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Disenfranchisement in Spatial Voting Games

Abstract

The questions of voting rights, group membership, and the boundaries of acceptable discourse all involve a recursive, self-stability issue, wherein the voters, group members, and acceptable commentators are often the ultimate arbiters of their own rules for inclusion and exclusion. In order to understand how ideological or issue diversity may impact the stability of such inclusion and exclusion, we introduce franchise elections, where voting members of a group vote to change the electorate. In particular, when agents are positioned inside an ideological or issue space, a social choice function that aggregates agent viewpoints induces a preference for agents over group composition, where agents prefer groups that improve the social choice function outcome for them. We demonstrate that when ideological space is two-dimensional, these franchise elections can generate complex behavior and that this complexity exists for any social choice function. Using the Yolk social choice function from voting theory, we illustrate that franchise elections can predict that agents attempting to introduce a new ideological axis perpendicular to an existing left-right spectrum risk disenfranchisement unless they ally with either side of the spectrum, and that franchise elections can cycle with any period.

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vlnc:W_t5qads8a
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