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Connecting Base-Extension Semantics, Beth Semantics, and Ecumenical Logic

Abstract

We investigate the relationship between base-extension semantics, Beth semantics, and Prawitz's ecumenical logic. We first present a base-extension semantics for the propositional fragment of Prawitz's system and prove that it is sound and complete. The semantics interprets intuitionistic and classical operators directly within a common proof-theoretic framework, without reducing the classical operators to their intuitionistic counterparts by means of a translation. We then analyse the effect of incorporating Beth-style clauses into base-extension semantics. When arbitrary bases are admitted and ⊥\bot is governed by atomic explosion, these clauses trivialise. By contrast, when ⊥\bot is treated as a basic sentence and attention is restricted to consistent bases, the Beth-style clauses for atoms and disjunction characterise, respectively, classical atoms and classical disjunction in Prawitz's system. We also obtain equivalent, path-independent formulations of the classical clauses for atoms, disjunction, and implication. These results reveal that the consistency constraint is not merely a technical restriction: within base-extension semantics, it transforms clauses originally associated with intuitionistic semantics into semantic characterisations of classical operators.

Introduction

The relatively young discipline of proof-theoretic semantics (PtS) provided a fresh breath of air into the semantic study of intuitionistic logic [47]. Grounded in inferentialist interpretations of constructivism that regard proofs as semantic ingredients of meaning [9], PtS provides new semantic frameworks in which the core semantic values are defined in terms of proof-theoretic structures corresponding to constructive proofs of propositions. Aside from making explicit the relationship between semantics and proofs, PtS has the additional benefit of allowing use of proof-theoretic instruments for the proof of semantic results.

An important instance of this approach is base-extension semantics (BeS) [45], in which validity is defined relative to systems of rules over basic sentences and their extensions. The resulting semantics exhibits a clear structural affinity with Kripke semantics: bases may be regarded as information states, base extension behaves like an accessibility relation, and the clause for implication quantifies over all extensions of the current base [25, 39]. This affinity is more than suggestive. Pym, Ritter, and Robinson [44] analyse Sandqvist’s semantics by means of presheaf and sheaf constructions, clarifying its relationship with intuitionistic Kripke models and, in particular, the distinctive behaviour of disjunction in BeS. Correspondences between base-extension and Kripke semantics have also been developed for several classical and intuitionistic modal logics by Eckhardt and Pym [19] and by Buzoku and Pym [11].

The relationship between BeS and traditional model-theoretic semantics is nevertheless far from exhausted. In particular, its connection with Beth semantics [6] remains largely unexplored. This is especially intriguing because the two approaches treat disjunction in formally similar ways [55]. One might therefore expect Beth’s clauses to provide an alternative route to the intuitionistic operators of BeS. However, what happens is almost the opposite! The behaviour of the clauses depends of the treatment of absurdity, but in neither case we have intuitionistic logic.

When Beth-style clauses are transplanted into the usual base-extension setting, in which ⊥\bot is understood through atomic explosion, the resulting clauses trivialise: the presence of a greatest base, containing all atomic rules, forces the relevant conditions to hold indiscriminately. The picture changes completely when ⊥\bot is itself treated as a basic sentence and the semantics is restricted to consistent bases. Under this constraint, Beth-style clauses cease to be trivial and instead characterise classical operators. Quite surprisingly, this brings Beth semantics into contact with logical ecumenism, which is an approach to logic that aims at providing frameworks allowing rival logics to peacefully coexist [4]. In this setting, Beth’s clause for disjunction provides semantics to the classical disjunction of Prawitz’s ecumenical system [43].

The version of BeS developed in [4] for Barroso-Nascimento’s ecumenical system [2] already points in this direction. There, intuitionistic validity is grounded in the traditional understanding of proofs as constructions, whereas the consistency constraint gives rise to a genuinely classical notion of proof, echoing Hilbert’s association between truth and proofs of consistency [15, 29].

The present paper develops this connection for Prawitz’s ecumenical logic. Since by using Beth’s semantic definitions in this setting we obtain semantic characterisations of Prawitz’s classical connectives, such clauses, originally devised to provide a genuinely intuitionistic definition of proof, can also be used to provide a genuinely classical definition of proof. Moreover, analogously to what happens in [4], the metalanguage of the semantics has to be ecumenical, but classical reasoning principles (which now include set-theoretic as well as logical reasoning) are required only to establish properties of classical connectives. Thus, the coexistence between classical and intuitionistic reasoning is reflected not only in the object language, but also in the methods used to study its semantics.

This gives rise to the following motto:

Overview

Three strands come together in the results of this paper: Prawitz’s logical ecumenism, base-extension semantics, and Beth semantics. Each approaches the boundary between classical and intuitionistic reasoning from a different direction: Ecumenism places their operators within a common language; base-extension semantics gives meaning in terms of inferences and their possible extensions; and Beth semantics follows what becomes established along every possible path. In this section, we recall the aspects of these three approaches that will allow them to meet in the technical development that follows.

Logical ecumenism

Logical ecumenism is a philosophical and proof-theoretic framework introduced by Peter Krauss [32, 31], Dag Prawitz [43] and Gilles Dowek [16, 7, 26, 8, 27], aimed at harmonising opposing logical systems, most notably intuitionistic and classical logic. Rather than viewing constructivism and classicism as mutually exclusive concepts, ecumenism posits that both can peacefully coexist within a single, unified language. Under this view, logical disagreement is not an intractable dispute over the nature of truth, but rather a distinction in the logical constants being expressed.

At its structural core, an ecumenical system achieves such a harmony by sharing a common set of foundational connectives, while bifurcating others into explicitly variants. For example, an intuitionistic implication demands a constructive method to transform proofs, whereas its classical counterpart accommodates non-constructive principles like double negation elimination. This setup allows classicists and intuitionists to reason in the same workspace while precisely tracking where non-constructive assumptions are deployed.

This is actually the core behind Prawitz’s ecumenism [43], where classicists and intuitionists share what are called neutral connectives: ∧\land, ⊥\bot, ∀\forall for conjunction, falsity and universal quantification. Thinking of the proof-theoretical nature of these connectives, they all share the same inference rules in, e.g., Gentzen’s LK and LJ sequent systems [22]. On the other hand, implication, disjunction and the existential quantifier have a quite different behavior in these systems, and this is reflected in Prawitz ecumenism, where there are classical and intuitionistic versions of them. Prawitz’s claim is that they are not, in fact, the same connectives.

Negation deserves separate discussion. In both classical and intuitionistic logic, proving the negation of a sentence AA typically amounts to deriving a contradiction from the assumption AA. As Prawitz puts it:

There is no other direct way of getting a ground for asserting ¬A\lnot A classically, although the classical use of negation differs from the intuitionistic.

This naturally raises the question of how the classical use of negation can be captured proof-theoretically. As noted in [43], introducing separate classical and intuitionistic negation constants equipped with their expected inference rules would cause the two connectives to collapse into one, a phenomenon first observed by Popper in [41]. While this already provides strong evidence that negation is, in fact, a neutral connective as defended by Prawitz, in this work we present an even stronger proof by showing that classical and intuitionistic negation also collapse at the semantic level (see § 3).

Prawitz’s formulation of ecumenism is particularly well suited to the present work because it internalises the classical/intuitionistic coexistence in a single deductive system. This makes it a natural testing ground for an inferentialist semantics: If the distinction between its operators is fundamentally a distinction between rules, then their semantic interpretation should reflect those rules directly.

Base-extension Semantics

Whereas model-theoretic semantics [30] explains the meaning of logical expressions through their interpretation in set-theoretic structures, with Tarski’s definition of truth as the paradigmatic example [51], Proof-theoretic semantics (PtS) [42, 46, 47] takes proofs and inferences as fundamental. Its philosophical basis is inferentialism [9]: the meaning of a logical expression is determined by the inferential rules governing it. Logical constants are therefore characterised not by the conditions under which they are true in a model, but by the role they play in reasoning.

PtS has recently attracted considerable attention, see, e.g., [50, 24, 1, 12]. By grounding validity in derivability, PtS makes it possible to employ the rich machinery of proof theory in giving meaning to logical operators.

BeS is a strand of PtS in which proof-theoretic validity is defined relative to a specified collection of inference rules, called a base, governing the basic formulas of the language [45]. Such bases provide the underlying proof-theoretic environment from which the semantic behaviour of complex formulas is determined. These basic formulas are typically atomic propositions, whose meaning is determined by their inferential role within the base.

To illustrate the idea, suppose that one does not know the meaning of the sentence

“Giant squids live in the aphotic zone.”

If, however, we are given the inference rules

Giant squids live in the aphotic zoneGiant squids live in the oceanGiant squids live in the aphotic zoneGiant squids live in areas with little or no sunlight\frac{\text{Giant squids live in the aphotic zone}}{\text{Giant squids live in the ocean}} \qquad \frac{\text{Giant squids live in the aphotic zone}}{\text{Giant squids live in areas with little or no sunlight}}
Giant squids live in the oceanGiant squids live in areas with little or no sunlightGiant squids live in the aphotic zone\frac{\text{Giant squids live in the ocean}\qquad\text{Giant squids live in areas with little or no sunlight}}{\text{Giant squids live in the aphotic zone}}

then the inferential role of “aphotic zone” tells us that, in this setting, it corresponds to a part of the ocean with little or no sunlight.

Bases do more than specify the inferential roles of basic formulas: they themselves constitute inference systems in which such formulas can be derived. For example, let rr, ww, uu, mm, dd represent, respectively, the sentences “It’s raining”, “I might get wet”, “I have an umbrella”, “I bring the umbrella with me”, and “I will stay dry”, and consider a base SS containing the following rules

[r]rwwum⋮md[r] \qquad \frac{r}{w} \qquad \frac{w\qquad u}{m} \qquad \vdots \qquad \frac{m}{d}

Then, within SS, we can derive that “I will stay dry” from “I have an umbrella”

[r]wwumd\frac{[r]}{w} \qquad \frac{w\qquad u}{\frac{m}{d}}

The derivation above takes place entirely within the base SS. A central feature of BeS, however, is that we do not consider bases in isolation. A base SS is an extension of SS, written S′⊇SS' \supseteq S, if it contains all the rules of SS, possibly together with additional ones. Intuitively, extending a base amounts to enriching our inferential resources: anything derivable in SS remains derivable in S′S', but the additional rules may enable new derivations.

For example, consider the extension S′⊇SS' \supseteq S by adding the rule

ru\frac{r}{u}

expressing, for example, that whenever it rains I have an umbrella available. In the extended base S′S', from rr we can now derive both ww and uu, and hence mm

rwrum\frac{\frac{r}{w}\quad\frac{r}{u}}{m}

The passage from SS to S′S' therefore represents an increase in inferential information, rather than a change in the meaning of rules already present in SS.

This notion of extension plays a fundamental role in BeS. Semantic support is often required to be stable under extensions of a base: what is supported given certain inferential resources must remain supported when those resources are enriched. Moreover, the semantic clauses for some logical operators explicitly quantify over extensions of the current base. In this sense, base extensions play a role analogous to accessible future states in Kripke semantics, although here the underlying structure is proof-theoretic: what grows is not a state of information specified model-theoretically, but the collection of available inference rules.

Sandqvist [45] gave a sound and complete formulation of BeS for intuitionistic propositional logic. There, the notion of consequence in BeS is given by an inductively defined semantic judgment, called support, whose base case is determined by provability in a base. Thus, for any base SS, the support of an atomic formula pp is defined by

⊩Spiffp is provable in S.\Vdash_S p \quad\text{iff} \quad p\text{ is provable in }S.

The clauses for complex formulas are then defined inductively. Conjunction, for example, behaves much as it does in Kripke semantics:

⊩SA∧Biff⊩SA and ⊩SB.\Vdash_S A \land B \quad\text{iff} \quad\Vdash_S A\text{ and }\Vdash_S B.

Beyond this point, however, the similarity with Kripke semantics begins to fade. In particular, ⊥\bot is often understood as absurdity, following its second-order characterisation instantiated over atoms (as in the system Fat [20]):

⊩S⊥iff⊩Sp for every atom p.\Vdash_S \bot\quad\text{iff} \quad\Vdash_S p\text{ for every atom }p.

Simply requiring ⊥\bot to be unsupported, as one might expect by analogy with Kripke semantics, leads to serious problems. In particular, it allows one to establish ⊩S¬¬p\Vdash_S \neg\neg p for every atom pp [39]. Perhaps surprisingly, this is not the case if we include ⊥\bot in bases but require ⊬S⊥\nvdash_S \bot to hold for all bases. As demonstrated in [4], by doing this and using the other semantic clauses of standard BeS we obtain a semantics for intuitionistic logic.

As we shall show, BeS is particularly well suited to the ecumenical setting: it allows the interaction between neutral, intuitionistic, and classical operators to be captured directly, without appealing to a translation into one of the component logics.

BeS and Beth: Constructivism and Consistency

The impact of definitions of ⊥\bot in intuitionistic logic and completeness proofs has a very rich history. Beth’s original proof of completeness for his semantics contained an important flaw directly related to the possibility of models being inconsistent [53 pg. 8]. A result due to Gödel and Kreisel shows that this is part of a more general phenomenon, as any completeness proof for semantics having a definition of ⊥\bot in terms of unsatisfiability has to validate Markov’s principle at the metalinguistic level [36, 33]. On the other hand, Veldman [54] and de Swart [14] provided intuitionistic completeness proofs for Kripke and Beth first-order intuitionistic semantics by defining ⊥\bot in terms of explosion. Sandqvist’s [45] and Gheorghiu’s [23] completeness proofs follow along the same lines.

Beth semantics is defined over ordered frames F=⟨W,≤⟩F = \langle W, \le\rangle, with paths represented by maximal chains. Beth’s approach yields semantics for different logics depending on the class of frames used [13]. Historically, Beth gave particular importance to spreads and fans: a spread is a tree in which every node has a successor, and a fan is a finitely branching spread [52 p. 679], [6]. This choice reflects the connection between Beth’s frames and Brouwer’s free-choice sequences, through which mathematical activity is understood as a process unfolding through successive choices [13 p. 21]. It also illustrates how both the selection of frames and their intended pre-theoretic interpretation shape the relationship between a semantics and constructive mathematics.

This becomes particularly important for BeS once we point out that similar readings are applicable to the concepts of bases and extensions. Given the standard reading of bases as collections of accepted inferences, the extension relation can be visualised as standing for a process of expansion of a knowledge base [48]. If all bases are allowed in our semantics, we are considering all possible extension process, and if we only allow consistent bases, we are only considering extensions preserving consistency.

Despite this conceptual similarity, structural differences makes transplantation of Beth’s interpretation to BeS untenable. This is so since the set of all bases can be characterised as the powerset of the set of all rules [49] and, since there are countably infinitely many rules, there are uncountably many bases. This entirely precludes the establishment of any meaningful conceptual relationship between BeS and choice sequences: while Beth semantics, when defined over fans, is capable of providing infinitary definition with strong, finitary roots, BeS quantifies over an uncountable set and characterises its extension processes in terms of the continuum 1. This makes it so that the set-theoretic metalinguistic structure employed in BeS exhibits strong classical features.

Traditional definitions of Beth semantics use a definition of atomic valuation different from that of Kripke semantics [13, 52], although it is also possible to define Beth semantics using Kripke valuations [37]. The basic difference between both is that Beth valuations allows the value of an atom at a point to affect its value in antecessors of that point, whereas Kripke valuations only allows a point to affect its successors. The formal definitions are as follows.

Definition 2.1. Given any ordered frame F=⟨W,≤⟩F = \langle W, \le\rangle, a function b:W↦P(At)b : W \mapsto\mathcal{P}(\mathrm{At}) is a Beth valuation if, for all atoms pp, if for all maximal chains α\alpha such that w∈αw \in\alpha there is some w′∈αw' \in\alpha such that p∈b(w′)p \in b(w'), then p∈b(w)p \in b(w).

Definition 2.2. Given any ordered frame F=⟨W,≤⟩F = \langle W, \le\rangle, a function k:W↦P(At)k : W \mapsto\mathcal{P}(\mathrm{At}) is a Kripke valuation if p∈k(w)p \in k(w) and w≤w′w \le w' implies p∈k(w′)p \in k(w').

Intuitively, Beth and Kripke valuations establish which atomic facts hold at each point ww of the frame. The condition imposed on Beth valuations requires that, whenever an atomic fact is eventually established at some point w′w' in any maximal chains passing through ww, it is already be established at ww. Although the requirement is only stated for atoms, it is possible to prove that the property extends to arbitrary formulas [13 pg. 25]. When combined with fans, Beth valuations can intuitively be read as fixing that everything inevitably knowable in a finite amount of time can already be considered true. As such, Beth semantics seems to be a particularly good fit for Michael Dummett’s constructive concept of truth [18], in which a statement is considered true (although possibly not yet provable or assertible) whenever some procedure leading to a construction of its object is available, even if the construction itself has not been obtained, and regardless of our knowledge of the fact that the procedure will lead to this construction [3 pg. 31]. It is also worthy of notice that Beth valuations are monotonic, meaning that every Beth valuation is also a Kripke valuation [34], but not all Kripke valuations constitute Beth valuations.

Beth’s semantic clauses are then defined by using a doubly indexed relation ⊩wF\Vdash^{F}_{w} to define validity in w∈Ww \in W of a frame F=⟨W,≤⟩F = \langle W, \le\rangle, then defining ⊩F\Vdash^{F} in terms of ⊩wF\Vdash^{F}_{w} and then ⊩\Vdash in terms of ⊩F\Vdash^{F}. For our purposes it suffices to consider the definitions using ⊩wF\Vdash^{F}_{w}, as we only compare semantic clause for operators. The clauses for conjunction, implication and entailment correspond to those of Kripke semantics (and BeS), but his clauses for atomic validity and disjunction are as follows:

  1. ⊩wFp\Vdash^{F}_{w}p iff p∈b(w)p \in b(w), for atomic pp;

  1. ⊩wFA∨B\Vdash^{F}_{w} A \lor B iff for every path α\alpha with w∈αw \in\alpha there is some w′∈αw' \in\alpha such that either ⊩w′FA\Vdash^{F}_{w'} A or ⊩w′FB\Vdash^{F}_{w'} B;

Although the definition of atomic support in BeS seems to be closer to Kripke’s definition of atomic validity, Beth’s definition of disjunction is remarkably similar to that of BeS. In particular, both allow a disjunction A∨BA \lor B to be semantically valid in a point ww (or base SS) even when neither AA nor BB are valid in that particular point. If we change Beth’s clause to one in which A∨BA \lor B is valid in ww iff either AA or BB is valid in ww, we get the intuitionistic Kripke semantic, but if the same change is done in BeS this leads to incompleteness w.r.t. intuitionistic logic [39]. Since the semantic clauses of BeS can be interpreted as definitions over the frame containing all bases, ordered by set-theoretic inclusion [25, 39], this result can be interpreted as a consequence of the fact that the frames use in BeS are much more restrictive than those used in Beth and Kripke semantics.

It is important to note that, unlike Kripke semantics, Beth semantics is highly frame-sensitive [13]. To provide an example, while the set of finitary Kripke models is sound and complete w.r.t. intuitionistic logic, every finite Beth model is classical [13 pg. 42]. The results we will prove are intimately connected to the frame structures implicitly defined by BeS and the behaviour they induce in Beth clauses. Since standard BeS with ⊥\bot defined explosively and BeS with the consistency constraint implicitly define different frames, pairing Beth clauses with them has different effects. In short, the connections we will show between Beth semantics and standard BeS hold Since the set of all bases, when ordered by the set-inclusion relation, has a greatest element (the set of all rules), while the set of all consistent bases, despite not having a greatest element, contains maximal consistent bases as maximal elements in all its maximal chains.

BeS for Prawitz’s ecumenical system

In this work, we adopt Sandqvist’s terminology and adapt the framework to the ecumenical setting, following the developments in [4, 5]. In particular, we treat ⊥\bot itself as a basic formula while restricting attention to consistent bases.

The propositional base language is assumed to have the set At consisting of a countable infinite set of atomic propositions {p1,p2,…}\{p_1,p_2,\ldots\}, together with the unit ⊥\bot. The elements of At will be called basic sentences. We use, as does Sandqvist, systems containing natural deduction rules over basic sentences for the semantical analysis, and we allow inference rules to discharge sets of basic hypotheses. Sets used in the definition of the derivability relation and semantic consequence are always assumed to be finite. Unlike Sandqvist, however, we allow the logical constant ⊥\bot to be manipulated by the rules.

In what follows, we will adopt the following notation: capital Greek letters with the subscript ‘At’ (ΓAt,ΔAt\Gamma_{\mathrm{At}},\Delta_{\mathrm{At}}) denote finite sets of basic sentences; capital letters (A,BA,B) denote formulas; capital Greek letters without the subscript ‘At’ (Γ,Δ\Gamma,\Delta) denote sets of formulas; commas between sets denote set union.

Definition 3.1 (Base). An atomic system (a.k.a. base) SS is a (possibly empty) set of atomic rules of the form

[ΔAt1][ΔAtn]⋮⋮p1⋯pnp\begin{array}{cccc} [\Delta_{\mathrm{At}}^{1}] & & [\Delta_{\mathrm{At}}^{n}] \\ \vdots& & \vdots\\ p_1 & \cdots& p_n \\ \hline & p & \end{array}

where pj,p∈Atp_j,p \in\mathrm{At} and ΔAtj\Delta_{\mathrm{At}}^j are (possibly empty) finite sets of basic sentences. The sequence ⟨p1,…,pn⟩\langle p_1,\ldots,p_n\rangle of premises of the rule can be empty – in this case the rule is called an atomic axiom. Labels will sometimes be written as the superscript of ΔAtj\Delta_{\mathrm{At}}^j and to the right of a rule to denote that ΔAtj\Delta_{\mathrm{At}}^j was discharged at that rule application.

Definition 3.2 (Extension). An atomic system S′S' is an extension of an atomic system SS (written S′⊇SS' \supseteq S), if S′S' results from adding a (possibly empty) set of atomic rules to SS.

Definition 3.3 (Deducibility). The deducibility relation ⊢S\vdash_S coincides with the usual notion in the system of natural deduction consisting of just the rules in SS, that is, p1,…,pn⊢Spp_1,\ldots,p_n \vdash_S p iff there exists a deduction with the rules of SS whose conclusion is pp and whose set of undischarged premises is a subset of {p1,…,pn}\{p_1,\ldots,p_n\}.

Note that, following this definition, if p∈{p1,…,pn}p \in\{p_1,\ldots,p_n\} then p1,…,pn⊢Spp_1,\ldots,p_n \vdash_S p holds regardless of SS, as a single occurrence of the assumption pp already counts as a ruleless deduction of pp from pp.

Definition 3.4 (Consistency). An atomic system SS is called consistent if ⊬S⊥\nvdash_S \bot.

All the bases considered in this section are consistent. In § 4 we will discuss an alternative semantics where this restriction can be dropped.

Prawitz’s ecumenical propositional base language L\mathcal{L} [43] is described as follows. We will use a subscript cc for the classical meaning and ii for the intuitionistic one, dropping such subscripts when formulas/connectives can have either meaning. ⊥∈L\bot\in\mathcal{L} and, if p∈At−{⊥}p \in\mathrm{At}-\{\bot\}, then pc,pi∈L2p_c,p_i \in\mathcal{L}^2.2 The neutral logical connectives {¬,∧}\{\neg,\land\} are shared between the classical and intuitionistic fragments, while {→c,∨c}\{\to_c,\lor_c\} and {→i,∨i}\{\to_i,\lor_i\} are restricted to classical and intuitionistic interpretations, respectively.

Prawitz’s natural deduction system for the propositional fragment of ecumenical logic, denoted by NEp\mathrm{NEp}, is presented in Figure 1. We write Γ⊢NEpA\Gamma\vdash_{\mathrm{NEp}} A when there is a NEp\mathrm{NEp}-deduction with conclusion AA whose undischarged assumptions form a subset of Γ\Gamma.

Figure 1. Ecumenical natural deduction system NEp.

An ecumenical version of BeS is given by the definition below. As usual, we start by giving semantic conditions for basic sentences in atomic systems, expanding them through semantic clauses, having as a starting point Sandqvist’s semantics for intuitionistic logic [45].

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