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Trembling toward Duverger: Convergence and Cycles in Synchronous Plurality Dynamics

Abstract

Duverger's law states that plurality elections tend to concentrate support on two candidates. Pivotal-voter models typically derive this from aggregate uncertainty about votes, so that two-candidate competition emerges in the limit of large electorates. We instead propose a model for a fixed, finite population. A poll reveals the current support counts, and each voter best responds under trembling-hand beliefs, assuming that every other voter may deviate with a small probability. Starting from truthful votes, we show that a single update typically suffices for the dynamics to converge to a stable profile in which every voter supports her preferred candidate among the two poll leaders. For any number of candidates and any full-support tremble belief, a four-vote lead of the runner-up over all lower candidates suffices; for three candidates, a lead of two suffices. As a consequence, under random preferences, Duverger's law emerges after one update with probability 1−O(N−1/2)1-\mathcal O(N^{-1/2}). While these results may suggest that the dynamics always settle, convergence can fail. Mild period-two cycles already arise, with a few voters swapping ballots around an otherwise stable profile. We show that substantially richer behavior is possible, even with three candidates. Period-three cycles arise with six voters changing their ballots, and no such cycle can involve fewer than four. Cycles can also alternate the plurality winner. Moreover, larger electorates support ever longer cycles: for every odd ℓ≥3\ell\geq3, truthful voting can lead to a cycle whose vote counts repeat every ℓ\ell rounds and whose full ballot profile repeats every 2ℓ2\ell rounds.

Introduction

A few weeks before an election, a poll shows two front-runners, a centrist narrowly in third place, and a fourth candidate far behind. Supporters of the fourth candidate do the sensible thing: they rally behind the centrist, their second choice. Meanwhile, some of the centrist’s wavering supporters, who prefer her only slightly to one of the front-runners, conclude that she cannot win and defect. Both groups act on the same poll, at the same time. The defectors are then surprised by the next poll: the centrist, their favorite all along, is now in the lead. Everyone revises again, and the poll moves again. Do such revisions ever settle, or can polls and ballots keep chasing each other forever?

Each individual move in this story is the familiar logic behind Duverger’s law: plurality rule tends to concentrate support on two candidates, because voters desert those who cannot win [2, 5]. Formal accounts of this coordination usually avoid the issue by relying on large electorates, deriving pivot probabilities from aggregate uncertainty about votes and obtaining two-candidate competition in the limit [20, 23]. We instead fix a finite electorate, let all voters respond to the same poll simultaneously, and follow the resulting ballot profiles exactly.

The difficulty in a finite electorate is that most voters are not pivotal at the observed counts, so all ballots lead to the same outcome. Following Obraztsova et al. [22], we resolve this indifference with trembling-hand beliefs: each voter treats the other ballots as subject to small independent deviations and chooses the ballot with the highest expected utility as the deviation probability tends to zero. These deviations are beliefs, not realized errors, and they select a deterministic response in every finite election. Applying this response to all voters simultaneously after each poll defines the dynamics we study, which Obraztsova et al. leave as an open direction.

Contributions. Our first contribution, in Section 4, identifies when one simultaneous revision ends the dynamics. If the runner-up leads every lower candidate by at least four votes, every voter switches to her preferred poll leader and no voter wants to move again: the profile becomes a sincere runoff between the leaders. This holds for any number of candidates and any full-support tremble belief; with three candidates a lead of two suffices, and parity decides the remaining cases. Failure thus requires a near-tie in the initial poll, which has probability O(N−1/2)O(N^{-1/2}) under random preferences.

Our second contribution, in Section 5, shows that convergence can nevertheless fail, already with three candidates, and in escalating ways. Beyond the period-two swap in an election of Obraztsova et al. [22], period-three cycles with three candidates arise with six active voters, and never with fewer than four. Cycles can alternate the plurality winner, as in the story above. Finally, for every odd ℓ≥3\ell\ge3, an election with 3(ℓ+4)3(\ell+4) voters started from truthful votes enters a cycle whose poll has period ℓ\ell and whose ballot profile has period 2ℓ2\ell.

Related work

Duverger’s law and pivotal voting. Duverger’s law asserts that plurality rule concentrates support on two candidates [5], which Cox [2] explains as strategic coordination. Formal derivations usually rely on large electorates, where pivot probabilities stem from aggregate uncertainty [20, 23]. Fey [7] shows that non-Duvergerian equilibria are unstable under poll-driven belief adjustment, and Messner and Polborn [19] obtain exactly two vote-getters in equilibria robust to rare miscounts. Forand and Maheshri [8] give a dynamic account based on party entry and exit rather than voter coordination. These works study equilibria and their stability; we follow individual ballots exactly in a fixed finite electorate.

Non-pivotal voters and trembling hands. In a finite election most voters are not pivotal, so Nash equilibrium predicts little. Refinements break this indifference through truth bias [21], abstention [3], or local dominance [14, 16]. Obraztsova et al. [22] adapt trembling-hand perfection [26] to plurality and characterize the resulting equilibria. Their Proposition 2 is the static precursor of our separation theorem; their Example 4 admits no equilibrium, and they list trembling-hand best-response dynamics as an open direction. We analyze exactly these dynamics under synchronous updates. Since our update is a deterministic map on a finite set (Lemma 3.1), their Example 4 must cycle; it does so with period two, as two voters swap ballots around an otherwise stable profile.

Iterative and poll-based voting. Under plurality, sequential best responses converge given suitable tie-breaking [17, 18], while other rules may not [13]; see [15] for a survey. Further work asks which equilibria are reached and how good they are [1, 10, 11, 24, 27]. Poll-based models let voters respond to published scores [25, 29], which also shape human votes [6]. Closest to us, Vasselai [28] lets all voters respond synchronously to pivot probabilities estimated from current vote shares, proving convergence for large electorates and observing it in simulations of small ones. We derive responses from vanishing tremble beliefs instead, and exhibit cycles with only three candidates.

Cycles under simultaneous updates. Simultaneous revisions can cycle where sequential ones converge [18]. Kloeckner [12] proves that synchronous cycles are robust to small perturbations and exhibits bad cycles under approval voting. Goldberg et al. [9] show that detecting convergence or cycles is NP-complete for iterative plurality, and build truthful period-mm cycles with two voters and mm candidates under top-bottom updates. We instead fix three candidates and obtain periods growing with the electorate, with count period ℓ\ell and profile period 2ℓ2\ell.

Model: Polls, Trembles, and Synchronous Update

Let MM contain m≥2m \ge2 candidates and let [N]={1,…,N}[N] = \{1,\ldots,N\} index the voters. Voter ii has fixed utilities ui:M→Ru_i:M \to\mathbb{R} with distinct values. At round tt, the complete ballot profile is St=(sit)i∈[N]S^t = (s_i^t)_{i\in[N]}, and a poll publishes the counts nct=∣{i:sit=c}∣n_c^t = |\{i:s_i^t=c\}|. Write ece_c for the unit vector of candidate cc and W(n)=arg⁡max⁡c∈MncW(n)=\arg\max_{c\in M}n_c for the plurality winner set. A nonempty tied set is valued by its uniform lottery ui(W)=1∣W∣∑c∈Wui(c)u_i(W)=\frac{1}{|W|}\sum_{c\in W}u_i(c). This convention is used only in the expected-utility calculation; no final winner is drawn.

Trembling-hand responses. After the poll, each voter reconsiders her ballot. She first removes her own ballot from the poll, giving the private counts qi=nt−esitq_i=n^t-e_{s_i^t}; hence identical voters with different current ballots may respond differently. Taking the other ballots as certain would usually leave her indifferent, since a single ballot rarely changes the winner. Following Obraztsova et al. [22], she instead believes that each other ballot independently stays with probability 1−p1-p and otherwise switches uniformly to another candidate, so a specified directed tremble has probability p/(m−1)p/(m-1). These trembles are beliefs, not realized errors. If q~\widetilde{q} denotes the resulting random private counts, the expected payoff of ballot cc is

Uip(c∣q)=E[ui(W(q~+ec))].U_i^p(c\mid q)=\mathbb{E}\left[u_i\left(W(\widetilde{q}+e_c)\right)\right].

For a fixed private count qq, every pairwise payoff difference is a polynomial in pp, and its first nonzero coefficient determines its sign for all sufficiently small p>0p>0. To compute these coefficients, we call a realization vv of q~\widetilde{q} a terminal private vector. A flow specifies how many of the other ballots tremble from each candidate to each other candidate; for instance, k(A→B)k(A\to B) denotes kk ballots trembling from AA to BB. Many individual tremble assignments yield the same flow, and their number is its multiplicity. In words, a voter compares ballots on the most likely flows under which her ballot matters. We write BRi(q)\mathrm{BR}_i(q) for the resulting best response.

Synchronous update. All voters read the same poll and revise at the same time, so the next profile is F(S)i=BRi(n−esi)F(S)_i=\mathrm{BR}_i(n-e_{s_i}). For a fixed p>0p>0, let FpF_p denote the analogous update with exact expected payoffs. The next lemma shows that, under strict utilities, both updates are well defined and coincide for small pp, without any further assumption on utilities.

Lemma 3.1 (Unique limiting responses). Under strict utilities and uniform tremble destinations, every private vector has a unique limiting best response. For each finite election, Fp=FF_p=F on all profiles for all sufficiently small positive pp.

Proof. At p⋆=(m−1)/mp_\star=(m-1)/m, every other ballot is uniform on MM, regardless of its current value. By symmetry, casting cc gives cc an expected lottery share α\alpha (the expectation of 1{c∈W}/∣W∣1\{c\in W\}/|W|) and every other candidate the same share β\beta. Moreover, α>β\alpha>\beta: moving the focal ballot from c′c' to cc never decreases cc's share, and increases it strictly at terminal counts (k,k,0,…,0)(k,k,0,\ldots,0) or (k+1,0,…,0)(k+1,0,\ldots,0) in (c,c′,…)(c,c',\ldots) coordinates, according as ∣q∣=2k|q|=2k or 2k+12k+1. Such counts have positive probability.

Uip⋆(c∣q)−Uip⋆(c′∣q)=(α−β)(ui(c)−ui(c′))≠0.U_i^{p_\star}(c\mid q)-U_i^{p_\star}(c'\mid q)=(\alpha-\beta)(u_i(c)-u_i(c'))\ne0.

No pairwise polynomial is identically zero. Its sign is constant near zero, so the finitely many ballots have a strict ordering there. Taking the minimum of the finitely many bounds over voters and profiles proves the second claim. □

Thus FF is a deterministic map on the finite set of complete profiles, and every trajectory is eventually periodic. A lowest-order coefficient can vanish for special utilities; then the first later nonzero coefficient decides the comparison, so no generic-utility assumption is needed. The bound on pp can depend on the entire election and on NN; we do not claim a uniform bound as electorates grow.

Convergence and cycles. Initialization is truthful if every voter supports her favorite candidate. A profile is Duvergerian if at most two candidates have positive support, and stable if F(S)=SF(S)=S. A stable profile is thus precisely a pure trembling-hand equilibrium in the sense of Obraztsova et al. [22]. The dynamics converge if they reach a stable profile. Otherwise, the trajectory enters a recurrent orbit after finitely many rounds, its preperiod. The period is the smallest positive return time of the complete profile on this orbit, and an active voter changes ballot somewhere on it. The period of the polls is the smallest positive LL for which nt+L=ntn^{t+L}=n^t at every recurrent phase; it divides the period of the profile.

With m=2m=2, truthful voting is trivially stable, so the dynamics converge immediately; we assume m≥3m\ge3 from now on. We use c,c′∈Mc,c'\in M for arbitrary candidates and A,B,CA,B,C for named candidates.

For a single voter’s ranking with three candidates, X≻Y≻ZX \succ Y \succ Z denotes her favorite, middle, and least-preferred candidates.

One-Step Convergence to Duverger

That such dynamics often converge, and towards Duverger, is perhaps not surprising. A voter compares ballots on the most likely configurations in which her ballot matters. If her favorite trails far behind, many trembles are needed before a ballot for that candidate could make a difference, whereas a few trembles already make the race between the two leaders close. Her decisive comparison should therefore involve only the leaders, and she should vote for the one she prefers. Two things could still go wrong though. First, the revised profile could trigger further revisions, as in the introductory story, where a narrowly trailing candidate gains and loses supporters at once; a large enough gap rules this out. Second, the leaders themselves could lose support; truthful initialization prevents this, since their supporters already vote for them and keep doing so. We formalize this argument in the remainder of the section.

Arbitrary Number of Candidates

We first consider an election with any number of candidates and a general tremble belief, and derive a simple sufficient condition for one-step convergence. In this subsection only, voters may believe that trembles are biased towards some candidates. A ballot for cc trembles to c′≠cc' \ne c with probability pλcc′p\lambda_{cc'}, where the shares λcc′>0\lambda_{cc'} > 0 sum to one over c′≠cc' \ne c and do not depend on pp. Trembles remain independent, and uniform trembles are the case λcc′=1/(m−1)\lambda_{cc'} = 1/(m-1); expected payoffs are defined as before. The following lemma then shows that a voter facing two leaders well separated from all other candidates has a unique best response—her preferred leader—independent of her tremble belief.

Lemma 4.1 (Choice between separated leaders). If A,BA,B have the two highest private counts and min⁡{qA,qB}≥qc+3\min\{q_A,q_B\} \ge q_c + 3, for every c∉{A,B}c \notin\{A,B\}, then the unique limiting response is the one of A,BA,B the voter prefers, for every choice of positive shares λ\lambda.

Proof. Relabel so that qA≥qBq_A \ge q_B and put d=qA−qBd = q_A - q_B, r=⌈d/2⌉r = \lceil d/2\rceil. In any configuration where at most rr other ballots tremble, the resulting private vector vv satisfies

vA−vc≥d+3−2r≥2(c∉{A,B}).v_A - v_c \ge d + 3 - 2r \ge2 \qquad(c \notin\{A,B\}).

Even after adding any contemplated ballot, no lower candidate can win or tie for the lead. On every such terminal assignment, voting for the preferred member of {A,B}\{A,B\} is therefore weakly better than any other ballot: it can only shift the winner lottery toward that candidate.

There is a strict comparison at or before order rr. If the voter prefers AA, use rr trembles A→BA \to B, leaving gap 00 when dd is even and −1-1 when dd is odd. Ballot AA then strictly beats every alternative. If she prefers BB, use ⌊d/2⌋\lfloor d/2\rfloor trembles A→BA \to B, leaving gap 00 or 11, and ballot BB strictly beats every alternative. These flows are feasible because qA≥d+3q_A \ge d + 3. Every assignment with η\eta trembles has probability pη(1−p)N−1−ηp^\eta(1-p)^{N-1-\eta} times a positive constant depending on the assignment. Take the earliest order with a strict contribution to the required margin. It has η≤r\eta\le r, all contributions at that order are nonnegative, and all earlier ones vanish. Their positive sum is therefore the first nonzero coefficient. □

The lemma concerns a single voter’s private counts, while all voters respond to the same public poll. Since removing one’s own ballot lowers a gap by at most one, a public gap of four gives every voter a private gap of three. Combined with truthful initialization, this yields convergence in a single update.

Theorem 4.2 (One-step convergence). Let S0S^0 be truthful and let A,BA,B be the two leaders of the initial poll. If min⁡{nA0,nB0}≥nc0+4\min\{n_A^0,n_B^0\} \ge n_c^0 + 4, for every c∉{A,B}c \notin\{A,B\}, then one update makes every voter support her preferred member of {A,B}\{A,B\}, and the resulting profile is stable. This holds for every choice of positive shares λ\lambda.

Proof. Removing any ballot leaves both leaders at least three above every lower candidate, so Lemma 4.1 determines every first response. Truthful AA- and BB-supporters keep their ballots. Both candidates therefore retain at least their initial support, which is at least four, while every other candidate has zero support. At the successor, removing any ballot again leaves both supported candidates at least three above all others, and the lemma makes every voter stay. □

After a single revision, the profile thus coincides with sincere voting in a runoff between the two poll leaders, although no candidate is formally eliminated. Note that the shares λ\lambda must not vanish with pp: otherwise, trembles towards some candidates become less likely than others, which changes which configurations are decisive.

Sharper Conditions for Three Candidates

The previous result gives a sufficient condition in a very general setting. We next show that this condition can be relaxed considerably assuming three candidates and uniform trembles. We first state a simple but useful lemma.

Lemma 4.3 (Least-preferred ballot). No voter’s limiting best response is her least-preferred candidate. With three candidates, each voter thus chooses between her favorite and middle candidates.

Proof. Let XX and ZZ be the voter’s favorite and least-preferred candidates. Fix a terminal private vector vv, and compare WX=W(v+eX)W_X = W(v+e_X) with WZ=W(v+eZ)W_Z = W(v+e_Z), where the two ballots change only the counts of XX and ZZ, either WX={X}W_X = \{X\}, or WZ={Z}W_Z = \{Z\}, or WX∖{X}=WZ∖{Z}W_X \setminus\{X\} = W_Z \setminus\{Z\}. In the first two cases, ui(WX)≥ui(WZ)u_i(W_X) \ge u_i(W_Z) is immediate. In the third, WXW_X is obtained from WZW_Z by possibly removing ZZ and possibly adding XX; neither operation lowers the value of the uniform lottery. Hence ballot XX is weakly better at every terminal vector. It is strictly better at v=(k,k,0,…,0)v = (k,k,0,\ldots,0) or v=(k,k+1,0,…,0)v = (k,k+1,0,\ldots,0) in (X,Z,…)(X,Z,\ldots) coordinates, according as ∣q∣=2k|q| = 2k or 2k+12k+1. These vectors have positive probability, so the expected comparison is strict for every p>0p > 0. □

This is the trembling-hand counterpart of the classical fact that voting for one’s worst alternative is weakly dominated under plurality [4]. With three candidates, the gap that matters is the one between the runner-up and the trailing candidate. The next theorem shows that a gap of two always suffices, and a gap of one suffices when the leaders’ gap is even. Parity matters because a tremble from one leader to the other changes their gap by two, so whether they can be brought exactly level depends on its parity.

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