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WorksEconomics, Econometrics and Finance

The Market for AI-Assisted Signaling

Abstract

This paper studies a market in which AI providers choose technologies and prices for assistance used to signal ability. Individual adoption is unobserved. Profitable assistance can lower welfare relative to signaling without AI, even when ability remains fully revealed. Easier imitation increases the output required to demonstrate ability, and the extra signaling can outweigh production savings. Providers can profit from improving assistance for lower-ability senders because this increases higher-ability senders' purchases. Such improvements can lower welfare relative to retaining existing tools. Competition among providers offering the same technology supports full information, but development costs can sustain monopoly provision that conceals ability. Greater verification capacity can also reduce information by changing which customers providers serve.

JEL codes: D82, L12, L13, L15, O33.

Introduction

An applicant preparing a cover letter can write it unaided or use artificial intelligence. The employer observes the letter but may not observe how it was produced. The letter’s informational value depends on how difficult it is for a weaker applicant to imitate a stronger one. Artificial intelligence (AI) makes imitation easier, and narrows differences among applicants. The price of AI assistance also plays a role. A membership fee determines when assistance becomes worth buying, while a usage price changes the cost of producing a more impressive letter. The provider’s offer can change both the letters applicants submit and what the employer learns from them.

This paper studies how AI providers choose technology and prices when their customers use assistance to signal ability. It asks when these choices preserve information and whether AI provision improves welfare. The model has senders with one of two ability levels, and a receiver who values accurate ability assessment. Senders can demonstrate ability through observable output, such as a written application, and through evidence that AI is less able to substitute, such as a supervised work trial. I call the output an artifact, and the second form of evidence a hard signal. Institutional capacity limits the amount of hard evidence each sender can provide.

The provider chooses how much editing assisted production requires from each ability group, and how much production the technology can assist. Then, it charges a membership fee and a price per unit of AI input. Senders know their ability when deciding whether to subscribe, how much assistance to buy, and which signals to produce. Prices and technology are public, but individual adoption and production methods are unobserved.1 Providers anticipate the signaling behavior induced by their offers.2

Lower-ability senders save more effort from AI and begin using it at a less demanding artifact than higher-ability senders. Over a range of output, producing a better artifact can be cheaper for an assisted lower-ability sender than for a higher-ability sender who still works manually. A small improvement in the artifact need not credibly identify higher ability. Distinguishing oneself can require a much larger, costly improvement. Pooling outcomes, in which both ability groups submit the same signals and receive the same assessment, survive when this expenditure exceeds the gain from recognition and lower-ability senders are willing to participate. Partial pooling can also arise. Some lower-ability senders join the shared signal, while the rest reveal their ability by submitting only the basic artifact.

Hard evidence offers another way to distinguish ability. The model assumes that higher-ability senders have a stronger cost advantage in producing this evidence than in producing the artifact. The separating outcome with the lowest private cost for these senders uses hard evidence first, adding artifact production when capacity alone cannot deter imitation. Pooling requires senders to exhaust this capacity. For otherwise, a small increase in hard evidence would credibly reveal higher ability. Increasing capacity can eliminate pooling without eliminating partial pooling, so the disappearance of a signal shared by everyone need not restore full information.

The provider’s optimal offer depends on which ability group purchases assistance. When signals fully reveal ability and optimal operating profit is positive, the provider serves higher-ability senders and extracts their production savings. The threat of imitation by lower-ability senders limits how much assistance the provider can sell. In pooling and partial pooling, participating lower-ability senders buy assistance, and higher-ability senders produce manually. The provider charges for the manual effort its customers avoid, subject to participation and the cost of distinguishing oneself. Its technology choice compares these operating returns with development costs.

Membership and usage prices affect these incentives separately. Two offers can collect the same payment for the chosen artifact, yet impose different costs on someone producing a better artifact to demonstrate higher ability. Optimal usage prices can lie below compute cost, including free usage, with membership fees covering the resource bill. Such subsidies can be profitable because assistance saves enough effort for lower-ability customers.

Price competition changes both access to assistance and the information conveyed by signals. With two or more providers offering the same already developed technology, a pricing equilibrium has zero membership fees and usage priced at compute cost. Signals fully reveal ability, and providers earn zero operating profits. If providers must finance development before competing on price, the sequential entry game can instead support a sole provider charging an optimal monopoly tariff. A second entrant would not recover its development cost under the specified competitive pricing equilibrium. Hence, potential competition can coexist with pooling.

I also let two established providers improve their technologies before choosing prices. Each can reduce the editing effort required from either or both ability groups, within a bounded set of improvements. Initial development costs are sunk, so this comparison holds entry fixed. Under sufficient productivity and hard-evidence restrictions, and with no limit on assisted production, the game admits equilibria with one profitable improved technology and a rival retaining its baseline. In one such equilibrium, improving both groups’ productivity lowers welfare relative to retaining both baseline technologies, although signals fully reveal ability in both outcomes.

Making imitation easier for lower-ability senders increases the artifact required from higher-ability senders, and their purchases of AI input.

AI changes the cost differences that make signals credible, the production required to distinguish ability, and the choice between artifacts and hard evidence. These changes have different welfare implications. At a fixed verification capacity, AI improves welfare relative to manual signaling when resource savings exceed development costs and any loss from inaccurate assessment. Pooling can satisfy this condition, and full separation can fail it, as cheaper imitation can increase the required artifact enough to outweigh production savings. When both outcomes separate, competition can require more signaling resources than monopoly provision of the same technology. Monopoly usage markups can also favor hard evidence over assisted production that uses fewer resources, so the privately cheapest separating outcome need not minimize resource use. Welfare depends on how providers’ offers change the information conveyed by signals and the resources spent producing them.

Verification also changes the providers’ incentives to improve and price AI assistance. I let a monopolist choose design and pricing, and compare verification chosen before its offer with simultaneous choices. Sequentially, the receiver commits to capacity and anticipates the provider’s response. Simultaneously, capacity and the provider’s entire offer must be mutual best responses. In a tractable case, the provider reduces artifact quality as capacity increases, encouraging participation and offsetting part of the information gain. Anticipating this response can lead the receiver to choose less verification than in the simultaneous game. A higher externally imposed minimum capacity can also reduce equilibrium information under both timings: the provider switches from assisting higher-ability senders in separation to assisting lower-ability senders in pooling.

The receiver values accuracy and bears verification costs, but omits changes in signaling resources and newly chosen improvement expenditure. Its investment can be socially excessive or insufficient. An accuracy gain can induce investment that replaces a cheap shared outcome with more costly separating production and improvement. Conversely, an expansion that leaves pooling intact can save resources without improving accuracy, giving the receiver no reason to purchase it. Once hard evidence alone deters imitation, separation requires no incremental AI input or costly improvement.

Related literature. The closest paper is Cetemen and Ozdenoren [7], who introduce an AI token industry into a career-signaling model with skill formation and output trade. Both papers show that cheaper AI production can increase the performance required to distinguish ability. Their analysis follows how token trade affects work, skills, and surplus. Here, ability is fixed, and providers choose technologies and membership and usage prices for privately adopted assistance. Adoption changes the relative cost of producing better signals and can sustain pooling despite unequal costs. The additional hard signal connects these choices to verification and welfare.

The model

Camboni et al. [5] study schools choosing attendance fees and monitoring policies, showing that competition can increase signal informativeness and wasteful effort. Lu (2025) studies a seller choosing the price schedule of a signaling good. In the present model, customers buy a private production method and retain the option of producing manually. Membership and usage charges determine both adoption and the cost of departing from a shared signal, linking provider revenue to which ability group purchases assistance.

The signaling analysis builds on Spence [23] and Riley [22], belief refinements (Cho and Kreps, [8]; Banks and Sobel, [3]; Cho and Sobel, 1990), and multidimensional signaling (Ramey, [21]). Hard evidence connects the model to direct assessment and certification.3 Kurlat and Scheuer [15] study how buyer expertise changes reliance on public signals. Certification intermediaries choose what information to disclose or acquire (Lizzeri, [16]; Asseyer and Weksler, [2]; Çelik and Strausz, [6]). Here, senders produce both signals, and the AI provider changes production costs without learning individual abilities or issuing a quality report.

Recent work examines AI’s effects on communication and screening (Gans, [13]; Cowgill et al., [10]). Galdin and Silbert [12] and Cui et al. [11] document declining informativeness of written applications. The latter also find that employers shift toward work histories. Abbas Nejad et al. [19] find disproportionate improvements in lower-quality applicants’ cover letters, and Jungbauer [14] shows how better applications can coexist with worse talent allocation. These studies motivate the interaction between assisted writing and alternative evidence.4 The present model studies how providers’ prices and technology choices shape these informational effects.

Sections 2, 3.1 and 3.2 introduce the signaling environment. Sections 4.1 to 4.3 study monopoly provision, competition with development, and improvements by established providers. Sections 5 and 6 examine welfare and verification. Proofs appear in the appendix. The supplement contains additional calculations, examples, and robustness results.

The model

A sender uses costly signals to obtain a favorable assessment of its privately known ability. The receiver observes the signals but does not observe how they were produced. AI can assist production of an observable artifact, such as a written application. A second signal provides harder-to-substitute evidence, such as a supervised work trial, which the sender produces without assistance. An AI provider charges separately for membership and usage. These prices affect who adopts assistance and how costly it is to produce or imitate a signal.

Players, information, and timing. There is a unit mass of senders, each evaluated separately by a receiver. A sender privately knows its ability, represented by its type θ∈Θ={θℓ,θh}\theta\in\Theta= \{\theta_{\ell}, \theta_{h}\}, where 0<θℓ<θh0 < \theta_{\ell} < \theta_{h}. I refer to these as the low and high types. The high-type share is π∈(0,1)\pi\in(0,1), which is also the receiver’s prior probability that a sender has high ability. Define the type gap Δ:=θh−θℓ\Delta:= \theta_{h} - \theta_{\ell} and the prior mean θˉ:=πθh+(1−π)θℓ\bar{\theta} := \pi\theta_{h} + (1-\pi)\theta_{\ell}.

The baseline market has one AI provider. The provider first decides whether to develop a technology and, if so, chooses its features. Then, it posts a tariff specifying membership and usage prices. After observing the offer, senders choose whether to subscribe, how much AI input to buy, and which signals to produce. The receiver observes each sender’s signals and chooses an assessment.

Technology features, tariffs, and the capacity of the second signal are public. The receiver does not observe individual subscriptions, AI input, or production methods. The provider knows the type distribution but does not observe individual types.5

Production and tariffs. Every sender must supply a basic artifact, which can be produced without a paid subscription. Let q≥0q \ge0 denote observable quality above this baseline: q=0q = 0 means supplying only the basic artifact. Without paid AI, producing additional quality qq costs type i∈{ℓ,h}i \in\{\ell, h\} the amount κiq\kappa_iq, where 0<κh<κℓ0 < \kappa_h < \kappa_{\ell}. Basic tools, including free assistance, can be incorporated in the basic artifact. The production choices below concern quality above that baseline.

The hard signal is τ∈[0,Q]\tau\in[0,Q], where Q≥0Q \ge0 limits how much evidence each sender can supply. For example, capacity may be the maximum length of a supervised work trial. I measure the signal in units of the low type’s effort cost: producing τ\tau costs the low type τ\tau and the high type ρττ\rho_{\tau}\tau, where ρτ>0\rho_{\tau} > 0.

A paid AI technology can assist at most L>0L > 0 units of additional quality.6 A subscriber producing quality qq chooses AI input z∈[0,min⁡{q,L}]z \in[0,\min\{q,L\}]. Each unit of input replaces one unit of manual production but requires effort ϵi\epsilon_i from type ii, such as editing or checking the output. The remaining q−zq-z units are produced manually. The provider chooses the technology’s physical features d=(ϵℓ,ϵh,L)\mathbf{d} = (\epsilon_\ell,\epsilon_h,L) from a feasible design set DD and incurs compute cost c>0c > 0 per unit of input. Paying for membership without using input provides no production benefit.

Assumption 1. The feasible design set DD is compact. Every design in DD has finite positive coverage and satisfies

0<ϵh<ϵℓ<κh,0 < \epsilon_h < \epsilon_\ell< \kappa_h,
0<ϵℓ−ϵh<κℓ−κh,0 < \epsilon_\ell- \epsilon_h < \kappa_\ell- \kappa_h,
0<ρτ<min⁡{κhκℓ,ϵhϵℓ}.0 < \rho_\tau< \min\left\{\frac{\kappa_h}{\kappa_\ell},\frac{\epsilon_h}{\epsilon_\ell}\right\}.

Manual costs, compute cost, and the hard-signal cost ratio are fixed across designs.

AI reduces production effort for both types and narrows the effort difference between them. The low type saves more effort per unit of input, so a given tariff can make adoption worthwhile at a lower artifact quality. The final inequality gives the high type a stronger marginal cost advantage in hard evidence than in either manual or assisted artifact production.

The provider independently chooses a membership fee F≥0F \ge0 and a usage price p≥0p \ge0. A subscriber using input zz pays F+pzF + pz.7 The usage price may be below compute cost, p<cp < c.8

After paying the membership fee, a sender can still choose between AI and manual production. Therefore, its cheapest private unit cost within coverage is mi:=min⁡{p+ϵi,κi}m_i := \min\{p+\epsilon_i,\kappa_i\}. Optimizing over subscription and input gives type ii’s private artifact cost9

Ci(q∣d,F,p)=min⁡{κiq, F+mimin⁡{q,L}+κi(q−L)+}.(1)C_i(q \mid\mathbf{d},F,p)=\min\left\{\kappa_iq,\ F+m_i\min\{q,L\}+\kappa_i(q-L)_+\right\}. \tag*{(1)}

The first option is manual production without a subscription. The second includes the membership fee, the cheaper production method within coverage, and manual production beyond coverage. The sender subscribes when the two options have equal private cost and, conditional on subscribing, uses the most AI input among cost-minimizing choices. I refer to these assumptions as the subscription rule and input rule, respectively.10

I suppress the technology and tariff arguments when they are fixed. Quality qq has the same physical meaning across offers, and it is not rescaled when prices change. Appendix § 12.1 derives the cost function and explains the treatment of the basic artifact. § 6.2 specifies production when several offers are available.

Payoffs. A sender supplies the signal pair s=(q,τ)\mathbf{s}=(q,\tau). Adding artifact and hard-signal costs gives the two types’ private signaling expenditure above the basic artifact,

cℓ(s)=Cℓ(q)+τ,(2)c_{\ell}(\mathbf{s})=C_{\ell}(q)+\tau, \tag*{(2)}
ch(s)=Ch(q)+ρττ.(3)c_{h}(\mathbf{s})=C_{h}(q)+\rho_{\tau}\tau. \tag*{(3)}

Let a∈[θℓ,θh]a \in[\theta_{\ell},\theta_{h}] denote the receiver’s assessment. Both types prefer a higher assessment and pay their own signaling costs. Net of the common cost of supplying the basic artifact, type ii’s payoff is

ui(s,a)=a−ci(s).u_i(\mathbf{s},a)=a-c_i(\mathbf{s}).

The receiver prefers assessments close to the sender’s true ability. With accuracy weight λ>0\lambda>0, its payoff is

uR(a,θ)=−λ2(a−θ)2.u_R(a,\theta)=-\frac{\lambda}{2}(a-\theta)^2.

After observing s\mathbf{s}, the receiver assigns posterior probability μ(s)∈[0,1]\mu(\mathbf{s})\in[0,1] to the high type.

Lemma 1. For every posterior μ∈[0,1]\mu\in[0,1], the receiver’s unique best response is

a∗(μ)=μθh+(1−μ)θℓ.a^*(\mu)=\mu\theta_h+(1-\mu)\theta_{\ell}.

The receiver assesses a sender at its posterior mean ability. Both types gain Δ\Delta in gross payoff from being assessed as a high- rather than a low-ability sender. In the application, aa can represent an applicant’s evaluation score.11

Developing technology d\mathbf{d} costs the provider K(d)≥0K(\mathbf{d})\geq0, continuous on D\mathcal{D}. This expenditure is sunk when the provider sets its tariff. For a developed technology and given hard-signal capacity QQ, expected net profit is

Π(d,F,p∣Q)=E[F1{subscribed}+(p−c)z]−K(d),(4)\Pi(d,F,p \mid Q)=\mathbb{E}\left[F\mathbf{1}_{\{\mathrm{subscribed}\}}+(p-c)z\right]-K(d), \tag*{(4)}

where the indicator records subscription and the expectation averages over sender types and equilibrium choices. Capacity QQ affects subscription and input demand through the signaling outcome, so the same technology and tariff can generate different profits at different capacities. Each subscriber generates membership revenue FF and a usage margin p−cp-c per unit of input. Choosing not to develop yields zero profit. Membership and usage payments affect senders’ private costs but transfer income to the provider. Production effort, compute, and development expenditure consume resources. This distinction matters for the welfare comparisons in § 7.

Signaling with AI assistance

Equilibrium. I use the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) refined by D1 ([8, 3]). Senders optimize their signals and production choices, and the receiver responds optimally to beliefs satisfying Bayes’ rule at signals observed on-path. D1 restricts beliefs after unexpected, off-path signals. I restrict attention to equilibria in which each type’s distribution over observable signal pairs has finite support. This allows senders to randomize among finitely many signal pairs, while excluding distributions with infinite or continuous support.

For each public offer or tariff menu and capacity, a signaling equilibrium specifies sender strategies, receiver responses, and beliefs satisfying PBE. D1 restricts the admissible off-path beliefs. An observable signaling outcome records each type’s signal choices and mixing probabilities and the receiver’s on-path assessments. Equilibria that differ only in off-path beliefs have the same observable outcome.

I use an additional selection rule to choose among observable outcomes of finite-support signaling equilibria refined by D1. The selected outcome is sender-Pareto-maximal: no other such outcome makes both types weakly better off and at least one strictly better off. Among outcomes giving both types the same payoffs, selection favors the greatest population mass at signals shared by both types, then the least artifact quality at the shared signal. Remaining cost ties between separating signals favor the least artifact quality. For each fixed offer or tariff menu and capacity, this equilibrium selection rule selects a unique observable outcome.12

Signaling with AI assistance

Benchmark: a single AI-assisted signal

Set Q=0Q = 0 and hold the technology d\mathbf{d} and tariff (F,p)(F,p) fixed. The sender signals only through artifact quality qq. This benchmark explains how voluntary AI adoption changes the cost of imitation and can support pooling.

In a separating equilibrium, the low type chooses q=0q = 0 and receives assessment θℓ\theta_{\ell}. Imitating the high type would raise its assessment by Δ\Delta, so the high signal must impose a low-type cost of at least Δ\Delta. Both cost functions are strictly increasing. The least-cost separating, or Riley, quality qRq_R makes this constraint bind, and its high-type cost is ψ1\psi^{1}. That is,

Cℓ(qR)=Δandψ1≔Ch(qR).(5)C_{\ell}(q_R) = \Delta\quad\text{and} \quad\psi^{1} \coloneqq C_h(q_R). \tag*{(5)}

This allocation supports a separating PBE. Whether it satisfies D1 depends on how adoption changes the high type’s cost advantage.

Consider a positive membership fee and a sufficiently low usage price. Let xx denote the low type’s adoption quality, and suppose that

F>0,p+ϵℓ<κh,andx≔Fκℓ−p−ϵℓ∈(0,L).(6)F > 0,\quad p + \epsilon_{\ell} < \kappa_h,\quad\text{and}\quad x \coloneqq\frac{F}{\kappa_{\ell} - p - \epsilon_{\ell}} \in(0,L). \tag*{(6)}

At q=xq = x, the low type’s production saving just covers the membership fee, so it subscribes under the subscription rule. The high type saves less from AI, and continues to produce manually. Although they use different methods, both types incur the same private cost as under manual production at this quality. That is, Cℓ(x)=κℓxC_{\ell}(x) = \kappa_{\ell}x and Ch(x)=κhxC_h(x) = \kappa_hx.

Let W1(q)≔Cℓ(q)−Ch(q)W_1(q) \coloneqq C_{\ell}(q) - C_h(q) denote the high type’s cost advantage. Below xx, both types produce manually, and this advantage increases with quality. Just above xx, the low type uses AI while the high type does not. In this case, the low type’s marginal cost is p+ϵℓ<κhp + \epsilon_{\ell} < \kappa_h, so further quality reduces the high type’s advantage. The advantage increases again once the high type also adopts assistance or, likewise, when AI coverage is exhausted.

When both types submit quality xx, D1 attributes a deviation to the high type if it increases this cost advantage and full recognition makes the deviation profitable. Hence, the high type must move beyond the range in which low-type adoption has reduced its advantage. Let qE>xq_E > x be the first quality at which the advantage recovers to W1(x)W_1(x). Define the high type’s additional expenditure needed to reach that quality by

E≔Ch(qE)−Ch(x),W1(qE)=W1(x).(7)\begin{aligned} E &\coloneqq C_h(q_E) - C_h(x),\\ W_1(q_E) &= W_1(x). \tag*{(7)} \end{aligned}

At a pooling outcome, the receiver assigns to the sender ability the prior assessment θˉ\bar{\theta}. Full recognition as high ability would raise the high type’s gross payoff by

dP:=θh−θˉ=(1−π)Δ.d_P := \theta_h-\bar{\theta}=(1-\pi)\Delta.

Figure 1 illustrates the fall and recovery of the high type’s cost advantage following low-type adoption.

Figure 1. Adoption and the cost of recognition. Panel (a) shows private artifact costs; panel (b) shows the high type’s cost advantage. Following low-type adoption at xx, the advantage falls before recovering at qEq_E. Reaching recovery costs the high type an additional EE.

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