WorksPhysics and Astronomy
Are quantum measurements universal?
Abstract
With D. Aerts, we showed in 2014, within the extended Bloch representation of quantum mechanics, that the Born rule can be understood as resulting from a universal average over all the possible ways in which the measurement-interactions can be selected. The cellular construction used there was since questioned, in the context of Bertrand's paradox, by N. Shackel, who observed that the result depends on the discretization adopted, that the sequence of averages is constant, and that the sense in which the average is taken over "all" densities remains unclear. Taking these criticisms as a stimulus, we re-examine the notion. The key is to recognize that a universal measurement is a random way of selecting a measurement which does not privilege any portion of the structure describing the available interactions, a property we call indifference. We prove that every indifferent universal measurement, however constructed, produces exactly the Born probabilities: the universal average is unique, and the cellular construction of 2014 is one among infinitely many ways of obtaining it, exact at every finite resolution. Non-trivial indifferent universal measurements exist, but must involve deterministic measurements: Dirichlet processes are indifferent universal measurements reaching every way of selecting an interaction, whereas an indifferent universal measurement free of deterministic components necessarily selects the uniform density, so that the Born rule holds not only on average but with certainty. Deviations from the quantum statistics in sequences of measurements are governed by a single parameter, in principle accessible to experiment. The only geometric inputs are the Euclidean length of the membrane and the orthogonal landing of the point-particle on it; the latter is where the content of Gleason's theorem lies. Generalizations to N outcomes and to Bertrand's paradox are discussed.
Introduction
The idea that quantum measurements might be universal measurements has a long history, which it is useful to recall briefly, as it explains both the motivation of the present article and the nature of the questions it addresses.
The starting point is the hidden-measurement approach to quantum probabilities, proposed by Diederik Aerts in the eighties [1]. In this approach, the indeterminism of a quantum measurement is not attributed to a lack of knowledge about the state of the measured entity (which would lead to a classical, Kolmogorovian probability model), but to a lack of knowledge about the interaction between the measuring apparatus and the entity, which is each time selected in an uncontrollable way. The simplest illustration is the so-called spin quantum machine, or sphere model: a point particle (descriptive of the system’s state) on the surface of a sphere, an abstract elastic band stretched between two opposite points of the sphere, the particle falling orthogonally onto the band and sticking to it, then the band disintegrating at some unpredictable point, and contracting, thus drawing the particle to one of its two end points. When the band is uniformly disintegrable, one obtains exactly the probabilities of a spin- measurement. When it is not, one obtains probability models which are neither classical nor quantum, the so-called intermediate models, of which the -model is the paradigmatic example [2, 3, 4, 5].
The existence of this whole spectrum of possible measurements immediately raised a question: why, in the microscopic world, would it be precisely the (uniform) quantum measurements that are realized? The answer that was conjectured in [6, 7] was that quantum measurements could be universal measurements, i.e., the result of a huge average over all the possible ways of selecting an interaction, so that the quantum probabilities would be those of a “first-order non-classical theory,” in the same way as the first term of a Taylor expansion is a first-order approximation to any smooth function. A heuristic argument in favor of this conjecture was based on Gleason’s theorem [8, 9]: if the transition probability of a universal measurement depends only on the state before the measurement and the state after it, then it must be the quantum transition probability. But the conjecture could not be given, at the time, a precise mathematical content, because any attempt to define a uniform average over “all possible ways of selecting an interaction” was immediately confronted with the difficulties of Bertrand’s paradox [10].
The scientific collaboration between D. Aerts and the author started in 2013 precisely on this issue, initially from a position of disagreement, as the author was then exploring a different explanation of the emergence of quantum measurements, based on the notion of robustness [11, 12], and was rather skeptical about the possibility of giving a precise meaning to the notion of universal measurement. The construction of a simple toy model, however, confirmed the conjecture instead of refuting it, and led to the general result published in [13] (see also [14, 15]): in the extended Bloch representation of quantum mechanics, where a measurement with outcomes is represented by an abstract -dimensional elastic and disintegrable membrane, the Born rule corresponds to a uniform membrane, and its uniform disintegrability can in turn be understood as resulting from a universal average over all the possible non-uniform ways in which the membrane can disintegrate. The average was defined by first discretizing the membrane into cells of equal size, considering all the “cellular” probability densities taking a constant value on a subset of the cells and vanishing elsewhere, averaging the outcome probabilities uniformly over them, and finally taking the limit , in the spirit of the definition of the Wiener measure. The same construction was then also applied to Bertrand’s paradox, providing what we called a solution of its hard problem [16].
It is in this latter context that our construction was examined, with great care, by N. Shackel in his recent monograph on Bertrand’s paradox and the principle of indifference [17], where a whole chapter is devoted to our universal average. Shackel’s observations can be summarized as follows. First, the argument by which we showed that every probability density can be approximated by a sequence of cellular densities proves less than it claims, because the approximating sequence is allowed to depend on the interval under consideration (what Shackel calls an ambiguity in the order of the quantifiers). Second, the three constraints on which the construction rests (cells of equal length, two values only, uniform weights) are not justified, and as soon as more than two values are allowed there are uncountably many cellular densities, so that a uniform average over them seems no longer definable. Third, the sequence of averages over the cellular densities is in fact constant, in the sense that each of its terms is already the uniform probability, so that the limit adds nothing, and the theorem looks “trivial.” Fourth, in the context of Bertrand’s paradox, the result depends on the parameterization adopted (what Shackel calls a “naming”), so that the paradox would recur at the level of the choice of the parameterization.
We consider these observations as valuable, and the present article, which is to be regarded as the natural continuation of the effort initiated in [13], has been stimulated by them. More precisely, we shall see that they can all receive a clear answer as soon as one recognizes that a universal average is an invariant average, i.e., that the “uniform average over all possible probability densities” of [13] is best understood as an average which does not privilege any portion of the elastic band, for the two-outcome situation, or of more general simplicial structures, for the -outcome situation. Once this is recognized, the following becomes clear.
The universal average is unique: any random way of selecting a -measurement (a measurement characterized by a probability density ) which is invariant in the above sense produces exactly the uniform density , hence the Born rule. The cellular construction presented in [13] is one way, among infinitely many, of obtaining this uniform average through an indifferent selection of -measurements. Its use of two density values and uniform weights is not essential; what matters is the invariance of the selection law under permutations of equal-size cells (§ 5).
The result holds exactly at every finite resolution: the average over any invariant family of cellular densities with cells is the uniform density, for every , with no limit to be taken, and this explains why the sequence of averages in [13] is constant, and the origin of the combinatorial identities that were used in the proof by induction (§ 6 and Appendix A).
The “huge average over all possible ways of selecting an interaction” can be given a precise meaning, provided one admits, as we did in [13], deterministic measurements, in which the band disintegrates at a predetermined point. Dirichlet processes, which are random mixtures of deterministic measurements, provide non-trivial indifferent universal measurements whose weak support contains every probability distribution on the band (§ 7).
An indifferent universal measurement which almost surely selects no deterministic components necessarily selects the uniform density: the Born rule then governs the outcome probabilities of each individual run, not merely their average. More generally, any non-trivial indifferent universal measurement must admit deterministic components, whose contribution to fluctuations and correlations in sequences of measurements is quantified by the coincidence probability (§ 8–§ 9).
The definition of indifference requires a notion of size, here provided by the Euclidean geometry of the extended Bloch sphere: no such notion can be extracted from the set of all densities alone (§ 10).
The article is organized as follows. In § 2, we briefly recall the two-outcome measurement process in the extended Bloch representation, so as to arrive at the key expressions for the outcome probabilities of a general -measurement. In § 3, we recall the universal average as defined in [13], and we formulate the questions it leaves open. In § 4, we introduce the notion of universal measurement as a random -measurement and we observe a simple but decisive fact: the outcome statistics of a universal measurement are those of an ordinary -measurement, with the average density. § 5–§ 10 contain the results listed above and, in § 11, we indicate how everything generalizes to measurements with outcomes, and we briefly comment on Bertrand’s paradox. § 12 contains our conclusions, and some additional technical proofs are deferred to the appendices.
Two-outcome measurements
We recall the essential elements of the model of [13], in the two-outcome case, referring to that article for all details. A two-dimensional quantum entity (for instance a spin- entity) is described, in the Bloch representation, by a real vector in the three-dimensional unit ball: a unit vector for a vector-state, a shorter vector for an operator-state (density matrix). A measurement with two outcomes and , associated with two orthogonal rank-1 projection operators and , is represented by two opposite unit vectors and , and by the diameter of the ball joining them, which one can think of as an abstract elastic and disintegrable (i.e., breakable) band of length 2, stretched between and .
The measurement process unfolds in two stages. In the first, deterministic, stage, the point-particle representing the state is attracted by the band and “falls” orthogonally onto it, reaching the position
It is convenient to introduce a coordinate along the band, writing a generic point of as , so that corresponds to and to . The particle then sits at the coordinate
which for a vector-state is simply , being the angle between and . In the notation of [13], , where is the decomposition of in the convex combination of the two end points, with . The presence of the particle divides the band into two regions, , between and , and , between and (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. The two-outcome measurement in the extended Bloch representation. The dashed circle is the great circle of the Bloch sphere containing , and the vector-state (drawn in perspective), of which the elastic band is a diameter. The point-particle falls orthogonally from onto the band, reaching , of coordinate . The band then breaks at a point selected according to the probability density : if the disintegrating point lies in , the particle is drawn to (outcome ), otherwise to (outcome ).
In the second, indeterministic, stage, the band, which is unstable, disintegrates at some point and its two pieces contract toward their respective anchor points. If the disintegrating point lies in , the particle, attached to the piece anchored at , is drawn to , so that the outcome is . If it lies in , the particle is drawn to and the outcome is . The point is the hidden variable of the measurement. Note, however, that it is not a hidden variable of the entity, but of the measurement interaction, selected each time in an unpredictable way. This is why the hidden-measurement approach is not affected by the no-go theorems [18, 19, 20], which refer solely to hidden variables associated with the state of the measured entity.
If the band is made of a uniform substance, all its points being equally likely to disintegrate, the probability of the outcome is the ratio between the length of and the total length of the band, and similarly for :
which is exactly the Born rule for a two-dimensional entity. This is the content of Section 7 of [13].
If the band is not uniform, its disintegrability being described by a probability density , , , the outcome probabilities become (Eq. (80) of [13]):
We shall call such a measurement a -measurement. The uniform density gives back (3). Hence, a -measurement is a quantum measurement. It is useful to introduce the cumulative function of ,
which is non-decreasing (with unless has a delta component at , in which case equals its weight), and in terms of which (4) becomes
In other words, the probability model of a two-outcome -measurement, i.e., the transition probability as a function of the initial state, is nothing but the cumulative function of , and the quantum probability model corresponds to the linear function . We will make repeated use of this simple observation.
As in [13], we allow to contain Dirac delta components. The density describes a band that can only disintegrate at the predetermined point , which corresponds to a deterministic measurement. Indeed, given the state, the outcome is predetermined: if and if . The density describes a so-called solipsistic measurement, whose outcome probabilities ( and ) do not depend on the state. The density describes the -model, which interpolates between a deterministic measurement () and the quantum one () and which, for , is neither classical nor quantum [2, 3, 4, 5].
Note that, mathematically, a density with delta components is just a probability measure on . When has delta components, the integrals over the regions and in (4) are to be understood with the point assigned to one of the two regions, say and ; which one is irrelevant for all the averages considered below, since a delta component sitting exactly at corresponds to the exceptional situation of unstable equilibrium discussed in [13].
Averaging over cellular densities
The question addressed in Section 13 of [13] was the following. The Born rule (3) is obtained when the band is uniformly disintegrable. But why would the band be uniform? The hidden-measurement interpretation offers a natural answer: a quantum measurement is a situation of maximal lack of knowledge, not only about which interaction is actualized, but also about the way the interaction is actualized, i.e., about the density . If nothing is known about , all the should be considered as equally possible, and the measurement that is actually performed should be described by an average over all of them. To put it another way, if nothing in an experiment allows one to control the way an outcome is chosen, all possible ways (all possible ) are a priori possible and must be taken into account when calculating probabilities. We called such a measurement a universal measurement, and we conjectured, and then proved in a specific sense, that the universal average of the outcome probabilities (4) is exactly the Born rule.
The definition adopted in [13] was the following. The interval is partitioned into elementary cells of equal length , and one considers the cellular probability densities
where is a step function taking the value in the disintegrable cells, , and in the remaining non-disintegrable cells (see Fig. 9 of [13]; note that is just a superscript, not an exponent, indicating that refers to the disintegrable cells). Such densities describe bands which can only break in the disintegrable cells, uniformly within them. For a given , there are exactly different cellular densities, and one defines the average probability at level by giving the same weight to each of them:
where . The universal average is then defined as the infinite-cell limit
and the theorem proved in [13] states that
i.e., that the universal average reproduces the Born rule.
The proof had two steps. In the first (Section 13.1 of [13]), it was shown that cellular densities are dense among all densities, in the sense that for every one can find cellular densities such that as . The purpose of this step was to make sure that the average (9) could legitimately be considered as an average over all densities. In the second step (Section 13.2), it was shown, by induction and using two combinatorial identities (Eqs. (108) and (113) of [13]), that for intervals made of whole cells
where is the cellular density whose cells are all disintegrable, i.e., the uniform density, from which (10) follows in the limit.
This construction raises a number of questions, which we now formulate in our own words (they are essentially those raised by Shackel [17]).
(Q1) Why these particular cellular densities? The construction uses cells of equal length, densities taking only two values (one of which is zero), and equal weights for all of them. If a different discretization were used, say cells of different lengths, or densities with three or more values, or unequal weights, would the result be the same? Note that as soon as three values are allowed there are uncountably many cellular densities with cells, so that “giving the same weight to each of them” no longer corresponds to a finite average.
(Q2) What does the limit add? Equation (11) holds for every and the sequence of averages is constant. In other words, the limit in (9) is the limit of a constant sequence. In what sense, then, is the result “universal,” and not just “trivial”?
(Q3) Is the average over “all” densities? The density argument of the first step shows that every can be approximated by cellular densities, but this does not, by itself, make an average over the cellular densities of level , followed by a limit, an average over all densities. Moreover, as Shackel pointed out, the approximation argument of [13] was written with an ambiguous order of quantifiers (the approximating sequence was allowed to depend on the interval considered).
(Q4) What is the role of the length? The density is uniform with respect to the length along the band, and equal cells are cells of equal length. If the band were parameterized differently, by a coordinate , uniform density in would not be uniform in . Where does the length come from, and is it an arbitrary choice?
In the following sections we answer these questions. The answer to all of them rests on a single idea: the universal average is an invariant average.
Random -measurements
As we have explained, a -measurement is a measurement in which a potential interaction is randomly actualized through a process weighted by the density . A universal measurement, on the other hand, is a measurement in which the density is itself actualized at random, each time the measurement is performed, among all the possible (potential) densities. To describe such a measurement, we must specify the probability law according to which is selected. Let denote this law. We shall then say that a -measurement is a universal measurement characterized by , in the same way as a -measurement is a measurement characterized by . In other words, a -measurement is a random -measurement, or, as we also said in [13], a “measurement of measurements.”
For instance, the average (8) corresponds to the -measurement in which is selected, with the same probability , among the cellular densities with cells. The law is a probability law on a finite set of densities, but in general can be a probability law on an infinite set of densities, discrete or continuous. In other words, several universal measurements can a priori be defined, each characterized by a specific set of potential probability densities that can be randomly actualized, and by the probabilities with which they are actualized.
Given a universal measurement , the probability of the outcome is obtained by averaging the probability (4) over the random , i.e., by taking the mean value of with respect to the law , which we denote by
For a finite law like the integral is just the sum (8). The following simple observation is the key to everything that follows. Since, according to (4), depends linearly on , the mean value of the probability is the probability of the mean density. So, if we define the average density of the universal measurement as
which is again a probability density on , then, exchanging the order of the two integrations, (12) becomes
and similarly for . In other words, from the point of view of the outcome probabilities, a universal measurement is an ordinary -measurement, whose density is the average density, or, to put it more succinctly: a -measurement is a -measurement.
The question in the title (are quantum measurements universal?) therefore becomes a question about average densities: for which universal measurements is the average density the uniform density ? The answer, as we are now going to show, is: for all those which are indifferent, in a sense that we now define.
Indifferent universal measurements
We consider the band , which spans the interval , and divide it into cells of equal length :
the last cell being closed at . For a density , let
be the cell masses of , giving the probabilities that the band disintegrates in the different cells. Now imagine that the band, made of the non-uniform substance described by , is cut along the cell boundaries and that the pieces are glued again in a different order, specified by a permutation of : the piece that was in position is moved to position , (see Figure 2). The new band is described by a new density, which we denote , whose cell masses are a permutation of those of :

Figure 2. A rearrangement of the band: the cells of equal length are cut and glued again in a different order. The density of the band becomes the density , whose cell masses are a permutation of those of .
and whose profile inside each cell is the profile that had in the piece that has been moved there. We call this operation a rearrangement of the band. Note that a rearrangement is a bijection of the band onto itself which preserves lengths (it is a piecewise translation), and that it induces a bijection of the set of densities onto itself, under which genuine densities are mapped to genuine densities, delta components to delta components, and the uniform density to itself.
A universal measurement selects at random. We say that it is indifferent if it does not privilege any portion of the band, i.e., if it ignores which piece of the band is which: selecting or selecting its rearranged version must be, for an indifferent universal measurement, one and the same thing.
Definition 1 (indifferent universal measurement). A -measurement is indifferent if, for every of the dyadic form , , and for every permutation of the cells (15), the probability law of the random measure is invariant under the rearrangement map ; equivalently, for every measurable set of probability measures. In particular, the joint probability law of the cell masses is symmetric under any permutation of the cells.1
In the language of probability theory, the cell masses of an indifferent universal measurement form an exchangeable family of random variables, at every level . Physically, Definition 1 is the transcription of the statement “nothing in the universal measurement allows one to attribute any preference to some regions of the band over others”: an indifferent universal measurement is the situation of maximal lack of knowledge about ‘the way’ the interaction is selected, in the same way as the uniform is the situation of maximal lack of knowledge about ‘the’ interaction itself.
The universal measurement given in [13] is indifferent at its own level : a rearrangement maps a cellular density with disintegrable cells to another cellular density with the same number of disintegrable cells, so that the uniform law on the cellular densities is unchanged.2 But the definition is much more general: it does not refer to any particular family of densities, finite or infinite, to any discretization, or to any limit. It is a property of the law alone.
Theorem 1 (uniqueness of the universal average). Let be an indifferent universal measurement. Then its average density is the uniform density:
Consequently, for every initial state ,
In other words, the outcome probabilities of an indifferent universal measurement are the quantum probabilities, whatever the universal measurement.
Proof. Let us consider the cells of level . The cell masses of the average density are the averages of the cell masses of :
Since is indifferent, the two random variables and , for any two cells and , take any given range of values with the same probability. Indeed, let be the rearrangement which exchanges the cells and (leaving the others in place). By (17), the mass of the cell after the rearrangement is the mass that the cell had before it, ; and since is selected with the same probability as , the random variable takes its values with the same probabilities as . Hence and take their values with the same probabilities. In particular, this means that they have the same mean value, . So the numbers are all equal, and since they sum to 1, each of them is equal to :
In other words, the average density gives to every cell, of every level, a mass equal to its length divided by the total length of the band, which is what the uniform density does. It remains to see that this forces to be the uniform density everywhere, not only on the cells. For this, we use the cumulative function (5) of , which we denote . By (21), at every dyadic point of the band (the right end of the -th cell of level ), is the sum of the masses of the first cells, so that
Take now an arbitrary point and, for each level , the two consecutive dyadic points of that level, which are at distance from each other. Monotonicity of the cumulative function gives , and letting , since is continuous, for every . Two probability measures with the same cumulative function are identical. In particular, two ordinary densities with the same cumulative function coincide almost everywhere. Hence (as probability measures, or as densities almost everywhere).
It is instructive to restate the argument as a proof by contradiction, as this is the form in which it directly expresses the physical intuition. Suppose that the average density of an indifferent universal measurement were not uniform. Then, since the dyadic cells determine the density, there would be a level and a cell receiving an average mass different from , hence two cells and of that level receiving different average masses, . But the universal measurement is indifferent: the rearrangement which exchanges the pieces and of the band does not change the law of , and therefore does not change the average mass of any cell; applying it, one gets , a contradiction. In other words, a non-uniform average density would mean that the universal measurement gives more weight to some piece of the band than to another piece of the same length, whereas by hypothesis it does not distinguish between them.
Theorem 1 answers the question (Q1). The proof uses two ingredients only: the symmetry of the law under rearrangements, and the linearity of the outcome probabilities in . It is completely insensitive to the kind of densities that selects (two-valued, many-valued, continuous, with or without delta components), to the number of them (finite or infinite), to the weights given to them (which must be equal only for densities that are rearrangements of one another, and are otherwise arbitrary; see § 6), to the resolution, and to the existence of a limit. Of the “three constraints” of the construction in [13], only one matters: the cells have the same length and are treated symmetrically. This is the constraint that encodes indifference. The other two were conveniences of presentation. As for the question (Q4), the theorem makes explicit where the length enters: in the very definition of indifference, through the cells of equal length. We shall see in § 10 that this is not a defect but a necessity.
The theorem also makes precise the sense in which the universal average is unique: the average density is the same, , for all indifferent universal measurements. There is therefore no need to specify a particular “way of choosing at random among all the possible ”: all the indifferent ways give the same answer. This is what dissolves the regress that one might fear when “averaging over all the ways of selecting an interaction”: the choice of the way of averaging (which could call for a further average over all the ways of averaging, and so on) is immaterial, as long as it is indifferent. We shall write, accordingly,
which extends and makes independent of the construction the definition (9) of [13].
Before proceeding, a word on a possible objection. Theorem 1 is a symmetry theorem, and like all symmetry theorems it may look, once stated, almost tautological: an average which treats all pieces of the band alike gives a density which treats all pieces of the band alike, and this is the uniform density. In a sense this is true, and it is also the whole point. What is not tautological is that the result holds for every indifferent selection law, without privileging any family of densities, prescribing any particular way of weighing them, or requiring a limiting procedure. Moreover, indifference is a genuine restriction, not a reformulation of the Born rule: as we shall see in § 10, some random selections are not indifferent and do not yield the Born rule, while others may yield it without being indifferent. And § 8 will reveal the remarkable rigidity of this condition: no non-trivial indifferent selection of densities without deterministic components is possible. Finally, the theorem also clarifies what indifference does not determine: the notion of length on the band (§ 10), while the derivation of the Born probabilities additionally requires the orthogonal fall of the particle (§ 11). What the universal average achieves is therefore precise: it replaces the direct hypothesis of uniform disintegration by a symmetry-based hypothesis of indifference at the level of the selection of the measurement, and proves that the latter implies the former. That this implication may seem almost obvious once the relevant symmetry has been identified does not make it devoid of content.
Universal measurements at finite resolution
Theorem 1 tells us what happens when a universal measurement is indifferent at all resolutions. The universal measurements of [13], however, live at a single, finite resolution: they select among densities which are constant inside each of the cells of a given level, and they are indifferent with respect to the rearrangements of these cells only. It is therefore natural to ask what indifference gives at a single level, and the answer turns out to be even simpler than Theorem 1: the uniform density is obtained exactly, at every finite , with no limit to be taken, and this for every indifferent way of selecting cellular densities, not only for the uniform selection among two-valued ones adopted in [13]. The reason is that, at a given resolution, the densities can be grouped into families of densities that are rearrangements of one another, and that the average of each family is already the uniform density. This is the key to the question (Q2), and it also explains why the proof of [13] could be carried out by induction.
We fix and consider the set of all densities which are constant inside each of the cells (15): we call them cellular densities of level , in a sense slightly more general than that of [13], since we now allow arbitrary values in the cells. Such a density is completely specified by its cell masses , , :
where is the characteristic function of , and is the uniform density on the -th cell. The two-valued cellular densities (7) are those for which the take only the values and . A rearrangement of the cells maps to , with . We can then define the orbit of as the set of the densities obtained from by all possible rearrangements (some of which may coincide).
Theorem 2 (finite resolution). For every cellular density of level , the average of its orbit is the uniform density:
*Consequently, for every universal measurement which selects cellular densities of level in a way that is invariant under the rearrangements of the cells, we have . In particular, this holds for the universal measurement , which proves (11) for all and for all intervals , not only those made of whole cells.
Proof. Consider any rearrangement of the cells. Applying it to the orbit average (25) merely permutes the terms of its sum, and the orbit average remains unchanged, hence it is a cellular density invariant under all rearrangements. Its cell masses are therefore all equal, and since they sum to 1, each of them is , i.e., the orbit average is .3 The law being invariant under rearrangements, we have for every , so that averaging over all and using (25), gives . The law is clearly a special case of , and since as densities, the probabilities and coincide for every interval , by (14).
According to Theorem 2, every orbit has the uniform density as its center of mass, so that the average over all of them is uniform whatever the weights given to the different orbits. The proof by induction of [13] and the combinatorial identities obtained there are just the shadow of this symmetry in the particular family of two-valued densities (see Appendix § 13).
The answer to (Q2) is now clear. The sequence of averages of [13] is constant because the symmetry already fixes the average at every finite resolution; there is nothing to be gained, as far as the value of the average is concerned, from the limit . The triviality of the constant sequence is not a defect of the result but its very content: the value is exact, independent of the resolution, and independent of the family, which is what one expects from a structural fact, like the fact that the center of mass of a symmetric body lies on its axis of symmetry. What the limit was meant to secure in [13] is something else, namely that every density is reachable, so that the average can be said to be over all of them. This is the question (Q3), to which we now turn.
Every genuine density is the limit, as , of its histogram of level , i.e., of the cellular density whose cell masses are those of , . The convergence holds in the strongest sense that matters for probabilities: since (convergence in the norm, a standard result of analysis), the difference between and tends to zero uniformly over all regions . So the union of all the finite levels, with the general cellular densities (24), exhausts all genuine densities, and one single sequence (the histograms) works for all regions at once. For the two-valued densities of [13], which cannot approximate a density in the sense (they take only two values), one can still construct, for every density , a single sequence of two-valued cellular densities such that for every interval , with an explicit rate. This is done in Appendix § 14, and it settles the quantifier issue raised by Shackel about the first step of the proof in [13].
But the point we want to stress is that, in the present formulation, the computation of the universal average no longer rests upon this approximation property. The value of the universal average is fixed by Theorems 1 and 2, at every resolution and for every indifferent law, without any limit to interchange with an average. The approximation property only tells us that the family of finite resolutions leaves no density out. And in the next section we shall see that the words “all the possible ” can be given an even more literal meaning, not through a limit of finite families, but through a single indifferent universal measurement which reaches all densities at once.
Mixtures of deterministic measurements
The original idea of [6, 7] was that a universal measurement is a random choice among all imaginable types of measurement: “deterministic classical measurements, quantum measurements, super-quantum and sub-quantum measurements.” Deterministic measurements are, in the present language, those of the form , in which the band starts disintegrating at a predetermined point . They are the elementary building blocks of all the others, a general being a continuous combination . of deterministic measurements. We now show that, once deterministic measurements are admitted, indifferent universal measurements exist in abundance, with a transparent physical meaning, and that among them there are some whose support is the set of all densities. We shall also see, in § 8, that deterministic measurements are not only natural but unavoidable: there is no non-trivial indifferent universal measurement which selects only genuine densities.
Let us consider three paradigmatic examples, and start with a random deterministic measurement. Let , . A random deterministic measurement is a -measurement which, at each run, selects a deterministic measurement with a uniformly distributed disintegrable point . It is obviously indifferent and its average density is , the uniform density, in agreement with Theorem 1. But this universal measurement is nothing but the original hidden-measurement model itself, read at the meta-level: “first select at random, uniformly, a deterministic measurement, then perform it” is operationally the same as “perform the uniform measurement.” Thus, the uniform measurement is the simplest universal measurement, and this is, in a sense, the content of the original conjecture of [6] in its most elementary form.
Consider now a finite number of disintegrable points , chosen independently and uniformly in , and let . This corresponds to a band which can only disintegrate at randomly located points, with equal probabilities. Again, is indifferent, and . As , the empirical density of the points approaches the uniform density (law of large numbers), so that the random -band becomes, in the limit, the uniform band.
Finally, let us take infinitely many disintegrable points, , independent and uniform in , with random weights , , , chosen independently of the positions by the following “stick-breaking” recipe [21]: take a stick of length 1 and break off a random fraction of it: the piece broken off has length . Then break off a random fraction of what remains (which has length ): the piece broken off has length . Continue in the same way: at the -th step a fraction of the remaining stick, of length , is broken off, so that the -th piece has length . The lengths of the pieces are the weights: they are positive and, since the whole stick is eventually used up, they sum to 1. The fractions are independent random numbers in , all with the same probability density
where is a fixed parameter (in the language of statistics, the follow a Beta law, and is called the concentration parameter). For the fractions are uniformly distributed; for small the density (26) favors fractions close to 1, so that a few points receive almost all the weight; for large it favors small fractions, so that the weight is spread over many points. Then, the random density
describes a band with a countable set of disintegrable points of random strengths (Figure 3). Its law is called, in probability theory and Bayesian statistics, the Dirichlet process with concentration and “base” probability density (in the standard notation it is written DP), the two parameters being combined in a single measure of total mass [22, 24, 25]. It is indifferent, since the positions are uniform and the weights are chosen independently of the positions. So, Theorem 1 applies and its average density is . This is also a well-known property of the Dirichlet process: its mean is the base probability density, here , whatever the value of . The parameter interpolates between the two previous examples: for the first fraction is close to 1, almost all the weight goes to the first point and one recovers the random deterministic measurement considered above; for the weights become small and numerous, and the random density becomes indistinguishable, as far as outcome probabilities are concerned, from the uniform density, as in the previous limit .

Figure 3. A realization of the Dirichlet universal measurement (27): the band (bottom) can only break at a countable set of randomly located points , each with a random strength . These weights sum to 1 and only the four largest are labeled in the figure, the others being too small to be visible at this scale. Although each realization is a mixture of deterministic measurements, the average over the realizations is the uniform, quantum, measurement.
What makes the Dirichlet process remarkable for our purposes is that, in an operational sense, it leaves no density out. To explain what we mean, observe that a universal measurement is a random selection, so that the question “which densities can it select?” is a question about probabilities. Densities can be compared through the outcome probabilities they produce, so let us say that a density imitates a density to within a tolerance , for a given finite family of initial states with , if for each of the corresponding outcome intervals . The Dirichlet universal measurement has the following property [22 Section 3]: whatever the density on , genuine or with delta components, whatever the tolerance , and whatever the finite family of initial states, the probability that the random density (27) imitates to within is strictly positive.4 A prescribed genuine density is never selected exactly (a sum of delta functions never coincides with a genuine density), but every density can be imitated as closely as one wishes, for any prescribed finite family of initial states, and this with a non-zero probability. In the language of probability theory, one says that the Dirichlet process has full weak support on the set of all probability distributions on . In this precise sense, the Dirichlet universal measurement can approximate the outcome statistics of all possible ways of selecting an interaction, none excluded, and the universal average over all of them is the quantum measurement.
This answers (Q3) in a precise operational sense: a single indifferent universal measurement can approximate the outcome probabilities of any prescribed density, at any fixed finite resolution, and Theorem 1 guarantees that its average is the Born rule, as it is for every other indifferent universal measurement.
We conclude this section by noting that indifferent universal measurements can be combined in two ways. First, if and are indifferent, so is the universal measurement which uses with probability and with probability : the indifferent universal measurements thus form a convex family, which is very large. Second, one can mix the selected densities themselves: if , and a random number are selected independently, according to and according to , then the universal measurement which selects is again indifferent (a rearrangement acts on and separately, and leaves their laws unchanged). Theorem 1 says that the average density is constant on this whole family, equal to : the quantum measurement is, so to speak, the center of mass of every member of the family. It is worth emphasizing that indifference is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for obtaining the uniform average density. Non-indifferent universal measurements can also reproduce the Born rule, as we shall illustrate in Section 10. What indifference provides is a structural guarantee: the uniform average follows from symmetry alone, independently of the particular selection law.
Rigidity of the universal measurements
We have seen that an indifferent universal measurement reproduces the quantum probabilities on average. We now show something stronger: the fluctuations of an indifferent universal measurement around its quantum average are entirely due to its deterministic (delta) components. If there are none, there are no fluctuations at all and the universal measurement is the quantum measurement, with certainty.
Consider an indifferent universal measurement , and the cell masses of the random density , at a dyadic level . By Theorem 1, their mean values are . How much do they fluctuate? The answer is given by the following theorem, which involves the average coincidence probability
where the are the random weights of the delta components of the selected density (their number and their positions being random as well). More precisely, if , with the non-deterministic (non-atomic) component of (possibly including a singular-continuous part), is the probability that two disintegrable points selected independently according to coincide exactly, since the non-deterministic component never produces coincidences. It vanishes if and only if has no deterministic components. The number is the average of this quantity over the random selection of , i.e., the probability that two interactions coincide when is first selected according to and then kept fixed for both independent selections of the interaction. Hence, it is the coincidence probability of the universal measurement .
Note that is not the total weight of the deterministic components, i.e., the probability that the selected interaction comes from a delta component. Since , with equality only when all the weight is carried by a single point, weighs the deterministic components quadratically, and is therefore sensitive to their concentration rather than to their amount. What matters for us is that vanishes if and only if the universal measurement has no deterministic (delta) components at all, and that, as we now show, it is precisely which governs the fluctuations of the outcome probabilities around their quantum values.
Theorem 3 (variance of an indifferent universal measurement). Let be an indifferent universal measurement. Then, for every dyadic level and every cell ,
and more generally, for every , writing
Proof. Let be the variance of and the covariance of and , . By indifference, these numbers do not depend on and (any two cells, or pairs of cells, can be exchanged by a rearrangement, and variances and covariances only depend on the probabilities with which the masses take their values, as in the proof of Theorem 1). All mean values, variances and covariances in this proof are taken with respect to , the selected density being the only random quantity. In addition, the variance of a sum of random variables is the sum of their variances plus the sum of the covariances of all the pairs of distinct variables:
where for the second equality we have used that there are variances, all equal to , and ordered pairs with , all with covariance . But , for every , so that this sum has zero variance, and therefore
In other words, since the cell masses always sum to 1, a cell which is heavier than average forces the others to be lighter, which is why the covariance between two cells is negative, and exactly compensates the variances.
At this point, we can use the fact that each cell of level is the union of two cells of level , so (level ) is the sum of two cell masses of level . So, using again (31), together with (32) applied at level , i.e., , we have
Defining , we can write and (33) gives
So, we have shown that the number is the same at all dyadic levels. We can call it and observe that (29) holds, with this , by (32).
As a final step, consider the mean value, with respect to , of . By definition of the variance, , so that
On the other hand, for a given , is the probability that two disintegrable points selected independently according to fall in the same cell of level . As increases, the cells shrink and this probability decreases to the probability that the two points coincide, which is . Taking the mean value over (the quantities are bounded by 1, so mean and limit can be exchanged) and letting in (35), we get , which is (28). Finally, (30) follows from (29) at dyadic points , since is then a sum of cell masses, whose variance is , and by continuity we can extend to arbitrary . □
To see what (30) means, consider the following simple universal measurement : with probability it selects the random deterministic measurement , uniform in , and with probability it selects the uniform density . It is indifferent, being a mixture of two indifferent universal measurements. For an initial state such that the particle sits on the band at the coordinate , the outcome probability is: in the first case, 1 if and 0 otherwise, i.e., a yes–no variable with mean and variance ; in the second case, , with variance 0. In both cases the mean is , so the mean of is , as it must be by Theorem 1, and the variance is the weighted sum of the two variances, . Theorem 3 says that every indifferent universal measurement with coincidence probability has exactly this variance, whatever its actual structure: as far as the fluctuations of the outcome probabilities around their quantum values are concerned, an indifferent universal measurement cannot be distinguished from a random measurement which is deterministic with probability and quantum with probability .5
For the uniform measurement, . For the random deterministic measurement of § 7, the selected density has a single delta component of weight 1, so : the selected measurement is always deterministic, and takes only the values 0 and 1, with mean and variance . For equally likely disintegrable points, each has weight , so , and . For the Dirichlet process with concentration parameter , the stick-breaking construction gives by a self-similarity argument: writing , the first piece contributes , and the remaining pieces are obtained by breaking the remaining stick, of length , in exactly the same way as the whole stick, so that , where has the same law as and is independent of . Taking mean values, . For the density (26) one computes and , hence , i.e.,
As expected, for (random deterministic measurement) and for (uniform measurement).
Theorem 4 (uniform or deterministic). Let be an indifferent universal measurement. Then is a mixture of the uniform measurement and of an indifferent universal measurement which only selects densities with deterministic components: with probability the selected density is , and with probability it has at least one delta component.
Corollary 1. In particular (): if never selects a density with delta components, then it selects, with probability one, the uniform density .
Proof. We first prove the corollary, then the theorem. If almost surely has no delta components, then almost surely, so by (28), so all the variances (29) vanish: every cell mass , of every dyadic level, is almost surely equal to its mean value . There are countably many dyadic cells, so with probability one all of them have mass simultaneously, and by the monotonicity argument of the proof of Theorem 1, , i.e., . Now, the property “ has no delta components” is unaffected by rearrangements. Hence, if we condition the law on this property, we obtain again an indifferent universal measurement, which now selects no delta components, and which by the corollary is the uniform measurement. Conditioning on the complementary property, we obtain an indifferent universal measurement selecting densities with delta components only.
Corollary 1 is a rigidity statement: indifference, together with the absence of deterministic components, leaves no freedom at all. It is the strongest possible form of the intuition that guided the analysis in [13], that “averaging over all densities cannot give anything but the uniform density”: if the random selection does not privilege any portion of the band and selects genuine densities, then it does not merely give the uniform density on average, it gives the uniform density every time. In the hidden-measurement language: a universal measurement without deterministic components is, with certainty, the quantum measurement. The Born rule then governs the outcome probabilities of each individual run, and not merely the statistics obtained by averaging over many runs.
The theorem also explains, retrospectively, a historical difficulty. The attempts made in the nineties to define a universal average by means of a probability law on the set of all densities (see the Preface of [15]) could not succeed, not because of technical subtleties, but because no such law exists, except the trivial one concentrated on . Non-trivial indifferent universal measurements exist only if one admits deterministic measurements, as in Section 7. In probability theory this is a known structural fact: a random probability measure on whose law is invariant under the length-preserving transformations of the interval is almost surely of the form , with the independent and uniform [27 Theorem 1.25, p. 50]; see also [26]. Theorem 4 is the elementary part of this representation, which also shows that the continuous part of the density selected by an indifferent universal measurement is always of the form , i.e., the uniform density multiplied by its total weight , the remaining weight being carried by the delta components: no non-uniform profile can appear, not even alongside deterministic components.
What happens to the cellular universal measurements introduced in [13]? They are indifferent only at their own level, and they select two-valued densities, which are genuine densities. So, Theorem 4 does not apply to them directly, and indeed a two-valued density is very different from the uniform one (half of the band, on average, is non-disintegrable). Yet, as , the outcome probabilities of the randomly selected two-valued density become indistinguishable from the quantum ones, with probability tending to one. This is a law of large numbers: the fraction of disintegrable cells in any region of the band is close to the fraction of disintegrable cells in the whole band, with fluctuations of order ; more precisely (Appendix C)
for every region made of whole cells. So the -measurements also concentrate on the quantum measurement, not in the sense that the selected density becomes uniform (it does not: in each cell it is either zero or twice the uniform value), but in the sense that its transition probabilities become those of the uniform density. This is the way in which Theorem 4 manifests itself at finite resolution, and it clarifies in what sense the two-valued cellular densities “approach” the uniform density as . They do not approach it as functions,6 but their integrals over any fixed interval converge to that of , because the oscillations compensate each other on scales smaller than the interval. In other words, it is the probabilities, not the densities, that become quantum. This is also, in our view, the correct way to read the remark, made in [17], that the limit of the cellular densities would be a set of Dirac delta functions: they do not, they only become infinitely fast oscillations whose local average is uniform.
Sequences of measurements
The average coincidence probability in (28) has an additional physical meaning when one considers sequences of measurements. Suppose that the same measurement is performed on a collection of entities, all prepared in the same state , and let us distinguish two scenarios.
In the first scenario, the random density is selected afresh at each run. Then the outcomes are independent, each with the quantum probabilities (19), whatever the indifferent universal measurement and whatever the value of its coincidence probability : the sequence is exactly the one predicted by quantum mechanics for independent repetitions.
In the second scenario, the density is selected once and then persists for the whole sequence (the measuring apparatus is “the same” at each run, in the sense that its ‘way’ of selecting interactions has been fixed once and for all, although it remains unknown to us). Then the outcomes are no longer independent. The probability of obtaining, say, the outcome in two consecutive runs is the mean value (we write for simplicity ) of , and by Theorem 3
to be compared with the value predicted by quantum mechanics for independent outcomes. The outcomes are positively correlated: having obtained makes more likely at the next run, by an amount proportional to . The sequence is exchangeable (its law is invariant under permutations of the runs) but, for and , not independent. For the Dirichlet universal measurement this is the well-known Pólya-urn structure of [24], in which each new breaking point is either a previously used one, with a probability proportional to the number of times it has been used, or a fresh uniformly distributed one. At the level of the binary outcomes, this induces a corresponding two-color Pólya-urn process.
So, the hypothesis that quantum measurements are universal measurements is compatible with the observed independence of repeated quantum measurements in two ways: either the way of selecting the interaction is itself re-selected at each run, or it is persistent but has no deterministic components, in which case, by Theorem 4, it is the uniform measurement. The two cases are in principle distinguishable through the statistics of sequences, with as the parameter to be determined experimentally—or, more precisely, to be bounded from above, since the independence of repeated measurements on identically prepared systems, which is routinely assumed and, as far as we know, never contradicted in quantum laboratories, indicates that, if the way of selecting the interaction persists from one run to the next, must be very small. A dedicated analysis of existing sequential data would be needed to turn this into a quantitative bound.
These two scenarios are of course idealizations, and the physically relevant situation is likely to be intermediate: the way of selecting the interaction, i.e., the density , could persist for a certain characteristic time , and then be “reset,” i.e., selected anew. In that case, whether correlations are observed depends on the latency between successive runs. To make this quantitative in the simplest way, suppose that the resets occur at random times, with a mean interval T (a Poisson process). Two runs separated by a time then share the same with probability , in which case their outcomes are correlated as in (38), and are otherwise independent, so that, for an initial state with Born probability ,
The correlations are visible only for latencies shorter than the persistence time T, and the independence of repeated quantum measurements, as observed in the laboratory, constrains the product , not alone. This situation is entirely analogous to the one we discussed in Section 10 of [13], one level below, for the measurement interactions themselves: if the interaction , rather than the way of selecting it, persisted in the measuring device for a characteristic time, successive measurements performed within that time on identically prepared entities would tend to produce the same outcome. This is precisely the hypothesis that was tested by Durt et al. [28], with an atomic interferometer, by analyzing the temporal statistics of successive measurements, with a negative result: no temporal correlations were observed.
As we observed in [13], this negative result admits different readings: the fluctuations could be too rapid to be detected, or, more fundamentally, the hidden interaction could be created anew at each measurement, in the interplay between the measuring system and the measured entity, in the manner of a symmetry breaking, rather than being a pre-existing fluctuating state of the apparatus. In the extended Bloch representation this is suggested by the fact that the membrane is destroyed by each measurement and has to be re-created for the next one. The same two readings are available one level up, for the density : either it is a persistent (if unknown) characteristic of the measuring system, in which case the correlations (39) should appear for sufficiently short latencies – and the negative result of Durt et al., or a refined version of their experiment, also constrains this scenario, although translating it into a quantitative bound on would require a dedicated analysis – or the way of selecting the interaction is itself created at each contact between the entity and the measuring system, in which case no correlation is to be expected.7 In the latter reading, a universal measurement is, at each run, a genuinely new “measurement of measurements,” and the Born rule for sequences holds exactly, with no constraint on the deterministic content of the individual runs.
We leave it to future work, and to the experimentalists, to assess which of these readings is the correct one. The point we want to make here is that the notion of universal measurement, far from being a purely formal device, articulates a precise and in principle testable hypothesis about the temporal structure of the measurement process.
The role of the length
We now come to the question (Q4): the role of the length. Indifference was defined through cells of equal length, and the uniform density is uniform with respect to the length along the band. Could one dispense with this notion, and define a universal average which would depend only on the set of all densities, with no reference to how the band is measured? The answer is no, and the reason is instructive.
Consider rearrangements of a more general kind: cut the band into pieces of unequal lengths, and glue them again in a different order, after stretching or compressing each piece so that it fits into its new place. Such an operation maps every density to a density (a stretched piece carries the same mass over a longer interval), so that the set of all densities is invariant under it, exactly as it is under the length-preserving rearrangements. If the universal average could be defined from the set of all densities alone, with no reference to the length, it would have to be invariant under these generalized rearrangements too.
Theorem 5 (no universal average without a notion of size). There is no probability density on which is invariant under all the generalized rearrangements (cut into pieces of unequal lengths, stretch or compress, and glue again). Consequently, no universal measurement can be indifferent with respect to all of them.
Proof. Let be a density invariant under all generalized rearrangements, and let and be any two intervals of positive length inside . There is a generalized rearrangement mapping onto (cut out , stretch or compress it to the length of , and fit the rest of the band around it); by invariance, gives the same mass to and to . Call this common mass . Take now strictly inside , with containing an interval of positive length: then , so . Every interval of positive length would then carry zero mass, which is incompatible with . If a -measurement were indifferent with respect to all generalized rearrangements, its average density would be invariant under all of them, by the same computation as in the proof of Theorem 1. So, no such exists.
Theorem 5 tells us that indifference is always indifference with respect to a notion of size. The set of all possible ways of selecting an interaction, taken as a bare set, has no symmetry that could single out a density: one has to say with respect to what the selection is indifferent. In our model, the answer is given by the physics of the model: the band is a segment of the Bloch ball, which is a Euclidean ball, its length is the Euclidean length, and the “cells of equal length” are cells of equal Euclidean length. This is the same input that gives the Born rule for the uniform measurement in [13]: the probability of an outcome is the ratio of two lengths, as per (3). The universal average does not create this input, it inherits it and shows that nothing else is needed. The Euclidean structure of the extended Bloch sphere is in turn not an arbitrary choice: it is induced by the Hilbert–Schmidt scalar product of operators, which is, up to a factor, the only scalar product invariant under unitary transformations.
This is also the sense in which the dependence of the universal average on the “parameterization” of the band, which in the context of Bertrand’s paradox is the core of Shackel’s objection, is to be understood: a passive change of coordinates does not by itself change the physical length measure (which must be pushed forward with the appropriate Jacobian). What changes the notion of size, and potentially the universal average, is instead imposing a new uniform measure in place of the transformed Euclidean measure . In the extended Bloch representation there is one natural parameterization, the Euclidean one, and the universal average is uniquely defined with respect to it. The theorem simply says that this input cannot be derived from the set of densities, but has to come from the physical model, and in our case it does.
The distinction between an indifferent and a non-indifferent random selection of measurements is well illustrated by a calculation made by Aerts in [6], before the notion of universal average was given its present form. There, the intermediate measurements were described by elastic bands uniformly disintegrable in a sub-interval and non-disintegrable elsewhere (a two-parameter generalization of the -model), i.e., by the densities
and one asked what the transition probabilities would be if were chosen “at random,” uniformly in the triangle of the allowed values. The result (Eq. (7) of [6]) was found to be different from the Born rule, by logarithmic correction terms. In the present language, this random choice is a universal measurement , and its average density can be computed in closed form. The triangle has unit area, so that choosing uniformly in means that the average density is obtained by integrating over with the measure :
where in the second expression we have first integrated over : for a given , the condition means , and is also constrained to , so that the integral over is the length (denoted ) of the intersection of these two intervals. Consider (the case follows by the symmetry ). For small , namely , the interval lies entirely inside , and the length is . For , the right end is cut, and the intersection is , of length . For , both ends are cut, and the intersection is the whole , of length . The three contributions to (41) are then
and their sum, after a short rearrangement of the logarithms (and extending the result to by symmetry), takes the remarkably simple form
where is the Shannon entropy (in natural units) of a yes-no experiment with probability . So, the average density of Aerts’ random choice is the entropy of the Born probability of the state whose particle lands at . It is maximal at the center of the band, , and vanishes at its ends, . It is correctly normalized, since . Integrating (43) one obtains the cumulative function
as one checks by differentiation, and for a vector-state corresponding to , this is exactly Eq. (7) of [6]. So the transition probability found in 1998 is, as it must be by (14), the transition probability of the -measurement with the average density (43), and its deviation from the Born rule is the deviation of this average density from the uniform one.
By Theorem 1, the -measurement is therefore not indifferent and it is easy to see why. A sub-interval chosen uniformly in the triangle is much more likely to cover the center of the band than its ends, because a point near an end can only be covered by the few, small, intervals that fit there (this is what the three regimes of the computation above express). Hence, the uniform choice of a sub-interval privileges the center of the band: it is a random choice of a measurement which is not indifferent with respect to the pieces of the band. The lesson is that “choosing a measurement at random” is not, by itself, enough to produce the quantum probabilities: the result depends on how the measurements are selected. Indifference provides a sufficient condition, but not a necessary one. Indeed, consider a -measurement selecting, with equal probability, either the density , uniform on , or the density , uniform on . Clearly, , so that the Born rule is recovered. Yet this -measurement is not indifferent: although its law is invariant under the exchange of the two halves of the band, it is not invariant under arbitrary rearrangements of four dyadic cells, which can transform into a density different from both and . Thus, reproducing the Born rule on average is a weaker requirement than indifference. What Theorem 1 establishes is that indifference guarantees the Born rule without any further specification of the selection law. Furthermore, Corollary 1 shows that the only fully indifferent law supported on absolutely continuous probability densities is the one concentrated on . Thus, while suitably chosen weights can reproduce the Born rule without indifference, a non-trivial indifferent universal measurement necessarily requires a broader family of admissible densities.
Generalizations
In the extended Bloch representation, a non-degenerate measurement with outcomes is represented by an -dimensional simplex , with vertices , filled with an abstract elastic and disintegrable membrane. The point-particle representing the state falls orthogonally onto the membrane, reaching the point , which divides the simplex into convex regions . If the membrane begins to disintegrate in , the particle is drawn to . If the membrane is uniform, the probability of the outcome is the ratio of the Euclidean, -dimensional volume of to the volume of the simplex, and this ratio is exactly the Born probability (Eqs. (59)–(66) of [13]). A general -measurement is described by a density on the simplex, and .
The same symmetry-based construction extends naturally to higher dimensions, once the cells of equal length are replaced by cells of equal volume. A convenient nested sequence of such cells is provided by the iterated barycentric subdivision of the simplex: the first subdivision cuts into small simplices of equal volume, corresponding to the orderings of the barycentric coordinates , which are permuted among themselves by the volume-preserving permutations of the coordinates. Each small simplex is then subdivided in the same way, and so on, the cells becoming arbitrarily small.8 A universal measurement is indifferent if its law is invariant under the rearrangements of the cells of every level, and the proof of Theorem 1 goes through unchanged: the average density gives to every cell of every level a mass equal to its relative volume, and since the cells of all levels determine the density (they become arbitrarily small and any region is approximated by unions of them), the average density is the uniform one, , and
for every indifferent universal measurement and every . Theorems 2, 3 (with the relative length replaced by the relative volume of the cells), 4 and 5 also carry over, with the same proofs. The -dimensional cellular construction of Section 13.3 of [13] is, again, one particular indifferent universal measurement, and the Dirichlet process with base probability density the uniform density on the simplex is another, whose weak topological support contains all Borel probability measures on the membrane.
It is worth being precise about what the universal average does and does not explain, in relation to Gleason’s theorem [8]. In the extended Bloch representation the Born rule results from two distinct ingredients: the orthogonal fall of the point-particle onto the membrane, which is deterministic and fixes the linear dependence of the outcome probabilities on the state (the Born probabilities are the barycentric coordinates of the orthogonal projection ), and the uniform disintegration of the membrane, which is indeterministic. The universal average concerns the second ingredient only: it shows that, given the geometry of the membrane and the landing point of the particle, indifference forces the disintegration to be uniform. It says nothing about the first ingredient, and it is precisely there that the content of Gleason’s theorem lies. Indeed, as shown in [9], for a non-orthogonal landing rule produces outcome probabilities which are perfectly consistent and yet non-Born. The uniform breaking of the band would then yield these non-Born probabilities, and so would, by Theorem 1, every indifferent universal measurement, since the universal average acts on the way the band disintegrates, not on the way the particle lands. For , on the contrary, the normalization constraints eliminate nonlinear rules (within the restricted class of scalar-product deformations studied in [9]). This provides a Bloch-geometric illustration of Gleason-type restrictions. So, the two results are complementary and concern the two stages of the measurement process: within the particular scalar-product deformation examined in [9], Gleason-type normalization constraints restrict the first stage for (while for the orthogonal fall remains a genuine assumption of the model); the universal average fixes the indeterministic second stage, for every . The heuristic argument of [6, 7], which derived the universal transition probabilities directly from Gleason’s theorem under the assumption that they depend only on the initial and final states, can be seen in retrospect as a conflation of the two stages. Degenerate measurements, which in [13] require an additional deterministic process after the collapse, are treated in the same way, since this additional process does not involve the selection of the interaction.
Turning now to Bertrand’s paradox, in [16] the same cellular construction was applied to the different “ways of tossing a stick” onto a circle, described by densities on the parameter space of the lines meeting the circle ( the direction, the distance of the line from the bottom of the circle), and the universal average was found to give the uniform density on this parameter space, hence the value for the probability that the chord is longer than the side of the inscribed triangle, which is also the value obtained by Jaynes [29] from the requirement of invariance under rotations, translations and dilations of the circle. Similarly, for the “ways of tossing two pebbles” onto the circumference, the universal average gives , and for a pebble tossed inside the disk, .
The results of the present article apply to these cases without change: for each of these parameter spaces, with its area measure, the universal average is unique, exact at every resolution, given by every indifferent random choice of a density, and the two-valued cellular densities are inessential. In this sense, the questions (Q1)–(Q3), which were raised by Shackel precisely in the context of Bertrand’s paradox, receive here their answer. The question (Q4), i.e., the dependence of the result on the parameterization, is in that context the crux of the matter, since Bertrand’s question, as posed, specifies neither a randomized entity nor a geometry. Theorem 5 tells us exactly what can and cannot be expected from a universal average in this respect: it cannot select a notion of size, but once one is fixed by the modelization of the problem, the universal average is unique. We believe that this allows a stronger conclusion than the one we drew in [16]. Bertrand’s question asks for a chord chosen “at random,” i.e., it appeals to indifference, and Theorem 5 shows that indifference, however it is implemented – by a direct application of the principle of insufficient reason to the chords, or by a universal average over all the ways of selecting them, or by any other procedure that does not privilege some chords over others – cannot produce a notion of size out of nothing: it can only be indifference with respect to a notion of size that has to be supplied independently. Consequently, no solution of Bertrand’s paradox can avoid the separation between the two problems: an “easy” part, which specifies a physical realization of the randomization, thereby identifying the randomized entity and the natural geometric measure (with its associated symmetries) on the space of possibilities, and a “hard” part, which, given that specification, determines the outcome probabilities [16]. The distinction between the two problems is thus forced upon us by Theorem 5, and is not a matter of interpretation. What the universal average adds is that, once the easy problem is solved, the hard one has a unique, exact and robust solution. The paradox arises, and will keep arising, whenever the easy problem is left implicit.
Conclusion
Let us return to the question in the title: are quantum measurements universal measurements? The results of this article allow us to answer it in a more precise way than in [13].
First, we have identified what a universal measurement is: a random way of selecting a -measurement, described by a probability law on the set of all possible densities; and what makes it universal: the law must be indifferent, i.e., it must not privilege any portion of the elastic band of the model, in the sense of being invariant under the cutting and re-gluing of the band in a different order. This is the transcription, at the level of the selection of the measurement, of the condition of maximal lack of knowledge which, at the level of the selection of the interaction, is expressed by the uniform density.
Second, we have shown that the outcome probabilities of every indifferent universal measurement are the quantum probabilities. The universal average is unique, it is exact at every finite resolution, and it does not depend on the way the random selection is constructed: by finite families of cellular densities as in [13], by continuous families, or by random mixtures of deterministic measurements of the Dirichlet type, whose weak topological support covers the entire space of probability measures on the membrane. In this precise sense, the quantum measurement is the universal measurement: it is the common “center of mass” of all the indifferent ways of selecting a measurement. The cellular construction of [13] was one way of exhibiting this center of mass, and its apparent peculiarities (equal cells, two values, constant sequence of averages, combinatorial identities) are all explained by the underlying symmetry.
Third, we have shown that the quantum measurement is not only the average of every indifferent universal measurement, but the only indifferent universal measurement free of deterministic components. The fluctuations of a universal measurement around its quantum average are entirely due to its deterministic components, and are governed by a single number, the coincidence probability , which also controls the correlations between the outcomes of a sequence of measurements performed with the same apparatus. The Born rule, together with the independence of repeated measurements, is thus recovered either when the way of selecting the interaction is renewed at each run, or when it is persistent but free of deterministic components, and the notion of universal measurement provides, with and the persistence time of the way of selecting the interaction, the parameters that quantify possible deviations.
Fourth, we have shown that the only input of the whole construction which cannot be derived from the notion of universal average itself is the notion of length (or volume) on the membrane representing the measurement, i.e., the Euclidean geometry of the extended Bloch sphere, which is itself a consequence of the unitary invariance of quantum mechanics. Indifference is always indifference with respect to a notion of size. The universal average does not create the geometry of the measurement, it shows that, given this geometry, and a point-particle falling orthogonally onto the disintegrable membrane, nothing else is needed to obtain the Born rule. The orthogonal fall, which encodes the linear dependence of the probabilities on the state, is the part of the model to which Gleason’s theorem pertains, and the two results are complementary: Gleason’s theorem constrains the deterministic stage of the measurement, for , and the universal average fixes its indeterministic stage, for every (Section 11).
The answer to the question in the title is therefore affirmative, in the following precise sense. If a quantum measurement is a situation of maximal lack of knowledge, not only about the interaction that is actualized, but also about the way it is selected, and if this lack of knowledge is understood as indifference with respect to the natural geometry of the measurement, then the Born rule is not merely compatible with the hypothesis: it is forced by it, whatever the details of the way the interaction is selected, and no other probability rule is possible. Conversely, every indifferent way of selecting an interaction, whether it is realized by a uniform membrane, by a random collection of deterministic breaking points, or by any mixture of the two, is operationally a quantum measurement. Whether quantum measurements are universal measurements in this sense, in nature, is of course a question that mathematics cannot settle. But the hypothesis is now shown to be consistent, unique in its consequences, and, through the statistics of sequences of measurements, not entirely beyond the reach of future experiments.
Combinatorial identities
We derive two combinatorial identities (Eqs. (108) and (113) of [13]. We observe that under the disintegrable cells form a random non-empty subset of , all the non-empty subsets being equally likely, and is the number of disintegrable cells. We write if (the -th cell is disintegrable) and otherwise. Since the two-valued density associated with takes the value in the disintegrable cells, of length , and the value 0 in the others, the mass of the -th cell is
i.e., if the cell is disintegrable and 0 if it is not. We can compute the mean value of the mass of the first cell in two different ways. The first way is a direct count: the subsets of size which contain the cell 1 are obtained by choosing the other elements among the remaining cells, so there are of them, each contributing to the mass of the first cell. Hence
The second way uses the symmetry. Summing (46) over gives for every , so that the mean values of the cell masses sum to 1, and since the uniform law on the subsets does not distinguish between the cells (a rearrangement of the band maps subsets of size onto subsets of size ), these mean values are all equal. Therefore
Comparing (47) and (48) we obtain the identity
which is nothing but the identity (113) of [13], written for instead of . One can also check (49) directly, using and , but the point here is that it is the symmetry which makes the identity true, and which makes it hold for every . Identity (108) of [13], on the other hand, can be obtained using (49), with replaced by , and the subtraction:
Approximation of an arbitrary density
We show that, for every density on , possibly with delta components, there is a single sequence of two-valued cellular densities , in the sense of (7), such that for every interval whose endpoints are not delta components of , and uniformly over all intervals if has no delta components.
This is the statement at which Section 13.1 of [13] aimed. The argument given there, however, chose the number of disintegrable elementary cells separately in each cell, without controlling the total error accumulated over all the cells, so that, strictly speaking, it only established the weaker statement in which the approximating sequence is allowed to depend on the interval considered (this is the ambiguity in the order of the quantifiers pointed out in [17]). The construction below provides a single sequence, with an explicit bound on the error, valid for all intervals at once.
Let be the number of cells , of length , and let each cell be divided into elementary cells, so that . Let be the cell masses of , . Choose , and let the two-valued cellular density have, in the cell , exactly disintegrable elementary cells (the first ones, say), so that the total number of disintegrable elementary cells is , with (because each differs from by less than 1); in particular . The mass of in is , and
So, the cell masses of and of differ, in total, by less than . For an interval whose endpoints fall in the cells and , let be the union of the cells entirely contained in : then , while the parts of outside lie in and carry a mass at most under and at most under . Altogether, we have
If has no delta components, as , and the right-hand side tends to zero uniformly in . If has delta components, tends to zero as long as the endpoints of are not delta components. In both cases a single sequence, , , works for all intervals.
Concentration of cellular universal measurements
We prove the bound (37). Under , the set of disintegrable cells is a random non-empty subset of , all the non-empty subsets being equally likely, and for a region made of a whole cells the probability of the outcome associated with is the fraction of disintegrable cells that lie in :
where is the number of disintegrable cells and the number of those lying in . Let us first fix the number of disintegrable cells. Since all subsets are equally likely, the subsets of size are equally likely among themselves, i.e., is obtained by drawing cells at random, without replacement, among the cells, of which belong to . The number of drawn cells belonging to is then a classical hypergeometric random variable, whose mean and variance are
where the subscript recalls that is fixed, and we used , and . Dividing by , the ratio (53) has, for fixed , mean value (whatever : this is Theorem 2 once more) and variance at most . Now, the variance of a random variable whose law depends on an auxiliary random quantity (here ) is given by the law of total variance: it is the mean, over , of the conditional variance of for fixed , plus the variance, over , of the conditional mean of for fixed . Here the conditional mean is for every , so its variance over vanishes, and we are left with
Since there are subsets of size , each with probability ,
where we used for , then the identity (49) with replaced by , and finally for . Inserting this into (55) gives , which is (37). The bound is not sharp: a numerical evaluation gives for , and half of the band, but what matters is that the variance tends to zero as , so that the outcome probabilities of the randomly selected two-valued density concentrate on the quantum values.
Acknowledgments
I would like to express my gratitude to Diederik Aerts for the wonderful scientific collaboration we have shared over the past fifteen years, and which continues to this day. After a long period away from academic research, my interest was rekindled by my encounter with him and our initial discussions of the problem at the heart of the present article: his conjecture on universal measurements, which eventually led us in 2014 to the result presented in [13]. I am also grateful to N. Shackel, whose criticisms, though severe, were undoubtedly pertinent and provided me with the motivation to revisit this fascinating notion, which I believe has now found a more mature formulation in the present work.
Declaration of generative AI use
The mathematical reformulation of the universal average as an invariant average presented in this article, including the statements and proofs of Theorems 1 through 5, the connection to Dirichlet processes, and a first draft of the manuscript, were developed by the author drawing also on a dialogue with the artificial intelligence assistant Claude (Anthropic).
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