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WorksEconomics, Econometrics and Finance

The opposing informational effects of AI trading

Abstract

Better artificial intelligence (AI) can improve individual forecasts without making prices better at revealing new information. In a competitive market with resource-constrained forecasting, more capable algorithms can substitute analysis of public records for private observations, reducing the private information aggregated into prices. The same trades can convey sophisticated public-data analysis to investors unable to perform it themselves. We establish conditions under which these effects coexist and the private benefit of further computation falls. Numerical equilibrium calculations and finite-data neural-market experiments exhibit corresponding patterns. Out-of-sample earnings forecasts and controlled language-model tasks show related patterns of information substitution. In the neural experiment, wider adoption increases the predictive value of price for limited observers, reduces it for advanced observers, and lowers the benefit of upgrading by 44%. Retraining by investors who did not upgrade can amplify the loss of private-information precision. The informational consequences of AI trading depend on what prices reveal and who can use them.

Will smarter trading make prices smarter?

How much can a market price tell us? From Adam Smith’s account of decentralized economic coordination to Friedrich Hayek’s argument that prices communicate scattered knowledge, economists have long debated how markets bring information together [1, 2]. Paul Samuelson’s analysis of anticipated asset prices and Eugene Fama’s work on market efficiency gave that question a sharper form in modern finance [3, 4]. Prices need not be perfectly efficient to reflect some of what investors know and help direct capital toward better opportunities [5, 6].

Artificial intelligence (AI) appears to offer a powerful way to improve that process. Algorithms can search large collections of corporate reports, economic data, and past prices for patterns that would escape less capable forecasters. Machine learning has demonstrated predictive value in asset-pricing research [7, 8], raising hopes of more efficient markets alongside concerns about instability [9, 10]. If more accurate forecasts inform more trades, surely prices should become more informative. But more informative about what?

Consider two investors. One visits a supplier and discovers unexpectedly strong orders—a clue that is not yet public. The other uses a powerful AI model to identify a subtle pattern in reports that anyone can download. Both may trade profitably, and both may move the same share price. Yet only the first contributes an observation that the published record did not already contain. The second contributes a better interpretation of that record. Improving the second investor’s forecast does not necessarily improve the market’s ability to discover new facts.

Trading algorithms also change the data on which future forecasts are based. When many investors adopt a new algorithm, their orders can change market prices. Those prices enter the public record, so even investors who keep their old algorithms encounter a different history of price movements. They may then retrain their forecasts on the changed market, producing further changes in trading [11].

We show that more capable trading AI can make prices less revealing about newly discovered facts while making them more useful to people who cannot analyze the public record as thoroughly. We establish how both effects can occur in a competitive market and examine them in numerical calculations and markets with trained neural forecasting models. The same analysis shows how prices can reduce the private benefit of further computation. We also examine information substitution using U.S. market data and controlled language-model forecasts.

How learning algorithms become market prices

Our model follows investors who trade an asset according to their forecasts of its future payoff. All have access to the same public record: past prices, corporate payouts, and published economic indicators. Each also possesses an imperfect private clue about current conditions. What distinguishes more capable AI is not exclusive access to public data, but an ability to extract more useful patterns from them. A smaller algorithm may capture a few regularities; a more powerful one can build a richer summary of the same history and use it to forecast both future payoffs and uncertainty.

Investors choose positions using their fitted forecasts of payoff and risk. Their orders meet in a competitive market and jointly determine the price. Private clues and AI-generated forecasts therefore affect prices through the same familiar force: people’s willingness to buy or sell (Figure 1A). The model allows algorithms to learn nonlinear patterns in public data. In a tractable version, we can also calculate forecasts and market prices exactly.

Figure 1. From private clues and public records to prices. (A) Investors combine their own private information with forecasts drawn from published data; trading on both inputs determines the market price. Prices then enter the histories used in subsequent AI training. (B) More capable AI can reduce trading on private clues (less discovery) while conveying more information extracted from public data to other price users (more sharing).

We distinguish three stages. First, a more capable algorithm, trained on the previously prevailing market, changes orders at its first auction. Second, even with every algorithm’s parameters fixed, the resulting prices enter subsequent public histories and change forecasts and orders. Third, investors may refit their algorithms to the changed market. The second adjustment requires no retraining. We keep these stages separate when comparing initial deployment, frozen-policy markets, and retraining.

Better forecasts can conceal new information

A better public-data forecast may leave less for a private observation to explain. If an AI can already infer likely sales from published reports, a supplier’s clue changes its forecast by less. Trading then responds less to the clue, and less privately observed information reaches the price.

The mechanism can be seen in the strength of an investor’s response to a private signal. In our analytically tractable benchmark,

∂hi∂si⏟trading response to a private clue=βiγivi⏟predictive weight adjusted for risk.(1)\underbrace{\frac{\partial h_i}{\partial s_i}}_{\text{trading response to a private clue}} = \underbrace{\frac{\beta_i}{\gamma_i v_i}}_{\text{predictive weight adjusted for risk}} . \tag*{(1)}

Here hih_i is the position held and sis_i the private clue. Holding the candidate price fixed, the coefficient βi\beta_i measures how much the clue changes the expected payoff; viv_i is the remaining forecast uncertainty, and γi\gamma_i describes how cautious the investor is about risk. As an AI explains more of the payoff using public data, the clue contributes less to its forecast, reducing βi\beta_i. A better forecast also lowers uncertainty viv_i, which can encourage larger positions. Our first theorem accounts for both changes. When private clues concern the fundamental driving the payoff, an upgrade that improves the fitted public-data forecast reduces the net response of trades to those clues at initial deployment. The result permits nonlinear public-data processing under the forecasting assumptions given in the Supplementary Materials.

When investors trade less on their private clues, their actions leave a weaker trace of that information in prices. Random buying and selling then makes it harder to infer what investors have learned privately. We measure this using the precision of new information: how clearly prices distinguish private news from unrelated trading. In a competitive-market model, this precision falls from 2.47 before advanced AI enters to 2.26 at first deployment and 2.07 after retraining (Figure 2A})—a decline of about 16%. The decrease arises from investors’ trading decisions even as their forecasts improve. Experiments with trained linear state-space and recurrent neural-network algorithms also find improved forecasts alongside weaker discovery on average (Fig. 2B,C`).

Figure 2. Better forecasts need not produce better discovery. (A) In a population-optimal competitive-market example, prices carry progressively less new private information after advanced AI is deployed and after investors retrain. (B,C) In separate finite-data experiments, increasing the size of linear state-space and gated recurrent models reduces forecast error on average while also reducing price sensitivity to new private information on average. Small dots show three training runs; diamonds show their means. The fitted-model experiments are separate from the population calculation.

Prices can also share what AI has learned

But revealing less new information is not the same as being less useful to everyone. A more powerful trading algorithm can recognize patterns in published data that a less capable investor cannot practically extract. When the algorithm trades on those patterns, part of its analysis becomes visible in the market price. Watching the price may therefore give others the benefit of computations they never performed.

Consider two people looking at the same share price. One can analyze years of reports and market data; the other can perform only a smaller set of calculations. The second may learn more from the price because the first can already work out much of what it reveals.

We can describe this difference mathematically. Let θ\theta be the economic condition investors are trying to infer and pp the price. Write F\mathcal{F} for the information a modest algorithm can extract from published data and U⊇F\mathcal{U} \supseteq\mathcal{F} for what a more capable algorithm can extract from the same data. Then

I(θ;p∣F)=I(θ;p∣U)⏟New information beyond public analysis+[I(θ;U∣F)−I(θ;U∣F,p)]⏟Public information shared through price.(2)I(\theta; p \mid\mathcal{F}) = \underbrace{I(\theta; p \mid\mathcal{U})}_{\text{New information beyond public analysis}} + \underbrace{\left[I(\theta; \mathcal{U} \mid\mathcal{F}) - I(\theta; \mathcal{U} \mid\mathcal{F}, p)\right]}_{\text{Public information shared through price}} . \tag*{(2)}

Here II measures information as a reduction in uncertainty. Imagine first that you could carry out all the public-data analysis performed by the powerful algorithm. The price may still reveal information beyond that feasible analysis, including traders’ private observations: this is the first term. Now imagine that you see the same publicly available reports but have only the resources for simpler analysis. The price can pass along some of the sophisticated conclusions that you could not produce yourself: this is the second term. The identity holds for nested information sets; the second term is signed and need not be positive. Our economic model supplies conditions under which sharing increases while discovery declines.

We prove that both effects can occur together even when investors’ competitive trading determines prices. In a numerical market, as advanced AI spreads, the additional information that prices reveal beyond advanced public-data analysis falls by about 13%. At the same time, the information that a less capable observer gains from prices rises by about 36% (Figure 3A,B). These opposite changes occur in the same market: prices reveal less that is new while giving more information to people with limited computing resources.

Opposing price-information effects and a falling benefit of computation

Figure 3. Opposing price-information effects and a falling benefit of computation. (A–C) Gaussian benchmark: price information beyond advanced analysis falls, information to a limited observer rises, and the upgrade benefit falls. Solid curves allow population retraining; dashed curves freeze incumbent policies while histories adjust. (D–F) Neural markets after six joint retraining updates: price-induced dividend-MSE reductions fall for advanced observers and rise for limited observers; directly evaluated upgrade benefits also fall. Diamonds are three-seed means; faint lines show individual seeds. Lines connect the three tested adoption shares. Panels D,E exclude own signals; both strategies in F receive the same price and own signal. Adoption is within group 1 (55% of the neural market). Units and vertical scales differ; neural profiles are not certified retraining equilibria.

A similar pattern appears when neural networks learn from market data and then trade. We examine how much observing the current price improves dividend forecasts for two outside observers—one with limited computing capacity and one with more advanced tools. As AI adoption rises in the market, the forecasting benefit of seeing the price increases by 12.4% for the limited observer but decreases by 6.8% for the advanced observer (Figure 3D,E). The experiment measures these gains in predictions from trained models rather than from a theoretical information formula.

Who still needs to invest in more AI?

If investors can learn from prices what others have already calculated, why pay to repeat the work? But competition could also lead to an arms race in which every investor keeps buying more powerful AI. Which force determines the value of the next upgrade?

In a benchmark with normally distributed signals and correctly fitted forecasts, the benefit of greater computing power has a simple expression. Let MM represent the additional public history an advanced algorithm can process beyond the basic information F\mathcal{F}; the investor also observes the current price pp and a private signal ss. With optimal trading, the gain from additional computation is

Value of extra computation=1γI(asset payoff;M∣p,s,F).(3)\text{Value of extra computation} = \frac{1}{\gamma} I(\text{asset payoff}; M \mid p,s,\mathcal{F}). \tag*{(3)}

The formula says that extra computing power is valuable to an investor only to the extent that it reveals something not already learned from the price and available clues. If competitors’ AI has already put much of the relevant analysis into the price, doing the same analysis independently brings a smaller advantage. Under the conditions we establish, wider adoption can therefore reduce the private benefit against which an investor weighs the cost of additional computation.

In our example, the payoff-equivalent benefit of an AI upgrade falls by more than half, from 0.0233 to 0.0102 in the model’s monetary units, as advanced trading AI becomes widespread (Figure 3C). We establish conditions for this decline and show that it can accompany the simultaneous loss of new information and gain in shared analysis. Earlier financial research established the importance of incentives to acquire and interpret information [5, 12, 13, 14, 15]. The additional mechanism here is that competing algorithms process the same publicly accessible material and pass the results of that work into a common price.

In the same neural markets, we evaluate the low- and high-capacity models’ trading strategies under the true payoff distribution, giving both the same price and private signal. The certainty-equivalent benefit of upgrading falls from 0.0213 to 0.0119 model units, a 44.2% decline (Figure 3F). The extra computing power still has value, but its advantage becomes considerably smaller as competitors adopt stronger AI.

When the new prices become new training data

The market can change again after the first AI upgrade. A newly deployed algorithm alters prices through its trades; those prices then enter the data used for its next training round. Even investors who did not upgrade may change their behavior because they now learn from a different market history.

In our equilibrium calculations, retraining makes the loss of new private information larger, while reducing some of the gain that limited observers receive from prices (Figure 3, solid versus dashed curves). In one example, much of the additional loss of discovery comes from investors who did not buy the stronger AI but updated their forecasts in response to prices changed by others (Supplementary Materials, Section S7). Other experiments distinguish the improvement in forecasting expected payoffs from the improvement in forecasting risk: the first can reduce trading on private clues, while the second can make investors trade more aggressively (Supplementary Materials, Section S7). The neural experiment supports the same mechanisms: retraining the non-upgrading group accounts for much of the additional reduction in private-information precision, while post-fit substitutions show that changes in predicted risk partly offset changes in predicted means (Supplementary Materials).

The neural results persist with larger training budgets, new training samples, and alternative ways of turning learned information into forecasts. Separate experiments also find the opposing information effects and a falling upgrade benefit when payoffs depend on factors not directly observed by private clues, or when payoff risk changes with public economic conditions (Supplementary Materials).

We also examined whether repeated neural retraining settles into a stable pattern. With the same market disturbances reused across updates, several model coefficients stabilize; with fresh training data, they continue to drift. The neural results therefore describe markets after a specified number of learning rounds, alongside our separate analytical and population-equilibrium results.

Information substitution beyond simulated markets

Do the same differences appear outside simulated markets? We first use historical U.S. financial data to predict companies’ quarterly earnings relative to analysts’ earlier forecasts. We compare a limited statistical model using a short public-data history with a richer model that processes longer histories and more complex patterns. We then give both the same additional current market information: share price, market capitalization, and the latest monthly stock return. Across 58,807 firm-quarter observations outside the training sample, these variables reduce mean squared forecast error by 0.60% for the limited model, compared with 0.14% for the richer model (Figure 4A). The difference remains when we use more recent quarterly financial statements (Supplementary Materials).

Figure 4. The value of market information depends on the observer’s forecasting tools. (A) Adding current market information improves a limited predictor’s forecasts about 4.2 times as much as a richer predictor’s forecasts (58,807 U.S. firm-quarter observations). Dots show mean reductions in out-of-sample forecast loss. (B) With historical returns, GPT-6.1 Sol responds about 6% less than GPT-5.2 to the same hypothetical private research estimate; the gap between the models is nearly twice as large as without the returns (50 company-quarter cases). Dots show means and 95% confidence intervals (two-way clustering in A; resampling cases in B). Precise differences are 0.00254 in A and −0.0205 for the change in the model gap in B.

We next examine how actual language models respond to a hypothetical private research estimate of a company’s next earnings surprise. We give GPT-5.2 and GPT-6.1 Sol identical anonymous financial information, then change only the private estimate and measure how much each forecast moves. Across 50 company-quarter cases, the newer model responds about 6% less to the clue when historical market returns are available. The gap between the models is nearly twice as large with that history as without it (Figure 4B). Both models respond more to the clue when returns are supplied, but the increase is smaller for the newer model. Together, the market-data and language-model experiments show how the value and use of information depend on what can already be learned from public records.

What does a smarter market mean for society?

Market prices matter far beyond the people who trade. Investors use them to judge opportunities, while companies and lenders can use them to assess changing economic conditions [16, 17]. As AI becomes more widely used in trading, prices may become better summaries of information already available in public records while revealing less about developments that investors have discovered independently. The same price can therefore be more useful for one decision and less useful for another.

These changes can also reshape the incentives to invest in AI. When prices convey some of the conclusions reached by better-equipped traders, others can benefit without performing the same calculations. As advanced trading systems spread, the reward to buying an additional forecasting system can fall rather than rise indefinitely. Meanwhile, their trades can leave a weaker trace of private observations in prices, and those altered prices become the data from which other investors learn.

The familiar promise of markets is that prices bring dispersed knowledge together. AI adds a new dimension: prices can also carry conclusions that require substantial computation to extract from public data. Better individual forecasts need not produce better collective discovery. To understand whether smarter trading produces a smarter market, we must ask not only how well AI predicts, but what prices still discover and whose analysis they share.

Economic environment and timing

This section defines the common economic environment underlying the paper’s theoretical and computational results. We distinguish three objects at the outset: (i) the economic process that generates fundamental payoffs and publicly released data; (ii) the information and technology available to market participants when making forecasts; and (iii) the price process that results when they trade. The underlying economic state determines both cash flows and the clues about them. Each trader combines a private clue with an AI-generated summary of the publicly available record to choose a holding. The holdings together determine the price. An improvement in the AI changes the processing of existing data and, through the resulting orders, the price; it does not mechanically improve the underlying fundamentals. Learning the new price process may then change subsequent trading decisions. These distinctions are maintained throughout the Supplementary Information (SI).

We first describe the environment conditional on a fixed profile of deployed forecasting systems. The population training problem and capacity restrictions are developed in S2; the forecast-based optimal demand schedules, clearing map, and endogenous retraining equilibrium are derived in S3. S4–S6 state and prove the three main analytical results using the primitives and timing established here. Additional stochastic-volatility, architecture-specific, and long-duration specifications used in robustness experiments are identified explicitly where introduced, rather than silently being treated as assumptions of the core theoretical results.

A stochastic economy with a finite-dimensional latent state

Trading dates are indexed by t∈Zt \in\mathbb{Z}. The latent economic state ft∈Rmf_t \in\mathbb{R}^m, where m<∞m < \infty is arbitrary, follows

ft+1=Fft+Gηt+1,ηt∼iidN(0,Iq),ρ(F)<1.(4)f_{t+1} = Ff_t + G\eta_{t+1}, \qquad\eta_t \overset{\mathrm{iid}}{\sim} \mathcal{N}(0,I_q), \qquad\rho(F) < 1. \tag*{(4)}

Here FF is an m×mm \times m transition matrix, GG is m×qm \times q, and ρ(⋅)\rho(\cdot) denotes spectral radius. The economy is taken in its stationary solution,

ft=∑j=0∞FjGηt−j,Σf≡Var⁡(ft)=FΣfFT+GGT.(5)f_t = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} F^jG\eta_{t-j}, \qquad\Sigma_f \equiv\operatorname{Var}(f_t) = F\Sigma_fF^\mathsf{T} + GG^\mathsf{T}. \tag*{(5)}

Stability ensures existence and uniqueness of the finite positive-semidefinite stationary covariance Σf\Sigma_f. We require positive variance for the scalar fundamental introduced below, without requiring Σf\Sigma_f to be nonsingular on economically irrelevant directions. Full-rank conditions needed for individual linear projections or for a smooth implicit-function argument will be added in the corresponding theorem.

A scalar fundamental about which traders possess dispersed information is

θt=aTft,Pθ≡Var⁡(θt)=aTΣfa>0,(6)\theta_t = a^\mathsf{T}f_t, \qquad P_\theta\equiv\operatorname{Var}(\theta_t) = a^\mathsf{T}\Sigma_f a > 0, \tag*{(6)}

where a∈Rma \in\mathbb{R}^m is fixed. Thus ftf_t is the full economic state, whereas θt\theta_t is the particular scalar about which traders receive individual clues. The state may contain many other components, including persistent or transitory macroeconomic drivers. The number mm describes the economy, not the memory or computational power of an AI. This definition does not itself provide a trader with θt\theta_t. Traders instead infer it from their signals and the disclosed record; a special disclosure technology may happen to reveal it exactly. The individual clue sci,ts_{ci,t} is introduced in (S1.11), and the AI’s public-data summary zc,tz_{c,t} in (S1.16). In particular, a high-dimensional economy need not require a high-dimensional predictor for every task.

Let mt∈Rrm_t \in\mathbb{R}^r denote the vector of public economic releases available before the date-tt auction. The unindexed mm denotes the latent state dimension, whereas the time-indexed mtm_t denotes the public release (possibly a vector). The baseline linear-Gaussian observation specification is

mt=Hft+ωt,ωt∼iidN(0,Σω),(7)m_t = Hf_t + \omega_t,\qquad\omega_t \mathrel{\overset{\mathrm{iid}}{\sim}} \mathcal{N}(0,\Sigma_\omega), \tag*{(7)}

where HH is r×mr \times m, Σω⪰0\Sigma_\omega\succeq0, and {ωt}\{\omega_t\} is independent of primitive fundamental and trading shocks. The degenerate case Σω=0\Sigma_\omega= 0 permits exact disclosure of selected coordinates of ftf_t. The general market mechanism does not depend on (S1.4) being the only possible form of public disclosure: S2 allows algorithms to process any pre-auction, commonly accessible release stream. The linear-Gaussian branch needed for the exact information and certainty-equivalent identities in S5–S6 retains (S1.4) (or a jointly Gaussian specialization).

Traded claims, payoffs, and random supply

At each date tt, traders can buy or sell a risky claim at an ex-dividend price ptp_t. This claim pays Dt+1D_{t+1} at the beginning of date t+1t+1 and then expires. The next auction trades a new one-period claim generated by the same stationary economic structure. The baseline payoff is

Dt+1=dˉ+ℓ⊤ft+εt+1,εt∼iidN(0,σε2),σε2>0,(8)D_{t+1} = \bar{d} + \ell^\top f_t + \varepsilon_{t+1},\qquad\varepsilon_t \mathrel{\overset{\mathrm{iid}}{\sim}} \mathcal{N}(0,\sigma_\varepsilon^2),\qquad\sigma_\varepsilon^2 > 0, \tag*{(8)}

where ℓ∈Rm\ell\in\mathbb{R}^m. The payoff shock is independent of {ηt,ωt}\{\eta_t,\omega_t\}, the supply shocks, and all investors’ idiosyncratic signals. The time index is deliberate: DtD_t is known at the date-tt auction, whereas Dt+1D_{t+1} is not yet realized. The claim’s one-period duration is a restriction on the holding horizon, not on the length of the data history an AI may analyze.

A risk-free account is supplied elastically at gross return Rf>0R_f > 0 (we use Rf>1R_f > 1 in the numerical examples). Holding hh shares of the risky claim and financing the remainder at the risk-free rate produces risky excess payoff

Xt+1(pt)≡Dt+1−Rfpt(9)X_{t+1}(p_t) \equiv D_{t+1} - R_f p_t \tag*{(9)}

per share. In particular, at wealth Wci,tW_{ci,t} before trading, an investor with risky holding hci,th_{ci,t} has next-date wealth

Wci,t+1=RfWci,t+hci,t(Dt+1−Rfpt).(10)W_{ci,t+1} = R_f W_{ci,t} + h_{ci,t}(D_{t+1} - R_f p_t). \tag*{(10)}

The primitive payoff-shock variance σε2\sigma_\varepsilon^2 should not be confused with a forecasting system’s fitted conditional payoff variance vc,tv_{c,t}. The latter also reflects uncertainty about ftf_t that the particular algorithm fails to resolve. Accordingly, vc,tv_{c,t} may depend on its processed public state even when εt+1\varepsilon_{t+1} is homoskedastic. Both quantities are defined and related explicitly in S2–S3.

There is no exogenous resale-price term in (S1.5) or (S1.7). Allowing resale of a long-lived security, with payoff Dt+1+δpt+1D_{t+1} + \delta p_{t+1}, is an explicitly separate extension; it is not needed for Theorems 1–3.

The net quantity of risky claims to be absorbed by computational traders at date tt is

St=Sˉ+ζt,ζt∼iidN(0,σζ2),σζ2>0.(11)S_t = \bar{S} + \zeta_t,\qquad\zeta_t \mathrel{\overset{\mathrm{iid}}{\sim}} \mathcal{N}(0,\sigma_\zeta^2),\qquad\sigma_\zeta^2 > 0. \tag*{(11)}

The disturbance ζt\zeta_t represents exogenous liquidity or hedging orders and is not separately disclosed to traders before the auction. It is independent of fundamental, payoff, and private-signal shocks. It enters the aggregate demand-clearing equation and limits what an observer can infer about fundamentals from the price. Because a Gaussian has unbounded support, StS_t is interpreted as a signed net supply, not a technologically constrained number of physical shares; unconstrained long and short positions are allowed in the analytical benchmark. In numerical experiments with nonzero Sˉ\bar{S}, the mean net supply can create a level or risk premium, but it does not change the definition of informational precision after removal of predictable components.

The primitive exogenous laws in (S1.1)–(S1.8) are held fixed in computational-adoption comparisons unless a stated robustness exercise changes a primitive. A change in a price time series therefore comes from changed forecasts and trading demands, not from automatically better or worse exogenous fundamentals.

The aligned-payoff restriction and the unrestricted payoff

For the paper’s information-crowd-out theorem it is useful to isolate an economy in which private clues and the traded payoff concern the same fundamental. We call the payoff aligned with the privately signaled scalar if

ℓ=λa,λ>0,⟺Dt+1=dˉ+λθt+εt+1.(12)\ell= \lambda a,\qquad\lambda> 0,\qquad\Longleftrightarrow\qquad D_{t+1} = \bar{d} + \lambda\theta_t + \varepsilon_{t+1}. \tag*{(12)}

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