WorksEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
Truthful compromise and insurance on a sphere
Abstract
Can public choice without transfers insure conflicting interests when action intensity is fixed? We require truthful reporting for every increasing-concave evaluation of alignment with private ideals. On a sphere, efficiency at profiles with at most three ideal directions forces fixed-weight random dictatorship; weaker tests suffice in two and three dimensions. From four dimensions, binary efficiency permits committees to insure members by placing outcome risk orthogonally to their reports. We identify restrictions shared by all mechanisms with these incentives and binary efficiency: binary winning probabilities determine mean outcomes at every profile and individual alignment distributions at planar three-camp profiles. When these probabilities depend only on camp size, complete insurance at balanced equilateral disagreement requires dimension proportional to population. In contrast, committees reduce each participant's welfare loss relative to certain zero alignment to any prescribed positive fraction of the equal-weight random-dictatorship loss in a population-independent dimension.