betaFeedback

WorksEconomics, Econometrics and Finance

An Enforcement Foundation for Constrained Equal Awards

Abstract

Standard claims problems take claims as given. We ask how rule selection changes when a certified claim can be augmented by a privately known component that is costly to verify. In a binary environment, equal treatment of equals, claim boundedness, and efficiency impose a sharp lower bound on the gain from exaggeration and hence on the expected auditing needed for truthful reporting to be weakly dominant. The constrained equal awards (CEA) rule attains this bound at every report profile through a correlated audit policy. Conversely, every profilewise audit-minimal rule is CEA. The pointwise result also makes CEA the unique admissible rule that minimizes expected verification cost under every prior over true claims.

Introduction

Claims problems divide an insufficient estate among competing claims. The classical model treats claims as established before allocation [9, 11]. When a documented claim can be augmented by an increment requiring further evidence, the allocation rule also affects verification costs.1

The canonical claims problem is a triple (N,E,c)(N, E, c), where ci>0c_i > 0 and 0<E≤∑j∈Ncj0 < E \le\sum_{j \in N} c_j. A rule chooses awards xx satisfying 0≤xi≤ci0 \le x_i \le c_i and ∑i∈Nxi=E\sum_{i \in N} x_i = E. The constrained equal awards rule (CEA) assigns

CEA⁡i(N,E,c)=min⁡{ci,λ},where λ≥0 solves ∑j∈Nmin⁡{cj,λ}=E.\operatorname{CEA}_i(N, E, c) = \min\{c_i, \lambda\}, \qquad\text{where } \lambda\ge0 \text{ solves } \sum_{j \in N} \min\{c_j, \lambda\} = E.

Thus all unsatisfied claimants receive the same award. Dagan [4] characterizes CEA by equal treatment of equals (equal claims receive equal awards), composition up (for E<E′E < E', allocating EE and then E′−EE' - E to the residual claims using the same rule yields the allocation for the larger estate E′E'), and claims-truncation invariance (the part of a claim that exceeds the estate does not matter). By contrast, the proportional rule assigns Pi(N,E,c)=Eci/∑j∈NcjP_i(N, E, c) = Ec_i/\sum_{j \in N} c_j: it preserves claim ratios and equalizes satisfaction ratios xi/cix_i/c_i for positive claims, rather than award levels.

This raises a rule-selection question: among claim-bounded and efficient rules that treat equals equally (henceforth admissible), which is cheapest to enforce when eligibility for the increment is privately known? A larger payoff gain from a high report strengthens the incentive to exaggerate and therefore requires more auditing. Verification burden is thus an endogenous property of the rule.

We study a binary environment. Every claimant has the same certified component LL and a total claim of either LL or H>LH > L; eligibility for the increment H−LH - L is privately known, and an audit reveals perfectly whether an asserted increment is genuine. The estate covers all certified components but not all high claims. “Certified” describes evidence, not a guaranteed award.

Our main result characterizes CEA. An admissible rule is profilewise audit-minimal if no admissible rule can make truthful reporting weakly dominant with fewer expected audits at any report profile. Admissibility imposes a lower bound on the payoff premium from a high report. CEA reaches the resulting audit bound at every profile and is the only rule that does so. The sanction changes the amount of auditing, but not the selected rule.

Recent work derives CEA from restrictions on maximal reasonable claims (Flores-Szwagrzak and Treibich [6]) or immunity to merging manipulations (Yin et al. [13]). Strategic approaches instead endogenize claims or bargaining (Ashlagi et al. [1]; Li and Ju [7]). For rationing with single-peaked preferences, Sprumont [10] characterizes the uniform rule by strategy-proofness, efficiency, and anonymity. Under excess demand it gives the CEA allocation when peaks are interpreted as claims. Under this rule, overstating a peak cannot increase the award of an agent rationed below it; an agent already at her peak does not prefer more. Here claims are entitlements, while preferences increase with the monetary award, including amounts above the true claim. Verification is therefore needed to induce truthful CEA.2 Whereas the costly-verification literature designs allocation mechanisms subject to verification constraints (Townsend [12]; Border and Sobel [3]; Ben-Porath et al. [2]; Mylovanov and Zapechelnyuk [8]), we compare admissible claims rules by the minimum auditing needed to implement each one.

For intuition, let RR be the estate remaining after reserving LL for every claimant. At a scarce profile with mm high reports, claim boundedness caps each low reporter at LL, so efficiency and equal treatment of equals force each high reporter to receive at least L+R/mL + R/m. A low claimant facing the same m−1m-1 high-reporting opponents can therefore gain at least R/mR/m by reporting high. CEA makes both bounds tight.

Model

Let N={1,…,n}N = \{1,\ldots,n\}, n≥2n \ge2, be the set of claimants. Fix claim levels 0<L<H0 < L < H, an estate EE with nL<E<nHnL < E < nH, a per-audit cost κ>0\kappa> 0, and a sanction p>0p > 0 for a detected false high report. Each claimant ii has a true claim ci∈{L,H}c_i \in\{L,H\} and submits a report ri∈{L,H}r_i \in\{L,H\}; cc and rr denote the true and report profiles, both in {L,H}n\{L,H\}^n. Let D≡H−LD \equiv H-L be the possible increment and

R≡E−nL∈(0,nD)R \equiv E-nL \in(0,nD)

the estate remaining after hypothetically covering every certified component. For a profile rr, let H(r)={i∈N:ri=H}\mathcal{H}(r) = \{i \in N : r_i = H\} be its set of high reporters, and write (L,r−i)(L,r_{-i}) for the profile obtained by replacing ii’s report with LL.

A rule FF assigns an award vector F(r)F(r) to every report profile rr (the estate is fixed and suppressed). It is admissible if it is claim bounded (0≤Fi(r)≤ri0 \le F_i(r) \le r_i for every ii), efficient (∑i∈NFi(r)=min⁡{E,∑i∈Nri}\sum_{i\in N} F_i(r) = \min\{E,\sum_{i\in N}r_i\}), and satisfies equal treatment of equals (ETE): ri=rjr_i = r_j implies Fi(r)=Fj(r)F_i(r) = F_j(r).3 Efficiency exhausts the compensation budget whenever claim bounds permit. If ∑iri<E\sum_{i} r_i < E, claims are paid in full and the authority retains the surplus. This binary rationing problem restricts to the usual claims domain when total claims are at least EE.

At a profile rr with mm high reports, ETE gives high reporters a common award bF(r)b^{F}(r) (m≥1m \ge1) and low reporters a common award aF(r)a^{F}(r) (m<nm < n). The profile is nonscarce if mD≤RmD \le R and scarce otherwise. Claim boundedness and efficiency fully compensate every reporter at nonscarce profiles. At a scarce profile,

(n−m)aF(r)+mbF(r)=E,(1)(n-m)a^{F}(r) + mb^{F}(r) = E, \tag*{(1)}

where the first term is absent when m=nm=n. On this domain CEA depends only on mm:

aCEA(r)=L(m<n),bCEA(r)=L+δm∗(m≥1),where δm∗=min⁡{D,Rm}.(2)a^{\mathrm{CEA}}(r)=L \quad(m<n), \qquad b^{\mathrm{CEA}}(r)=L+\delta_m^* \quad(m\ge1), \qquad\text{where }\delta_m^*=\min\left\{D,\frac{R}{m}\right\}. \tag*{(2)}

Note that δm∗\delta_m^* is nonincreasing in mm, so δh∗≥δm∗\delta_h^*\ge\delta_m^* whenever 1≤h≤m1\le h\le m.

We now turn to verification. An audit policy α\alpha assigns to every report profile rr a probability distribution α(⋅∣r)\alpha(\cdot\mid r) over subsets A⊆H(r)A\subseteq\mathcal{H}(r). Only high reports are audited, because only the asserted increment requires verification. After observing rr, the authority draws AA and audits its members simultaneously, so α\alpha cannot depend on audit outcomes or on cc. Each audit costs κ\kappa and reveals the audited claimant’s true claim. Audited false high reports are corrected to LL before FF is applied, and each detected liar pays pp; the sanction does not augment EE, and truthful audited claimants are not sanctioned. Claimants are risk neutral and value their award net of any sanction.

Write qiα(r)≡∑A∋iα(A∣r)q_i^\alpha(r)\equiv\sum_{A\ni i}\alpha(A\mid r) for the probability that ii is audited. The number of audits at rr is the random variable ∣A∣|A|, where A∼α(⋅∣r)A\sim\alpha(\cdot\mid r), and its expected value is

Nα(r)≡∑A⊆H(r)∣A∣α(A∣r)=∑i∈H(r)qiα(r).N_\alpha(r)\equiv\sum_{A\subseteq\mathcal{H}(r)}|A|\alpha(A\mid r)=\sum_{i\in\mathcal{H}(r)}q_i^\alpha(r).

Expected audits depend only on marginals; incentives depend on the joint corrections, which determine the profile to which FF is applied.

An audit policy makes FF dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if, for every ii, true profile cc, and reports r−ir_{-i} of the others, reporting cic_i weakly maximizes ii’s expected payoff. Let Ap(F)\mathcal{A}_p(F) denote these policies. For every admissible FF, auditing every high report is DSIC: exaggerations are corrected and penalized, while truthful high types receive more than LL (see the proof of Lemma 1) and low reports yield at most LL. Hence Ap(F)\mathcal{A}_p(F) is nonempty. It is closed in a finite product of simplices, so the minimum

AF(r)≡min⁡α∈Ap(F)Nα(r)A_F(r)\equiv\min_{\alpha\in\mathcal{A}_p(F)}N_\alpha(r)

exists. The fixed sanction is suppressed in AFA_F and subsequent cost notation.

Definition 1 (Profilewise audit-minimality). An admissible rule FF is profilewise audit-minimal if AF(r)≤AG(r)A_F(r)\le A_G(r) for every admissible rule GG and every r∈{L,H}nr\in\{L,H\}^n.

Fix rr with m≥1m\ge1 high reports and i∈H(r)i\in\mathcal{H}(r). Define

ΔiF(r)≡bF(r)−aF(L,r−i)\Delta_i^F(r)\equiv b^F(r)-a^F(L,r_{-i})

as the reporting premium, the gain from reporting high without audits. Suppose ci=Lc_i=L and c−i=r−ic_{-i}=r_{-i}, so others’ reports are truthful and never corrected. Truth pays aF(L,r−i)a^F(L,r_{-i}); exaggeration pays bF(r)b^F(r) without an audit and aF(L,r−i)−pa^F(L,r_{-i})-p otherwise. DSIC requires

(1−qiα(r))bF(r)+qiα(r)(aF(L,r−i)−p)≤aF(L,r−i).(1-q_i^\alpha(r))b^F(r)+q_i^\alpha(r)(a^F(L,r_{-i})-p)\le a^F(L,r_{-i}).

Equivalently, qiα(r)(ΔiF(r)+p)≥ΔiF(r)q_i^\alpha(r)(\Delta_i^F(r)+p)\ge\Delta_i^F(r). Solving at equality for a positive premium gives the threshold

q^iF(r)≡max⁡{ΔiF(r),0}max⁡{ΔiF(r),0}+p,\widehat{q}_i^F(r)\equiv\frac{\max\{\Delta_i^F(r),0\}}{\max\{\Delta_i^F(r),0\}+p},

which is zero for a nonpositive premium, since no audit is needed to deter this deviation. Every α∈Ap(F)\alpha\in\mathcal{A}_p(F) thus satisfies qiα(r)≥q^iF(r)q_i^\alpha(r)\ge\widehat{q}_i^F(r). This condition is necessary for DSIC but not sufficient, since it considers only truthful opponents. Lemma 1 establishes strictly positive premiums. CEA’s premium with mm high reports is δm∗\delta_m^* from (2), giving the marginal audit threshold

qm∗=δm∗δm∗+p.q_m^*=\frac{\delta_m^*}{\delta_m^*+p}.

Results

Lemma 1 (Premium floor). For every admissible FF, every rr with m≥1m \ge1 high reports, and every i∈H(r)i \in\mathcal{H}(r), ΔiF(r)≥δm∗\Delta_i^F(r) \ge\delta_m^*, with equality for F=CEAF = \mathrm{CEA}. Proof. If mD≤RmD \le R, both rr and (L,r−i)(L,r_{-i}) are nonscarce, so bF(r)=Hb^F(r) = H, aF(L,r−i)=La^F(L,r_{-i}) = L, and ΔiF(r)=D=δm∗\Delta_i^F(r) = D = \delta_m^*. If mD>RmD > R, claim boundedness gives aF(r)≤La^F(r) \le L when m<nm < n, and (1) yields mbF(r)≥E−(n−m)L=mL+Rmb^F(r) \ge E - (n-m)L = mL + R; when m=nm=n, (1) gives bF(r)=L+R/nb^F(r) = L + R/n directly. Since also aF(L,r−i)≤La^F(L,r_{-i}) \le L, we obtain ΔiF(r)≥R/m=δm∗\Delta_i^F(r) \ge R/m = \delta_m^*. Equality for CEA follows from (2).

Lemma 2 (Audit floor). For every admissible FF and every rr with m≥1m \ge1 high reports,

AF(r)≥∑i∈H(r)q^iF(r)≥mqm∗.A_F(r) \ge\sum_{i \in\mathcal{H}(r)} \widehat{q}_i^F(r) \ge m q_m^*.

Proof. Every α∈Ap(F)\alpha\in\mathcal{A}_p(F) satisfies Nα(r)=∑i∈H(r)qiα(r)≥∑i∈H(r)q^iF(r)N_\alpha(r) = \sum_{i \in\mathcal{H}(r)} q_i^\alpha(r) \ge\sum_{i \in\mathcal{H}(r)} \widehat{q}_i^F(r); minimizing over α\alpha gives the first inequality. The second follows from Lemma 1, since z↦z/(z+p)z \mapsto z/(z+p) is strictly increasing on z≥0z \ge0.

Theorem 1 (Audit-minimality characterization of CEA). The audit policy α∗\alpha^* defined by α∗(∅∣r)=1\alpha^*(\varnothing\mid r) = 1 if H(r)=∅\mathcal{H}(r) = \varnothing and, if rr has m≥1m \ge1 high reports,

α∗(H(r)∣r)=qm∗,α∗(∅∣r)=1−qm∗,\alpha^*(\mathcal{H}(r) \mid r) = q_m^*, \qquad\alpha^*(\varnothing\mid r) = 1-q_m^*,

makes CEA DSIC and attains ACEA(r)=mqm∗A_{\mathrm{CEA}}(r) = m q_m^* at every profile rr with m≥1m \ge1 high reports, with ACEA(r)=0A_{\mathrm{CEA}}(r) = 0 at the all-low profile. Moreover, for an admissible rule FF, the following are equivalent:

  • (a) F=CEAF = \mathrm{CEA};

  • (b) ΔiF(r)=δm∗\Delta_i^F(r) = \delta_m^* for every rr with m≥1m \ge1 high reports and every i∈H(r)i \in\mathcal{H}(r);

  • (c) FF is profilewise audit-minimal.

Proof. Fix ii and the others’ true claims and reports, and let mm count high reports when ii reports HH. Under α∗\alpha^*, each high reporter is audited with probability qm∗q_m^*, so Nα∗(r)=mqm∗N_{\alpha^*}(r) = m q_m^*. Reporting LL always yields LL under CEA.

Let ci=Lc_i = L. Reporting HH yields L+δm∗L + \delta_m^* if nobody is audited. Otherwise ii is detected, corrected, and receives L−pL-p. The expected payoff is (1−qm∗)(L+δm∗)+qm∗(L−p)=L(1-q_m^*)(L+\delta_m^*) + q_m^*(L-p) = L, so truthful reporting is weakly optimal.

Let ci=Hc_i = H. Reporting HH yields L+δm∗>LL+\delta_m^* > L if nobody is audited. Otherwise ii is confirmed while false high reports of others are corrected, leaving hh high reports with 1≤h≤m1 \le h \le m; ii receives L+δh∗≥L+δm∗>LL+\delta_h^* \ge L+\delta_m^* > L because δ∗\delta^* is nonincreasing. Reporting HH is strictly optimal. Hence α∗∈Ap(CEA)\alpha^* \in\mathcal{A}_p(\mathrm{CEA}), and with Lemma 2, ACEA(r)=mqm∗A_{\mathrm{CEA}}(r) = m q_m^*; at the all-low profile, ACEA(r)=0A_{\mathrm{CEA}}(r) = 0.

(a)⇒(b)(a)\Rightarrow(b) is the equality case of Lemma 1.

(b)⇒(a)(b)\Rightarrow(a). Nonscarce profiles are fixed by admissibility. Let rr be scarce with mm high reports and i∈H(r)i \in\mathcal{H}(r). The proof of Lemma 1 gives

ΔiF(r)=bF(r)−aF(L,r−i)≥L+Rm−aF(L,r−i)≥Rm.\Delta_i^F(r) = b^F(r) - a^F(L,r_{-i}) \ge L + \frac{R}{m} - a^F(L,r_{-i}) \ge\frac{R}{m}.

By (b), ΔiF(r)=δm∗=R/m\Delta_i^F(r) = \delta_m^* = R/m, so both inequalities bind and bF(r)=L+R/mb^F(r) = L+R/m. If m<nm<n, (1) then gives aF(r)=La^F(r) = L. Every scarce profile’s awards thus coincide with (2), so F=CEAF = \mathrm{CEA}.

(a)⇒(c)(a)\Rightarrow(c) follows from ACEA(r)=mqm∗A_{\mathrm{CEA}}(r) = m q_m^* and Lemma 2.

(c)⇒(b)(c)\Rightarrow(b). If FF is profilewise audit-minimal, then for every rr with m≥1m \ge1 high reports,

mqm∗≤∑i∈H(r)q^iF(r)≤AF(r)≤ACEA(r)=mqm∗.m q_m^* \le\sum_{i \in\mathcal{H}(r)} \widehat{q}_i^F(r) \le A_F(r) \le A_{\mathrm{CEA}}(r) = m q_m^*.

Since each qiF(r)≥qm∗q_i^F(r) \ge q_m^* by Lemma 1 and the monotonicity of z/(z+p)z/(z+p), each equals qm∗>0q_m^*>0. Strict monotonicity of z/(z+p)z/(z+p) then gives ΔiF(r)=δm∗\Delta_i^F(r)=\delta_m^*.

The joint audit distribution matters for attaining the bound. Let n=2n=2, L=1L=1, H=3H=3, E=4E=4, and p=1p=1, so q2∗=1/2q_2^*=1/2. Fix a claimant, suppose both true claims are low, and let the opponent report HH. Reporting LL pays 1. If both report HH and each is audited independently with probability 1/21/2, the four equally likely outcomes (neither audited, only the opponent, only the claimant, both) give a claimant net payoffs 2, 3, 0, 0: catching only the opponent raises the unaudited liar’s award to 3. Exaggeration therefore pays 5/4>15/4>1. Under α∗\alpha^*, both are audited or neither is, and exaggeration pays (0+2)/2=1(0+2)/2=1. Correlation thus allows the minimum marginal audit probabilities to deter exaggeration even when others lie. Independent audits at higher rates, including full auditing, can still provide DSIC.

The proportional benchmark also illustrates the strictness of the bound. At a scarce mixed profile rr (one with 1≤m<n1\le m<n high reports), let ρm≡E/(nL+mD)<1\rho_m\equiv E/(nL+mD)<1. Proportional awards are aP(r)=ρmL<La^P(r)=\rho_m L<L and bP(r)=ρmHb^P(r)=\rho_m H. By efficiency, bP(r)>L+R/mb^P(r)>L+R/m; since aP(L,r−i)≤La^P(L,r_{-i})\le L, it follows that ΔiP(r)>R/m\Delta_i^P(r)>R/m for every i∈H(r)i\in\mathcal{H}(r). Proportional therefore requires strictly more auditing at that profile. If no mixed profile is scarce, its full-compensation extension and CEA coincide on the binary domain.

The sanction changes required auditing, while CEA remains uniquely optimal for every finite p>0p>0, including p>Hp>H. Such penalties are feasible in the model because net payoffs may be negative. Since qm∗→0q_m^*\to0 as p→∞p\to\infty, institutional restrictions justify taking pp as fixed or bounded [3, 8]. If the authority chooses 0<p≤pˉ<∞0<p\le\bar p<\infty without a cost of setting the sanction, Ap(F)\mathcal{A}_p(F) expands with pp, so choosing pˉ\bar p minimizes audits. A cost incurred only when a sanction is imposed is zero along the truthful equilibrium used to evaluate costs. An ex ante cost of establishing a sanction may favor a smaller pp. If this cost depends only on pp, replacing any rule by CEA at the same positive sanction weakly lowers total expected cost. Thus any attained joint optimum can be achieved with CEA.4

We close with expected verification cost. For a prior μ\mu over true profiles {L,H}n\{L,H\}^n, the minimum expected verification cost of implementing FF truthfully is

CF(μ)≡κmin⁡α∈Ap(F)Ec∼μ[Nα(c)].C_F(\mu)\equiv\kappa\min_{\alpha\in\mathcal{A}_p(F)}\mathbb{E}_{c\sim\mu}[N_\alpha(c)].

Costs are evaluated at truthful reports r=cr=c. Under α∗\alpha^*, low types are indifferent between both reports, so truthfulness need not be the unique equilibrium. The prior may assign all its weight to nonscarce profiles, where every admissible rule pays claims in full.

Corollary 1 (Prior-free verification cost). For every prior μ\mu and every admissible rule FF, CCEA(μ)≤CF(μ)C_{\mathrm{CEA}}(\mu)\le C_F(\mu). Moreover, an admissible rule that minimizes expected verification cost for every prior is CEA.

Proof. For every α∈Ap(F)\alpha\in\mathcal{A}_p(F) and every cc, Nα(c)≥AF(c)≥ACEA(c)=Nα∗(c)N_\alpha(c)\ge A_F(c)\ge A_{\mathrm{CEA}}(c)=N_{\alpha^*}(c) by the definition of AFA_F and Theorem 1. At the all-low profile nobody reports high, so every policy audits nobody and all these terms are zero. Taking expectations under μ\mu and minimizing over α\alpha gives CF(μ)≥κEc∼μ[Nα∗(c)]=CCEA(μ)C_F(\mu)\ge\kappa\mathbb{E}_{c\sim\mu}[N_{\alpha^*}(c)]=C_{\mathrm{CEA}}(\mu). For uniqueness, let FF minimize cost for every prior and take μ\mu degenerate on an arbitrary profile cc. Then κAF(c)=CF(μ)≤CCEA(μ)=κACEA(c)\kappa A_F(c)=C_F(\mu)\le C_{\mathrm{CEA}}(\mu)=\kappa A_{\mathrm{CEA}}(c), and ACEA(c)≤AG(c)A_{\mathrm{CEA}}(c)\le A_G(c) for every admissible GG by Theorem 1. As cc is arbitrary, FF is profilewise audit-minimal, and Theorem 1 gives F=CEAF=\mathrm{CEA}. □

Conclusion

Costly verification changes the comparison of claims rules because a rule determines not only how the estate is divided but also how profitable it is to exaggerate. In the binary environment, admissibility imposes a lower bound on this reporting gain. CEA uniquely attains the bound simultaneously at every profile and, together with a correlated audit policy, makes truthful reporting weakly dominant with the fewest expected audits. The contrast with proportional division identifies the source of the result: protecting each certified component leaves the smallest possible premium for a high report. Because the bound is pointwise, the same argument delivers verification-cost optimality under every prior.

The characterization is deliberately tied to perfect, one-sided, simultaneous verification. Richer claim spaces, heterogeneous evidence or sanctions, and adaptive or imperfect audits may select different rules.

Declaration of generative AI and AI-assisted technologies in manuscript preparation

ChatGPT (OpenAI) was used to assist with exposition and checks of arguments, notation, and references. The author reviewed and revised the resulting material and takes responsibility for the article.

References

  1. [1]Itai Ashlagi, Emin Karagözoğlu, and Bettina Klaus. A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems. Mathematical Social Sciences, 63(3):228–233, 2012. doi: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.01.004.
  2. [2]Elchanan Ben-Porath, Eddie Dekel, and Barton L. Lipman. Optimal allocation with costly verification. American Economic Review, 104(12):3779–3813, 2014. doi: 10.1257/aer.104.12.3779.
  3. [3]Kim C. Border and Joel Sobel. Samurai accountant: A theory of auditing and plunder. Review of Economic Studies, 54(4):525–540, 1987. doi: 10.2307/2297481.DOI
  4. [4]Nir Dagan. New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules. Social Choice and Welfare, 13(1):51–59, 1996. doi: 10.1007/BF00179098.DOI
  5. [5]Lloyd Dixon, Geoffrey McGovern, and Amy Coombe. Asbestos bankruptcy trusts: An overview of trust structure and activity with detailed reports on the largest trusts. Technical Report TR-872-ICJ, RAND Institute for Civil Justice, Santa Monica, CA, 2010. URL https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR872.html.DOI
  6. [6]Karol Flores-Szwagrzak and Rafael Treibich. How much can you claim? Economics Letters, 246:112068, 2025. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112068.
  7. [7]Jiawen Li and Yuan Ju. Divide and choose: An informationally robust strategic approach to bankruptcy problems. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 107:102862, 2023. doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102862.DOI
  8. [8]Tymofiy Mylovanov and Andriy Zapechelnyuk. Optimal allocation with ex post verification and limited penalties. American Economic Review, 107(9):2666–2694, 2017. doi: 10.1257/aer.20140494.DOI
  9. [9]Barry O’Neill. A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud. Mathematical Social Sciences, 2(4):345–371, 1982. doi: 10.1016/0165-4896(82)90029-4.DOI
  10. [10]Yves Sprumont. The division problem with single-peaked preferences: A characterization of the uniform allocation rule. Econometrica, 59(2):509–519, 1991. doi: 10.2307/2938268.DOI
  11. [11]William Thomson. How to Divide When There Isn’t Enough: From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the Axiomatics of Resource Allocation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019. doi: 10.1017/9781108161107.DOI
  12. [12]Robert M. Townsend. Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification. Journal of Economic Theory, 21(2):265–293, 1979. doi: 10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0.DOI
  13. [13]Xiuxia Yin, Pedro Calleja, and Josep M. Izquierdo. Claims manipulations discriminate between egalitarian rules. Theory and Decision, 100(4):1041–1059, 2026. doi: 10.1007/s11238-025-10096-2.

Paper details

vlnc:W_p5xrht8d
Version
v1 · latest
Published
Fresh — added to the Hub within the last 30 days
Added
License
CC BY 4.0
Usage

views · 10

downloads · 0

A view counts once per browser per day, a download each time the PDF is requested.

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance

ChatGPT

View statement
Looking for related papers…
Contents