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From Claws to Conferences: Device-Independent Key Agreement Beyond Non-Signaling

Abstract

Device-independent conference key agreement (DI-CKA) allows a group of users to establish a common secret key without trusting the internal operation of their quantum devices. Existing DI-CKA protocols derive their security from multipartite Bell tests and therefore require the device components not to communicate during each round. We present, to the best of our knowledge, the first DI-CKA protocol that removes this non-signaling assumption: all interfaces and their mutual communication are treated as one untrusted device, which only has to be quantum polynomial-time while the protocol runs. Assuming that the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem is hard for quantum algorithms with quantum advice during the execution, we prove finite-size security against coherent attacks, in which the device may keep quantum memory and correlate and adapt its behavior across rounds. For two parties the protocol is a computational DI-QKD protocol with an explicit finite-size proof against coherent attacks. Technically, we lift the claw state underlying the classical-verifier test of Brakerski et al.\ (FOCS 2018) to multipartite entanglement, obtaining a GHZ-correlated claw state. %that is prepared with one coherent claw-free function evaluation and N−1N-1 CNOT gates. We then introduce the collective adaptive hardcore bit, a multiparty generalization of the adaptive hardcore bit of Brakerski et al.\ and show that it follows from the original property by a tight reduction. Combined with Jordan's lemma, an entropic uncertainty relation, and entropy accumulation, this certifies smooth min-entropy of the key against an external quantum adversary. Our protocol achieves everlasting security: LWE needs to hold only during the execution, because the final key is statistically secure and its secrecy persists even if LWE is broken after the protocol ends.

Introduction

Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two parties to establish a secret key whose confidentiality rests on the laws of quantum mechanics rather than on the presumed hardness of a computational problem [1, 2]. This guarantee, however, is only as reliable as the correspondence between the security proof and the physical implementation. Conventional proofs model sources, measurements, and detectors mathematically. Real apparatus deviates from these models, and such deviations have enabled side-channel attacks that break implementations without contradicting quantum mechanics [3, 4].

Device independence (DI) removes this modeling premise [5, 6, 7]. The users retain trusted classical control, private randomness, and authenticated classical communication, but treat their quantum apparatus as an uncharacterized and possibly adversarial black box: security is inferred from the observed classical input–output behavior alone, without any assumption on the states or measurements inside. The strength of this guarantee has motivated loophole-free Bell experiments [8, 9, 10] and the first experimental demonstrations of DI-QKD [11, 12]. In information-theoretic DI protocols the certificate is a Bell-inequality violation: if the observed correlations cannot be reproduced by any local hidden-variable model, then the device components must share entanglement and perform incompatible measurements. This inference requires that the components cannot communicate while they are being measured. This non-signaling assumption is usually justified by space-like separation, so that no signal travelling at or below the speed of light can pass between the components before all measurements are completed. It is not a technicality of the proof: it is the physical mechanism from which the proof obtains its soundness.

The multiparty setting. Many applications require a key shared by a group rather than by a pair. In conference key agreement (CKA), Alice and N−1N-1 Bobs establish one common secret key, a basic primitive for secure group communication and distributed protocols [13]. Existing DI-CKA protocols certify security through multipartite Bell tests [14, 15] and therefore require non-signaling among all NN components during every measurement. Enforcing this is considerably harder than in the bipartite case. The experiment must coordinate NN laboratories, their quantum links, their random input choices, and tightly timed responses, and the number of pairwise causal separations that must be maintained and audited grows quadratically with NN.

Replacing non-signaling by computational hardness. Brakerski, Christiano, Mahadev, Vazirani, and Vidick (BCMVV) [16] showed that a different assumption can take the place of non-signaling. If the device is computationally bounded, a classical verifier can certify its quantum behavior by interacting with a single device, without any spatial separation. Their test is built from noisy trapdoor claw-free functions constructed from the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem and yields both a test of quantumness and certifiable randomness. Related techniques underlie the classical verification of quantum computations [17], remote state preparation and blind delegation [18, 19], and the compilation of nonlocal games into single-device protocols [20].

For key distribution, Metger, Dulek, Coladangelo, and Arnon-Friedman [21] constructed a computational DI-QKD protocol in which the two device components may exchange arbitrary quantum communication, provided the device is computationally bounded while the protocol runs. They proved security in the asymptotic IID setting, in which the device behaves identically and independently in every round. A coherent attack is more powerful: the device may keep quantum memory and correlate and adapt its behavior across all rounds. Merkulov and Arnon [22] subsequently developed a modular framework that combines entropic uncertainty relations and entropy accumulation with post-quantum assumptions, and used it to certify randomness from a single device against general adversaries. To the best of our knowledge, however, no computational approach to the multiparty task has been proposed, and every existing DI-CKA protocol relies on non-signaling among the device components. This leaves open the following question.

Can device-independent conference key agreement be achieved without any non-signaling assumption among the device components, with security against coherent attacks?

We answer this question in the affirmative.

Our Results

Setting. Alice and N−1N-1 Bobs have trusted classical control and authenticated public classical channels, and Alice holds private randomness. They share an untrusted quantum apparatus with one interface per participant. For soundness, all interfaces, their shared memory, and any classical or quantum communication between them are treated as a single quantum polynomial-time (QPT) device that may keep quantum memory and adapt to the entire past. In particular, there is no tensor-product, non-signaling, or space-like-separation assumption. The eavesdropper Eve is computationally unbounded, may hold a purification of the device’s initial state, and sees all public communication. As in [21], the device cannot send information to Eve during the execution; once the components may communicate, this is unavoidable, as the device could otherwise simply forward the key. The honest implementation needs no communication between the components: pre-distributed GHZ states and local operations suffice (Remark 3.3). The protocol can therefore be layered on a standard DI setup in which physical isolation is attempted but not relied upon [21].

Theorem 1.1 (Main result, informal). Let N≥2N \ge2, and assume that LWE is hard for QPT algorithms with polynomial-size quantum advice while the protocol runs (Assumption 2.4). Then there is an NN-party DI-CKA protocol (Protocol 1) with the following properties.

  1. Security against coherent attacks. For every QPT device, even one whose components communicate arbitrarily and which keeps quantum memory and adapts across rounds, the protocol is εcorr\varepsilon_{\mathrm{corr}}-correct and εsec\varepsilon_{\mathrm{sec}}-secret (Definition 2.1): all Bobs output Alice’s key, and this key is close to uniform given Eve’s information. The key has length nt−O(n)−Lnt - O(\sqrt{n}) - L, where nn is the number of rounds, tt is the certified min-entropy per round, and LL is the public leakage (Theorem 4.3).

  1. Completeness. An honest noiseless implementation aborts only with probability exponentially small in nn, up to the failure probability of classical post-processing (Proposition 4.2).

  1. Everlasting security. The secrecy guarantee is statistical. It remains valid against arbitrary later computation, including an algorithm that breaks LWE after the protocol has ended (Proposition 9.1).

For N=2N = 2 the protocol is a computational DI-QKD protocol with the same guarantees (Corollary 4.4).

Contributions. Theorem 1.1 rests on the following ingredients.

  1. GHZ-correlated claw state (Section 3). We give a multiparty state-preparation procedure that combines GHZ-type entanglement with the claw structure of a trapdoor claw-free family. One coherent claw-free function evaluation followed by N−1N - 1 CNOT gates prepares the state (∣0⟩⊗N∣x0⟩+∣1⟩⊗N∣x1⟩)/2(\lvert0\rangle^{\otimes N}\lvert x_0\rangle+ \lvert1\rangle^{\otimes N}\lvert x_1\rangle)/\sqrt{2}, which lifts the two-branch claw structure of BCMVV to NN parties. Its computational-basis measurement gives every participant the same bit, and its Hadamard-basis measurement satisfies one global parity relation tied to the hidden claw.

  1. Collective adaptive hardcore bit (Section 5). We formulate a multiparty generalization of the BCMVV adaptive hardcore bit (AHB) property [16], tailored to the GHZ-correlated claw state, which we call the collective AHB property. Treating the whole apparatus, including its internal communication, as one QPT circuit, we show that the collective property follows from the ordinary AHB property via a tight reduction that loses nothing, and in particular nothing that depends on NN. It therefore inherits the LWE-based instantiation of BCMVV.

  1. DI-CKA secure against coherent attacks without non-signaling (Sections 4–8). Building on these two ingredients, we construct what is, to the best of our knowledge, the first DI-CKA protocol whose security does not rely on non-signaling among the device components. We prove its finite-size security against coherent attacks. The proof adapts the single-device analysis of [22] to key agreement. For N=2N = 2, the protocol is a computational DI-QKD protocol with an explicit finite-size security proof against coherent attacks.

4. Everlasting security (Section 9). The hardness of LWE is needed only during the challenge–response phase. Once privacy amplification is complete, the key is statistically close to uniform conditioned on the public transcript and Eve’s side information. This guarantee is preserved under arbitrary subsequent quantum computation, including an algorithm that later solves the public LWE instances, provided that excluded device memory and erased verifier secrets remain inaccessible. Whereas earlier computational-DI works discuss this property informally, we provide an explicit trace-distance formulation and lifting theorem that makes the necessary isolation and erasure assumptions precise.

5. Multiparty resource saving (Section 10). Distributing a conference key through N−1N-1 pairwise computational DI-QKD sessions uses N−1N-1 coherent claw-free function evaluations per raw conference symbol. Our construction requires only one such evaluation, together with N−1N-1 CNOT gates. This is a structural saving in the most expensive quantum circuit of the protocol, namely the state-preparation circuits.

Scope and limitations. We assume that all conference participants are honest, and the adversary is external. We do not address insider attacks or group-membership functionality. As in [21], the device’s internal communication must be inaccessible to Eve during the execution (§ 5.1). Finally, our certified rate inherits the stringent noise requirements of the single-round bound of [22]: it vanishes once the aggregate test-failure probability exceeds about 10−1210^{-12}, which corresponds to depolarizing noise of order 10−10/(N−1)10^{-10}/(N-1) at best (Table 1). Our results should therefore be read as a proof of principle, and any improvement of the single-round bound translates directly into better rates for our protocol.

β\beta1−ω∗1-\omega^*Q∗ (N=2)Q^*\ (N=2)Q∗ (N=3)Q^*\ (N=3)Q∗ (N=5)Q^*\ (N=5)Q∗ (N=10)Q^*\ (N=10)
0.56.5×10−136.5 \times10^{-13}1.3×10−121.3 \times10^{-12}6.5×10−136.5 \times10^{-13}3.2×10−133.2 \times10^{-13}1.4×10−131.4 \times10^{-13}
0.11.2×10−121.2 \times10^{-12}1.2×10−111.2 \times10^{-11}5.8×10−125.8 \times10^{-12}2.9×10−122.9 \times10^{-12}1.3×10−121.3 \times10^{-12}
0.011.3×10−121.3 \times10^{-12}1.3×10−101.3 \times10^{-10}6.4×10−116.4 \times10^{-11}3.2×10−113.2 \times10^{-11}1.4×10−111.4 \times10^{-11}

Table 1. Noise thresholds of the single-round bound. The function gβg_\beta vanishes for aggregate test-failure probabilities 1−ω≥1−ω∗1-\omega\ge1-\omega^*, and Q∗Q^* is the depolarizing noise at which 1−ωN(Q)=1−ω∗1-\omega_N(Q)=1-\omega^*. The certified rate (103) is therefore zero for Q≥Q∗Q \ge Q^*, and it may vanish already at smaller QQ. All values are numerical upper bounds on the zero crossing, rounded to two significant digits (see the paragraph on numerical evaluation). The thresholds scale as (N−1)−1(N-1)^{-1} and depend only weakly on β\beta through 1−ω∗1-\omega^*.

Technical Overview

We now explain the main ideas. Figure 1 shows the structure of the proof: the computational assumption enters only through the upper row, and every step of the lower row is information theoretic.

Structure of the security proof

Figure 1. Structure of the security proof. The blue steps (solid frames, upper row) carry the computational assumption, which enters only through the AHB property; the green steps (dashed frames) are information theoretic. The final trace-distance guarantee is lifted to everlasting security by data processing.

Starting point: a classically certified qubit. A trapdoor claw-free (TCF) family consists of pairs of injective functions fk,0,fk,1f_{k,0}, f_{k,1} with a common image, so that every image yy has a unique claw (x0,x1)(x_0,x_1) with fk,0(x0)=fk,1(x1)=yf_{k,0}(x_0) = f_{k,1}(x_1) = y. The trapdoor of the key kk reveals the claw, but without it no QPT algorithm can find one. A quantum device can nevertheless evaluate both branches in superposition and measure the image yy, which leaves the state

12(∣0⟩∣x0⟩+∣1⟩∣x1⟩).(1)\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\left(|0\rangle|x_0\rangle+ |1\rangle|x_1\rangle\right). \tag*{(1)}

BCMVV [16] pair this state with two complementary challenges. In a preimage test, the device measures in the computational basis and returns a valid preimage (b,xb)(b,x_b). In an equation test, it measures in the Hadamard basis and returns a string dd and a bit ee, which must satisfy e=d⋅(x0⊕x1)e = d \cdot(x_0 \mathbin{\oplus} x_1). The adaptive hardcore bit (AHB) property states that no QPT device can do both: even after returning a valid preimage, it cannot output an admissible dd together with a non-negligibly biased prediction of d⋅(x0⊕x1)d \cdot(x_0 \mathbin{\oplus} x_1). Admissibility means membership of dd in a set Gk,yG_{k,y} that contains almost all strings and is recognizable with the trapdoor; it excludes degenerate choices such as d=0wd = 0^w, for which the equation is trivial. This computational form of measurement incompatibility is what lets a classical verifier certify quantum behavior.

Step 1: a conference correlation from a single claw. Key agreement needs more than certified randomness: Alice and every Bob must obtain the same raw bit, and the verifier must still be able to test the privacy of that bit. We obtain both properties from one claw. Starting from (1), Alice fans the branch qubit out to N−1N - 1 fresh qubits with CNOT gates, which produces the GHZ-correlated claw state

∣Ψy⟩=12(∣0⟩⊗N∣x0⟩+∣1⟩⊗N∣x1⟩),(2)|\Psi_y\rangle= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\left(|0\rangle^{\otimes N}|x_0\rangle+ |1\rangle^{\otimes N}|x_1\rangle\right), \tag*{(2)}

and she sends the jj-th branch qubit to Bob jj. A computational-basis measurement now gives every participant the same branch bit bb, a raw key symbol, and gives Alice the matching preimage xbx_b. A Hadamard-basis measurement of the preimage register and the branch registers gives outcomes dd and u1,…,uNu_1,\ldots,u_N that satisfy the global parity relation (Proposition 3.2)

u1⊕⋯⊕uN=d⋅(x0⊕x1).(3)u_1 \mathbin{\oplus} \cdots\mathbin{\oplus} u_N = d \cdot(x_0 \mathbin{\oplus} x_1). \tag*{(3)}

Thus a single coherent TCF evaluation and N−1N - 1 CNOT gates support both a common raw symbol and a test of its privacy. The state (2) describes only the honest implementation. The soundness analysis assumes nothing about the state or the measurements of the device.

Step 2: soundness for a communicating apparatus via collective AHB. The parity relation (3) involves answers produced by all NN interfaces, which may communicate arbitrarily. To constrain them, we consider an analytical sequential experiment; the protocol itself asks only one of the two questions in each round. After the device has committed to yy, apply its preimage instrument and record Alice’s answer (b,x)(b,x), leaving the Bobs’ preimage answers unmeasured. Then apply its equation instrument to the residual state and record (d,u1,…,uN)(d,u_1,\ldots,u_N). When Alice’s preimage is valid, the equation answer falls into one of three classes:

C:d∈Gk,y and ⨁j=1Nuj=d⋅(x0⊕x1),I:d∈Gk,y and ⨁j=1Nuj≠d⋅(x0⊕x1),B:d∉Gk,y or the answer is malformed.\begin{aligned} \mathrm{C}:&\quad d \in G_{k,y}\ \text{and}\ \bigoplus_{j=1}^{N}u_j = d \cdot(x_0 \mathbin{\oplus} x_1),\\ \mathrm{I}:&\quad d \in G_{k,y}\ \text{and}\ \bigoplus_{j=1}^{N}u_j \ne d \cdot(x_0 \mathbin{\oplus} x_1),\\ \mathrm{B}:&\quad d \notin G_{k,y}\ \text{or the answer is malformed.} \end{aligned}

The collective AHB property (Definition 5.1) asserts that ∣Pr⁡[C]−Pr⁡[I]∣\lvert\Pr[\mathrm{C}] - \Pr[\mathrm{I}]\rvert is negligible for every joint QPT device. It follows from the ordinary AHB property by an exact reduction (Theorem 5.2). Since all interfaces form one QPT machine, the AHB adversary can simulate the entire apparatus, including its internal communication, and output the single predicted bit e=⨁juje = \bigoplus_j u_j. This map sends C and I exactly to the correct and incorrect events of the ordinary AHB game. Malformed answers are completed to well-formed ones with a uniformly random final bit, so their contributions to the two events are equal and cancel. Note that the events involve only Alice’s preimage answer. Whether the Bobs’ branch bits agree with Alice’s is a correctness question, which the key-agreement layer tests and repairs separately.

Step 3: the protocol. Protocol 1 (§ 5) is run by a trusted classical verifier hosted by Alice, and every round uses a fresh TCF key. After the device has committed to an image, the verifier privately samples a generation flag GG and reveals only a challenge TT, where

Pr⁡[G=1]=1−γ,Pr⁡[T=0∣G=1]=1,Pr⁡[T=1∣G=0]=β.(4)\Pr[G = 1] = 1 - \gamma,\qquad\Pr[T = 0 \mid G = 1] = 1,\qquad\Pr[T = 1 \mid G = 0] = \beta. \tag*{(4)}

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