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Otter: A Provably MEV-Resilient Automated Market Maker via Surplus Redistribution

Abstract

Miner extractable value (MEV) in automated market makers allows block builders to profit from transaction ordering and injected trades, imposing costs on users and contributing to builder centralization. We introduce Otter (Optimal Truthful Trading with Excess Redistribution), a two-asset batch AMM that achieves provable MEV resilience when the consensus layer provides censorship resilience and block space is uncongested. Otter makes truthful behavior a dominant strategy for both users and builders. Consequently, a builder cannot profit from strategic deviations, including reordering bids or injecting sybil bids, even when the builder is itself a trader with intrinsic value. Moreover, we show that Otter maximizes social welfare, in a strong sense, within a natural class of mechanisms satisfying the desired game-theoretic properties. To achieve these guarantees, we introduce a new paradigm called surplus redistribution, which provably prevents residual surplus from being captured as MEV by redirecting it to the broader community. Specifically, the pool's output tokens need not be distributed entirely among users in the current batch. Instead, residual surplus may be transferred to a smart contract governed by the decentralized community. The accumulated surplus can be used to benefit community members — for example, by subsidizing transaction fees, rewarding liquidity providers, or returning assets to the pool. Our approach relies on the underlying consensus layer to provide censorship resilience. We motivate its necessity through an impossibility result showing that the desired game-theoretic guarantees become unattainable when the builder is additionally allowed to censor transactions. Thus, our results also provide a mathematically formal demonstration of how consensus-level security guarantees can fundamentally expand what is achievable at the application layer.

Introduction

MEV, short for Miner (or Maximum) Extractable Value, refers to the widespread phenomenon whereby a block builder leverages its unilateral control over the inclusion and ordering of transactions within a block to extract profit from this privileged position. MEV is harmful in multiple respects. It not only imposes additional costs on ordinary users, but also fosters opaque off-chain markets in which block builders, traders, and specialized searchers compete to identify and exploit MEV opportunities. These off-chain ecosystems, in turn, create strong forces toward centralization. Indeed, a recent measurement study by Yang et al. [49] found that the top two block builders produce more than 85% of Ethereum blocks, severely undermining the decentralized vision of blockchain systems.

In this work, we focus on Automated Market Makers (AMMs), one of the most widely used applications in decentralized finance (DeFi) and a major source of MEV. Numerous prior works [52, 41 KDC22] have demonstrated how a strategic block builder can exploit its control over transaction inclusion and ordering to launch front-running and back-running attacks, often collectively referred to as sandwich attacks. Through such attacks, the block builder can extract essentially risk-free profits at the expense of ordinary users.

In a typical two-asset AMM, users trade one of two assets, denoted XX and YY, against a smart contract, which we henceforth also refer to as the pool. Initially, the state of the pool is denoted by (x0,y0)(x_0, y_0), meaning that the pool holds x0x_0 units of XX and y0y_0 units of YY. The exchange rate for each trade is determined by a predefined pricing curve. For example, the widely adopted constant-product rule requires

(x0−x)(y0+y)=C(x_0 - x)(y_0 + y) = C

for some positive constant CC. Thus, starting from state (x0,y0)(x_0, y_0), a user who contributes yy units of YY to the pool receives xx units of XX. Following the trade, the pool transitions to state (x0−x,y0+y)(x_0 - x, y_0 + y), preserving the invariant that the product of the reserves remains equal to CC.

Our Results and Contributions

Our main contribution is a new two-asset AMM mechanism called Otter (short for “Optimal Truthful Trading with Excess Redistribution”) that achieves provable MEV resilience, assuming that the underlying consensus protocol provides censorship resilience and that block space is uncongested (i.e., there is ample capacity to include all relevant transactions). Specifically, compared with today’s AMMs, our mechanism satisfies several desirable properties:

  1. Provable MEV resilience. We prove that a block builder (henceforth simply a builder) cannot benefit from any strategic manipulation within its control, including misreporting its true type, manipulating transaction ordering, or creating pseudonymous identities to inject sybil bids. Since we assume that the underlying consensus protocol provides censorship resilience, censoring transactions lies outside the builder’s strategy space. Moreover, this guarantee continues to hold even when the builder is itself a user with an intrinsic demand to trade; we refer to such an entity as a builder-as-user. In particular, the profit-maximizing strategy for a builder or builder-as-user is to truthfully report its type (if it has an intrinsic demand to trade) and refrain from injecting sybil bids. Our mechanism is inherently order-independent: its outcome does not depend on the ordering of transactions within a block. Consequently, the builder gains no advantage from reordering transactions and may order them arbitrarily without affecting the outcome.

  1. Truthful reporting and sybil-proofness. We prove that every user’s profit-maximizing strategy is to truthfully report its type, including both its valuation for the asset being purchased and its budget, where both quantities may be denominated in units of the other asset. Furthermore, no user can benefit by creating pseudonymous identities and submitting additional bids through them—a property we refer to as sybil-proofness.

This stands in sharp contrast to today’s AMMs. Under common MEV attacks, most notably sandwich attacks [52, 41 KDC22], users may be forced to trade at the worst possible price permitted by their reported slippage tolerance. Consequently, users face an inherently strategic choice when setting their slippage tolerance: it must be sufficiently permissive for the transaction to execute, yet sufficiently restrictive to limit their exposure to MEV extraction.

Today’s users may also have an incentive to delay submitting their bids, hoping to first observe others’ bids and then choose their own actions strategically. By contrast, the incentive-compatibility guarantees of our mechanism hold ex post: even after observing all other bids, each user, builder, or builder-as-user still maximizes its own profit by behaving truthfully. Thus, observing others’ bids before submitting one’s own confers no strategic advantage, eliminating the incentive for last-minute bid submission.

  1. Social welfare optimization. Since truthful behavior constitutes an equilibrium for all participants, including users, builders, and builders-as-users, we show that our AMM maximizes social welfare in a strong sense at equilibrium.

By contrast, today’s AMMs generally incentivize both users and builders to behave strategically, and their resulting equilibrium behavior is poorly understood. Without a well-characterized equilibrium, it is difficult for a mechanism designer to provide rigorous guarantees about economic objectives such as social welfare.

Last but not least, our new AMM is intuitive, conceptually simple, and computationally efficient, making it a promising candidate for practical implementation and deployment.

Surplus redistribution as a new paradigm. To simultaneously achieve the above desiderata, we introduce a new paradigm that we call surplus redistribution. Most popular AMMs today [47], as well as a large body of the literature [26, 18, 38], impose two requirements: (1) all tokens output by the pool must be completely distributed to the users, and no surplus is allowed to remain; and (2) the resulting state of the pool, after each trade or batch of trades, must land on the prescribed pricing curve (e.g., the constant-product curve).

We depart from this conventional model. While we still require the end state of the pool to conform to the pricing curve, we allow only a portion of the tokens output by the pool to be paid to the users. Rather than allowing the remaining surplus to be captured as MEV by privileged participants, our mechanism redistributes it for the benefit of the broader community. For example, the surplus may be transferred to a smart contract governed through a decentralized mechanism and subsequently allocated in various ways that benefit the community, such as:

  1. as additional rewards for liquidity providers, thereby incentivizing greater liquidity provision and, in turn, reducing price impact and slippage for users;

  2. back to the pool itself, thereby deepening liquidity and reducing the cost of future trades;

  3. to subsidize or offset users’ transaction fees; and/or

(4) to the underlying layer-one blockchain or its stakeholders, where it can support the continued development and maintenance of the blockchain, or provide economic incentives that strengthen the security and robustness of the broader ecosystem.

We summarize our main contribution in the following theorem:

Theorem 1 (MEV-resilient AMM mechanism). Suppose that the underlying consensus layer ensures censorship resilience, and that we allow surplus redistribution. Then, there exists an AMM mechanism that incentivizes truthful reporting, achieves strategy-proofness for a block builder who may or may not have intrinsic demand, and maximizes social welfare in a strong sense (to be formally defined later). Further, the mechanism can be computed in O(nlog⁡n)O(n \log n) operations for a batch of nn orders.

Mitigating the externalities of an already centralized builder economy. We argue that deploying our new AMM alongside, and in direct competition with, legacy AMMs can significantly mitigate the negative externalities arising from today’s highly centralized builder economy, in the following ways:

  • Eliminating builders’ privileged control over economic surplus. Today, MEV extraction has contributed to a severe centralization of the builder economy, which has effectively become a duopoly [49]. This concentration allows a small number of dominant builders to capture a disproportionate share of the economic surplus generated through MEV. By contrast, our new AMM prevents this surplus from being captured as MEV and instead redistributes it to the broader decentralized ecosystem.

  • Pressuring builders to offer competitive pricing. The first three avenues for surplus redistribution described above can all, directly or indirectly, reduce users’ effective trading costs, making our AMM economically competitive with legacy AMMs. Under today’s AMMs, users targeted by MEV attacks effectively suffer from the worst execution price permitted by their reported slippage tolerance. By contrast, in our new AMM, increases in the execution price arise naturally from competition among users, and provably never from MEV extraction.

Deploying our AMM alongside legacy AMMs therefore creates competitive pressure on the existing builder economy. Builders may be compelled to offer users more favorable pricing, effectively returning a greater share of the economic surplus to users and liquidity providers rather than capturing it as MEV.

Necessity of the censorship-resilience assumption. To establish the desirable properties of our AMM, we assume that the underlying consensus layer provides censorship resilience. We argue that this assumption is both necessary and reasonable. We first establish its necessity through the following impossibility result: if block space is finite and the builder has the ability to censor bids, then no non-trivial AMM can simultaneously guarantee truthful reporting for individual users and strategy-proofness for a builder-as-user.

Theorem 2 (Necessity of censorship resilience). Suppose that block space is finite and that the block builder can censor bids. Then, no non-trivial AMM mechanism can simultaneously incentivize truthful reporting by every individual user and be strategy-proof for a builder-as-user.

The censorship-resilience assumption is also well motivated, as numerous blockchain projects are actively pursuing censorship resilience at the consensus layer, most notably Ethereum through FOCIL [25]. Beyond FOCIL, a variety of other approaches to achieving censorship resilience have been proposed [29, 1]. More broadly, motivated in part by the urgency of mitigating MEV and its negative externalities, many blockchain projects are exploring enhancements to their consensus protocols that provide stronger guarantees over transaction inclusion and ordering. These efforts include censorship resilience [25, 29, 1], fair sequencing [19, 24, 37, 34, 35, 36, 53], and private transaction submission [Dra, BO22, AFP, FPTX25, BLT25, GWWW26, CGPW25, BFOQ25].

Despite this growing effort at the consensus layer, relatively little is understood about how such guarantees can expand the possibilities for application-layer mechanism design from a game-theoretic perspective. In particular, can stronger consensus-layer guarantees enable fundamentally new mechanism-design feasibility results that would otherwise be impossible?

Our results provide a concrete affirmative answer to this question. Together, our AMM construction and Theorem 2 jointly establish a separation between consensus layers with and without censorship resilience: the desired incentive guarantees are achievable in the former setting, whereas no non-trivial AMM can achieve them in the latter. Thus, our results mathematically confirm the community’s wide-spread intuition that censorship resilience at the consensus layer can play a fundamental role in mitigating MEV at the application layer.

Additional results. As a by-product of our analysis, we also characterize the permissible forms of builder compensation when a portion of the surplus is allocated to the builder. Specifically, we prove the following:

Theorem 3 (Constraints on surplus returned to the builder). For any AMM mechanism that incentivizes truthful reporting and is strategy-proof for a builder-as-user, the amount of surplus returned to the builder must be constant and independent of the outcome of the AMM.

Interestingly, the proofs of both Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 draw on techniques from the recent literature on transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs) [44, 17]. Our results thus uncover a useful connection between TFM and AMM mechanism design, demonstrating how techniques and insights developed in the study of one can inform the other.

Last but not the least, we also prove that allowing surplus redistribution is essential for obtaining a “dream” AMM mechanism that simultaneously satisfies our desired incentive compatibility and efficiency guarantees.

Theorem 4 (The necessity of surplus redistribution). If we do not allow surplus redistribution, then no deterministic AMM mechanism can simultaneously incentivize truthful reporting and achieve Pareto optimality for orders with “reasonable” asks (to be formally defined later).

Theorem 4 also explains why recent works on AMM mechanism design that do not allow surplus redistribution [18, 38] cannot achieve reasonable notions of social welfare maximization.

We stress, however, that we introduce surplus redistribution not merely as a technical device to circumvent the impossibility of Theorem 4, but more importantly, as a desirable paradigm itself to provably defend against MEV and substantially reduce the negative externalities of the already centralized builder economy [49].

Both Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 hold in a strong sense, even when the underlying consensus offers strong properties including censorship resilience and fair sequencing.

Comparison with Existing Approaches of MEV Mitigation

Capturing MEV through builder auction. A line of work [23, 21, 46] has explored capturing MEV through auctions for block-building or transaction-ordering rights. Such auction-based approaches have also been deployed by major blockchain ecosystems, including Ethereum’s Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) framework [42] and Arbitrum’s Timeboost [46]. Broadly, these approaches allocate privileged block-building or transaction-ordering rights through competitive bidding, allowing some of the associated MEV to be captured by the protocol or returned to the broader community. Unfortunately, such approaches may exacerbate builder centralization by favoring participants with superior access to high-value order flow or other MEV opportunities, thereby disadvantaging smaller builders with fewer resources or customers [49, 6]. As the builder economy becomes increasingly concentrated, diminished competition may in turn allow dominant builders to exercise market power, extract monopoly rents, and retain a larger share of the MEV, ultimately undermining the goal of returning MEV to the broader community.

Application-specific MEV mitigation or recovery at the consensus layer. Several academic works, as well as discussions in the blockchain community, have proposed implementing application-specific MEV mitigation or recovery directly at the consensus layer. For example, Ferreira and Parkes [26] propose enforcing application-specific sequencing rules at the consensus layer that restrict how a block builder may order transactions, thereby limiting its ability to extract MEV. In particular, they design sequencing rules for AMM contracts that provide weak but provable guarantees against MEV extraction. Beyond enforcing verifiable sequencing rules, the cryptocurrency communityhave also informally explored the possibility of estimating the amount of MEV extracted by a builder and requiring the builder to return, or pay as a tax, an amount proportional to the estimated MEV to the underlying blockchain.

A fundamental drawback of this general approach is that it pushes application-specific logic into the consensus layer, blurring the architectural boundary between consensus and applications. As the ecosystem grows to support an increasingly diverse collection of applications, incorporating application-specific MEV rules into consensus could substantially increase the complexity of the consensus layer. In the extreme, the consensus layer would need to understand increasingly rich aspects of application semantics in order to determine which builder behaviors are permissible.

Consensus-level MEV recovery faces an additional challenge: it requires the consensus layer to identify and quantify MEV across potentially arbitrary smart contracts. Such an approach may be inherently difficult to sustain in a permissionless environment, where developers can continually deploy new or deliberately obfuscated contracts. Each new application may require the consensus protocol or its maintainers to analyze the contract’s semantics and devise an application-specific method for detecting and quantifying its MEV. This creates an inherently reactive dynamic: as new strategies and contracts emerge, the consensus layer must continually adapt its MEV-detection mechanisms to keep pace.

Our approach instead preserves a clean separation of concerns. We ask the consensus layer to provide only generic, application-agnostic primitives—most importantly, censorship resilience—while leaving application-specific incentive design to the application layer. Our results demonstrate that even such a generic consensus-layer guarantee can be sufficient to enable strong, provable MEV resilience at the application layer.

The approach of Ferreira and Parkes [26] also faces additional limitations specific to their model. Their framework requires trades to be executed sequentially, with the pool state satisfying the prescribed pricing curve after every individual trade. Under this restriction, they establish strong impossibility results. In particular, even arbitrage resilience—a guarantee strictly weaker than the incentive-compatibility properties we seek—is impossible in their model. They therefore consider a substantially weaker MEV-resilience notion: roughly speaking, if the builder earns risk-free profit, then each user must receive an execution price at least as favorable as the price it would have received had its order been the only order in the block.

Additional Related Work

Comparison with closely related work. Our work is directly inspired by that of Chan, Wu, and Shi [18], who construct an AMM that processes trades in batches while ensuring that the pool’s end state conforms to the pricing curve. Their AMM achieves the same game-theoretic guarantees as ours, but has two important limitations in comparison. First, their construction relies on a substantially stronger assumption about the consensus layer—namely, fair sequencing. Moreover, the idealized fair-sequencing model assumed in their work is stronger than existing guarantees in the literature [19, 24, 37, 34, 35, 36, 53], which provide only approximate sequencing fairness. It remains unclear whether their idealized notion of fair sequencing can be realized in practice. Second, unlike our AMM, their mechanism does not achieve optimal social welfare.

Automated market makers. Milionis, Moallemi, and Roughgarden [39] study the design of a market maker’s demand curve with the dual objectives of maximizing profit and eliciting truthful reports from traders. Their focus is orthogonal to ours, as their model does not seek to capture or mitigate MEV. In particular, traders submit orders directly to the market maker, and their model does not capture strategic transaction ordering and associated arbitrage opportunities, such as front-running or back-running other traders’ orders. Bartoletti et al. [5] study how to determine an adversary’s optimal MEV-extraction strategy in an AMM. In particular, they develop an algorithmic procedure for strategically ordering user transactions and inserting adversarial trades so as to maximize the value extracted from users. Their work seeks to characterize and optimize MEV extraction, rather than to design mechanisms that prevent or mitigate MEV.

A line of work has explored batch trading, particularly batch clearing at a uniform price [10, 11, 16, 43]. However, uniform-price batch clearing alone does not guarantee incentive compatibility: when the clearing price depends on orders in the batch, users may benefit from misreporting their valuations or budgets. For example, Canidio and Fritsch [10, 11] propose a uniform-price batch AMM with a modified potential function that achieves arbitrage resilience, but only provides incentive compatibility when there is an infinite number of competing arbitrageurs; with finitely many arbitrageurs, strategic misreporting can be profitable. Other batch-trading mechanisms [13] similarly do not satisfy our notion of incentive compatibility. Zhang et al. [51] likewise observe this limitation and study optimal strategic behavior under batch clearing. A recent work by Li, Shi, and Zhang [38] establishes a somewhat counterintuitive tension between uniform pricing and incentive compatibility. Although uniform pricing eliminates internal arbitrage, they show that it is fundamentally incompatible with the stronger goal of incentive compatibility: in the absence of surplus redistribution, no efficient AMM mechanism can simultaneously achieve uniform pricing and incentive compatibility.

Other related work. Chitra et al. [14] propose to redistribute MEV to stake-holders to enhance the blockchain’s economic security; however, their work does not suggest any secure mechanism for capturing the MEV without leading to builder centralization. In this sense, their work is orthogonal to ours. In particular, the surplus accumulated through our Otter mechanism can also be (in part) redistributed to stake-holders as they suggest. Zhang et al. [ZYZ25] propose a mechanism that captures MEV in AMMs and redistributes it to users and liquidity providers. However, their mechanism does not incentivize truthful reporting for users. Moreover, it relies on a stronger assumption about the underlying consensus layer: in addition to censorship resilience, the consensus layer must support private transaction submission [ZYZ25].

Hartline and Roughgarden [HR08] study routing, scheduling, anti-spam, and resource-allocation settings in which conventional monetary transfers are undesirable or technologically unavailable. They design mechanisms that instead require agents to destroy resources — for example, by expending computation or accepting degraded service — and use such resource destruction as an instrument for providing incentives. Although our work shares the high-level idea of burning, it differs fundamentally in both setting and objective. In our mechanism, the burnt surplus is redistributed to the broader community and therefore contributes to social welfare; in their framework, by contrast, burnt resources constitute a social loss. Burning has also been used as a mechanism design tool in the recent transaction fee mechanism literature [44, 17].

The elegant work of Yokoo et al. [50] considered combinatorial auctions with a finite set of indivisible items. They showed that, under a suitable submodularity condition on the welfare function, the VCG auction is sybil-proof, even though VCG is not sybil-proof in general. While our approach to achieving Sybil-proofness is reminiscent of that of Yokoo et al. [50], we stress that our auction setting differs substantially from theirs, and thus their proof does not directly carry over to our setting. Specifically, in our setting, the tokens being traded are infinitely divisible, trades with the pool are governed by a pricing curve, and agents are subject to budget caps. Moreover, our Sybil strategy space is broader: Sybil identities may not only misreport both valuations and budgets, but may also submit bids in the opposite trading direction.

Our setting resembles multi-unit auctions with budget limits [20], in which buyers compete for a fixed supply of XX using YY, subject to hard payment budgets. Such budgets make utility non-quasilinear and preclude a standard VCG treatment, motivating their adaptive clinching auction. At first glance, it may therefore be surprising that VCG works in our setting despite the presence of budget constraints. One might try to reconcile the two by viewing each budget-constrained buyer as a capacitated seller of YY, but this does not make our procurement-VCG construction applicable to their setting [20]: because their supply of XX is fixed independently of the amount of YY collected, it corresponds in our formulation to a constant compensation curve FF. The resulting procurement problem is degenerate—additional input generates no marginal output, so the welfare-maximizing allocation selects no trade. In an AMM, by contrast, additional input generates output along an increasing concave curve, making seller-side VCG both meaningful and feasible.

Model

Imagine a pool that holds two crypto-assets (also called tokens) named XX and YY, respectively. Users can trade with the pool through two types of orders, called sell-YY and sell-XX orders, respectively.

Sell-YY orders. A real user ii of sell-YY profile has type (vi,qi)∈R≥02(v_i,q_i) \in\mathbb{R}_{\geq0}^2, indicating that the user has a budget of qi≥0q_i \geq0 units of YY to spend on purchasing XX, and its reservation value of each unit of YY is vi≥0v_i \geq0, measured in units of XX. A sell-YY identity reports a per-unit ask and a declared budget (v~i,q~i)∈R≥02(\tilde{v}_i,\tilde{q}_i) \in\mathbb{R}_{\geq0}^2. Truthful reporting means (v~i,q~i)=(vi,qi)(\tilde{v}_i,\tilde{q}_i) = (v_i,q_i).

Sell-XX orders. Symmetrically, a real user jj of sell-XX profile has type (uj,rj)∈R≥02(u_j,r_j) \in\mathbb{R}_{\geq0}^2, where rjr_j is its budget in units of XX, and uju_j is its reservation value for one unit of XX, measured in units of YY. A sell-XX identity reports (u~j,r~j)∈R≥02(\tilde{u}_j,\tilde{r}_j) \in\mathbb{R}_{\geq0}^2, and truthful reporting means (u~j,r~j)=(uj,rj)(\tilde{u}_j,\tilde{r}_j) = (u_j,r_j).

AMM mechanism. An AMM mechanism receives as input a list of orders, each of either sell-YY or sell-XX type, and decides an outcome (xi,yi)(x_i,y_i) for each order:

  • For a sell-YY order (v~i,q~i)(\tilde{v}_i,\tilde{q}_i), it means that the user obtains xix_i units in XX in exchange for yiy_i units of YY. It is required that 0≤yi≤q~i0 \leq y_i \leq\tilde{q}_i.

  • For a sell-X order, it means that the user obtains yiy_i units in YY in exchange for xix_i units of XX. It is required that 0≤xi≤r~i0 \le x_i \le\tilde{r}_i.

Unless otherwise noted, we require that an AMM mechanism satisfy the following natural properties:

  • Individual rationality. Under truthful reporting, every user obtains nonnegative utility.

  • Feasibility. Every token paid to an order is funded by tokens supplied by opposite-side orders or by an AMM trade. No outside subsidy is required. Any surplus compensation token is burnt (i.e., redistributed the decentralized community).

Remark 5. As formalized in § 2.1, the builder, who determines the order in which transactions appear in a block, is also a strategic player. We assume that the AMM mechanism pays no fee to the builder. § 7 justifies this assumption by showing that our desired incentive guarantees preclude outcome-dependent builder fees. This restriction does not rule out a fixed exogenous payment, funded, for example, by surplus that the mechanism previously redistributed to the community. Provided that this payment is independent of the current batch’s outcome, it has no effect on our game-theoretic analysis.

Strategy Space and Utility

Strategy space. A truthful user always reports its true type. A strategic user, however, can not only misrepresent its valuation and budget, but also create an arbitrary finite number of identities, and inject sybil bids. The declared valuation and budget associated with each sybil identity can be arbitrary finite nonnegative reals. Moreover, the bids submitted by a strategic user need not be in the same direction as its true type. For example, a sell-YY user may submit sell-XX bids, and vice versa.

A strategic builder can arbitrarily order the bids in the block, and inject sybil bids. If the strategic builder also has intrinsic demand, then it can also misreport its valuation and budget. Note that the mechanism observes only the declared valuations and budgets, and it is not aware which identities belong to the same real user or builder-as-user.

Utility. Let Y\mathcal{Y} and X\mathcal{X} be the sets of identities that have sell-YY and sell-XX profiles, respectively. For the finite set I\mathcal{I} of identities controlled by one real user, define aggregate token flows

SY(I):=∑i∈I∩Yyi,RX(I):=∑i∈I∩Xxi,SX(I):=∑i∈I∩Xxi,RY(I):=∑i∈I∩Yyi.(1)\begin{aligned} S_Y(\mathcal{I}) &:= \sum_{i\in\mathcal{I}\cap\mathcal{Y}} y_i, & R_X(\mathcal{I}) &:= \sum_{i\in\mathcal{I}\cap\mathcal{X}} x_i,\\ S_X(\mathcal{I}) &:= \sum_{i\in\mathcal{I}\cap\mathcal{X}} x_i, & R_Y(\mathcal{I}) &:= \sum_{i\in\mathcal{I}\cap\mathcal{Y}} y_i. \tag*{(1)} \end{aligned}

Here STS_T denotes the amount of token T∈{X,Y}T \in\{X,Y\} supplied by the user and RTR_T denotes the amount of token TT received by the user. Its net token changes are

ΔX(I):=RX(I)−SX(I),ΔY(I):=RY(I)−SY(I).\Delta_X(\mathcal{I}) := R_X(\mathcal{I}) - S_X(\mathcal{I}), \qquad\Delta_Y(\mathcal{I}) := R_Y(\mathcal{I}) - S_Y(\mathcal{I}).

A true sell-YY user of type (v,q)(v,q) has utility

Util⁡Y(I;v,q):={−∞,if −ΔY(I)>q or (−ΔY(I)<0 and ΔX(I)<0),ΔX(I)+vΔY(I),o.w.(2)\operatorname{Util}^{Y}(\mathcal{I};v,q) := \begin{cases} -\infty, & \text{if } -\Delta_Y(\mathcal{I}) > q \text{ or } (-\Delta_Y(\mathcal{I}) < 0 \text{ and } \Delta_X(\mathcal{I}) < 0),\\ \Delta_X(\mathcal{I}) + v\Delta_Y(\mathcal{I}), & \text{o.w.} \end{cases} \tag*{(2)}

Thus a true sell-YY user receives catastrophic utility if its realized net sale in YY exceeds the true budget qq, or if its aggregate trade is strictly in the opposite direction of its desire, namely, if it obtains a strict net gain in YY while incurring a strict net loss in XX. Otherwise its utility is computed in the normal quasilinear way from its aggregate net trade. In particular, the utility function does not penalize a sell-YY user merely for obtaining a net gain in YY when it does not lose XX; this includes a potential free-lunch outcome with weak net gains in both tokens. Nor does it penalize the user if it gross-sells more than qq units of YY through some identities provided opposite-direction identities buy back enough YY that its final net sale does not exceed qq. This makes the possible strategy larger and will later make our game-theoretic definitions stronger.

Symmetrically, for a true sell-XX user of type (u,r)(u,r), its utility is defined as:

Util⁡X(I;u,r):={−∞,if −ΔX(I)>r or (−ΔX(I)<0 and ΔY(I)<0),ΔY(I)+uΔX(I),o.w.\operatorname{Util}^{X}(\mathcal{I};u,r) := \begin{cases} -\infty, & \text{if }-\Delta_X(\mathcal{I})>r\text{ or }\left(-\Delta_X(\mathcal{I})<0\text{ and }\Delta_Y(\mathcal{I})<0\right),\\ \Delta_Y(\mathcal{I})+u\Delta_X(\mathcal{I}), & \text{o.w.} \end{cases}

Thus a true sell-XX user receives utility −∞-\infty if it net-sells more than rr units of XX, or if it obtains a strict net gain in XX while incurring a strict net loss in YY.

A Concave AMM Pricing Curve

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