needs Multiple Perspectives

Abstract

The origin of the quantum speedup is a topic of ongoing research. We propose a logical criterion for the possibility of a speedup within the continuous-variable and odd-prime qudit settings. There, Wigner function nonnegativity signals the possibility of efficient classical simulation in the state-injection scenario. We consider representations of quadrature/Weyl measurements in a single von Neumann algebra that reproduce the Born statistics in a particular state. If in that state, the set-theoretic universe of the algebra is ZFC-satisfiable, i.e. every ZFC-theorem holds with unit probability, all measurement contexts can be represented in a single commutative algebra of `beables'. Furthermore, the statistics admit a noncontextual hidden variable model, ensuring Wigner nonnegativity for two or more modes or qudits. For a single mode, a stronger notion of linear representation ensures commutativity, and with it, ZFC-satisfiability independently of the state, as well as Wigner nonnegativity. In consequence, in any setting that cannot be efficiently simulated, it must be impossible to merge the models associated with every context into a single ZFC-satisfiable one: quantum advantage needs multiple perspectives.

Introduction

The application of mathematical logic, and specifically model theory, to quantum mechanics started in earnest in the late 1970s with the seminal contributions of Paul Benioff [1, 2] and Gaisi Takeuti [3, 4, 5]. A key aspect of these works is the use of Boolean-valued models of set theory (Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice, ZFC for short). Roughly speaking (see below for the details), a Boolean-valued model of ZFC is a mathematical structure in which all theorems of ZFC hold, while at least some statements undecidable for ZFC are assigned an ‘intermediate’ truth value bb, with 0<b<10 < b < 1 and bb being an element of a complete Boolean algebra BB.

To build some intuition, one can motivate the relevance of such objects to quantum mechanics via the notion that at least some measurement outcomes are irreducibly random. Indeed, under certain conditions, quantum mechanical measurement outcomes are 11-random [6], meaning that no initial segment of an infinite outcome sequence σ\sigma can be compressed by more than a constant factor by computational means [7]. Such a σ\sigma cannot be computable (recall von Neumann’s warning that ‘any one [sic] who considers arithmetical methods of producing random digits is, of course, in a state of sin’ [8]), for if some program pp were to output σ\sigma if provided to a universal, deterministic Turing machine UU, this would constitute compression of σ\sigma to the length of pp. Consequently, no formal system TT capable of expressing the necessary arithmetic to define σ\sigma can at the same time decide the value of all of its bits: otherwise, there would be a program successively enumerating proofs of TT until, for any nn, it found a proof that the nn-th digit of σ\sigma is either 11 or 00 (in a binary representation). But this would render σ\sigma computable, as the resulting program could produce its digits in sequence. Therefore, if quantum measurement is genuinely random, not all measurement results can be decidable for some appropriately strong formal theory TT.

This yields the motivation to study Boolean-valued models: whenever there is an undecidable proposition ϕ\phi within a (first-order) theory TT, it follows from the completeness theorem that there are models M1\mathcal{M}_1, M2\mathcal{M}_2 of TT such that M1⊨ϕ\mathcal{M}_1 \models\phi and M2⊨¬ϕ\mathcal{M}_2 \models\neg\phi, i.e. M1\mathcal{M}_1 and M2\mathcal{M}_2 are structures such that every theorem of TT holds in them, and in M1\mathcal{M}_1, ϕ\phi holds, while in M2\mathcal{M}_2, so does its negation. Furthermore, in some Boolean-valued model, ϕ\phi may be assigned an intermediate truth value in the above sense. Thus, Boolean-valued models are useful to study undecidable statements.

To this end, they were introduced in work by Scott and Solovay (see, e.g., [9]) to provide an alternative formulation of Cohen’s notion of forcing, as developed in his celebrated proof of the independence (undecidability) of the continuum hypothesis from the axioms of ZFC [10]. Cohen showed that there are models of ZFC in which the continuum hypothesis is true, and models in which it is false; hence its truth cannot be established from the axioms of ZFC.

The first significant result is Takeuti’s proof that moving from an ‘ordinary’ to a Boolean-valued model, the real numbers of that model are in one-to-one correspondence with the self-adjoint operators of a commutative sublattice on an infinite-dimensional, separable Hilbert space [4]. That is, this move is akin to a logical version of quantization: real values are replaced by Hilbert-space operators. Benioff [2] has then shown that, starting with a minimal model of ZFC, an infinite random outcome sequence forces a Cohen extension of the model.

These results highlight the relevance of undecidability, or logical independence, for quantum mechanics. In [11], it was proposed that this has foundational significance: it is, in fact, due to the existence of undecidable measurement outcomes (for any given observer) that a quantum mechanical description is necessary. In part, we will elaborate on this in the following: undecidability necessitates the introduction of a family of Boolean-valued models for each measurement context, which cannot be subsumed into a single model, yielding a logical version of the Kochen-Specker theorem [12]. Furthermore, the concept of a Boolean-valued model itself provides a rigorous formulation of the notion of an epistemic horizon introduced in [11].

Our focus, however, lies on the relevance of these mathematical logical considerations for the characterization of the quantum computational speedup. To this end, our main result is to show that, in qudit-systems and in the setting of continuous-variable (CV) quantum computation, a necessary requirement for the presence of a quantum speedup is that the underlying set-theoretical model is not ZFC-satisfiable in the sense that every theorem of ZFC holds with probability one. Thus, for any ZFC-satisfiable model, the system can be efficiently simulated on a classical computer.

The computational model used throughout is that of quantum computing by state injection (QCSI): enhancing a set of gates and measurements not itself capable of delivering an advantage over classical resources with certain special (e.g. ‘magic’ [13]) resource states that these means are unable to produce. This yields an ideal window into the origins of the quantum speedup: whatever characteristics pick out these states as useful for QCSI is at least a promising candidate for driving the power of quantum computation.

To keep the presentation as self-contained as possible, we will start with a brief introduction to Boolean-valued models in general, and their application to quantum mechanics specifically, in § 2. The purpose of this section is mainly to foster intuition for a topic usually remote from most physicists’ interests, and thus, builds its exposition alongside an explicit toy-example, while the reader is directed to the cited literature for technical details. A particular focus is on the work of Ozawa, most notably the logical characterization of beable-algebras advanced in [14], which forms the first key support column for our result.

The second column is then discussed in § 3. There, we recall some fundamentals of CV quantum computation, in particular with a view to introducing the result by Booth et al. [15] (see also [16]) that contextuality and Wigner-function negativity are equivalent resources in this setting. Wigner nonnegativity is sufficient for the existence of an efficient classical simulation of the system [17] (for operations themselves having a Wigner-nonnegative representation), thus, any setting admitting a noncontextual hidden variable model cannot provide a speedup.

An analogous characterization holds for qudit-quantum computation with systems of odd prime dimension [18]. Thus, in § 4, we present the first run-through of our construction for qudit systems. While the most immediate strategy of trying to find a subalgebra of the operators on the system’s Hilbert space that is ‘beable’ in the sense of admitting simultaneous values does not work, an auxiliary phase-space construction yields a positive result, leading us to introduce the notion of a classical system for a given setting.

The construction is then extended to CV quantum systems in § 5. We follow essentially the same blueprint as in the preceding section, extending the concepts as necessary to apply to the infinite-dimensional setting. We demonstrate that the algebra of functions on phase space serves as a generalized ‘beable’ algebra, whose existence is equivalent to the nonnegativity of the Wigner function.

In § 6, we then connect these two constructions to the formalism developed by Ozawa [14]. We show that if a classical system exists, we can construct a model in which every ZFC theorem holds, thus connecting the mathematical logical criterion of ZFC-satisfiability with the potential for the existence of a quantum speedup. Moreover, ZFC-satisfiability turns out to entail the noncontextuality of a setting, thus demonstrating that a quantum computational advantage can only obtain if the models associated with every context cannot be amalgamated into a single model satisfying every ZFC-theorem.

Finally, we conclude and discuss some possible directions for future research in § 7.

Boolean-Valued Models and Quantum Mechanics

In this section, we first recall some basic notions from mathematical logic, notably model theory, in order to supply some of the background necessary to properly appreciate the application of Boolean-valued models to quantum theory. When we then introduce BVMs, we will do so by means of a simplified toy example, taken from [19], sufficient to introduce most main concepts. Then, we will give a brief review of the application of BVMs to the formulation and interpretation of quantum mechanics.

Axioms and Models

Intuitively, a formal theory TT is given by a set of axioms such that its theorems can be derived using the repeated application of certain rules of inference. A model MM of TT then is a mathematical structure (typically some set equipped with finitary operations and relations) that satisfies the axioms in the sense that, suitably interpreted, they come out true. We may for example think of the theory of fields, which has among its models the rational numbers Q\mathbb{Q}, the real numbers R\mathbb{R}, the complex numbers C\mathbb{C}, or the two-element field F2\mathbb{F}_{2}, each equipped with the usual multiplication and addition.

More formally, we fix a formal language L\mathcal{L}, which is a set of logical and non-logical symbols equipped with a grammar that governs which strings of symbols correspond to well-formed formulas. The non-logical symbols comprise the signature, with symbols for constants as well as functions and relations of a certain arity. Here, an nn-ary function given a set SS is a mapping Sn→SS^{n} \to S, while an nn-ary relation is a subset of SnS^{n}. Constants may be viewed as relations of arity zero. Together with variables, logical connectives, quantifiers, and other logical symbols, these form the well-formed formulas according to the grammar. Well-formed formulas without free variables are called sentences of the theory.

A finitely specifiable subset of these sentences comprise the theory’s axioms. This set need not itself be finite, but may contain one or more axiom schemas, which contain placeholders for L\mathcal{L}-expressions together with rules specifying admissible replacements.

We call TT consistent if there is no sentence ϕ\phi such that both it and its negation ¬ϕ\neg\phi can be derived from the axioms by means of applying the rules of inference. We write T⊢ϕT \vdash\phi if TT proves ϕ\phi, that is, ϕ\phi is derivable from the axioms using a finite sequence of applications of the rules of inference. If furthermore for every well-formed formula ϕ\phi, either T⊢ϕT \vdash\phi or T⊢¬ϕT \vdash\neg\phi, we call TT complete.

It is a straightforward consequence of the completeness theorem that for a consistent TT whose language is first order (that is, the quantifiers ∀\forall and ∃\exists range only over individuals of the domain), there is a model of TT. Furthermore, for such a theory, every logical consequence of the axioms is derivable in finitely many steps. A model MM of TT is a tuple (U,I)(U,I) consisting of a set UU (the universe of the model) together with an interpretation II that takes any function or relation symbol to a function or relation defined over UU. We write that M⊨ϕM \models\phi (read ‘MM models ϕ\phi’) if under this interpretation, ϕ\phi is true in MM.

In general, a particular TT need not be complete, i.e. there exist formulas ϕ\phi such that neither T⊢ϕT \vdash\phi nor T⊢¬ϕT \vdash\neg\phi. As an example, take the formula τ:∀a∃b:b⋅b=a\tau: \forall a\exists b : b \cdot b = a in the language of the theory of fields. It asserts the existence of a square root for every element. This formula cannot be proven from the field axioms: it is independent of the theory. There are two possible ways to accommodate such a situation. On the one hand, one can extend the field axioms either by τ\tau or ¬τ\neg\tau, and obtain a consistent system in either case. By completeness, there must be models of both extensions, and indeed there are: square roots for all elements exist in C\mathbb{C} and F2\mathbb{F}_{2}, but not in Q\mathbb{Q} or R\mathbb{R}.

On the other hand, one can take a particular model of TT, and extend it by adding a new element. Thus, take the real numbers R\mathbb{R}, and add the imaginary unit ii, and with it, square roots for all elements. The resulting structure, C\mathbb{C}, remains a model of TT, in which however τ\tau now holds. We can write this more succinctly using the valuation

⟦ϕ⟧(U,I):={1if (U,I)⊨ϕ0if (U,I)⊭ϕ\llbracket\phi\rrbracket_{(U,I)} := \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } (U,I) \models\phi\\ 0 & \text{if } (U,I) \not\models\phi\end{cases}

That is, e.g. ⟦τ⟧R=0\llbracket\tau\rrbracket_{\mathbb{R}} = 0, while ⟦τ⟧C=1\llbracket\tau\rrbracket_{\mathbb{C}} = 1 (in a slight abuse of notation, we will sometimes refrain from explicitly noting the interpretation II, and take it to be understood that we replace the free variables of a formula with those elements of the model that II assigns to them). In the sequel, we will be chiefly concerned with the extension of models by adding new elements.

Consequently, for a proposition independent of TT, there will exist models of TT in which it holds, or fails to. Logical independence thus implies the existence of models that are not isomorphic, and indeed fail to be elementarily equivalent, just as C\mathbb{C} contains elements that have no counterpart in R\mathbb{R}.

However, note that the converse is not true: even complete systems need not have unique models up to isomorphism, a property known as categoricity. In fact, if TT has an infinite model, the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem implies that TT must have models of any infinite cardinality. While this prevents a unique (up to isomorphism) model, one might hope that there are theories that have the property that for any sentence ϕ\phi, either it or its negation holds in every model (suitably interpreted). That this is not the case for at least a wide class of theories able to express a certain fragment of ordinary arithmetic (known as Robinson arithmetic [20]) is the consequence of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem [21]: in the semantic formulation, for any such theory TT, if it is consistent, there exists a sentence ϕG\phi_{G} such that there are models M,M′\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}' of TT with M⊨¬ϕG\mathcal{M} \models\neg\phi_{G}, M′⊨¬ϕG\mathcal{M}' \models\neg\phi_{G}.

This situation naturally invites the question: given a theory TT, which ϕ\phi are independent of its axioms? To address it, in particular with respect to proving the independence of the continuum hypothesis from the axioms of ZFC, Paul Cohen developed the technique of forcing in 1963 [10]. In brief, the aim is to show that for a theory TT and a sentence ϕ\phi, there exist models of both ϕ\phi and ¬ϕ\neg\phi; by the completeness theorem, this entails that ϕ\phi is independent of TT. A particularly elegant way of understanding forcing was then developed by Dana Scott and Robert Solovay in the form of Boolean-valued models (see [9]).

Boolean-Valued Models and Forcing

The basic idea of a Boolean-valued model is to let the codomain of the valuation ⟦⋅⟧\llbracket\cdot\rrbracket range over the elements of a general Boolean algebra (rather than over the two-element one). For the following, it will be useful to consider a toy example, largely adapted from [19], to build intuition. Thus, consider the three-element set S3={1,2,3}S_3=\{1,2,3\} and its powerset P(S3)\mathcal{P}(S_3). To make P(S3)\mathcal{P}(S_3) into a Boolean algebra BB, we define logical operations as follows:

a∧b:=a∩ba\wedge b := a\cap b
a∨b:=a∪ba\vee b := a\cup b
⋀a∈A⊆Ba:=⋂a∈A⊆Ba(meet)\bigwedge_{a\in A\subseteq B}a := \bigcap_{a\in A\subseteq B}a\quad\text{(meet)}
⋁a∈A⊆Ba:=⋃a∈A⊆Ba(join)\bigvee_{a\in A\subseteq B}a := \bigcup_{a\in A\subseteq B}a\quad\text{(join)}
¬a:=S3∖a\neg a := S_3\setminus a

With this definition, BB is a complete Boolean algebra (the join and meet of arbitrary elements is in BB), equipped with a partial order relation a≤b:⟺a∧b=aa\leq b\mathrel{\vcentcolon\Longleftrightarrow}a\wedge b=a, which yields a logical implication a→b:⟺a≤ba\to b\mathrel{\vcentcolon\Longleftrightarrow}a\leq b. Under this order, the top element {1,2,3}\{1,2,3\} and the bottom element ∅\varnothing of BB will be referred to as 11 and 00, respectively.

An important notion in the following is that of a filter. A filter FF on BB is a subset of BB such that

1∈F,0∉F,1\in F,0\notin F,
a∈F,b∈B,b≥a⇒b∈F,a\in F,b\in B,b\geq a\Rightarrow b\in F,
a,b∈F⇒a∧b∈F.a,b\in F\Rightarrow a\wedge b\in F.

If furthermore a∈F⇔¬a∉Fa\in F\Leftrightarrow\neg a\notin F, then FF is called an ultrafilter. For a subset DD of BB, DD is called dense if ∀b∈B∖{0}∃d∈D:d≤b\forall b\in B\setminus\{0\}\exists d\in D:d\leq b. Finally, FF is generic if for any dense subset DD of B∖{0}B\setminus\{0\}, F∩D≠∅F\cap D\neq\varnothing.

With this definition, there exist three distinct ultrafilters on BB (see also Figure 1):

The elements of the Boolean algebra B

Figure 1. The elements of the Boolean algebra B=P({1,2,3})B=\mathcal{P}(\{1,2,3\}). Black links between elements read in the upward direction indicate the partial ordering/implication relation, while the colors highlight the individual ultrafilters defined on BB.

F1:={{1,2,3},{1,2},{1,3},{1}}F_1:=\{\{1,2,3\},\{1,2\},\{1,3\},\{1\}\}
F2:={{1,2,3},{1,2},{2,3},{2}}F_2:=\{\{1,2,3\},\{1,2\},\{2,3\},\{2\}\}
F3:={{1,2,3},{1,3},{2,3},{3}}F_3:=\{\{1,2,3\},\{1,3\},\{2,3\},\{3\}\}

P(S3)\mathcal{P}(S_3), like every finite Boolean algebra, is atomic (contains minimal non-zero elements). In this case, every dense set contains the atoms and every ultrafilter is generated by a single atom (making it a principal ultrafilter), and thus, is generic.

We can then use BB to introduce the idea of Boolean sets, where a Boolean set SS over BB is defined by assigning each member of SS an element of BB that

describes its ‘degree of membership’ in SS. Boolean sets are defined recursively: each member is itself a Boolean set. As an example, consider a quantity that can take one of three values, which we can represent as the von Neumann ordinals 0:=∅0:=\varnothing, 1:={∅}1:=\{\varnothing\}, 2:={∅,{∅}}2:=\{\varnothing,\{\varnothing\}\}. Since each is the set of its predecessors, the representation of such a quantity via Boolean sets needs only to record where its value exceeds 00 or 11 respectively:

x:={(∅,{2,3}),({∅,{1,2,3}},{3})},x:=\{(\varnothing,\{2,3\}),(\{\varnothing,\{1,2,3\}\},\{3\})\},
y:={(∅,{1,2,3}),({{∅,{1,2,3}},∅)}.y:=\{(\varnothing,\{1,2,3\}),(\{\{\varnothing,\{1,2,3\}\},\varnothing)\}.

Each of these has two elements, which are themselves Boolean sets:

x:∅↦{2,3},{∅,{1,2,3}}↦{3}x:\quad\varnothing\mapsto\{2,3\},\quad\{\varnothing,\{1,2,3\}\}\mapsto\{3\}
y:∅↦{1,2,3},{{∅,{1,2,3}}↦∅y:\quad\varnothing\mapsto\{1,2,3\},\quad\{\{\varnothing,\{1,2,3\}\}\mapsto\varnothing

We can interpret this by means of a ‘many worlds’-kind of picture. If the elements of the base set S3={1,2,3}S_3=\{1,2,3\}, i.e. the atoms of the Boolean algebra, each indicate a separate ‘world’ or possible state of affairs, then we have:

World 1World 2World 3
xx∅=0\varnothing= 0{∅}=1\{\varnothing\} = 1{∅,{∅}}=2\{\varnothing, \{\varnothing\}\} = 2
yy{∅}=1\{\varnothing\} = 1{∅}=1\{\varnothing\} = 1{∅}=1\{\varnothing\} = 1
relationx∈yx \in yx=yx = yy∈xy \in x

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