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WorksEconomics, Econometrics and Finance

Automation, AI, and the Intergenerational Transmission of Knowledge

Abstract

Motivated by concerns that AI-driven entry-level automation may disrupt early-career learning, this paper examines how technological change affects the intergenerational transmission of tacit knowledge – practical, hard-to-codify skills acquired through workplace interaction. I develop a task-based overlapping-generations model in which novices acquire tacit knowledge by working alongside experts. Knowledge-transfer contracts are incomplete because tacit knowledge is embodied and non-verifiable. In equilibrium, endogenous growth arises because only the most knowledgeable experts manage production and transmit their expertise to multiple novices, diffusing best practices. I show that improvements in entry-level automation increase output upon adoption but can reduce growth and welfare, even without reducing entry-level employment. This occurs when such improvements reallocate novices away from the most productive experts, slowing the diffusion of best practices. By contrast, technological improvements that increase the number of novices learning from the most productive experts strengthen knowledge transmission and raise growth.

Introduction

Recent advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) have fueled optimistic forecasts of dramatic increases in productivity and economic growth. Unlike earlier technological innovations—such as robots or conventional computers—AI systems can learn and adapt from examples, enabling them to perform work once considered inherently human (Autor, 2024; Brynjolfsson et al., 2025b; Ide and Talamàs, 2025). As a result, many technologists foresee an economic transformation that could rival or even surpass that of the Industrial Revolution (Amodei, 2024; Levy, 2025; Altman, 2025).

However, the widespread adoption of AI may carry unintended long-term costs. By allowing senior workers to accomplish more tasks independently, AI-driven automation may reduce entry-level opportunities and threaten the implicit contract in which younger workers exchange their labor for training and the prospect of future promotion (Roose, The New York Times, 2025; The Journal Podcast, The Wall Street Journal, 2025; BloombergTV, Bloomberg.com, 2025). Such arrangements have historically been crucial for transmitting tacit knowledge—practical insights that cannot be fully articulated yet remain indispensable for carrying out complex work—raising concerns about how future generations will acquire essential expertise (Beane, 2024a,b; Garicano, 2025).

Motivated by these concerns, this paper develops a framework for analyzing how different forms of technological change—automation, task creation, and labor- and capital-augmenting technologies—reshape the intergenerational transmission of tacit knowledge and, through that channel, long-run growth. The central premise is that technological change affects current and future productivity not only by changing how tasks are performed, but also by changing who works with whom and, therefore, who learns from whom.

Existing research on automation and AI has mainly focused on how new technologies directly affect productivity, labor-market outcomes, and the distribution of income and wealth (e.g. Autor et al., 2003; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Moll et al., 2022; Acemoglu et al., 2024; Autor and Thompson, 2025; Ide and Talamàs, 2025). However, much less attention has been paid to how these innovations reshape the interpersonal interactions through which valuable workplace skills are transmitted. This paper addresses that gap by embedding technological change within a growth model of knowledge diffusion and learning (e.g., Lucas, 2009; Lucas and Moll, 2014; Perla and Tonetti, 2014; De la Croix et al., 2018). In doing so, it provides a unified framework for analyzing how new technologies jointly affect current output, knowledge transmission, and long-run growth.

The baseline model features overlapping generations, with individuals living for two periods: first as novices, then as experts. Novices are identical at birth, have no wealth, and supply one unit of labor inelastically. Experts, by contrast, differ in skill. This skill level is observable, but the knowledge underlying it is tacit. Outsiders can therefore assess an expert’s productivity, but the insights and processes through which it is achieved are accessible only through close interaction.

Production combines expert skill with routine tasks that can be performed either by novices or by machines. Machines are more productive than novices, but can perform only a subset of tasks; the rest must be carried out by novices. Because the non-automated portion of production requires multiple units of novice labor, production gives rise to many-to-one matching: each novice works for exactly one expert, while any expert who produces hires multiple novices. By working alongside an expert, a novice gains intimate access to that expert’s tacit knowledge and enters the next period with the same skill level as her mentor.2

Since future earnings rise with mentor skill, novices are willing to accept lower wages to work alongside more skilled experts. Those higher future earnings reflect both the greater productivity novices will attain as experts and the lower wages their own novices will accept in exchange for access to more valuable expertise. However, because expert knowledge is tacit, it cannot be fully articulated and is therefore non-verifiable. Moreover, because it is tied to personal experience and thus embodied in the individual, the resulting human capital cannot be seized or repossessed and therefore cannot serve as collateral. Consequently, novices cannot finance access to better mentors by borrowing against the future returns to acquired expertise. Lacking initial wealth, they face a zero lower bound on wages. Concurrent labor thus becomes the only way to compensate experts for the opportunity to learn, giving rise to an apprenticeship-like arrangement.

In equilibrium, all automatable tasks are assigned to machines, and each expert cohort is partitioned endogenously by skill. The lowest-skilled experts are inactive because hiring novices at equilibrium wages is unprofitable. Above them lies an active region, which itself splits into two: a price-cleared tier in which experts hire novices at strictly positive wages, and an oversubscribed tier at the top, where the zero lower bound binds and wages can no longer clear the market for those positions.3 This endogenous partition then governs the evolution of expertise over time: the next generation’s skill distribution is obtained by truncating the current distribution at the marginal active expert and reweighting the surviving upper tail by experts’ span of control—the number of novices each active expert employs.

When the initial distribution of expert skill is fat-tailed,4 this process generates endogenous asymptotic growth. The most productive experts replicate their skills by passing them on to multiple novices, while the fat upper tail prevents the pool of mentors from becoming too sparse as the economy develops. The asymptotic growth rate of output is therefore determined by experts’ span of control and the tail thickness of the initial skill distribution. Furthermore, once skills are normalized relative to the least-skilled expert in each cohort, the cross-sectional distribution of skills converges asymptotically to a Pareto law.

I then use the framework to study several technological shocks, beginning with automation. I first show that expanding the set of automatable tasks raises output upon adoption, but can also reduce subsequent growth. The immediate output gain reflects two margins: routine tasks are reallocated from novices to more productive machines, and the novices released by high-skill experts allow a new tier of lower-skill experts to produce. The subsequent growth slowdown, in turn, reflects the fact that this same reallocation of novice labor worsens mentor composition. Some novices are matched with worse experts, acquire lower-quality tacit knowledge, and later become worse mentors themselves. The best practices of the leading experts thus diffuse more slowly, imposing a persistent drag on growth. Importantly, this slowdown does not require an improvement in automation to reduce entry-level employment or deprive novices of hands-on practice; a compositional deterioration in the pool of mentors is sufficient.

Through this displacement channel, the automation shock can reduce aggregate welfare, defined as the discounted sum of the income of current and future generations, relative to a no-adoption benchmark. This welfare loss stems from the zero lower bound on wages. In a frictionless environment, novices would be able to borrow against future earnings to preserve access to valuable training positions—especially since the same automation shock makes expertise more valuable. Instead, novices cannot directly pay oversubscribed experts for access, so those experts fail to fully internalize the future income generated by the mentorship positions that automation displaces. Put differently, the zero lower bound forces novices to finance elite mentorship solely through their labor, the very currency that an improvement in entry-level automation devalues.

Displacement, however, operates alongside a countervailing force. Improvements in automation can also expand experts’ scale of operation by reducing the supervision time required to complete a given production process. If this scale effect dominates, the total number of novices working with the very best experts rises, even if each production process requires fewer novices. The automation shock then accelerates the diffusion of best practices and raises growth. Even so, at least in these early stages of adoption, the preliminary evidence on generative AI discussed below seems more consistent with displacement than with offsetting scale effects. This may be because current AI automation is still “so-so” ((Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2019)), generating limited time savings, or because expert supervision is constrained by hard cognitive or attentional limits (see § 6.1 for details).

Beyond automation, the framework yields analogous implications for other forms of technological change. Technologies that create new labor-intensive tasks raise output on impact and increase long-run growth, even without scale effects. They do so by inducing the most skilled experts to hire more novices, thereby accelerating the diffusion of best practices. By contrast, technologies that raise the productivity of novices or machines in the tasks they already perform increase long-run growth only if they expand experts’ scale of operation.

Taken together, these results imply that the effects of new technologies on knowledge transmission can be ambiguous. The same technology can automate some tasks, create new ones, and augment labor or capital in existing tasks. Yet these forces operate through a common margin: they reallocate junior workers across experts, thereby changing whom those workers learn from. Although direct evidence on this technology-induced reallocation remains scarce, evidence from other shocks supports its relevance: weak labor-market conditions at entry and idiosyncratic shifts in large-firm hiring can redirect young workers across initial placements, with persistent consequences for earnings and skill development ((Oyer, 2006; Arellano-Bover, 2022, 2024)). Future empirical work on how technological change shapes expertise formation should therefore look beyond aggregate entry-level employment and track how junior workers are reallocated across firms and mentors.

While applicable to many technologies, these results are especially relevant to the recent advent of generative AI. Early evidence comparing employment changes across age groups and occupations differentially exposed to AI suggests that junior workers have experienced weaker relative employment outcomes in more AI-exposed occupations (Berger et al., 2024; Hosseini and Lichtinger, 2025; Brynjolfsson et al., 2025a; Klein Teeselink, 2025; Atkinson and Yamco, 2026). This pattern is consistent with some displacement of junior labor occurring in such environments. Although the available evidence does not yet track affected workers’ subsequent placements, anecdotal reports suggest that some graduates may be taking positions at smaller, mid-tier firms that previously struggled to attract such talent (Ellis, 2026; Lahart, 2026).

In this sense, the evidence so far suggests that current iterations of generative AI may be a form of “seniority-biased technological change” (Hosseini and Lichtinger, 2025): a technology that substitutes for entry-level execution while complementing expert judgment. Holding expertise fixed, such a change is unambiguously beneficial. But expertise is endogenous, and its intergenerational transmission is governed by incomplete contracts. As a result, to the extent that such technologies reduce junior workers’ access to the most productive mentors and firms, seniority-biased technological change can erode the future supply of the very expertise it complements.

Related Literature

This paper bridges three strands of literature. It connects the task-based literature on technology and labor demand with the literature on idea flows and economic growth by examining how new technologies reshape the workplace interactions through which tacit skills are transmitted across generations. It also contributes to the literature on the economics of apprenticeships by showing how early-career learning links technology adoption to aggregate productivity over time.

The task-based approach to technology and labor demand was developed by Zeira (1998), Autor et al. (2003), and Acemoglu and Autor (2011). In this framework, production requires the completion of a range of tasks allocated across factors of production according to comparative advantage. Technological change therefore affects labor demand, wages, inequality, and productivity by altering who performs which tasks and at what cost (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018, 2019, 2022; Acemoglu et al., 2024). Building on this approach, Autor and Thompson (2025) model occupations as bundles of tasks and show that automation can be expertise-leveling, reducing occupational expertise requirements.5

More recently, Ide and Talamàs (2024, 2025, 2026) build on the knowledge-hierarchies literature of Garicano (2000) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004, 2006) to study AI’s distinctive implications. Knowledge hierarchies are a specialized version of the task-based framework in which task linkages emerge endogenously from organizational choices aimed at using tacit knowledge efficiently (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2015). Using this framework, Ide and Talamàs (2024, 2025, 2026) highlight the importance of AI autonomy: nonautonomous AI disproportionately benefits the least knowledgeable—resembling the expertise-leveling logic of Autor and Thompson (2025)—whereas autonomous AI is expertise-amplifying, primarily benefiting the most knowledgeable.

I contribute to the task-based literature by studying how technological change affects the intergenerational transmission of tacit knowledge and, through that channel, the evolution of productivity. My model builds on the canonical task-based framework. At the same time, it also draws inspiration from the knowledge-hierarchies literature in emphasizing the economic importance of tacit knowledge and the role of organizations in determining who works with whom.

The literature on idea flows and economic growth emphasizes how knowledge diffuses through interactions among individuals and firms, shaping productivity and growth (Kortum, 1997; Eaton and Kortum, 1999, 2002; Lucas, 2009; Lucas and Moll, 2014).⁵ My paper contributes to this literature by studying a margin largely absent from existing models: how technological change reshapes who learns from whom in production, with consequences for the diffusion of best practices.

In the context of idea flows and economic growth, the papers closest to mine are Perla and Tonetti (2014), De la Croix et al. (2018), and Caicedo et al. (2019). In both my paper and Perla and Tonetti (2014), long-run growth is tied to the endogenous evolution of a fat-tailed productivity distribution as better practices diffuse through the economy. In Perla and Tonetti (2014), this evolution is driven by firm imitation: low-productivity firms upgrade by drawing a new productivity level from the distribution of producing firms. In my model, by contrast, diffusion is intergenerational and workplace-based: the most productive experts replicate their expertise by transmitting it to the novices who work with them and later become experts themselves. This distinction introduces a scarce-mentor bottleneck and gives technological change a central role in reshaping who learns from whom.

As in Caicedo et al. (2019), my paper embeds organizations within a model of idea flows and knowledge diffusion. In their framework, however, agents learn through stochastic encounters, while organizational assignment determines production roles, output, and wages. In my model, by contrast, workplace assignment is itself the learning technology: novices learn from the experts with whom they work. De la Croix et al. (2018) is closer on intergenerational transmission: it also studies an overlapping-generations economy in which tacit knowledge passes from experts to novices. But De la Croix et al. (2018) assumes random matching and focuses on how preindustrial apprenticeship institutions helped mitigate masters’ incentives to shirk on training effort. By contrast, my paper assumes that novices compete to work with the best experts and studies how technological change affects the transmission of tacit knowledge.

This workplace-based learning structure also connects my paper to the literature on the economics of apprenticeships: novices acquire tacit knowledge by working alongside experts, effectively exchanging current labor for access to expertise. As Mokyr (2019) emphasizes, apprenticeship contracts are inherently incomplete because they govern the transfer of tacit knowledge. That incompleteness can distort training and lead to inefficient knowledge transmission (Garicano and Rayo, 2017; De la Croix et al., 2018; Fudenberg and Rayo, 2019; Fudenberg et al., 2021).

I contribute to this literature by studying how technological change reshapes apprenticeship-like arrangements and, through them, the intergenerational transmission of tacit knowledge. Closest is the complementary work of Garicano and Rayo (2025), which extends Garicano and Rayo (2017) to analyze how AI affects apprenticeship viability. Their analysis, however, focuses on the dynamics of a single expert–novice relationship. By contrast, my paper studies apprenticeship-like arrangements in general equilibrium, where technology changes the allocation of novices across experts and, through that allocation, the evolution of expertise and long-run growth.

Finally, my paper is closely related to several contemporaneous contributions that examine how new technologies affect learning, skill formation, and internal labor market structure. Acemoglu et al. (2026) show how agentic AI can substitute for human learning effort and erode the stock of public knowledge. Afrouzi et al. (2026) study how automation and task creation shape learning-by-doing and worker-to-manager transitions, while Friebel et al. (2026) study how AI shocks reshape firms’ junior-to-senior span, generating hiring freezes and transitional oscillations. Relative to these papers, I emphasize a different margin: who learns from whom. In my framework, technological change shapes skill formation by reallocating novices across experts and thereby altering the expertise transmitted to future generations, even without changing aggregate entry-level employment.

Roadmap

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the conceptual foundations of the analysis. Section 3 presents the baseline model and defines competitive equilibrium. § 4 characterizes long-run equilibrium outcomes. § 5 studies the effects of technological change. § 6 extends the framework to incorporate additional margins that shape technology’s effects on tacit knowledge transmission. § 7 concludes.

Conceptual Foundations

This section outlines the conceptual foundations of the analysis: the tacit dimension of expertise, the inherent constraints on its transfer, and its transmission across generations.

The Tacit Dimension of Expertise.— Codifiable knowledge refers to explicit rules and procedures that can be easily transmitted via manuals, books, and databases. Tacit knowledge, in contrast, encompasses intuitive skills and insights that are difficult to articulate precisely (Polanyi, 1966; Foray, 2004). These two forms of knowledge are interdependent: codified instructions usually require tacit knowledge to be properly interpreted and adapted to real-world complexities. As Mokyr (2002, pp. 14-15) explains:

Tacit knowledge is needed to obtain inexpensive, reliable access to codified instructions

[…] no set of instructions […] can ever be complete. It would be too expensive to write

a complete set of instructions for every technique. Judgement, dexterity, experience, and other forms of tacit knowledge inevitably come into play when technique is executed.

While professional capability relies on both forms of knowledge, codifiable elements can be standardized and scaled. This paper therefore focuses on the tacit dimension. Hereafter, I use “expertise” and “tacit knowledge” interchangeably to refer to the unwritten insights required to execute and orchestrate well-defined tasks. In investment banking, for instance, populating financial models and verifying due diligence documents are largely standardized procedures. However, transforming their completion into financial advice requires the judgment to select appropriate models, identify anomalies that standard procedures might overlook, and adjust methods when unforeseen contingencies arise.

Because tacit knowledge is tied to personal experience, it is embodied in the individual (Polanyi, 1966; Garicano, 2000). Thus, while tacit insights can be transferred, their transmission requires the expert’s direct involvement. This makes the expert’s time a key bottleneck to the use and diffusion of this knowledge (Foray, 2004; Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2015; Ide and Talamàs, 2025).

Labor as a Mechanism and Currency for Acquiring Tacit Knowledge.— Lacking a codifiable structure, tacit knowledge must be acquired experientially through active execution and collaboration with more experienced individuals. As Polanyi (1962, p. 55) observes:

An art which cannot be specified in detail cannot be transmitted by prescription [...] It can be passed on only by example from master to apprentice [...] By watching the master and emulating his efforts, the apprentice unconsciously picks up the rules of the art, including those which are not explicitly known to the master himself.

Thus, labor supplied alongside an expert serves a dual role: it is both a productive input and a mechanism for assimilating tacit knowledge (Lave and Wenger, 1991; Brown and Duguid, 1991; Beane, 2019). This apprenticeship model is pervasive in expertise-intensive professions (e.g., medicine, law, finance), where novices perform routine tasks under expert supervision, observing how experts apply judgment to integrate these inputs into a cohesive whole (Garicano and Rayo, 2017; Beane, 2024b).

Independent trial-and-error can also help acquire tacit skills, but it remains an inefficient substitute for mentorship. For instance, exploiting office closures and subsequent return-to-office mandates at a Fortune 500 firm, Emanuel et al. (2026) show that younger engineers receive more feedback and later write higher-quality code when co-located with more experienced colleagues. They also find that these engineers are subsequently more likely to be poached for better jobs, consistent with co-location fostering the accumulation of valuable human capital. The value of mentorship is also visible in entry-level labor markets in professional services, such as finance and law, where novices routinely accept demanding hours and low effective pay to work alongside top practitioners.78

The contracts governing the transfer of tacit knowledge, however, are inherently incomplete (Mokyr, 2019). Because such expertise resists precise articulation, it is non-verifiable; because it is embodied in the individual, it cannot be seized or repossessed, and therefore cannot be pledged as collateral. These features make it difficult to finance training through claims on the future returns to acquired expertise (Becker, 1964; Garicano and Rayo, 2017). Concurrent labor thus becomes the natural means of payment in this environment.

These observations motivate the structure of the baseline model. The model represents early-career workers as novices and more experienced practitioners as experts. Expertise is embodied in experts and transmitted through joint production. The assignment of novices to experts therefore determines the expertise novices carry into the future and, in turn, the quality of mentors available to subsequent cohorts. Because access to expertise cannot be financed through enforceable claims on future returns, novices rely on concurrent labor to pay for access to mentorship. Technological change can therefore affect productivity not only by changing how tasks are performed, but also by changing which experts novices learn from and the value of novice labor as a means of financing mentorship. Section 3 formalizes these margins.

The Baseline Model

§ 3.1 introduces the environment and maps its key assumptions to the conceptual foundations of Section 2. § 3.2 then describes agents’ problems, defines competitive equilibrium, and establishes existence and uniqueness. Doing so upfront allows the analysis to focus directly on long-run outcomes and the effects of technological shocks. To help readers navigate the notation used throughout the analysis, Appendix § 9 provides a glossary of the core mathematical symbols.

The Environment and Its Interpretation

A Broad Overview of the Environment.— Time is discrete and infinite, indexed by t=0,1,2,…t = 0, 1, 2, \ldots. The economy consists of overlapping generations of risk-neutral individuals who live for two periods: first as novices, then as experts. Each cohort has unit mass, so the total population remains constant at two. All agents discount future payoffs by the common discount factor β∈(0,1)\beta\in(0, 1).

Novices are identical at birth, lack wealth, and inelastically supply one unit of labor. Experts, in contrast, differ in their skill qq. This skill level is observable, but the knowledge behind it is tacit. Consequently, external observers can perfectly assess an expert’s productivity but cannot discern the insights or processes that drive those results without closer interaction.

Let Ft(q)F_t(q) denote the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of expert skills at time tt, with xt≡min⁡support⁡{Ft}x_t \equiv\min\operatorname{support}\{F_t\}. This distribution is the aggregate state of the economy and evolves endogenously as novices work alongside experts and assimilate their expertise in the manner described below. The initial distribution F0F_0 is exogenously given, has a finite mean, and admits a continuous and strictly positive probability density function f0(q)f_0(q) on its support [x0,+∞)[x_0,+\infty).

There is a single final good, which serves as the numeraire. An expert produces output by combining her skill with a continuum of routine tasks in the [0,N][0,N] interval. Tasks are not scalable: in each expert’s production process, every task must be completed exactly once. A unit measure of tasks can be completed using one unit of novice labor or, when feasible, one machine. For simplicity, experts do not supply routine labor themselves.

Novices can perform all routine tasks with productivity hh, while machines can perform only tasks in [0,I]⊆[0,N][0,I] \subseteq[0,N], but do so with higher productivity m>hm > h. The output of an expert is the product of her skill and a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of routine-task contributions. Thus, if an expert with skill qq decides to produce (is “active”) and assigns a feasible measure k∈[0,I]k \in[0,I] of automatable tasks to machines—and the remaining measure N−kN-k to novice labor—her output is given by:9

qmkhN−kqm^k h^{N-k}

I restrict attention to the case in which experts require multiple novices to produce. As I formally show in § 4.1, this assumption is necessary for the economy to exhibit long-run growth:

Assumption 1 (Experts Need Multiple Novices). The measure of non-automatable tasks exceeds one:

N−I>1N-I>1

Following Acemoglu et al. (2024), each machine is produced instantaneously using ρ>0\rho> 0 units of the final good and fully depreciates after one period, implying a rental rate of ρ\rho. On the labor side, matching is many-to-one: each novice works for exactly one expert and uses her single unit of labor to perform a unit measure of routine tasks, while each active expert hires multiple novices to carry out all tasks not assigned to machines (a measure strictly greater than one by Assumption 1).

By working alongside an expert, a novice observes and assimilates the tacit insights behind the expert’s skill. Hence, a novice matched with an expert of skill qq becomes an expert of identical skill in the subsequent period. In this sense, the employment relationship is also the channel through which tacit knowledge is transmitted.

However, the non-verifiability of tacit knowledge and the inalienability of the resulting human capital prevent novices from pledging future earnings as collateral. Lacking initial wealth, they face a liquidity constraint that forces wages to be non-negative (wt(q)≥0w_t(q) \ge0). This leaves concurrent labor as the only means of compensating an expert for the opportunity to learn, giving rise to an apprenticeship-like arrangement.

The economic environment is thus parsimoniously described by a small set of primitives: the discount factor β\beta, the initial distribution of skills F0F_0, the rental rate of machines ρ\rho, the parameters of the production technology (N,I,h,m)(N,I,h,m), and the zero lower bound on wages.

Interpretation.—Having described the economic environment, I now relate the model’s core assumptions to the conceptual framework of Section 2.

First, for tractability, the baseline model imposes a strict division of labor between execution and judgment: novices and machines perform routine tasks, while experts orchestrate production. This structure mirrors knowledge-intensive industries, where early-career professionals (and, more recently, AI) execute well-structured tasks, while senior practitioners integrate those inputs into a cohesive whole. § 6 returns to this simplification by discussing an extension in which each expert chooses whether to act as an orchestrator or to supply one unit of routine labor. The section argues that allowing this occupational choice preserves the paper’s main insights.

Second, the assumption that tasks are non-scalable reflects experts’ limited time and attention: each expert can oversee only the measure NN of tasks required for a single production process. This formalizes a core principle of Section 2: because expertise is embodied in the individual, its application and transmission cannot be easily scaled. In investment banking, for instance, a senior partner can oversee only a finite number of concurrent transactions, regardless of skill. Admittedly, this fixed-capacity assumption is stark: it rules out scale-of-operation effects. § 6 relaxes this restriction and examines the implications of the resulting scale effects.

Third, the model assumes that joint production is necessary for skill acquisition. By executing routine tasks, a novice gains direct insight into how the expert transforms these inputs into output, unconsciously learning “the rules of the art.” Online Appendices III and IV relax this assumption by allowing skill development through independent innovation as well. Within joint production, I impose two further simplifications: routine tasks provide uniform access to the expert’s methods, and skill transmission is exact, so novices always inherit their mentor’s skill. Online Appendices V and VI study extensions that relax these two simplifications, and § 6.2 discusses their implications.

Fourth, because novices lack initial wealth and cannot borrow, labor is their only means to pay for training (wt(q)≥0w_t(q) \ge0). Rather than explicitly microfounding the contractual frictions that preclude such borrowing, I impose this non-negativity constraint as a reduced-form proxy for the contract incompleteness inherent in the transfer of tacit knowledge, as discussed in Section 2.10 A zero wage can be interpreted literally as unpaid labor (e.g., culinary stages), or more broadly as novices accepting demanding hours relative to nominal pay, resulting in low effective compensation (e.g., medical residencies, or junior associates in law and finance).11

Fifth, the model treats experts’ skill levels as observable, while the tacit insights behind them remain hidden from outsiders. This should be interpreted not as literal perfect observability, but as a tractable polar case of directed sorting, in which novices rank potential mentors using observable markers of expertise, such as professional standing, past performance, institutional affiliation, or training lineage. Such directed sorting is consistent with the observation that novices in white-collar professions often sacrifice current compensation to work alongside top practitioners (see Section 2).

Finally, the initial skill distribution, F0F_0, is assumed to have unbounded support. Following Buera and Lucas [2], this assumption serves as a reduced-form approximation for an economy where an initial population with bounded skills draws ideas from an unbounded latent distribution (“Plato’s realm of Forms”). Online Appendix III formalizes this extension.

Optimization, Matching, and Equilibrium

**Experts’ Problem.—**Given the machine rental rate ρ\rho and the wage schedule wtw_t, an expert with skill qq at time tt maximizes final-period income. Specifically, the expert chooses whether to produce or remain inactive. If active, the expert assigns a measure k∈[0,I]k \in[0,I] of automatable tasks to machines. The expert’s optimal income is therefore:

Πt(q)=max⁡{0, max⁡k∈[0,I][qmkhN−k−ρk−wt(q)(N−k)]}\Pi_t(q) = \max\left\{0,\ \max_{k\in[0,I]}\left[qm^k h^{N-k} - \rho k - w_t(q)(N-k)\right]\right\}

The following lemma establishes a central result for the subsequent analysis.

Lemma 1. Even if novice labor is free (wt(q)=0w_t(q)=0), full automation (k=Ik=I) is strictly optimal for all active experts with skill:

q>ρIhN[(m/h)I−1]q > \frac{\rho I}{h^N\left[(m/h)^I-1\right]}

Proof. See Appendix § 10.2.

Intuitively, high-skill experts benefit more from the productivity premium of machines (m>hm > h), while the direct cost advantage of using novice labor is bounded by the zero lower bound on wages. Thus, even when novice labor is free, wt(q)=0w_t(q)=0, the productivity premium of machines dominates for sufficiently high qq. Full automation is therefore strictly optimal for sufficiently skilled experts.

I then impose the following assumption:

Assumption 2 (Full Adoption of Automation Technologies). The lower bound of the initial skill distribution, x0x_0, satisfies:

x0>ρIhN[(m/h)I−1]x_0 > \frac{\rho I}{h^N\left[(m/h)^I-1\right]}

Since all experts in subsequent periods possess skills q≥x0q \geq x_0 (as shown below), all active experts at every date, regardless of their skill, optimally assign II tasks to machines and hire N−IN-I novices.

Online Appendix I.2 shows that, for the equilibrium class analyzed here, this restriction affects only a finite initial transition. If the initial minimum skill lies below the full-automation threshold, some active experts may initially choose less than full automation. Skill accumulation, however, raises the economy’s minimum skill above the threshold in finite time, after which all active experts fully automate.

Given Assumption 2, the optimal income of expert qq at time tt reduces to:

Πt(q)≡max⁡{0, S(q)−wt(q)(N−I)}(1)\Pi_t(q) \equiv\max\{0,\,S(q)-w_t(q)(N-I)\} \tag*{(1)}

where S(q)≡qmIhN−I−ρIS(q) \equiv qm^I h^{N-I}-\rho I is the surplus generated by an active expert with skill qq before novice compensation. Expert qq at time tt weakly prefers producing to remaining inactive if and only if S(q)≥wt(q)(N−I)S(q) \ge w_t(q)(N-I).

I restrict attention to equilibria in which the expert income schedule, Πt(q)\Pi_t(q), is continuous and non-decreasing in qq. The continuity restriction merely streamlines the exposition; one can show that any equilibrium featuring a non-decreasing income schedule is necessarily continuous. The monotonicity requirement, in turn, selects outcomes robust to the free disposal of skills—where an expert can costlessly mimic a less-skilled peer. Under this selection, and up to zero-profit production indifferences, the set of active experts at time tt, denoted by AtA_t, can be represented as an upper interval:

At≡[at,∞),for some at≥xtA_t \equiv[a_t,\infty), \quad\text{for some } a_t \ge x_t

where, by convention, the cutoff expert ata_t is included in AtA_t.

Novices’ Problem.— Given the current wage schedule wtw_t and next period’s expert income schedule Πt+1\Pi_{t+1}, novices at time tt evaluate potential matches by the lifetime income they deliver. Matching with an expert of skill qq yields:

wt(q)+βΠt+1(q)w_t(q)+\beta\Pi_{t+1}(q)

where Πt+1(q)\Pi_{t+1}(q) is the optimal income of an expert with skill qq in period t+1t+1, as defined by (1). Throughout, whenever this continuation schedule is evaluated below the support of Ft+1F_{t+1}, I use the convention Πt+1(q)=0\Pi_{t+1}(q)=0; equivalently, Πt+1(q)=0\Pi_{t+1}(q)=0 for q<xt+1q<x_{t+1}.

Within-Period Competitive Matching.— I now characterize the equilibrium outcome at time tt, taking FtF_t and Πt+1\Pi_{t+1} as given. This requires determining the wage schedule and matching arrangement that prevails in that period.

I model within-period matching as a competitive assignment subject to experts’ fixed capacity and the zero lower bound on wages. Apart from these constraints, there are no search frictions, informational asymmetries, or coordination failures. Expert-novice matching at time tt is therefore represented as an assignment from novices to the set of active experts AtA_t, with inactive experts receiving no novices. Because novices are ex ante identical, this assignment is summarized by a finite Borel measure Lt\mathcal{L}_t on AtA_t, where Lt(E)\mathcal{L}_t(E) denotes the mass of novices assigned to experts in the measurable set E⊆AtE \subseteq A_t.

A feasible assignment must satisfy two conditions. First, each active expert optimally hires exactly N−IN-I novices, so:

Lt(E)=(N−I)∫EdFt(q),for any measurable E⊆At(2)\mathcal{L}_t(E)=(N-I)\int_E dF_t(q),\quad\text{for any measurable }E\subseteq A_t \tag*{(2)}

Second, novices have unit mass and supply labor inelastically, so all novices must be assigned: Lt(At)=1\mathcal{L}_t(A_t)=1. Since At=[at,∞)A_t=[a_t,\infty), these two feasibility conditions together imply the aggregate market-clearing condition:

1=(N−I)[1−Ft(at)].(3)1=(N-I)[1-F_t(a_t)]. \tag*{(3)}

The next definition adapts the canonical static, frictionless assignment framework (e.g., Becker, 1973; Eeckhout and Kircher, 2011, Section 2.1) to an environment with a zero lower bound on wages:

References

  1. [1]BINGHAM, N. H., C. M. GOLDIE, AND J.L. TEUGELS (1989): Regular Variation, vol. 27 of Encyclopedia of Mathematics and its Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, first paperback (with additions) ed.
  2. [2]BUERA, F. J. AND R. E. LUCAS (2018): “Idea Flows and Economic Growth,” Annual Review of Economics, 10, 315–345DOI

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