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Conformal Prediction at Performative Equilibrium: The Price of Performativity

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Abstract

Conformal prediction gives finite-sample coverage when calibration and test points are exchangeable, but exchangeability can fail when deployment changes the data distribution. We study conformal prediction in performative settings, where the deployed predictor affects the data distribution, and seek prediction sets valid at performative equilibrium: coverage must hold under D(f⋆)D(f^\star) for a performatively stable predictor f⋆f^\star. Under total-variation LL-sensitivity of the distribution map, we prove a phase transition at L=1L=1. If L≥1L \ge 1, no finite-sample procedure can uniformly guarantee both equilibrium-valid coverage and nontrivial prediction sets. If L<1L<1, the minimax excess miscoverage over informative procedures is Ω~(1/((1−L)n))\widetildeΩ(1/((1-L)\sqrt{n})), implying a sample-complexity inflation of order 1/(1−L)21/(1-L)^2 for fixed excess miscoverage. Our main technical tool is a transfer theorem: any procedure returning a predictor within ε\varepsilon of equilibrium yields equilibrium-valid coverage up to an additive LεL\varepsilon term after split-conformal calibration. We instantiate the theorem with two retraining algorithms: a model-free method for discretizable classes and a parametric tail-averaged method that matches the nn- and LL-dependence of this rate up to logarithmic factors. Experiments, including semi-synthetic credit scoring, demonstrate the predicted threshold behavior and scaling laws.

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Introduction

Conformal prediction provides distribution-free coverage guarantees: given exchangeable calibration data, one can construct prediction sets C(x)⊆YC(x) \subseteq\mathcal{Y} satisfying P(Y∈C(X))≥1−α\mathbb{P}(Y \in C(X)) \ge1-\alpha ([36, 31, 19, 1]). This guarantee requires no assumptions on the data-generating distribution beyond exchangeability; informally, the test point must come from the same data-generating process as the calibration data ([35, 18]).

In many applications, this assumption fails because deployment changes behavior and hence the data distribution. A lending rule affects who receives credit and thus the future distribution of defaults on which the rule is later retrained; a recidivism predictor affects sentencing and thus the future distribution of reoffending; a treatment-allocation rule affects who receives care and thus the future distribution of health outcomes. In such settings, the distribution is endogenous: it depends on the deployed predictor. The performative prediction framework (Perdomo et al. [27]; Mendler-Dünner et al. [22]; Miller et al. [24]; Izzo et al. [13]; Brown et al. [4]; Jagadeesan et al. [14]; Hardt et al. [11]) formalizes this through a map D:F→Δ(X×Y)D:\mathcal{F}\to\Delta(\mathcal{X}\times\mathcal{Y}) from predictors to distributions. Deploying ff induces distribution D(f)D(f), so a conformal guarantee calibrated under a fixed distribution need not remain valid under D(f)D(f).

If f⋆f^\star is a performatively stable predictor (a fixed point that minimizes risk under the distribution it induces), we want prediction sets valid at that distribution:

P(X,Y)∼D(f⋆)(Y∈Cf⋆(X))≥1−α.(1)\mathbb{P}_{(X,Y)\sim D(f^\star)}\left(Y\in C_{f^\star}(X)\right)\ge1-\alpha. \tag*{(1)}

We call this equilibrium-valid coverage. Equilibrium is the relevant operating point because deployed systems are retrained until they stabilize, and coverage is needed at that stable distribution. This viewpoint aligns with prior work on retraining dynamics, optimization to stable points, performative risk minimization, and state-dependent feedback (Perdomo et al. [27]; Mendler-Dünner et al. [22]; Miller et al. [24]; Izzo et al. [13]; Brown et al. [4]; Jagadeesan et al. [14]).

Research question. In performative environments, what coverage guarantees can conformal prediction provide at performative equilibrium? Under what conditions on the feedback map are such guarantees achievable, and what finite-sample complexity do they require?

Contributions. We answer these questions in five steps: we identify a feasibility threshold, establish minimax lower and upper bounds, prove a transfer theorem that converts convergence to equilibrium into coverage at equilibrium, apply the theory with simple retraining-based algorithms, and validate the predicted theory empirically.

  1. Impossibility (phase transition at L≥1L\ge1). (Theorem 3.1). If L≥1L\ge1, no finite-sample procedure can guarantee nontrivial equilibrium-valid coverage over all LL-sensitive performative environments: there exists an environment for which the procedure must either fail to achieve 1−α1-\alpha coverage at equilibrium, or output the trivial prediction set that includes all possible labels.

  1. Minimax rate (Theorem 3.2). When L<1L<1, the minimax excess miscoverage over informative procedures (those whose prediction sets are τ\tau-informative, excluding the vacuous set C(x)=YC(x)=\mathcal{Y}) with nn samples is Ω~(1/((1−L)n))\tilde{\Omega}(1/((1-L)\sqrt{n})). Under standard regularity (β\beta-smooth, γ\gamma-strongly convex loss with ρ=Lβ/γ<1\rho=L\beta/\gamma<1), Algorithm 2 achieves rate O~(1/((1−ρ)n))\tilde{O}(1/((1-\rho)\sqrt{n})), which matches this rate when β/γ=O(1)\beta/\gamma=O(1). A model-free algorithm achieves O~(1/((1−L)3/2n))\tilde{O}(1/((1-L)^{3/2}\sqrt{n})) under only L<1L<1.

  1. Coverage transfer theorem (Theorem 2.8). If a learning or retraining procedure returns a predictor within ε\varepsilon of performative equilibrium in the metric used by the LL-sensitivity condition, then split conformal calibration on held-out data achieves equilibrium-valid coverage up to an additive penalty of order LεL\varepsilon plus the standard finite-sample conformal term. This decouples optimization from calibration, allowing equilibrium to be reached first and coverage to be obtained through calibration afterward.

4. Achievability via simple retraining (Theorems 4.1–4.4). Combining Theorem 2.8 with standard retraining yields equilibrium-valid coverage when L<1L < 1. For discretizable classes, a model-free variant achieves O~(1/((1−L)3/2n))\widetilde{O}(1/((1-L)^{3/2}\sqrt{n})) under only L<1L < 1. Under standard regularity, a parametric variant with tail-averaging after a short stabilization period matches the nn- and LL-dependence of the informative minimax rate when β/γ=O(1)\beta/\gamma= O(1).

The price of performativity. The factor 1/(1−L)21/(1-L)^2 in the sample complexity is the price of performativity. It quantifies how endogenous distribution shift inflates the data required to achieve a fixed excess miscoverage level. Relative to the non-performative setting, the required sample size grows by a factor of order 1/(1−L)21/(1-L)^2 up to logarithmic terms. For example, L=0.5L = 0.5 corresponds to a 4×4\times increase, while L=0.9L = 0.9 corresponds to a 100×100\times increase. As L→1L \to1, this cost diverges, matching the impossibility at L≥1L \ge1.

Paper outline. Section 2 formalizes equilibrium-valid coverage, the LL-sensitivity framework, and the transfer principle. Section 3 establishes the fundamental limits: impossibility when L≥1L \ge1, minimax lower bounds when L<1L < 1, and the price of performativity interpretation. Section 4 gives retraining-based procedures and their upper bounds. Section 5 evaluates our framework empirically, beginning with a semi-synthetic study that demonstrates the value of equilibrium-aware calibration, followed by a set of controlled experiments that support the predicted sample complexity scaling, the LϵL\epsilon transfer effect, and the phase transition at L=1L = 1. Section 6 positions the results relative to related work on performative prediction and conformal prediction under shift. Section 7 discusses practical implications and extensions.

Framework and the Transfer Principle

We first recall the performative prediction framework and then introduce the objects used in our analysis.

Performative Prediction

Let X\mathcal{X} be a feature space, Y\mathcal{Y} a label space, and F\mathcal{F} a class of predictors f:X→Yf:\mathcal{X}\to\mathcal{Y}. Following Perdomo et al. [27], a distribution map D:F→Δ(X×Y)D:\mathcal{F}\to\Delta(\mathcal{X}\times\mathcal{Y}) assigns to each predictor ff a joint distribution D(f)D(f) over (X,Y)(X,Y). We write DfD_f as shorthand.

Definition 2.1 (Performative stability [27]). A predictor f⋆∈Ff^\star\in\mathcal{F} is performatively stable if

f⋆∈arg⁡min⁡f∈F E(X,Y)∼D(f)[ℓ(f(X),Y)].f^\star\in\underset{f\in\mathcal{F}}{\arg\min}\ \mathbb{E}_{(X,Y)\sim D(f)}[\ell(f(X),Y)].

The key parameter in our analysis is LL-sensitivity, which captures how strongly the distribution changes when the predictor changes.

Definition 2.2 (LL-sensitivity). D(⋅)D(\cdot) is LL-sensitive if for all f,g∈Ff,g \in\mathcal{F}:

TV⁡(D(f),D(g))≤L⋅dF(f,g).\operatorname{TV}(D(f),D(g)) \le L\cdot d_{\mathcal{F}}(f,g).

where TV⁡\operatorname{TV} denotes total variation distance and dFd_{\mathcal{F}} is a metric on F\mathcal{F}.

TV-sensitivity is the right assumption for our transfer result because total variation satisfies TV⁡(P,Q)=sup⁡A∣P(A)−Q(A)∣\operatorname{TV}(P,Q)=\sup_A\lvert P(A)-Q(A)\rvert, so it controls differences in event probabilities uniformly over all measurable events. The coverage event A={(x,y):s(x,y;f)≤q}A=\{(x,y):s(x,y;f)\le q\} is one such event. Therefore, to bound the coverage gap between D(f^)D(\hat{f}) and D(f∗)D(f^*), it suffices to control the total variation distance between these two distributions.

Standing assumptions. Throughout this section and § 4, we assume the distribution map D(⋅)D(\cdot) is LL-sensitive (Definition 2.2) and that an equilibrium f∗f^* exists (i.e., a performatively stable predictor). We also assume that the nonconformity score ss is measurable and bounded. Any additional conditions are stated with each theorem.

Equilibrium-Valid Coverage

A nonconformity score s:X×Y×F→Rs:\mathcal{X}\times\mathcal{Y}\times\mathcal{F}\to\mathbb{R} measures how unusual (x,y)(x,y) is under predictor ff. The prediction set at threshold qq is Cf(x)={y∈Y:s(x,y;f)≤q}C_f(x)=\{y\in\mathcal{Y}:s(x,y;f)\le q\}. Our theory is agnostic to the choice of score: all results hold for any measurable ss.

The guarantee in (1) requires validity under the equilibrium distribution D(f∗)D(f^*). The next two definitions make the feasibility question precise.

Definition 2.3 (Nontrivial Prediction Set). A prediction set mapping C:X→2YC:\mathcal{X}\to2^{\mathcal{Y}} is nontrivial if C(x)≠YC(x)\ne\mathcal{Y} for at least one x∈Xx\in\mathcal{X} with positive probability under the induced distribution.

Definition 2.4 (Excess Miscoverage). Given a target miscoverage level α∈(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1), the excess miscoverage of a prediction set CfC_f at distribution PP is

ExMisc⁡(Cf,P)=max⁡{0,PP(Y∉Cf(X))−α}.\operatorname{ExMisc}(C_f,P)=\max\{0,\mathbb{P}_P(Y\notin C_f(X))-\alpha\}.

Definition 2.5 (Marginal Excess Miscoverage). For a calibration-dependent procedure producing CSC_S from a sample SS, the marginal excess miscoverage at PP is

ExMisc⁡‾(C,P)=max⁡{0,ES[PP(Y∉CS(X))]−α}.\overline{\operatorname{ExMisc}}(C,P)=\max\left\{0,\mathbb{E}_S[\mathbb{P}_P(Y\notin C_S(X))]-\alpha\right\}.

The nontriviality condition excludes the vacuous solution C(x)=YC(x)=\mathcal{Y}, which achieves perfect coverage but conveys no information. Definition 2.3 is essentially the weakest non-vacuity requirement: it only demands that the prediction set be strictly smaller than Y\mathcal{Y} with positive probability. This suffices to state the impossibility result (Theorem 3.1), and that result continues to hold under any stronger informativeness criterion. For the minimax rate (Theorem 3.2), however, a purely qualitative condition is too weak: on a non-singleton X\mathcal{X} an algorithm can output Y\mathcal{Y} except on a vanishingly small region, remain nontrivial in the sense of Definition 2.3, and still drive excess miscoverage to zero. We therefore use the following quantitative version.

Definition 2.6 (τ\tau-Informativeness). Fix τ∈(0,1]\tau\in(0,1]. A prediction-set procedure producing CSC_S from a calibration sample SS is τ\tau-informative at PP if

Inf⁡(C,P):=ES[PX∼PX(CS(X)≠Y)]≥τ.\operatorname{Inf}(C,P):=\mathbb{E}_S\left[\mathbb{P}_{X\sim P_X}(C_S(X)\ne\mathcal{Y})\right]\ge\tau.

where PXP_X denotes the marginal distribution of XX under PP.

Setting τ→0+\tau\to0^+ corresponds to Definition 2.3. Excess miscoverage quantifies the shortfall from the target coverage level 1−α1-\alpha.

Interaction model. The learning process proceeds over multiple rounds. At round tt, the algorithm selects a predictor ftf_t and observes ntn_t independent samples from the induced distribution D(ft)D(f_t). The total sample size is n=∑tntn = \sum_t n_t.

Minimax formulation. We evaluate performance in a minimax sense. An algorithm interacts with an unknown distribution map DD that is LL-sensitive and admits a stable fixed point f⋆f^\star. The adversary selects both DD and a nonconformity score s:X×Y×F→[0,1]s : \mathcal{X} \times\mathcal{Y} \times\mathcal{F} \to[0,1]. The predictor class F\mathcal{F}, metric dFd_{\mathcal{F}}, and sensitivity level LL are fixed and known.

Without an informativeness constraint the minimax problem is vacuous: the constant procedure C(x)=YC(x) = \mathcal{Y} has zero excess miscoverage under every DD and ss, so the unconstrained infimum is 0. We therefore optimize only over procedures that are genuinely informative at equilibrium. For a fixed τ∈(0,1]\tau\in(0,1], let

Aτ={algorithms:Inf⁡(Cf^,D(f⋆))≥τ for every admissible (D,s)}\mathcal{A}_{\tau} = \{\text{algorithms} : \operatorname{Inf}(C_{\hat{f}},D(f^\star)) \ge\tau\text{ for every admissible } (D,s)\}

be the class of τ\tau-informative algorithms (Definition 2.6). The τ\tau-informative minimax marginal excess miscoverage is

Mτ(n,L,F)=inf⁡alg⁡∈Aτsup⁡D,sExMisc⁡‾(Cf^,D(f⋆)).\mathcal{M}_{\tau}(n,L,\mathcal{F}) = \inf_{\operatorname{alg} \in\mathcal{A}_{\tau}} \sup_{D,s} \overline{\operatorname{ExMisc}}(C_{\hat{f}},D(f^\star)).

In words, the learner seeks an informative algorithm that minimizes worst-case equilibrium marginal excess miscoverage over all LL-sensitive distribution maps and scoring rules. The minimax value depends on nn and F\mathcal{F}, which determine statistical difficulty, and on LL, which determines performative difficulty.

This objective underlies our lower bound Theorem 3.2 and matching upper bounds (Theorems 4.1–4.4).

Coverage Transfer Theorem

The following lemma turns distributional mismatch into a coverage penalty.

Lemma 2.7 (Coverage Decomposition). Fix predictors h,g∈Fh, g \in\mathcal{F}. Let S∼D(g)mS \sim D(g)^m be a held-out calibration sample, and let Ch,SC_{h,S} be the split conformal prediction set obtained by calibrating the scores s(⋅;h)s(\cdot;h) on SS. Then

PS,(X,Y)∼D(h)(Y∈Ch,S(X))≥1−α−TV⁡(D(h),D(g)).\mathbb{P}_{S,(X,Y)\sim D(h)}(Y \in C_{h,S}(X)) \ge1-\alpha-\operatorname{TV}(D(h),D(g)).

(Proof in Appendix C.) Split conformal calibration on SS guarantees 1−α1-\alpha coverage for a test point drawn from D(g)D(g). If the test point is instead drawn from D(h)D(h), the coverage probability changes by at most the total variation distance between the two distributions.

The independence condition is standard in split conformal prediction: conditional on hh, the calibration scores on SS and the test score must be exchangeable under the same distribution for the 1−α1-\alpha coverage guarantee to apply. Without this independence, the split conformal guarantee can fail because the calibration sample SS may depend on hh. In our algorithms, we enforce this by drawing SS after the final predictor is fixed.

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