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WorksEconomics, Econometrics and Finance

Safe manipulation of tops-only voting rules

Abstract

We study tops-only voting rules on the domain of all preferences with a unique top, focusing on manipulation by risk-avoiding voters. Following Hartman et al.(2025), we measure resistance to manipulation by the RAT-degree: the minimum number of other voters' reports that a voter needs to observe for a ``safe'' manipulation to become possible. Given the observed reports, such a manipulation weakly improves on truthful reporting under every completion of the unobserved reports and strictly improves on it under at least one completion. For any finite set of at least three alternatives, we show that anonymity, unanimity, and winner monotonicity imply an upper bound of ⌈n/2⌉\lceil n/2\rceil on the RAT-degree, where nn is the number of voters. We provide exact characterizations of the RAT-degree for anonymous generalized median voter schemes and voting by quotas, without imposing single-peakedness or separability on preferences. For odd nn, the median voter rule and objectwise majority rule uniquely maximize the RAT-degree within their respective classes and attain the general upper bound.

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vlnc:W_pn8jyjp7
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  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance

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