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Artificial Currency and Separate Selling: A 3-Approximation for Consumer Surplus

Abstract

We study the allocation of indivisible items to buyers with additive values drawn from independent distributions. The objective is consumer surplus net of burnt payments. We consider artificial-currency mechanisms: buyers receive personalized budgets of a currency worthless outside the mechanism and use them to bid across items. The better of separate selling and artificial-currency mechanisms provides a 3-approximation to optimal consumer surplus. The guarantee holds at every Bayes–Nash equilibrium, without equilibrium selection. Both branches are necessary: either alone may capture only a vanishing share of the optimum. The proof decomposes benchmark surplus into a stable part captured by artificial currency and a variation covered by separate selling.

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