betaFeedback

WorksComputer Science

Gradient-Based Defensive Poisoning Against System Identification Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems

Abstract

AI-driven attacks learn the models of cyber-physical systems (CPS) by passively observing controller and plant signals, then use this knowledge to act covertly. Because covertness depends on the accuracy of the identified model, degrading that accuracy is a viable countermeasure. This work applies Adversarial Machine Learning as a defense, injecting small perturbations into the measurements the attacker observes to degrade an artificial neural network (ANN)-based system identification (SI) attack. The perturbations are derived from input gradients of several independently trained identification models, aggregated into a generalized perturbation, and confined to the transient regimes that carry most of the dynamic information. A sparsity parameter further restricts them to the most influential samples, with negligible cost in effectiveness. On a simulated DC motor networked control system, the proposed perturbations induce larger prediction errors than stochastic poisoning of equal root-mean-square magnitude, and the advantage widens as the magnitude grows. This limits the defense's operating range, which is intended for decoy environments such as CPS honeynets. Additional results indicate that the designed poisoning signals can also degrade N4SID-based system identification, providing evidence of their transferability beyond the ANN-based models originally targeted.

Paper details

vlnc:W_ychfd5w8
Version
v1 · latest
Published
Fresh — added to the Hub within the last 30 days
Added
License
arXiv nonexclusive license
Usage

views · 6

downloads · 0

A view counts once per browser per day, a download each time the PDF is requested.

  • Computer Science

Not recorded for this paper

View statement
Looking for related papers…