WorksEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
Recommendations with Costly Verification
Abstract
A recommender faces consumers who can verify recommendations, but differ in their attention costs or in the salience of their choice of adoption. We characterize the conditions under which a technology that increases transparency by lowering the cost of verifying a product's quality will increase or decrease false recommendations. Without commitment, reducing verification costs never increases false recommendations, but when the recommender can commit to a policy, transparency can worsen both the quality of recommendations and consumer welfare. The necessary and sufficient condition is that the log-elasticity of the distribution of consumer cost types is decreasing. It can hold when the distribution is sufficiently fat-tailed, or when it mixes sophisticated and naive consumers. Our results can be applied to platform-recommended listings, security ratings, and audits.
Introduction
Modern markets are often organized around recommendations. Platforms and rating agencies offer rankings and suggestions of products, services and content, which affect their perception and visibility. Most of the time, these are subject to no oversight except for individual consumers’ ability to fact-check them against other sources. Aside from fact-checking, the only disadvantage to the intermediary of providing false information is that they become less trustworthy.
This paper studies the design of the content of product recommendations by a self-interested recommender when heterogeneous consumers can verify them at a cost. The recommender, e.g., a platform, can be motivated to recommend one product. over another for reasons unrelated to quality, such as profit-sharing with the seller. However, frequent false recommendations make it more attractive to consumers to acquire additional information before acting. Our main finding is simple: increasing transparency to lower consumers’ cost of information acquisition may or may not lead to better recommendations and increased consumer welfare, with a possible negative net effect on consumers when verification costs are heavy-tailed.
In particular, we focus on the case where the intermediary may make a binary recommendation of a preferred, risky product over a safe option (or no recommendation), which, depending on its quality, may be the better or worse option for the consumer. The intermediary knows the risky product’s quality and is able to commit to their preferred recommendation policy, but cannot prevent the consumer from paying an idiosyncratic attention cost to perfectly verify the product’s quality before responding to the recommendation.
We take the canonical example of a transparency-augmenting technology to be one that lowers the cost of verification for all consumers, while fixing relative attention-cost heterogeneity between consumers. Transparency has ambiguous effects on recommendations that depend on the distribution of consumer heterogeneity even when restricting to these cases, in which a shift in the technology affects more- and less-attentive consumers in equal proportion. We also identify the marginal effect of a general, FOSD shift in the consumer distribution: when technology improves costs in a non-proportional manner, consumers benefit most from those that decrease costs slower for marginal consumers.
The reason is that false recommendations trade off the platform’s exploitation of inframarginal adopters with persuasion of those on the margin, who may be swayed to either accept or verify recommendations depending on their level of trust in the recommender. The tradeoff depends on the log-elasticity of the consumer cost distribution because a thin population of near-accepters makes marginal improvements to the policy more appealing to the platform; decreasing the cost of verification for these near-accepters makes them into inframarginal consumers who strictly prefer to verify regardless of a change in the recommendation policy.
These effects rely on commitment. Without commitment, the recommender chooses whether to make a recommendation after observing quality, and unless it recommends every product, it makes false recommendations until the point where it is indifferent between doing so and not. The consumer who is indifferent to verifying is then fixed at the same quantile of the cost distribution, no matter the verification technology, and false recommendations become less frequent as verification gets cheaper.
While we primarily apply the model to a platform recommending products, the framework applies wherever a better-informed, self-interested intermediary guides agents who can verify its recommendation at a heterogeneous cost. For example, e-commerce platforms promote listings that yield higher commissions, while consumers differ in the cost of acquiring outside reviews. Rating agencies are paid by the issuers whose securities they rate, while investors, from retail buyers to sophisticated institutions, have very different costs of conducting independent due diligence. Auditors certify the financial reports of the firms that hire them, while the scrutiny these statements receive from analysts and counterparties varies widely. In each case, the audience of recommender differs in the cost of verifying its recommendation. Any improvements in transparency, such as review aggregators, standardized disclosures, or open-data requirements, could lower these costs. Our results identify when such interventions discipline the recommender and when they instead lead it to make more false recommendations. The answer depends on the intermediary’s commitment power and on the distribution of verification costs near the marginal verifier.
§ 2 describes the model of recommendations, adoption/exploration decisions, and transparency. § 3 describes the recommendation threshold that the platform optimally commits to, and characterizes how it responds to the consumer’s cost of verification, while § 4 focuses on consumer welfare. § 5 drops commitment, shows that transparency then never increases false recommendations, and compares the two benchmarks. Finally, § 6 discusses non-binary recommendations and concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
Related literature A large literature studies information intermediaries whose incentives diverge from those of the decision makers they advise (see e.g. Lizzeri 1999, Hagiu and Jullien 2011, Armstrong and Zhou 2011). Closest to us is Armstrong and Chen [2], where an exogenous share of inattentive consumers governs a seller’s quality choice; we endogenize this share as the choice of consumers with different attention costs. Our concept of a recommendation lies under the framework of information design, as in Kamenica and Gentzkow [11]. One recent paper with a similar application is Peitz and Sobolev [19], which studies a monopolist who issues personalized recommendations to consumers who differ in whether they know their own tastes, and characterizes when recommendations are biased. Unlike theirs, our recommender is uninformed about the consumer’s type, and so faces heterogeneity when making a recommendation.
Attention costs have also been well-studied. Models with informed and uninformed consumers [22, 23] share our basic tradeoff between exploiting consumers who do not check and retaining those who do, and sellers may raise verification costs deliberately [6, 8]; our recommender deters verification through the content of its recommendations rather than through the cost. Weitzman [24] and Dovak [5] analyze the problem of costly search through sequential inspection, mandatory or not; our problem is simpler in that there is only one recommendation to verify, and allows us to consider the platform’s design problem under a variety of cost structures. Unlike Fabbri and others who consider entropy-based attention costs [see 20], we focus on the case of perfect verification, but instead allow for a complex cost distribution in the population.
A limited collection of other work focuses on persuasion when the receiver can endogenously obtain information. Matysková and Montes [17] show in a more abstract persuasion environment that a sender’s optimal signal is constructed to deter independent information acquisition, and that cheaper acquisition erodes the sender’s persuasive power. Lukyanov and Safaryan [16] study a sender’s incentive to gather information to persuade an audience that fact-checks at heterogeneous costs, and finds that cheaper fact-checking coarsens the optimal public signal.
Our characterization of the optimal threshold is related to optimal monopoly pricing: the mass of false recommendations is analogous to a price, and the share of consumers who accept a recommendation without verification is analogous to the quantity sold. Our defection elasticity is the generalized failure rate of the cost distribution [13, 12]. It is well-known that the response of a monopolist to a multiplicative demand shift depends on the curvature of demand [4, 25]; in the language of Mr´azov´a and Neary [18], transparency lowers standards when demand is superconvex at the optimum. Likewise, the platform’s response to cost shifts depends on cost elasticity. Two features distinguish our problem. Demand is derived from consumer and product-quality heterogeneity together, so a second elasticity, the dilution elasticity , also determines the magnitude of the platform’s response. Secondly, costs have a direct effect on consumer welfare. Roesler and Szentes [21] elegantly describe the buyer-optimal information structure under monopoly pricing; we describe the total effect of information and costs generated by costly verification on consumer welfare.
Other work on consumer heterogeneity describes shifting and bunching effects of varying preferences. Johnson and Myatt [10] show that changes in the dispersion of consumer valuations rotate demand and that the comparative statics depend on the position of the rotation point relative to the firm’s operating point; Lewis and Sappington [14] and Anderson and Renault [1] study information supplied by the seller that rotates demand. In our setting, the level and slope of the cost-growth profile at the marginal consumer play a similar role. We show that the effect of a general FOSD shift in transparency can also be broken down into these components.
Model
A platform chooses a product to recommend to a consumer. There are two possible products:
The safe/standard product () has known consumption value to the consumer, and the platform obtains benefit if the consumer chooses to adopt it.
The risky product () has a consumption value known only to the platform. The platform obtains a benefit from recommending the risky product to the consumer.
We assume that , that is, the platform prefers that the consumer adopt the risky product to having them adopt the safe product. There can be several possible reasons for this: the platform may want to generate reviews on a new product in order to feed its algorithm, or its share of the revenue from the risky product could be higher. It will be convenient to work with the normalized margin
The consumption values and give a reduced-form description of the consumer’s utility. We assume that , so that the consumer has a straightforward preference to accept the recommendation of the safe product.
Our focal point is the problem of the consumer when recommended the risky product: they do not know , though they know the ex-ante distribution of is given by ; we assume it is supported on an interval of the form . Note that can be taken as the expected consumption value given the platform’s information – the platform need not be fully informed, only better-informed than the consumer.
Assumption 1. Quality distribution is continuous, with a density that is continuous and strictly positive on and on , where ; may jump at $v = 0.
For products listed by a seller with an exogenous price, we could think of the consumption value as the total of the product’s (possibly unknown) quality minus its (known) price, . Alternatively, if the product is not priced – e.g., it is content – then the consumption value directly describes the consumer’s welfare.
Heterogeneous verification costs The consumer is able to check the quality of a product before choosing to adopt it or not. The consumer’s cost of verification depends on a privately known attention cost parameter, , which is positive and distributed in the population. Verification is perfect: the consumer learns perfectly after paying the attention cost , and is then informed when choosing whether to accept or reject the risky recommendation.
We also allow the cost of verification to depend on a shared, commonly known parameter that describes the verification technology that determines the opacity of information about the (risky) product. We assume that the single-parameter family of distributions describes costs that are smoothly increasing in in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.
Assumption 2 (Differentiability and FOSD). For every , is an atomless distribution on whose support is an interval with ; the endpoints may depend on , and is nondecreasing in . On the interior of the
support, , is twice continuously differentiable in with and .2
It will be helpful to index the consumer’s type by its quantile, , so that the cost borne by the consumer at quantile is
Before proceeding further, we highlight the case where interventions in transparency (or opacity) have a uniformly proportional impact on all consumers.
Definition 2.1. The family with quantile cost function features a uniformly proportional effect of transparency if there is some monotone such that
The uniformly proportional case captures the benchmark in which lowering allows all consumers to learn quality more cheaply, but keeps relative heterogeneity unchanged. This assumption makes sense if consumer heterogeneity is orthogonal to the overall level of transparency – e.g., if relative consumer heterogeneity captures heterogeneous opportunity cost of time, and captures the amount of time it takes to navigate to a third-party opinion, then technology can be represented with a family satisfying (1).
The consumer’s decision proceeds as follows:
Observe own cost parameter, , and which product ( or ) is recommended. Choose whether the initial action is to Accept (), Reject (), or Explore () the product. If , the decision is over and payoffs are realized.
If , pay and observe a perfect signal of . Then, choose the post-exploration action .
Denote the consumer’s final decision between accept and reject (regardless of whether it is made in period 1 or 2) by . The consumer’s payoff is
Indeed, some parts of the consumer’s decision are simple: upon seeing the safe product recommended (with ), the consumer will choose to accept the product. However, exploration may have value when the consumer sees the risky recommendation instead.
We will show that their optimal decision path upon a risky recommendation depends on the platform’s recommendation policy.
Recommendation policies Upon being shown the premium product, the consumer updates beliefs via Bayes Rule:
The platform’s recommendation policy is a function that specifies the probability of recommending the premium product for each quality premium .
The consumer’s expected payoff under each initial action , conditional on receiving a premium recommendation:
Accept:
Explore: After paying and learning , the consumer accepts the premium product iff . Expected payoff:
Reject: .
The comparison between acceptance and rejection is governed by the posterior mean
If , high-cost consumers weakly prefer accepting blindly to rejecting. In this region, the consumer population separates into explorers, those with , and blind accepters, those with . This is the main region studied below.
Exploration is valuable because it allows the consumer to avoid the negative part of the recommendation. The value of exploration relative to blind acceptance is
Define the posterior downside
Then exploration is preferred to blind acceptance if and only if
(2) shows that verification is selected by low-cost consumers, while high-cost consumers accept blindly, provided that blind acceptance is preferred to rejection.
Optimal Recommendation under Commitment
In the commitment benchmark, the recommender commits to a measurable policy before consumers act. This section characterizes the optimal policy and then asks how it responds to the cost of verification.
Properties of the optimal policy
A recommendation policy is a function giving the probability that the risky product is recommended at quality . Write
for the frequency of risky recommendations, the mass of good products recommended, and the mass of bad products recommended. Denote by
the total posterior downside carried by the pool. The posterior downside per recommendation is .
Acceptance/verification region. The case of commitment can be thought of as a Stackelberg game in which the platform first chooses a recommendation policy, and then the consumer chooses their response to the realized recommendation once the policy has been fixed. In every equilibrium of this Stackelberg game, the platform’s recommendation induces a weakly positive posterior mean,
and a consumer rejects a recommendation with probability 0.
Lemma 1. Under any optimal policy the consumer’s posterior expectation of recommended quality is weakly positive, , and the platform expects the consumer to never immediately reject a recommendation.
Proof. See Appendix.
Given that the consumer either accepts or verifies the recommendation of the risky product, total demand for the risky product is
The platform’s optimal choice of maximizes
Demand under a threshold. The platform’s objective is supermodular in the pairing between recommendation probability and quality, so the optimal coupling is monotone and takes the form of a threshold quality, , above which the recommendation is always made and below which it is never made.
Proposition 2 (Threshold optimality). Fix any recommendation frequency . Among all policies with , risky demand is maximized by recommending the top mass of qualities. Hence an optimal commitment policy may be taken to be for some threshold .
Proof. In the acceptance–verification region every recommended good product is eventually adopted, while a recommended bad product is adopted only by consumers who accept blindly. Hence, is increasing in and decreasing in for fixed .
Suppose recommends some quality with positive probability while excluding some . Shifting recommendation probability from to holds fixed, weakly raises , and weakly lowers , strictly so whenever the shift crosses zero or removes a worse bad product. Iterating such rearrangements yields the upper-contour policy .
For a threshold write
so that is the mass of good products and the mass of bad products admitted into the pool. The posterior expected downside and the quantile of the marginal consumer are
and risky demand is
(4) separates demand into an always-inframarginal component, the good mass , which is adopted whatever the standard, and a component that is affected by the marginal consumer, the bad mass multiplied by the share of consumers who accept blindly. Lowering the standard adds bad mass but raises the posterior downside, inducing more consumers to verify.
Remark 1 (Verification region). If , no consumer verifies when , so and (3) reduces to , which is strictly decreasing in because . The recommender therefore never stops in this region: every optimal threshold satisfies . Write for the threshold with , with when . The analysis below is carried out on the verification region , on which lies in the interior of the support of , so that , and their derivatives are well defined and smooth. At itself jumps from to , so the corner can in principle be optimal; in all our examples the optimum is interior to the verification region, which we verify numerically.
An Elasticity Formula
The recommender’s problem can be seen as the following: they have access to a mass of good recommendations, which are used to subsidize the value of bad recommendations (). The goal is to maximize the mass of bad recommendations accepted, since the quantity of true “good” recommendations, , is fixed and always accepted.
For bad recommendations, there is an effective demand curve described by the tradeoff between and , the fraction of blind accepters. An increase in decreases , since verification becomes more valuable as posterior expected downside increases. Here, serves as a quantity margin, and as a price, since if , then each false recommendation generates 0 profit for the recommender.
In contrast to standard pricing environments, the tradeoff depends not just on consumer variation, but also on the rate of dilution of the recommendation pool that corresponds to a given shift in the marginal consumer.
Define the defection elasticity
driven by the distribution of consumers , to be the proportional rate at which consumers “defect” to verification due to a change in the posterior downside , and the dilution elasticity,
driven by quality distribution , to be the proportional rate of increase of the mass of bad recommendations due to the same change in the posterior downside. Their ratio is the elasticity of the inverse demand curve,
Proposition 3 (Optimal recommendation threshold). Any optimum in the interior of the verification region, , satisfies
where ; the RHS is a Lerner index with price and marginal cost .
Moreover,
so has the sign of the bracket, and the optimum is unique whenever is strictly decreasing in .
Proof. Differentiating (3) with , and ,
By (7), , so , which is (9). Setting and dividing by gives (8).
Note that since setting the optimal threshold is analogous to setting a monopoly price through false recommendations, the natural tradeoff is between marginal buyers and the deepening of the pool of bad recommendations. The term translates a shift in the marginal buyer to the impact on the mass of accepted false recommendations that the platform benefits from, so while the platform’s first order condition depends on consumer heterogeneity through as in standard monopoly pricing, it also depends on the product quality distribution through .
Remark 2 (Regularity). Uniqueness in Proposition 3 requires to be strictly decreasing in where it crosses zero. This is analogous to Myerson-type regularity in monopoly pricing, except that here is the failure rate, evaluated at the endogenous verification cutoff .
The Lerner term is always decreasing in : raising the standard lowers the posterior downside, so fewer consumers verify. But in addition, the demand elasticity must be decreasing in . Since decreases with , a simple sufficient condition is that (i) is nondecreasing in , i.e. the consumer side satisfies IGFR, and (ii) the dilution elasticity is nondecreasing in .
Verification Costs and Recommendation Standards
This section discusses the effect of transparency on optimal recommendation thresholds. We think of transparency as being controlled by the verification technology : when increases, verification becomes more costly for every consumer.
The main result shows that increased transparency need not always discipline the recommender towards fewer bad recommendations. The effect of a proportional shift in transparency when the safe option is worth 0 to the platform (or the platform can recommend the risky product without excluding the safe one) depends on the elasticity of consumer-side elasticity ; non-proportional shifts also affect the policy by reshaping the distribution of costs in the neighborhood of the marginal consumer.
To see this, note that the optimality condition can be summarized as
where we assume that we are in the case where is strictly decreasing.
We can describe how unevenly a change in the technology affects the population by the cost-growth profile
which records the elasticity with respect to of the cost borne by the consumer at quantile . A family of distributions is uniformly proportional if , i.e., every consumer’s cost rises with unit elasticity in . Write
for the level and slope of the cost-growth profile (11) at the marginal quantile, and denote the elasticity of the defection elasticity by
Intuitively, describes the rate at which a shift in the marginal consumer thickens or thins out the density of near-marginal vs. inframarginal consumers. This affects the optimal standard because a decrease in transparency (increase in ) shifts the marginal consumer independently of a shift in the recommendation policy and has a first-order impact on the platform’s incentive to capture vs. exploit consumers.
Lemma 4. At any ,
Proposition 5 (Opacity comparative static).
Proof. Since , the implicit function theorem gives . By Lemma 4,
To understand the proposition, start with the simplest case of uniformly proportional shifts with , where direction of the policy response depends only on the sign of , which could be either positive or negative. We give examples of both in the subsection to follow, and show that when is fat-tailed can be decreasing throughout the verification region, or non-monotone in with at .
The reason is that opacity lowers the share of verifiers at the current standard. When is increasing in , this lowers and makes it cheaper than before for the recommender to add bad recommendations; when is decreasing, it raises and makes adding bad recommendations more expensive (Figure 1). Assuming uniform proportionality and no opportunity cost of making a recommendation,3 this shift in the marginal consumer is the only strategically relevant change for the recommender4. When there is instead a positive cost of forgoing the safe recommendation (), verifiers are particularly costly, and opacity is more prone to increase false recommendations since it decreases the number of verifiers. This is reflected in the lower, strictly negative threshold in (15).
Figure 1. Opacity and the defection elasticity. Notes: Proportional families, . Verification becomes costlier () while the standard , and hence the posterior downside , is held fixed. Top: density of ; its height at the cutoff is and the shaded area is the blind-accepter share , so . Bottom: against , with unaffected by . (a) Exponential costs (Example 1): falls below and falls. (b) Log-Pareto costs (Example 3, ): rises above and rises. Cutoffs are illustrative.
Corollary 1 (Uniformly proportional transparency). If the family features a uniformly proportional effect of transparency, then and , so
Outside of the proportional case, there is an additional spread effect, which describes the relative bunching or spreading of the cost distribution just left of the marginal buyer induced by the shift in the verification technology . If , then costs rise faster for consumers marginally more attentive than the marginal one and the cost distribution is locally compressed around . Equivalently, the density rises, defection becomes more elastic, and the recommender gains a stronger incentive to persuade marginal buyers to accept the product without verification. If the distribution is locally spread out, which means the recommender becomes able to more cheaply flood the pool with false recommendations.
This effect is fully responsible for the direction of the difference between the recommender’s response to a general transparency shift vs. the comparable proportional shift if the rate of change of costs for the marginal buyer is normalized to be the same in both cases (). To see how this might be useful, take the case of comparing the uniformly proportional cost-reduction (e.g., time-savings, as explained in § 2) to a policy intervention that results in a uniform additive reduction in verification costs, e.g., reducing the payment for a third-party information source, that affects the marginal buyer equally. Since for the additive intervention, it induces a change in the platform’s behavior that is more beneficial to the consumer (though this does not account for the effect of the costs themselves).
More generally, suppose that a policymaker wishes to compare the marginal effect of any two smooth transformations of the cost distribution, parametrized by families and with local cost-growth profiles and respectively.
Corollary 2 (Comparison with proportional transparency). Fix the initial cost distribution and compare a shift with profile to a shift with profile . The former
yields fewer false recommendations if and only if
Examples
We now give a couple of example parametrizations, under the assumption of uniformly proportional families , that illustrate the role of consumer heterogeneity in . We also set throughout so that the sign of the effect of a shift in opacity is the same as that of .
Example 1 (Light-tailed types: opacity lowers standards). Let quality be uniform, , and let verification costs be exponential, on , so that . The defection elasticity is , so . The first-order condition reduces to the cubic
which has a unique root, interior if and only if , with . Note that as , as well: vanishing costs result in no false recommendations.
Example 2 (Pareto tail: knife-edge case). For a Pareto tail with survival on , so that , is constant on the verification region and . Local changes in have no first-order effect through the consumer-side elasticity.
Example 3 (Heavy-tailed types: opacity raises standards). Let bad qualities have a thin tail: on , the density is exponential in with scale , , and it is uniform, , on .5 Let verification costs be log-Pareto, on , so that and, on the verification region , is strictly decreasing in , with ; for nobody verifies and , and Remark 1 shows the optimum never lies there. When the standard is already sufficiently low, the average downside saturates at the tail mean, , while the marginal bad product keeps deteriorating, so is decreasing. Note that for sufficiently low , : vanishing costs lead to maximal false recommendations.
Example 4 (Bimodal types: two groups of consumers). Keep the quality distribution of Example 3. Let a fraction of consumers (“sophisticated”) have exponential costs with mean and the rest (“naive”) exponential costs with mean , so that $1-F_c(x) = p e^{-x/(cs_1)} + (1-p)e^{-x/(cs_2)}$. The family is uniformly proportional, satisfies Assumption 2, and both components are light-tailed. Writing and $w(a)
for the share of sophisticated consumers among blind accepters, the hazard rate is , , and
Since is the variance of group membership among blind accepters, exactly where that pool is tipping from mostly sophisticated to mostly naive: a higher downside drives out the sophisticated, while those who remain are increasingly insensitive to it. With , , and the optimum is unique and lies in this region for , where : as falls from to , falls from to .
Comparison. Both the light- and heavy-tailed examples feature interior thresholds at and , so we can compare the same increase in the verification cost:
| Example 1 () | Example 3 () | |||
| threshold | ||||
| posterior downside | ||||
| false recs | ||||
| response to | /false recs | /false recs |
Table 1.
Note that the same increase in moves the two thresholds in opposite directions. An even starker illustration may be what happens as : in this case, the recommender has very little power to persuade the consumer, as the consumer will verify recommendations unless they are a massive cost-outlier or the recommendation is almost perfect. However, under the fat- and thin-tailed distributions the recommender is pushed to opposite extremes: in Example 1, with thin tails, there are few outliers and persuasion means that false recommendations disappear from the policy. In Example 3, as vanishes, taking advantage of a fat tail becomes magnitudes more important than persuading the marginal consumer, and so the optimal policy in the limit is full exploitation.
Regime switches. With a larger sophisticated share the two-group family lowers standards discontinuously. The objective (4) splits into a persuasion term , which peaks at a shallow standard, and an exploitation term , which peaks at a deep one, so can have two local maxima. With , , and the shallow branch is optimal for and the deep branch for (Figure 2): at the switch the threshold jumps from to , false recommendations rise from to , and consumer welfare falls by 6%.
Figure 2. Regime switch in the two-group example. Optimal threshold. Consumer welfare along each branch. Verification-cost scale (lower = more transparent). Consumer welfare . Persuade branch (shallow standard). Exploit branch (deep standard). Notes: , , , , . Left: optimal threshold against ; solid segments are the global optimum, dashed segments the dominated local optimum, the dotted line the switch at . Right: consumer welfare along each branch. Lower means cheaper verification.
Since on both branches, Proposition 5 does not directly apply to this change; the reversal comes from comparing the two regimes. Once transparency makes the sophisticated consumers verify regardless of the recommendation standard, only the naive consumers remain on the margin. Then the recommender stops maintaining a costly standard it no longer needs.
Value of Transparency for Welfare
For consumers who would choose to verify , transparency also has a more direct positive effect: it directly lowers the disutility of acquiring information. The previous discussion showed that the behavioral effect on the platform of making more cheaply visible could, in some cases, hurt the consumer; we show here that the effect of deteriorating standards can outweigh the consumer’s direct cost-savings.
Let
be expected verification cost per risky recommendation, integrating over the consumers who explore. Let us consider the case in which the safe product yields zero consumption utility, ,6 so that consumer welfare is generated entirely by risky recommendations. Under a threshold such that all consumers either accept or verify the recommendation, ex ante consumer welfare is
For recommended good products, all consumers adopt the risky product, but explorers pay verification costs. For recommended bad products, blind accepters adopt and receive negative value, while explorers pay verification costs and reject.
Define the cost-weighted average growth rate among verifiers to be
a uniformly proportional technology has .
Here, captures the impact of standards on consumer welfare, while is the direct effect. For the net impact on consumer welfare, we combine the direct effect with the effect on , scaled by its impact on welfare.
Proposition 7 (Opacity and consumer welfare). Let and let be the platform’s optimal threshold. Then
Proof. By Lemma 6 and the chain rule.
Whenever standards respond positively to transparency, the two effects lie in the same direction, and transparency yields higher consumer welfare. However, when transparency makes the platform lower standards, the standards effect can dominate. In the economy of Example 3 (, ), the following numerical example demonstrates:
| 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.06 | |
| 0.1792 | 0.1794 | 0.1823 | |
| (threshold held fixed) | 0.1792 | 0.1780 | 0.1769 |
Table 2.
Consumer welfare decreases with decreasing cost at the optimum: the platform’s endogenous lowering of the standard outweighs the effect of cheaper verification.7 By contrast, in the light-tailed economy of Example 1, , so welfare falls monotonically in .
Which Technologies Help Consumers? Outside the uniformly proportional case, Prop. 7 also gives some insight into which technologies are best. Clearly, if is allowed to go to 0, consumers will obtain their first-best welfare, even if false recommendations abound. So, let us consider instead when increasing opacity (a positive FOSD shift in ) is not so bad, or even helpful.
Proposition 8 (Comparison.). Fix the initial cost distribution. A technology with profile leaves consumers better off after a marginal increase in than one with profile does if and only if
Proof. See Appendix B.
For comparable shifts, we can assume that . Note first that both and have a negative effect on consumer welfare, but there is a tension in minimizing both: when costs grow more quickly for lower-cost consumers than high-cost ones ( decreases), then some verifiers must pay more ( must be positive, assuming costs don’t decrease for anyone). A small increase in therefore benefits consumers the most if the increase in costs is sharply concentrated in near-marginal verifiers.
Recommendations without Commitment
In the commitment benchmark, the recommender chooses its policy before it observes quality. In this section, we consider the case when the recommender cannot commit to a policy. The recommender now observes first and then chooses which product to recommend. In equilibrium, consumers correctly anticipate the recommendation policy.
Equilibrium
The difference from the commitment case is that the recommender no longer accounts for how its recommendations affect consumers’ beliefs. Under commitment, a false recommendation raises the downside posterior and leads more consumers to verify, and the recommender weighs this cost when it chooses . Without commitment, the recommender decides at each and takes consumers’ beliefs as given. Therefore, the recommender’s payoff from recommending the risky product depends on only through its sign. A good product is adopted by all consumers, whereas a bad product is adopted only by those who do not verify, however bad it is.
Formally, a strategy for the recommender is a policy as in Section 3, where is now the probability of recommending the risky product after observing .
Consumers’ behavior is unchanged. They form the posterior ; when , a share of them accepts without verifying.
An equilibrium is a policy such that, for every , maximizes the recommender’s expected payoff given consumers’ response to .8
In an equilibrium with , a false recommendation earns , and the safe product earns . The recommender is therefore indifferent between the two when the share of consumers who accept without verifying equals the normalized margin . Intuitively, a false recommendation earns from each consumer in this share, and this must match the that the safe product earns. Since consumers whose cost lies below the posterior downside verify, the indifference condition holds if and only if the posterior downside equals the verification cost of the consumer at quantile . We denote this cost by
It depends on and , but not on the discution .
Lemma 9 (Structure of equilibria). In every equilibrium, consumers never reject, and every good product is recommended. Moreover, either every bad product is recommended (pooling), or
and the recommender earns the truthful profit .
The indifference condition (20) pins down the posterior downside of the pool. However, it does not pin down the composition of the pool. As a result, Lemma 9 allows many equilibria.9 We focus on threshold policies, , which have the same form as the commitment policy. Note that full pooling is the threshold . We write for the posterior downside under full pooling.
From now on, we assume that the safe product is profitable for the recommender, , and that the risky product is worth purchasing on average, . If , a false recommendation is never worse than the safe product, so every bad product is recommended. The second condition ensures that every threshold policy, including full pooling, has a nonnegative posterior mean, so consumers never reject it. Under these two conditions, a threshold equilibrium exists for every .
Proposition 10 (Threshold equilibrium). There is exactly one threshold equilibrium. If , it is full pooling, that is, . Otherwise, its threshold solves .
The proofs for are in Appendix § 11. Proposition 10 says that there are two cases. Suppose that verification is so costly that many consumers accept without verifying even when every product is recommended (when ). Then every false recommendation remains profitable, so verification does not discipline the recommender, and every product is recommended. Otherwise, verification disciplines the recommender exactly up to the point of indifference.
The threshold equilibrium is also the natural one to study. Suppose that a false recommendation carries a small cost that increases with how bad the product is, for example, because worse products generate more complaints, refunds, or legal liability. Such a cost break the recommender’s indifference condition in favor of the mildest bad products and therefore eliminates other equilibria.
Remark 3 (Equilibrium selection). Suppose that a false recommendation of quality costs the recommender , where is continuous and strictly increasing, with . Then, for every , the equilibrium is unique and is a threshold policy. As , it converges to the threshold equilibrium of Proposition 10.
In every non-pooling equilibrium, the recommender earns exactly the truthful profit , whatever and (Lemma 9). As long as more than a share of consumers accept without verifying, a false recommendation is more profitable than the safe product. The recommender therefore adds bad products until the share falls to , at which point each bad product earns whether or not it is recommended. Blind acceptance thus generates no rent for the recommender: the profit it could earn from consumers’ trust is fully dissipated.
Figure 3 illustrates this logic. Under a threshold policy , the recommender’s profit in excess of the truthful profit is
Figure 3. Commitment versus no commitment. Notes: Exponential costs (Example 1) with and . Each curve plots the share of consumers who accept without verifying, , against false recommendations as the threshold varies. The recommender’s profit in excess of the truthful profit equals the area of the rectangle under the curve and above the dashed line . Panel (a), : the commitment optimum (circle) maximizes this area; the no-commitment equilibrium (square) lies at , where the area is zero. Panel (b): a decrease in from to shifts the curve down; the no-commitment equilibrium moves along toward fewer false recommendations. Lower means cheaper verification.
that is, times the area of the rectangle under the curve in panel (a) and above the line . Commitment chooses the point on the curve that maximizes this area. Without commitment, the equilibrium lies where the curve crosses , so the area is zero.
Transparency without commitment
Under commitment, the recommender chooses the location of the marginal verifier. Its response to transparency therefore depends on the density of consumers near that margin. Without commitment, however, the marginal verifier is the consumer at quantile , whose cost rises with at the rate
The response of the equilibrium to thus depends only on how fast the cost of the consumer at quantile grows, a rate that is positive for every technology. Neither nor matters. As a result, the shape of affects the size of the response, but not its sign. Panel (b) of Figure 3 illustrates the consequence: a lower shifts the curve down, and the equilibrium moves along the fixed line toward fewer false recommendations.
Proposition 11 (Transparency without commitment). The threshold and consumer welfare are both nonincreasing in . Moreover, both are strictly decreasing where the threshold equilibrium is not pooling.
Proposition 11 shows that, without commitment, cheaper verification never increases false recommendations and never lowers consumer welfare, whatever the shape of .10 In the fat-tailed case of Example 3, the commitment optimum converges to recommending every product as . Without commitment, however, for any uniformly proportional family. As a result, the threshold equilibrium converges to recommending only good products. Therefore, the perverse effects of transparency identified in § 3 also depend on the recommender’s commitment power.
The value of commitment
Commitment is necessary for the perverse effects of transparency, but it nonetheless benefits both the recommender and consumers. To compare the two benchmarks, let denote the commitment profit and the profit in the threshold equilibrium.
Proposition 12 (Value of commitment). Every commitment optimum satisfies , , and . All three inequalities are strict where the threshold equilibrium is not pooling.
The intuition follows from (21). Commitment lets the recommender stop while the share of non-verifiers still exceeds . Without commitment, by contrast, that share falls to . As a result, the pool under commitment contains fewer bad products, so consumers also gain (Lemma 6). Commitment therefore benefits consumers in levels. However, it is also what makes their welfare respond ambiguously to transparency.
Discussion and Conclusion
Before concluding, we discuss the assumption that recommendations are binary.
General recommendations The restriction to a binary recommendation is motivated by what is observed in practice: products tend to be shown or not shown, or alternatively, recommended or not, but rarely given a complex rating. Indeed, in our main model, we assume that the risky product can only be accepted if it is recommended.
Nevertheless, the question of the optimal flexible recommendation policy is interesting. In contrast to the case of persuading a single consumer with known preferences, when consumers have heterogeneous attention costs, the restriction to binary recommendations is not without loss. When recommendations can involve as many messages as necessary, the form of the optimal policy involves a single non-recommendation message and, in many cases, multiple different recommendation messages. We know that such a policy can perform strictly better than a binary one because it better couples the proportion of accepting consumers () to the proportion of recommendations under a message that are false () than what can be done with a single threshold. Formalizing such a setup is beyond our current scope, but we conjecture that the optimal policy is one in which intervals of positive and negative qualities are paired “assortatively”: recommendation messages admit a ranking in which they pool progressively shrinking intervals of more deeply negative qualities with progressively expanding intervals of milder positive qualities.
Conclusion
This paper studies the content of recommendations issued by a self-interested intermediary when the consumers who receive them can verify quality at a private cost. The recommender is better informed, but may make false recommendations when some consumers are uninformed due to high attention costs. We have shown that an optimal binary recommendation can, perversely, respond negatively to easier verification by the consumer, via a tradeoff somewhat familiar from monopoly pricing: the consumer’s cost may indeed ”pass through negatively” to the recommender. Thus, starkly, recommendation quality may be worst precisely when consumers’ verification capabilities are strongest. Moreover, in some regimes, the effect of deteriorating recommendations can be enough to make consumers worse-off in the presence of better verification technology.
A practical takeaway is that transparency interventions have subtle effects: at the least, estimating their effect on recommendation quality requires knowing the shape of the attention-cost distribution near the verification cutoff, which may be nontrivial. A number of open questions remain. One, as slightly foreshadowed, is whether these results carry over to non-binary recommendation environments. Another interesting direction would be to consider the optimal design of verification technologies explicitly under practical constraints. Finally, our verification technology is stark in that it is perfectly revealing; although we reasonably believe the results carry through under other well-behaved cost and signal structures, this would be useful (and not immediate) to confirm.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. First, consider the case in which . In this case, , and acceptance dominates rejection (but exploration is still possible), for any recommendation policy.
Next, consider the case where . Define to be the unique threshold such that if the platform uses the recommendation policy that recommends the product if and only if , then .
Now consider an arbitrary policy . If , then all types of the consumer either reject the product or explore it. The platform’s payoff is upper-bounded by . The policy that simply recommends the product only when replicates this upper bound, and under it so there is no rejection.
Finally, suppose there is a policy such that and that, conditional on receiving the risky recommendation, the consumer rejects with probability . We show that cannot be optimal.
Because ,
Apart from the measure-zero marginal type, consumers with explore, while consumers with are indifferent between accepting and rejecting. Let
denote the mass of consumers who do not explore. By assumption, a mass of consumers rejects and a mass accepts.
We construct a strictly more profitable policy by discarding a sufficiently small set of particularly bad false recommendations. Under the posterior induced by , there is a positive probability of recommended qualities satisfying
Indeed, the recommended pool has positive probability of , on which , while the posterior average of equals . Hence some recommended negative qualities must have downside strictly greater than .
Choose a measurable set of such qualities whose conditional probability under the risky recommendation is . Let
and define to be identical to , except that the risky product is no longer recommended when . The original policy has total downside . The modified policy therefore has posterior downside
Moreover, because the original posterior mean is zero and the discarded qualities have conditional mean , the posterior mean under the modified policy is
Every consumer who rejected under had verification cost . Under , such a consumer strictly prefers blind acceptance to rejection because , and strictly prefers blind acceptance to exploration because
Thus, every consumer either accepts or verifies the new policy.
We have that , and moreover, the platform now receives from the safe recommendations made on the discarded states, so
Therefore, any policy with under which the consumer rejects with positive probability is strictly dominated; having ruled out all the cases above, we know that any optimal policy induces rejection with probability zero.
Lemma 13 (Derivative of posterior downside). For ,
Proof. We have . Since and ,
Because is an average downside over the pool while is the largest downside included at the margin, in the interior.
Proof of Lem. 4. Differentiating in at fixed gives , so ; since we have and , giving the first expression. For the second, and yield , where we used , itself obtained by differentiating (5) in . Substituting into gives the result.
Proof of Lemma 6 and Proposition 7
Write , where is the total downside of the pool, the frequency of risky recommendations, , and so that and .
Effect of the threshold. Since , we have and . Differentiating in ,
The last two terms equal , because by the definition of . This is the envelope property of the consumer’s exploration cutoff: the consumer at quantile is exactly indifferent between exploring and accepting blindly, so the composition shift in who verifies has no first-order welfare effect. With and ,
Effect of the cost. Differentiating in at fixed , we have and
using . The same cancellation applies: the two terms in cancel against , leaving only the direct increase in verification payments by the consumers who continue to verify,
Combining. Under the regularity condition of Remark 2, is differentiable, and the chain rule gives the decomposition in Proposition 7. Substituting , with given by (14), and multiplying by gives the condition in Proposition 8. If the bracket in (13) is nonnegative, then , so both terms are nonpositive and consumer welfare weakly decreases in . A welfare increase therefore requires a negative bracket together with a standards effect large enough to outweigh the direct effect.
Details for the Examples
Example 1 (light-tailed types)
Quality side. With , , and ,
where the last expression follows from substituting into the definition of . Note for all , so the entire range lies in the acceptance–verification region and .
Consumer side. With we have , so the family is uniformly proportional, and , strictly increasing in , with .
Uniqueness and interiority. The ratio satisfies
so (16) has a unique root and the single-crossing condition of Remark 2 holds. The root is interior () if and only if , that is, . Implicit differentiation of (16) gives
the denominator being positive by the same single-crossing property.
Numerical solutions.
| 0.05 | 0.10 | 0.15 | 0.20 | |
| 0.028 | 0.058 | 0.091 | 0.124 | |
| false recs | 0.133 | 0.203 | 0.263 | 0.319 |
| demand | 0.576 | 0.613 | 0.644 | 0.671 |
Table 3.
Each optimum is verified to dominate the corner policies (demand ) and .
Example 3 (heavy-tailed types)
The bad-side density is on with , so bad products have total mass concentrated within depth of zero; the good side is uniform, on . Verification costs satisfy , so on the region nobody verifies and demand is simply . The optima reported below are verified to lie in the interior verification region .
Quality side. Writing and ,
For beyond a few multiples of the exponential terms vanish: and , strictly decreasing in . The economics: the average downside saturates at the tail mean , while the marginal bad product at depth keeps deteriorating, so the pool’s tolerance for dilution falls as the standard deepens. The posterior mean satisfies for all , so the acceptance–verification region is again the entire range.
Uniqueness. On the verification region the first-order condition is
Because saturates, the left side is nearly flat in (its slope is exponentially small in ), while the right side is strictly decreasing; hence is strictly increasing where it crosses zero, which is the second-order condition for a maximum, and the crossing is unique. Substituting the saturated values gives the approximate closed form reported in the text.
Numerical solutions (, ):
| 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.06 | |
| 0.074 | 0.072 | 0.069 | |
| false recs | 0.499 | 0.497 | 0.491 |
| demand | 0.933 | 0.953 | 0.973 |
Table 4.
Each , so at every optimum, and each solution is verified to be the global maximum (against the corners and against a fine grid over ). The false-recommendation mass falls only slightly because the bad tail is thin beyond depth ; the economically meaningful movement is in the marginal quality admitted.
Proofs for Section 5
Proof of Lemma 9. Fix an equilibrium with .
*Step 1: \mu(\pi)<0. Then consumers who do not verify reject the risky recommendation. Hence a recommended bad product is adopted by nobody, and recommending it yields $0<p_S. Therefore, no bad product is recommended, which implies that , a contradiction. Since , no consumer rejects.
Step 2: good products. Every consumer adopts a recommended good product. Verifiers adopt it because , and the others adopt it blindly. Recommending a good product therefore yields , so for all .
Step 3: bad products. Recommending a bad product yields , which does not depend on . If , then for almost every , so . If , then for almost every . In that case, . However, because is atomless with , a contradiction. Otherwise, , which is (20). Step 4: profit. In a non-pooling equilibrium, the recommender is indifferent at every bad . Hence each bad state yields in expectation, whatever the realized recommendation. Each good state yields . Summing over states gives .
Proof of Proposition 10. Under , the posterior is the prior, so and . The recommender does not deviate at a bad if and only if , that is, .
Next, consider a threshold . It truncates the prior from below, so . By Lemma 9, it is an equilibrium if and only if . Indeed, indifference makes optimal at every . By Lemma 13, is continuous and strictly decreasing on , from to 0. Since , a solution in therefore exists if and only if . When it exists, it is unique.
Finally, if and only if . This is because is nonincreasing and . Moreover, is strictly decreasing to the right of , which lies in the interior of the support. Hence exactly one of the two threshold equilibria exists.
Proof of Remark 3. With the cost , recommending the risky product at yields . This payoff is strictly decreasing in . Good products still yield , and Step 1 of the proof of Lemma 9 applies unchanged. Hence every equilibrium is, up to a null set, a threshold policy. Define
A threshold is an equilibrium if and only if . The threshold is an equilibrium if and only if . Note that is continuous and strictly increasing in , because is nondecreasing and is strictly decreasing in . Moreover, as . Therefore, there is exactly one equilibrium. It is if , and the unique zero of otherwise.
As , uniformly on . Moreover, is strictly increasing near its zero , because lies in the interior of the support. Hence the equilibrium threshold converges to . If , the equilibrium is full pooling for all small .
Proof of Proposition 11. First, suppose that the threshold equilibrium is not pooling. Then , and (11) gives (22). This elasticity is strictly positive because on the interior of the support. Since is strictly decreasing (Lemma 13), it follows that
Next, is nondecreasing in by Assumption 2. Hence the values of with form an upper interval, on which the equilibrium is pooling and . At the lower end of this interval, , so is continuous in . Therefore, is nonincreasing everywhere.
For welfare, the chain rule gives . By Lemma 6, and . Both terms are therefore nonpositive. Moreover, the first term is strictly negative where the equilibrium is not pooling.
Proof of Proposition 12. Suppose first that the threshold equilibrium is not pooling, so that by Lemma 9. As , and . Moreover, for every . By (21), it follows that for close to zero, so . Since , (21) implies that , so that . Because is nonincreasing, . Because is strictly decreasing, .
Suppose instead that the threshold equilibrium is pooling. Then . Moreover, , because full pooling is feasible under commitment.
In both cases, , because is strictly increasing (Lemma 6). The inequality is strict when .
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