WorksComputer Science
Example-Based Spatial Guidance for Training-Free Concept Erasure in Diffusion Models
Abstract
Text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models often synthesize policy-violating content, necessitating robust safeguards and rigorous evaluation frameworks. However, current approaches remain largely monolithic in both execution and evaluation, limited to coarse-grained categorization within broad unsafe concepts. Such approaches fail to account for the specific constituent factors of a violation, resulting in weak learning signals and allowing model collapse to bypass safety checks. To overcome these limitations, we propose Example-Based Spatial Guidance (EBSG), a training-free method that utilizes user-editable exemplar packs to provide granular spatial guidance for precise concept steering. Unlike existing methods that coarsely steer the entire image away from a broad concept, EBSG decomposes these categories into specific sub-concepts via exemplar text-image pairs, providing explicit, localized steering signals for more robust safety control. Furthermore, we introduce a vision language model (VLM)-based evaluation protocol that provides a fine-grained assessment, avoiding the pitfall of conventional binary evaluators that permit model collapse to bypass safety checks. Empirically, EBSG achieves state-of-the-art erasure performance across diverse safety datasets and concept categories, spanning four nudity benchmarks, seven I2P harmful-concept slices, and four MJA metaphor categories, while supporting multi-concept removal and transferring to a modern backbone, SD3.
Content Warning. This paper discusses techniques for suppressing unsafe content in generative models. Censored examples appear solely for research evaluation; all sensitive regions are masked.

Figure 1. Outputs of several concept-erasure methods on prompts targeting nudity (top) and shocking content (bottom). Border colors denote rubric labels: red = FULL, yellow = PARTIAL, purple = NOT RELEVANT, and green = SAFE.
Introduction
Recent advances in text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models [26, 24] have enabled the effortless generation of photorealistic imagery from natural language. However, these developments also facilitate the synthesis of unsafe content, such as nudity, violence, hate imagery, and drug paraphernalia, which violates deployment policies and causes real-world harm [25, 28, 22]. To mitigate these risks, a growing body of research has focused on developing safety mechanisms to prevent such generation. The core philosophy shared across these efforts is to effectively suppress the generation of unsafe content while minimizing any adverse impact on the model’s overall generative performance [7].
Existing safeguards generally fall into two paradigms: training-based methods that modify model weights [7, 8, 15, 9] and training-free methods that steer the generation process [28, 2, 32]. However, the fundamental limitation is that both rely on coarse-grained representations, collapsing multifaceted safety criteria into a monolithic textual embedding of the target concept. For instance, while determining “sexual content” requires a composite evaluation of attributes, such as “naked body”, “sexual acts”, and “suggestive poses”, along with their spatial regions; reducing this complexity to a single representation inevitably creates a significant information bottleneck.
At the core of this issue lies a systemic tendency to treat safety as a reductive binary question, i.e., “is the image harmful?”, as reflected in evaluative classifiers such as NudeNet [21] and Q16 [27]. Such binary scoring fails to specify why, where, and to what extent a generation is problematic; in the extreme, a model that collapses into uninformative noise might technically satisfy binary criteria while utterly lacking practical utility. Our core insight is twofold: (i) detailed feedback enables targeted improvements that achieve more precise and higher-quality semantic-preserving concept erasure; (ii) we argue that such granular feedback must be integrated into current evaluation protocols to move beyond simplistic binary assessments.
Our key contributions are:
(§ 3) To address (i), we propose Example-Based Spatial Guidance (EBSG), a novel training-free and example-based framework. Unlike existing methods relying on globally suppressed guidance, EBSG incorporates a family-indexed exemplar pack for enhanced steering; this pack provides unsafe keywords, visual examples, and safe counterparts for each sub-concept family within the CLIP [23] embedding space (cf. Concept Pack panel in Figure 2).
Figure 2. Overview of EBSG. A concept pack groups paired target/anchor keyword–image exemplars into disjoint families for a target concept . At each denoising step , EBSG first evaluates a concept-alignment gate (When, § 3.3). Only after the gate is triggered, EBSG proceeds at subsequent denoising steps to localize family-specific regions using a per-family dual text/image cross-attention probe resolved by pixel-wise winner-take-all (Where, § 3.4), and applies a mask-gated hybrid target→anchor redirection (How, § 3.5).
(§ 3.2–§ 3.6) Consequently, rather than coarsely steering the entire image away from a broad concept, our method provides fine-grained guidance by dynamically detecting when (the denoising step) the generation leans toward the broad concept (e.g., “sexual content”; cf. When panel in Figure 2) and where (spatial regions) it aligns with a specific sub-concept (e.g., “naked body” or “sexual acts”), thereby resolving the information bottleneck problem. The resulting family assignment determines how each region is redirected toward its paired safe anchor.
(§ 3.7) To address (ii), we introduce the VLM-Based Evaluation Protocol, which shifts the focus from binary classification to granular attribute detection. By leveraging the superior reasoning and natural language understanding of modern vision-language models (VLMs), it employs a four-way classification (SAFE, PARTIAL, FULL, NOTRELEVANT) to provide a comprehensive evaluation of whether concept erasure is truly semantic-preserving.
(§4) Our comprehensive experiments, across four nudity benchmarks, seven harmful I2P concepts, and four MPA metaphor-based categories, show that EBSG substantially outperforms every training-free baseline. Furthermore, it matches the performance of training-based methods without requiring fine-tuning, extends naturally to simultaneous multi-concept removal, and generalizes to SD3 without algorithmic modifications. EBSG achieves strong erasure performance through lightweight exemplar-pack construction without model training. For example, even coarse label-only and LLM-minimal packs remain effective with minimal curation, indicating that EBSG need not rely on elaborate pack design (Appendix § 20.§ 1).
Related Work
Training or closed-form editing for safety. The most straightforward strategy to ensure safety is to update the pre-trained T2I model through gradient fine-tuning or closed-form editing. Representative methods include negative-guidance fine-tuning [7], safe self-distillation [15], and closed-form concept editing [8, 9]. A closely related recent work, SDErasure [20], identifies concept-specific denoising timesteps for fine-tuning based on a diffusion-classifier score derived from target and anchor noise-prediction errors. Inspired by this timestep-awareness, our work achieves timestep selectivity without parameter updates, using guidance geometry to adaptively decide when it is applied during sampling.
Training-free safeguards. Directly modifying the pre-trained T2I model weights may unintentionally impair existing functions. Consequently, several training-free approaches have emerged that preserve the original weights and focus on steering the generation. SLD [28] and SEGA [2] adapt classifier-free guidance to incorporate safety constraints. SAFREE [32] detoxifies harmful tokens by projecting them orthogonally to a toxic subspace. Safe Denoiser [13] derives a safer sampling trajectory through a negation-set formulation. SGF [14] generalizes negative guidance through a safety-guided flow objective, which can be stacked on top of SAFREE to serve as a compound baseline. Appendix F further discusses how EBSG differs from cross-attention editing and region-level safe-generation methods.
Evaluating safeguards. Several benchmarks have been established to evaluate T2I safeguards across varying levels of complexity. Ring-A-Bell [30], UnlearnDiff [37], and MMA-Diffusion [31] target nudity generation through the use of progressively implicit phrasing, while P4D-N [5] incorporates automated prompt optimization to bypass existing defenses. MJA [33] constructs metaphorical prompts that circumvent filters while still eliciting recognizable harmful patterns. For evaluation, safety benchmarks typically rely on automated classifiers, ranging from concept-specific models like NudeNet [21] to CLIP-based textual concept classifiers such as Q16 [27].
Method
Preliminaries
Classifier-free guidance in diffusion models. T2I diffusion models generate images by reversing a forward process that incrementally adds Gaussian noise to an image [29]. A denoiser is trained to predict the noise in latent at timestep given text prompt , where denotes the unconditional case using a null token . Classifier-free guidance [12] operates by sampling from a linear combination of the unconditional and conditional noise predictions, using the guidance scale to control the conditioning signal:
Safety mechanisms such as safe latent diffusion [28] extend this formulation to steer the generation away from harmful concepts. By defining a negative conditioning signal representing unsafe content, an additional safety guidance term is subtracted from the noise estimate:
where yields an element-wise scaling that triggers only when the denoising momentum aligns with the unsafe concept. However, by condensing a diverse spectrum of harms into a single, global negative embedding, this approach facilitates indiscriminate global suppression rather than targeted intervention, inevitably distorting safe visual features. Since the guidance direction is derived from such a highly composite signal, it lacks the semantic granularity required for precise removal; weak guidance is insufficient to neutralize the unsafe concept, while aggressive steering over-corrects the latent space, suppressing benign features and leading to a degradation in visual fidelity.
Pitfalls of safety evaluation. Such reliance on a single broad, compressed negative concept is inherently tied to limitations in current evaluation practices. Standard assessments typically rely on binary classifiers (e.g., NudeNet [21], Q16 [27]) which operate on a single unsafe decision boundary. These tools are designed to detect the presence of harm but are largely indifferent to the preservation of semantic utility or aesthetic quality. Indeed, our empirical analysis in Appendix § 22.§ 4.2 reveals a critical blind spot in this practice where these classifiers frequently misinterpret non-semantic noise resulting from generative collapse as safe. While steering in the direction opposite to a broad unsafe signal aligns with the binary logic of current evaluation protocols, it remains questionable whether such a strategy effectively serves the ultimate goal of semantic-preserving concept erasure.
Motivation: beyond global suppression. Our previous arguments suggest that safeguards must evolve beyond blunt steering away from broad unsafe regions toward fine-grained, context-aware intervention. Most existing steering mechanisms lack situational awareness; they typically operate on a globally suppressed signal with little informational resolution regarding the specific nature (what), the spatial location (where), or the optimal degree of correction (how much) required for a given violation. Lacking this granularity, these systems are forced to apply an undifferentiated penalty across the entire latent trajectory, inevitably compromising benign features. We argue that there is substantial room for improvement by shifting toward steering mechanisms that leverage informative and localized signals, enabling a transition from indiscriminate suppression to targeted intervention that preserves the generative integrity of the original prompt.
Family-indexed exemplar pack
Unsafe concepts are not monolithic; they encompass a diverse array of sub-concepts. For instance, “sexual content” can be decomposed into nudity, explicit acts, or suggestive poses, while “violent content” spans distinct facets such as blood, brutal actions, or weaponry. Suppressing this broad spectrum into a single signal is inherently reductive and lacks the granularity required for precise intervention. In this context, we construct a family-indexed exemplar pack that organizes each broad unsafe concept into distinct families, with each family comprising entries1:
where and denote the CLIP [23] embeddings of target keywords and image exemplars (e.g., “naked body” and its corresponding image), while denotes the CLIP embeddings of anchor keywords (e.g., “clothed person”) for the entry in the family. By decomposing the representation of harm into these granular sub-families, our framework can provide steering signals tailored to specific violations. For each family, we compute centroids in the embedding space:
Since the entries within a family share a core semantic meaning despite differing in phrasing, averaging their embeddings marginalizes phrasing-specific details while reinforcing the shared semantic signal, which is particularly advantageous for family-level steering. Crucially, we distinguish the requirements for detection from those for intervention. While a concept-level aggregate may suffice for coarse detection (cf. § 3.3), we restrict pooling to the family level for the steering signal itself (cf. § 3.5). Since different families possess distinct visual signatures (e.g., blood vs. weaponry), global pooling at the concept level would muddy the directional signal and compromise the precision of the steering. Representative per-family examples are provided in Appendix § 16.§ 1.
When to intervene: concept-level alignment score
To determine whether an intervention is necessary at each denoising timestep , we introduce the Concept-level Alignment Score (CAS) as a diagnostic metric. CAS evaluates the alignment between the model’s current denoising trajectory for a given prompt and a specific harmful concept :
where , , and is the representative embedding for , obtained by averaging the embeddings of the concept-level detection keywords (see Appendix § 16.§ 1 for details). Guidance is triggered only when ; once CAS surpasses at a specific timestep , we latch the activation for all to ensure temporal stability.
Remark. We deliberately employ a concept-level representative for this diagnostic phase to ensure robust detection. While steering necessitates family-level granularity to avoid over-correction, the detection of a potential violation is better served by a comprehensive concept-level aggregate that captures the overarching semantics of the harm. It ensures high sensitivity to the emergence of a harmful concept without being prematurely constrained by the nuances of any single sub-family.
Where to intervene: family-level spatial mask
Once the CAS triggers an intervention for a concept , the next step is to localize the target families within the latent grid. We define a Family-level Spatial Mask (FSM) to identify which pixels (latent-grid locations) correspond to a specific family . To achieve robust localization under target keywords and image exemplars, we employ a dual-probe mechanism followed by winner-take-all partition.
For each family under concept , we extract a cross-attention map where the keys and values correspond to textual embeddings and queries correspond to the intermediate spatial features of the latent grid (e.g., the grid of U-Net). For a query at spatial location , the attention score is aggregated across all target keywords using a token-wise maximum and averaged over attention heads and layers to produce . Although it is already normalized, we further apply a sigmoid-based soft thresholding function to obtain a sharpened text-probe mask:
where a steepness and threshold suppress low-confidence background noise and enhance the contrast of the mask. Notably, to further detect unsafe concepts that evade textual detection (e.g., metaphorical prompts), an analogous procedure is used to compute an image-probe mask by overwriting the conditioning tokens with visual family centroids .
To resolve spatial overlaps across families and ensure semantic specificity, we union the two modalities within each family, i.e., , and then apply a pixel-wise winner-take-all partition:
The resulting partition is pixel-wise disjoint, ensuring that each active latent location is assigned exclusively to the most relevant family. We adopt WTA as a simple choice for combining family-specific guidance. A comparison with an alternative confidence-weighted soft fusion rule is provided in Appendix § 20.§ 3.
Remark. The dual-probe mechanism addresses two distinct failure modes: (1) Text-based (explicit) erasing applies when adversarial prompts carry identifiable unsafe terms (e.g., “naked” or “blood”); here, the text-probe dominates. (2) Image-based (implicit) erasing applies when metaphor evades unsafe keywords (e.g., “a dark exchange in an alley” to induce a drug deal scene) but the generation still produces recognizable unsafe visual patterns; here, the image-probe dominates. Since we union both masks, the system remains robust across the entire spectrum of textual and visual violations.
How to intervene: example-based spatial guidance
Example-Based Spatial Guidance (EBSG) refines the noise estimate for a given prompt by steering the latent away from harmful concepts and toward safe alternatives within a specific spatial context. The semantic directions for harmful and safe concepts are computed at the family level:
The modified noise estimate is then formulated with the guidance scale and the mask :
Remark. Two key distinctions of EBSG deserve attention (cf. Equations (2) and (9)). First, the steering for each pixel is conducted at the family level rather than being applied to a broad, monolithic unsafe concept . Second, the latent representation is not merely repelled from a negative concept but is actively steered toward a specific safe alternative. These two features are intrinsically linked: while assigning a single safe alternative to a broad category risks excessive uniformity, leveraging granular alternatives at the family level enables a much more precise and viable guidance strategy.
EBSG in practice
Extension to multi-concept erasure. EBSG naturally extends to the simultaneous erasure of multiple distinct concepts. Specifically, we first identify the set of active concept-family pairs at timestep as , where is the per-concept threshold. We then define the partitioned mask by assigning each pixel to the single pair:
The final safe noise estimate is derived by aggregating across all active concept-family pairs:
Construction of exemplar pack. Central to the EBSG framework is the exemplar pack, which encapsulates all concept-specific artifacts required for intervention. This design grants users the flexibility to dynamically add or remove entities within the pack to suit specific safety requirements. Notably, since CLIP embeddings for each entity are pre-computed only once and involve negligible memory overhead, EBSG remains highly efficient for real-world deployments.
The role of image exemplars. Image exemplars in the pack serve an auxiliary role, supplementing text-based detection rather than acting as direct steering signals. By simply defaulting the image-probe mask to zero, the framework is robust even without example images, minimizing the practical burden of collecting images for every entity. Indeed, our empirical evaluation confirms that even in a text-only configuration, EBSG substantially outperforms existing baselines.
VLM-based evaluation protocol
Moving beyond a methodological contribution, we propose the VLM-Based Evaluation Protocol to address systemic limitations in current assessment frameworks. Unlike traditional binary classifiers [21, 27], our protocol harnesses the advanced reasoning capabilities of modern VLMs, specifically Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct [1], to categorize images into {SAFE, PARTIAL, FULL, NOTRELEVANT}. It addresses critical shortcomings in existing metrics; the NOTRELEVANT identifies instances of generative collapse, a failure mode that often evades previous safety metrics, while the PARTIAL prevents the overly punitive assessments common in previous systems. Accordingly, we adopt this VLM-based protocol as the primary metric for all results reported in the main text.
While a comprehensive discussion, including prompt templates, human evaluation, and comparative study for legacy metrics (e.g., NudeNet, Q16), is available in Appendix § 22, we present key results here demonstrating that Qwen3-VL-8B serves as a human-aligned proxy for safety judgment. Table 1 summarizes the agreement between Qwen3-VL-8B and 1,662 human annotations; these annotations were collected from 20 human participants who evaluated 400 items across 8 distinct concepts using four choices: {SAFE, PARTIAL, FULL, NOTRELEVANT}. Unlike legacy detectors that are restricted to coarse binary outputs and cannot handle such fine-grained rubrics, Qwen3-VL-8B demonstrates a unique capacity to align with complex human safety judgments.
| Concept | Agree (%) | |
| sexual | 43 | 93.0 |
| violence | 40 | 90.0 |
| self-harm | 39 | 82.1 |
| shocking | 42 | 76.2 |
| illegal | 43 | 88.4 |
| harassment | 40 | 70.0 |
| hate | 42 | 78.6 |
| disturbing | 39 | 82.1 |
| - | 328 | 82.6 |
Table 1. Human agreement.
Experiments
We evaluate EBSG along three axes: nudity erasure on four adversarial benchmarks (§ 4.1); generalization to broader harmful concepts under both single-concept and simultaneous multi-concept removal (§ 4.2); and ablations together with cross-backbone transfer to Stable Diffusion 3 (SD3), with additional FLUX.1-dev results deferred to Appendix § 19. Headline tables appear in the main body; full per-class breakdowns, per-concept cross-backbone numbers, and the wall-clock vs. SR Pareto curves are deferred to the Appendix.
Our primary T2I backbone is Stable Diffusion v1.4 [SD v1.4; [26]] ( resolution, 50 DDIM steps, ). Images are generated with deterministic per-prompt seeds under the reported settings. For cross-backbone validation, we also evaluate SD3 (MM-DiT) using its default flow matching configurations (cf. Appendix § 16.§ 3). Safety is assessed by Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct [1] using a four-class rubric {SAFE, PARTIAL, FULL, NOTRELEVANT}, yielding Safety Rate (SR) as (SAFE + PARTIAL)/Total and Not-relevant Rate (NR) as NOTRELEVANT/Total.
We compare our proposed EBSG approach against weight-modifying methods via iterative fine-tuning (ESD [7], SDD [15]) or closed-form editing (UCE [8], RECE [9]), as well as training-free approaches (SLD [28], SAFREE [32]) and compound stacks (Safe Denoiser [13], SGF [14]). Additional I2P comparisons with recent methods, including Co-Erasing [16], TRCE [3], CASTeer [6], and Double Projections [34], are reported in Appendix § 20.§ 9.
Main results: nudity erasure
Table 2 summarizes the nudity benchmark results for UnlearnDiff [37], Ring-A-Bell [30], MMA-Diffusion [31], and P4DN [5]. For unsafe prompts, higher ‘SR’ and lower ‘NR’ for ‘F’ indicate effective safety enforcement, while lower ‘NR’ ensures the generation avoids semantic collapse (e.g., no recognizable person remains in nudity erasure). For generic prompts from COCO [17], lower ‘FID’ (with baseline SD v1.4 as the reference) and higher ‘CLIP’ scores demonstrate the preservation of overall image quality. Among training-free methods, our proposed EBSG achieves state-of-the-art performance across all evaluated benchmarks. Most notably, it successfully circumvents semantic collapse, registering the lowest NR for unsafe prompts alongside the lowest FID for generic prompts.
| Method | UnlearnDiff (n=142) SR↑ | UnlearnDiff (n=142) F↓ | UnlearnDiff (n=142) NR↓ | Ring-A-Bell (n=79) SR↑ | Ring-A-Bell (n=79) F↓ | Ring-A-Bell (n=79) NR↓ | MMA-Diffusion (n=1000) SR↑ | MMA-Diffusion (n=1000) F↓ | MMA-Diffusion (n=1000) NR↓ | P4DN (n=151) SR↑ | P4DN (n=151) F↓ | P4DN (n=151) NR↓ | COCO FID↓ | COCO CLIP↑ |
| Baseline (SD v1.4) | 64.1 | 33.1 | 2.8 | 45.6 | 50.6 | 3.8 | 35.9 | 63.8 | 0.3 | 25.2 | 74.2 | 0.7 | – | 0.268 |
| Training-based: weights updated via gradient fine-tuning or closed-form weight edit | ||||||||||||||
| ESD [7] (FT) | 85.9 | 9.2 | 4.9 | 78.5 | 13.9 | 7.6 | 71.1 | 23.9 | 5.0 | 64.9 | 31.1 | 4.0 | 4.91 | 0.260 |
| SDD [15] (FT) | 90.8 | 4.2 | 4.9 | 88.6 | 7.6 | 3.8 | 81.3 | 16.4 | 2.3 | 72.2 | 24.5 | 3.3 | 4.73 | 0.261 |
| UCE [8] (WE) | 82.4 | 16.2 | 1.4 | 46.8 | 49.4 | 3.8 | 34.5 | 65.1 | 0.4 | 33.8 | 65.6 | 0.7 | 11.45 | 0.269 |
| RECE [9] (WE) | 90.1 | 1.4 | 8.5 | 54.4 | 0.0 | 45.6 | 79.4 | 16.4 | 4.2 | 70.2 | 1.3 | 28.5 | 10.33 | 0.255 |
| Training-free: no weight update, inference-time only | ||||||||||||||
| SLD-Weak [28] | 66.2 | 31.0 | 2.8 | 21.5 | 73.4 | 5.1 | 26.4 | 73.0 | 0.6 | 25.2 | 74.2 | 0.7 | 11.09 | 0.264 |
| SLD-Medium [28] | 78.9 | 16.9 | 4.2 | 35.4 | 60.8 | 3.8 | 32.4 | 66.9 | 0.7 | 32.5 | 66.9 | 0.7 | 12.26 | 0.260 |
| SLD-Strong [28] | 87.3 | 8.5 | 4.2 | 49.4 | 45.6 | 5.1 | 41.9 | 57.2 | 0.9 | 58.9 | 40.4 | 0.7 | 14.56 | 0.252 |
| SLD-Max [28] | 87.3 | 6.3 | 6.3 | 57.0 | 31.6 | 11.4 | 49.0 | 46.1 | 4.9 | 67.5 | 25.8 | 6.6 | 18.46 | 0.244 |
| SAFREE [32] | 87.3 | 4.9 | 7.7 | 83.5 | 11.4 | 5.1 | 75.4 | 20.2 | 4.4 | 70.9 | 21.2 | 7.9 | 8.96 | 0.264 |
| + Safe Denoiser [13] | 90.1 | 4.2 | 5.6 | 81.0 | 12.7 | 6.3 | 73.5 | 23.7 | 2.8 | 70.9 | 24.5 | 4.6 | 7.44 | 0.264 |
| + SGF [14] | 92.3 | 2.8 | 4.9 | 84.8 | 7.6 | 7.6 | 77.6 | 18.6 | 3.8 | 70.2 | 25.8 | 4.0 | 7.83 | 0.259 |
| EBSG (ours) | 97.2 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 96.2 | 2.5 | 1.3 | 84.2 | 15.4 | 0.4 | 97.4 | 2.6 | 0.0 | 6.31 | 0.263 |
Table 2. Nudity erasure (SR↑, F↓, NR↓) and generic fidelity (FID↓, CLIP↑) for SD v1.4. Training-based methods are grayed for reference; the comparison focuses on training-free methods. Bold: best training-free result for SR, F, and NR. Detailed per-class (SAFE/PARTIAL) breakdowns and legacy benchmark results (NudeNet, Q16) are available in Appendix Table 11 and Appendix § 22.4.4, respectively.
Generalization to broader harmful concepts
Table 3 summarizes the safety evaluation results across the top-60 Q16-toxicity prompts for each I2P [28] concept. Under single-concept erasure, our proposed EBSG achieves the highest SR on every concept. It is worth noting that the most significant gains over SAFREE occur in the harassment and hate categories. As we discussed in § 3.4, this is precisely the regime where our image probe effectively degrades against implicit harms.
| Method | sexual | violence | self-harm | shocking | illegal | harass | hate | Avg |
| Baseline (SD v1.4) | 68.3 | 36.7 | 43.3 | 15.0 | 31.7 | 25.0 | 25.0 | 35.0 |
| Single-concept erasure: one concept-specific model per row | ||||||||
| UCE | 60.0 | 36.7 | 43.3 | 20.0 | 28.3 | 23.3 | 25.0 | 33.8 |
| RECE | 61.7 | 65.0 | 38.3 | 26.7 | 13.3 | 30.0 | 28.3 | 37.6 |
| SLD-Max | 86.7 | 68.3 | 5.0 | 26.7 | 41.7 | 18.3 | 30.0 | 39.5 |
| SAFREE | 83.3 | 73.3 | 36.7 | 81.7 | 35.0 | 28.3 | 43.3 | 54.5 |
| + Safe Denoiser | 90.0 | 83.3 | 38.3 | 78.3 | 38.3 | 31.7 | 43.3 | 57.6 |
| + SGF | 88.3 | 61.7 | 38.3 | 70.0 | 31.7 | 15.0 | 41.7 | 49.5 |
| EBSG (ours) | 98.3 | 88.3 | 58.3 | 93.3 | 46.7 | 63.3 | 66.7 | 73.6 |
| Multi-concept erasure: one model erases all seven concepts simultaneously | ||||||||
| UCE | 80.0 | 53.3 | 33.3 | 18.3 | 25.0 | 16.7 | 20.0 | 35.2 |
| RECE | 53.3 | 43.3 | 21.7 | 36.7 | 21.7 | 10.0 | 16.7 | 29.1 |
| SLD-Max | 78.3 | 61.7 | 23.3 | 43.3 | 40.0 | 36.7 | 26.7 | 44.3 |
| SAFREE | 85.0 | 48.3 | 36.7 | 25.0 | 40.0 | 33.3 | 25.0 | 41.9 |
| + Safe Denoiser | 85.0 | 53.3 | 38.3 | 45.0 | 50.0 | 38.3 | 40.0 | 50.0 |
| + SGF | 86.7 | 56.7 | 45.0 | 36.7 | 31.7 | 26.7 | 48.3 | 47.4 |
| EBSG (ours) | 88.3 | 85.0 | 66.7 | 88.3 | 65.0 | 60.0 | 58.3 | 73.1 |
Table 3. I2P harmful-concept erasure (SR↑) for SD v1.4. Single-concept erasure evaluates separate models for each concept, while multi-concept erasure uses a single model to erase all seven concepts simultaneously. Bold: per-column best. Detailed SR/FULL/NOTREL breakdowns are available in Appendix Tables 12 (single-concept) and 13 (multi-concept).
EBSG consistently retains its safety under simultaneous multi-concept erasure. Erasing all seven concepts simultaneously yields a negligible drop in average SR (73.6 73.1), whereas SAFREE drops sharply (54.5 41.9), largely due to semantic collapse (cf. NR metric in Appendix Table 13).
By maintaining coherence at scale via our cross-concept winner-take-all partition, presented in § 3.6, our method effectively neutralizes compound triggers with negligible safety penalties. Specifically, jointly erasing semantically adjacent concepts may catch off-axis components that single-concept packs would otherwise miss (e.g., suppressing self-harm content embedded in a violent scene).
Ablation on CAS and FSM. We further investigate (1) the necessity of CAS for temporal intervention and (2) the complementary nature of text and image probes. Table 4 presents a comparative analysis across I2P concepts by deactivating individual components. Specifically, the w/o CAS (when) variant demonstrates that indiscriminate steering at every timestep leads to over-intervention, which degrades image fidelity as evidenced by lower CLIP scores. Furthermore, a distinct modality-specific trade-off is observed: while the w/o image-probe configuration struggles with metaphorical concepts (e.g., self-harm, hate) that lack explicit harmful keywords, the w/o text-probe underperforms on lexically explicit categories (e.g., illegal acts, harassment) where visual cues alone are insufficient for robust detection. Notably, even these single-probe configurations outperform the strongest baseline, achieving average SR scores of 65.0% and 65.7%, respectively, compared to the baseline’s 57.6% (cf. Table 3). Ultimately, integrating these components yields a synergistic effect, allowing our proposed EBSG to satisfy both safety and image fidelity requirements.
| Method | sexual | violence | self-harm | shocking | illegal | harass | hate | Avg | CLIP |
| EBSG (ours) | 98.3 | 88.3 | 58.3 | 93.3 | 46.7 | 63.3 | 66.7 | 73.6 | 0.255 |
| w/o CAS (when) | 98.3 | 78.3 | 50.0 | 63.3 | 51.7 | 50.0 | 55.0 | 63.8 | 0.240 |
| w/o text-probe in FSM (where) | 96.7 | 86.7 | 50.0 | 88.3 | 31.7 | 40.0 | 66.7 | 65.7 | 0.255 |
| w/o image-probe in FSM (where) | 98.3 | 71.7 | 35.0 | 85.0 | 45.0 | 65.0 | 55.0 | 65.0 | 0.258 |
Table 4. Ablation of the CAS and FSM modules on I2P harmful-concept erasure (SR↑) for SD v1.4. Bold: per-column best.
Family-level vs. concept-level steering. To validate the necessity of family-level steering, we perform an additional ablation study. We compare our approach against a concept-level pooling baseline, where entities within the exemplar pack are averaged across all families to form global concept-level embeddings. Table 5 shows that family-level steering is essential, yielding a +6.0%p increase in average SR over the concept-level baseline. This gain is attributed to the preservation of sub-concept structures, which simple pooling would otherwise collapse into a single, compressed global signal that fails to provide the granularity required for effective safety steering. The per-concept breakdown is reported in Appendix § 18.§ 2.
| Method | sexual | violence | self-harm | shocking | illegal | harass | hate | Avg |
| EBSG (ours; family-level) | 98.3 | 88.3 | 58.3 | 93.3 | 46.7 | 63.3 | 66.7 | 73.6 |
| EBSG w/ concept-level pooling | 98.3 | 85.0 | 46.7 | 91.7 | 36.7 | 56.7 | 58.3 | 67.6 |
| +0.0 | +3.3 | +11.6 | +1.6 | +10.0 | +6.6 | +8.4 | +6.0 |
Table 5. Ablation of family-level versus concept-level steering on I2P harmful-concept erasure () for SD v1.4. Bold: per-column best.
Cross-architecture transferability. We further validate the generalizability of the proposed EBSG by applying it to the SD3 model, confirming its effectiveness on modern architectures. Despite the structural disparities between backbones, the underlying conceptual framework remains identical, necessitating only minimal implementation adjustments. Specifically, only the probe mask extraction is re-implemented to suit the respective architecture: we utilize the cross-attention maps in the SD v1.4 UNet and the joint-attention sub-matrix in the SD3 MM-DiT. Additional FLUX.1-dev results are provided in Appendix § 19.
| Method | MJA | I2P |
| Baseline (SD3) | 26.0 | 41.2 |
| UCE | 30.5 | 48.6 |
| RECE | 37.8 | 51.0 |
| SAFREE | 32.8 | 47.9 |
| + Safe Denoiser | 36.8 | 43.1 |
| + SGF | 31.0 | 45.0 |
| EBSG (ours) | 51.0 | 65.0 |
Table 6. SD3 results.
Run-time analysis. Figure 4 summarizes the SR score relative to per-image inference cost, measured on an NVIDIA RTX 3090 (see Appendix § 18.§ 3 for full results). Notably, the family-level signal provided by our EBSG method is sufficiently informative that EBSG with only 10 DDIM steps matches or exceeds the performance of all inference-time baselines using 50 steps, while achieving a – speedup. This demonstrates that our signal is significantly more informative than conventional concept-level signals, thereby enabling more fine-grained steering. Appendix § 18.§ 3 additionally compares a low-latency EBSG configuration against several recent methods, demonstrating competitive SR performance at comparable sampling latency.
Figure 4. SR-Latency.
Conclusion
We introduced Example-Based Spatial Guidance (EBSG), a novel training-free, example-based approach for effective semantic-preserving concept erasure. Unlike traditional methods that rely on coarse steering signals, EBSG provides fine-grained steering across diverse sub-concepts to ensure high semantic fidelity. To ensure a rigorous assessment, we also proposed a VLM-based evaluation protocol that addresses the pitfalls of existing metrics, providing a more reliable measure of safety. Our comprehensive experiments demonstrate that EBSG not only outperforms existing baselines but also exhibits seamless scalability to billion-scale models like SD3. Furthermore, the user-editable nature of EBSG offers significant practical utility, allowing for on-the-fly adaptations to meet evolving user needs and safety requirements in real-world deployments.
Limitations and Future Work. Although minimally constructed exemplar packs and a shared configuration reduce the adaptation burden, EBSG still requires some exemplar-pack construction and calibration when targeting new concepts. Future work will therefore explore automatic pack construction and parameter selection to further reduce this effort.
Acknowledgments
This work was partly supported by the Institute of Information & Communications Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) grants funded by the Korea government (MSIT) (RS-2019-II190075, Artificial Intelligence Graduate School Program (KAIST); RS-2022-II220184, Development and Study of AI Technologies to Inexpensively Conform to Evolving Policy on Ethics), and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) grant funded by the Korea government (MSIT) (RS-2022-NR070855).
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Appendix Overview
In this Appendix, we present the following:
Additional experimental details, including concept-pack layout and per-(concept, backbone) hyperparameters (Section A).
Additional experimental results: per-dataset nudity breakdowns, full I2P single- and multi-concept tables, multi-concept scaling from 2c to 7c, CAS threshold analysis, and qualitative probe heatmaps (Section B).
Additional ablations (Section C): component ablation breakdown for the When-gate and dual-probe channels with the full Qwen3-VL four-class rubric (Section C.1), family-grouped vs single-pooled exemplars (Section C.2, mechanistic justification), NFE wall-clock vs SR Pareto (Section C.3), image-exemplar saturation (Section C.4), and safety-scale robustness (Section C.5).
Cross-backbone validation with full per-concept breakdowns on SD 3 and FLUX.1-dev (Section D).
Additional robustness and scope analyses: low-effort packs, shared settings, hard/soft fusion, overlap, brands, repeated runs, expanded baselines, and trajectory probes (Section E); related-work positioning (Section F).
Evaluator justification: MJ-Bench protocol, Qwen3-VL versus published VLM judges, rubric design, NudeNet/Q16 cross-checks, and a human-agreement study (Section G).
Verbatim Qwen3-VL rubric prompts for all eight concepts (Section H).
Qualitative examples that extend the headline gallery (Section I).
Limitations (Section J): inference cost, anchor drift, pack coverage and calibration, spatial overlap, and output-level evaluation boundaries.
Broader impact in Section K.
License information for datasets, models, and benchmarks used in our evaluation (Section L).
Additional Experimental Details
Concept Pack Layout
Section 3.2 introduces the per-concept exemplar pack at the level needed to define CAS, the probes, and the How update; this subsection details the on-disk layout and the family decomposition. Each concept in EBSG is materialized as a self-contained concept pack on disk. A pack contains a short concept-level detection-keyword list for the CAS gate, plus family directories; each family carries paired (target, anchor) keywords together with a small set of target image exemplars. Table 7 lists the concept-level detection keywords, Table 8 lists representative families for the seven I2P concepts, and Table 9 shows representative target/anchor keyword pairs for two concepts. At runtime, the concept-level detection keywords drive the CAS direction in § 3.3; the family keyword lists drive both the family-mean text-embedding direction used by the family-direction step in § 3.5 and the cross-attention text probe in § 3.4; and the image exemplars feed the image probe through a family-mean CLIP embedding.
| Concept | Concept-level detection keywords |
| Sexual / nudity | “nudity”, “nude person”, “naked body” |
| Violence | “violence”, “bloody scene”, “weapon”, “fight” |
| Self-harm | “crying despair”, “hanging noose”, “self mutilation” |
| Shocking | “gore”, “body horror”, “mutilation”, “corpse” |
| Illegal activity | “drugs”, “crime”, “contraband”, “illegal activity” |
| Harassment | “bullying”, “mockery”, “intimidation”, “abuse” |
| Hate | “white supremacy”, “racial slur”, “hateful gathering” |
Table 7. Concept-level detection keywords used to instantiate in the CAS gate. These keywords are separate from the family-level target/anchor keywords used for spatial localization and guidance.
| Concept | Example families |
| Sexual / Nudity | naked body, sexual act, exposed body parts, suggestive pose |
| Violence | blood/gore, weapon threat, physical combat, dramatic distress |
| Shocking | screaming face, horror creature, body distortion, gory violence |
| Illegal activity | drugs/pills, smoking substance, mugshot/prison, vandalism/riot |
| Harassment | political mockery, threatening aggression, hostile caricature |
| Hate | hate-symbol imagery, dehumanizing meme, dark/grotesque depiction |
| Self-harm | suicide/hanging, mutilation/decay, starvation, depression/isolation |
Table 8. Representative examples of family-level decomposition in our concept packs. Each family carries paired target/anchor keywords and image exemplars.
| Concept | Family | Target keywords (examples) | Anchor keywords (examples) |
| Sexual | naked body | “naked body”, “nude figure”, “bare-skinned person” | “clothed body”, “fully dressed”, “covered figure” |
| Sexual | sexual act | “sexual act”, “explicit intercourse”, “erotic contact” | “warm hug”, “casual conversation”, “friendly greeting” |
| Sexual | exposed parts | “exposed breasts”, “exposed genitals”, “intimate body parts” | “everyday clothing”, “business attire”, “casual outfit” |
| Sexual | suggestive pose | “suggestive pose”, “revealing outfit”, “seductive posture” | “confident stance”, “modest outfit”, “neutral pose” |
| Violent | blood / gore | “blood splatter”, “bloody wound”, “pool of blood” | “clean scene”, “empty room”, “peaceful setting” |
| Violent | weapon attack | “knife attack”, “shooting someone”, “weapon threat” | “handshake”, “friendly greeting”, “calm conversation” |
| Violent | physical combat | “brutal fight”, “punching victim”, “kicking on ground” | “friendly chat”, “group conversation”, “peaceful gathering” |
| Violent | dramatic distress | “severed limb”, “dismembered body”, “mutilated corpse” | “healthy person”, “intact body”, “calm portrait” |
Table 9. Representative family-level target/anchor keyword pairs for two concepts. Each row’s keyword list is mean-pooled in CLIP text-embedding space to form the family-mean text direction (§ 3.5); keywords are short descriptors (1–4 words), not full sentences.
Concept-level representative for CAS. For the When gate, is computed by averaging the text embeddings of the concept-level detection keywords in Table 7. This representative is used only to decide whether the denoising trajectory has entered the broad harmful-concept region; the family-specific target/anchor keywords in Table 8 and Table 9 remain the signals used for spatial localization and the final guidance update.
Why separate detection keywords from family keywords. The separation reflects the different roles of the three stages. The CAS gate only decides when the current trajectory has entered the broad harmful-concept region, so we use a compact concept-level detection list that is intentionally generic and easy for a user to edit. In contrast, the Where and How stages must preserve the semantic differences among sub-concepts: averaging visually distinct families such as blood, weapons, and physical fighting into a single concept direction would blur the signal needed to localize and redirect each region. We therefore keep the detection descriptor broad, while using family-specific target/anchor keywords and image exemplars for spatial assignment and guidance.
Constructing an exemplar pack
Construction used in this work. The exemplar pack serves as an explicit and user-editable policy interface: it specifies which sub-concepts should be controlled and the safe alternatives toward which they are redirected. We initialized the textual packs with an LLM using the concept name and a small number of violating examples, then lightly edited the proposed families, target keywords, and safe anchors. Appendix § 20.§ 1 compares this procedure with coarse label-only and unedited LLM-minimal packs.
Practical construction guidelines. Each family should describe a visually distinguishable aspect of the target concept. We recommend concise target phrases paired with safe anchors that preserve the benign scene, for example by replacing an unsafe attribute while retaining the subject. Concept-level CAS descriptors remain separate from these family-level pairs. Image exemplars should depict the corresponding family with limited unrelated background content. When suitable images are unavailable, a text-only pack can be used; Table 4 reports the resulting trade-off.
Validation and calibration. Pack validation should consider missing sub-concepts, inappropriate anchors, and representation bias. Held-out unsafe and benign prompts can be used to assess suppression and semantic drift before fixing the pack and hyperparameters for evaluation. The low-effort-pack and shared-configuration results in Appendices § 20.§ 1 and § 20.§ 2 quantify the effect of reducing curation and tuning on seven I2P categories; broader policy coverage remains a deployment consideration.
Hyperparameter Settings
Section 4 reports the headline numbers under per-concept-best hyperparameters; this subsection provides the corresponding per-(concept, backbone) configurations. Table 10 lists the best hyperparameters per cell, selected on small held-out splits. All settings use the default family-grouped configuration and the dual-probe mode (text + image).
| Setting | Backbone | ||||
| Nudity (UD / RAB / MMA / P4DN) | SD v1.4 | 20 | 0.6 | 0.10 | 0.30 |
| I2P-Sexual | SD v1.4 | 20 | 0.5 | 0.10 | 0.30 |
| I2P-Violence | SD v1.4 | 22.5 | 0.35 | 0.30 | 0.15 |
| I2P-Self-harm | SD v1.4 | 7.5 | 0.5 | 0.10 | 0.10 |
| I2P-Shocking | SD v1.4 | 27.5 | 0.6 | 0.15 | 0.10 |
| I2P-Illegal | SD v1.4 | 25 | 0.6 | 0.10 | 0.50 |
| I2P-Harassment | SD v1.4 | 30.0 | 0.5 | 0.10 | 0.50 |
| I2P-Hate | SD v1.4 | 27.5 | 0.6 | 0.25 | 0.05 |
| I2P-Sexual | SD 3 | 20 | 0.5 | 0.15 | 0.10 |
| I2P-Violence | SD 3 | 20 | 0.5 | 0.15 | 0.10 |
| I2P-Self-harm | SD 3 | 20 | 0.4 | 0.15 | 0.10 |
| I2P-Shocking | SD 3 | 20 | 0.5 | 0.15 | 0.10 |
| I2P-Illegal | SD 3 | 25 | 0.4 | 0.15 | 0.10 |
| I2P-Harassment | SD 3 | 20 | 0.4 | 0.15 | 0.10 |
| I2P-Hate | SD 3 | 25 | 0.5 | 0.15 | 0.10 |
| MJA-Sexual | SD 3 | 15 | 0.6 | 0.10 | 0.30 |
| MJA-Violent | SD 3 | 25 | 0.5 | 0.10 | 0.10 |
| MJA-Illegal | SD 3 | 25 | 0.45 | 0.10 | 0.10 |
| MJA-Disturbing | SD 3 | 25 | 0.6 | 0.10 | 0.10 |
| I2P-Sexual | FLUX.1 | 2.0 | 0.5 | 0.15 | 0.10 |
| I2P-Violence | FLUX.1 | 2.0 | 0.5 | 0.15 | 0.10 |
| I2P-Self-harm | FLUX.1 | 0.75 | 0.5 | 0.15 | 0.10 |
| I2P-Shocking | FLUX.1 | 2.0 | 0.5 | 0.15 | 0.10 |
| I2P-Illegal | FLUX.1 | 1.5 | 0.5 | 0.15 | 0.10 |
| I2P-Harassment | FLUX.1 | 1.5 | 0.5 | 0.15 | 0.10 |
| I2P-Hate | FLUX.1 | 1.0 | 0.5 | 0.15 | 0.10 |
| MJA-Sexual | FLUX.1 | 2.5 | 0.6 | 0.10 | 0.10 |
| MJA-Violent | FLUX.1 | 2.0 | 0.6 | 0.10 | 0.10 |
| MJA-Illegal | FLUX.1 | 2.0 | 0.6 | 0.10 | 0.10 |
| MJA-Disturbing | FLUX.1 | 3.0 | 0.6 | 0.10 | 0.10 |
Table 10. Inference hyperparameters per concept and backbone. : hybrid scale; : CAS threshold; : text/image probe thresholds.
Common settings. SD v1.4 runs use 50 DDIM steps at CFG scale at with deterministic per-prompt seeds under the reported settings. SD 3 uses 28-step flow matching at CFG 7.0, , fp16. FLUX.1-dev uses 28-step flow matching with embedded guidance scale 3.5, , bf16, max text sequence length 512; we run FLUX at rather than its native to amortize compute (4× speedup), and—crucially—all methods compared on FLUX (Baseline and EBSG) use the same resolution, so the cross-backbone comparison is fair. CLIP exemplar embeddings use ViT-L/14; cross-attention is read at resolutions and (SD v1.4) or the corresponding DiT blocks (SD 3, FLUX). Sigmoid sharpness and mask post-processing Gaussian blur are fixed across all runs.
Probe construction details (complementing § 3.4). Attention aggregation. At each selected cross-attention layer we average over attention heads, take the maximum across the family’s conditioning-token columns, aggregate across layers within each resolution group ( and ), bilinear-upsample to the latent resolution, average across resolution groups, and min-max normalize to obtain the raw attention score or . If the spatial range is at most , the implementation leaves the constant or near-constant score map unchanged rather than dividing by that range. The probe mask (text- and image-probe channels of § 3.4) is then obtained by applying the sigmoid and, finally, a Gaussian blur with to smooth the boundary. Image-probe token slots. The injected conditioning is initialized from the empty-prompt text embedding (which preserves the BOS, EOS, and PAD token statistics of the standard CLIP text encoder output) and overwrites sequence position with the -normalized family centroid for (family slots are token indices , with BOS at index 0). When the number of families is smaller than the maximum allocated slots (4 by default), the remaining slots are padded with the last family’s centroid so that the probe returns well-formed attention columns for all slots. The per-family image-probe heatmap is read out from the attention column of position , giving family-specific attention maps from a single UNet cross-attention pass. This auxiliary sequence supplies the probe keys; it does not replace the original prompt conditioning used for the denoiser prediction.
Why a pooled image embedding still yields a spatial map. The text probe uses token-level CLIP hidden states, whereas the image probe uses a pooled centroid for each family. Both are compared with spatially varying denoiser queries through the same cross-attention pathway. For one attention head in layer , let denote the query at location and the probe key at slot . Attention to family slot is
where the denominator includes all probe slots. Thus, spatial variation arises from the denoiser queries rather than from patch coordinates in the pooled image embedding. The resulting score selects families and regions, while CAS and target-to-anchor guidance remain text-conditioned. The text-only, image-only, and dual-probe average SRs of 65.0, 65.7, and 73.6 support the complementary contribution of the probes (Table 4).
Tensor and boundary conventions. For SD v1.4, each text embedding in the pack is a fixed-length CLIP hidden-state sequence in ; text centroids average these aligned sequences elementwise, whereas image centroids average pooled 768-dimensional visual vectors and are normalized before insertion into the conditioning sequence. The centroids in the method section denote these means, not an average of denoiser predictions. CAS computes a numerically stabilized cosine after flattening the noise-difference tensors over channels and spatial positions; a zero direction has cosine zero. Spatial probe maps are aggregated and resized as described above, and each scalar spatial mask is broadcast across latent channels in the guidance update. Argmax ties in both WTA rules are resolved by fixed pack order. If no concept has been activated, the active set is empty, no WTA is evaluated, and the sampler uses ordinary CFG. The sigmoid masks remain soft: low-attention background receives a small positive weight, not an exact zero guarantee, and WTA retains the winning weight rather than replacing it with one.
Configuration. All main-paper EBSG results use the hybrid target-to-anchor update in § 3.5. The scale controls its strength, while controls activation through concept–prompt directional alignment. Table 10 reports the per-concept settings; Appendix § 17.§ 2 evaluates a single configuration shared across all seven I2P categories.
Additional Experimental Results
Section 4.1 reports the headline SR on each of the four nudity benchmarks, and Section 4.2 reports the I2P single- and multi-concept averages. This section breaks each headline number down into its constituent class proportions, and adds the multi-concept scaling sweep that calibrates how SR behaves as the joint-erasure size grows from two to seven concepts.
Per-Dataset Detailed Results (Nudity)
The headline SR survives the four-class split. Section 4.1 collapses SAFE and PARTIAL into a single safety class; Table 11 expands the per-dataset SR of main-body Table 2 into the full SAFE / PARTIAL / FULL / NOTREL split. The breakdown shows that the collapse is not concealing a quality–safety trade-off: EBSG keeps both FULL (residual harmful content) and NOTREL (absence of in-domain content) low across all four benchmarks. Where another method achieves a lower FULL cell, it does so by trading into NOTREL outputs—most visibly RECE on Ring-A-Bell (FULL = .000 at NOTREL = .456) and on P4DN (FULL = .013 at NOTREL = .285), neither of which counts as semantic-preserving erasure under the four-class rubric.
| Method | UnlearnDiff (142) SR↑ | Sa | Pa | F↓ | NR↓ | Ring-A-Bell (79) SR↑ | Sa | Pa | F↓ | NR↓ | MMA-Diff (1000) SR↑ | Sa | Pa | F↓ | NR↓ | P4DN (151) SR↑ | Sa | Pa | F↓ | NR↓ |
| Baseline | .641 | .218 | .423 | .331 | .028 | .456 | .203 | .253 | .506 | .038 | .359 | .123 | .236 | .638 | .003 | .252 | .073 | .179 | .742 | .007 |
| ESD | .859 | .563 | .296 | .092 | .049 | .785 | .481 | .304 | .139 | .076 | .711 | .414 | .297 | .239 | .050 | .649 | .146 | .503 | .311 | .040 |
| SDD | .908 | .620 | .288 | .042 | .049 | .886 | .544 | .342 | .076 | .038 | .813 | .544 | .269 | .164 | .023 | .722 | .272 | .450 | .245 | .033 |
| UCE | .824 | .465 | .359 | .162 | .014 | .468 | .228 | .241 | .494 | .038 | .345 | .159 | .186 | .651 | .004 | .338 | .146 | .192 | .656 | .007 |
| RECE | .901 | .768 | .134 | .014 | .085 | .544 | .519 | .025 | .000 | .456 | .794 | .545 | .249 | .164 | .042 | .702 | .556 | .146 | .013 | .285 |
| SLD-Weak | .662 | .296 | .366 | .310 | .028 | .215 | .089 | .127 | .734 | .051 | .264 | .112 | .152 | .730 | .006 | .252 | .086 | .166 | .742 | .007 |
| SLD-Medium | .789 | .415 | .373 | .169 | .042 | .354 | .190 | .165 | .608 | .038 | .324 | .134 | .190 | .669 | .007 | .325 | .126 | .199 | .669 | .007 |
| SLD-Strong | .873 | .577 | .296 | .085 | .042 | .494 | .241 | .253 | .456 | .051 | .419 | .189 | .230 | .572 | .009 | .589 | .199 | .391 | .404 | .007 |
| SLD-Max | .873 | .669 | .204 | .063 | .063 | .570 | .329 | .241 | .316 | .114 | .490 | .278 | .212 | .461 | .049 | .675 | .338 | .338 | .258 | .066 |
| SAFREE | .873 | .627 | .246 | .049 | .077 | .835 | .494 | .342 | .114 | .051 | .754 | .516 | .238 | .202 | .044 | .709 | .411 | .298 | .212 | .079 |
| + Safe Denoiser | .901 | .718 | .183 | .042 | .056 | .810 | .532 | .278 | .127 | .063 | .735 | .481 | .254 | .237 | .028 | .709 | .338 | .371 | .245 | .046 |
| + SGF | .923 | .690 | .232 | .028 | .049 | .848 | .646 | .203 | .076 | .076 | .776 | .516 | .260 | .186 | .038 | .702 | .377 | .325 | .258 | .040 |
| EBSG | .972 | .739 | .232 | .014 | .014 | .962 | .899 | .063 | .025 | .013 | .842 | .669 | .173 | .154 | .004 | .974 | .921 | .053 | .026 | .000 |
Table 11. Detailed per-class nudity erasure on SD v1.4 across all four adversarial benchmarks. This appendix table provides the SAFE / PARTIAL per-class split that is summarised as a single SR column in main-body Table 2. Sub-columns: SR↑ = Safe + Partial, SA = Safe, PA = Partial, F↓ = Full, NR↓ = NotRel (no human figure present under the nudity rubric). All values are proportions in [0, 1].
I2P Single-Concept Erasure: Full Per-Class Breakdown
Detailed single-concept results. Table 12 expands the single-concept evaluation in Table 3 into SR, FULL, and NOTREL proportions. EBSG achieves the highest SR among the methods in this table, with large reductions in FULL relative to the unguarded baseline: shocking (.850 .033), violence (.617 .050), hate (.733 .167), and harassment (.733 .150). The expanded baseline comparison is reported in Appendix § 20.§ 9.
| Method | sexual SR↑ | F↓ | NR↓ | violence SR↑ | F↓ | NR↓ | self-harm SR↑ | F↓ | NR↓ | shocking SR↑ | F↓ | NR↓ | illegal SR↑ | F↓ | NR↓ | harass. SR↑ | F↓ | NR↓ | hate SR↑ | F↓ | NR↓ | Avg SR↑ |
| Baseline (SD v1.4) | .683 | .283 | .033 | .367 | .617 | .017 | .433 | .550 | .017 | .150 | .850 | .000 | .317 | .650 | .033 | .250 | .733 | .017 | .250 | .733 | .017 | .350 |
| UCE [8] | .600 | .333 | .067 | .367 | .617 | .017 | .433 | .400 | .167 | .200 | .800 | .000 | .283 | .883 | .033 | .233 | .550 | .217 | .250 | .667 | .083 | .338 |
| RECE [9] | .617 | .283 | .100 | .650 | .283 | .067 | .383 | .350 | .267 | .267 | .517 | .217 | .133 | .017 | .850 | .300 | .517 | .183 | .283 | .133 | .583 | .376 |
| SLD-Weak [28] | .700 | .233 | .067 | .400 | .600 | .000 | .367 | .367 | .267 | .200 | .800 | .000 | .350 | .267 | .383 | .267 | .533 | .200 | .233 | .717 | .050 | .360 |
| SLD-Medium | .817 | .083 | .100 | .683 | .317 | .000 | .450 | .183 | .367 | .250 | .750 | .000 | .250 | .350 | .400 | .283 | .433 | .283 | .233 | .633 | .133 | .424 |
| SLD-Strong | .833 | .050 | .117 | .717 | .133 | .150 | .367 | .050 | .583 | .317 | .667 | .017 | .317 | .217 | .467 | .217 | .300 | .483 | .383 | .467 | .150 | .450 |
| SLD-Max | .667 | .000 | .133 | .683 | .050 | .267 | .050 | .083 | .867 | .267 | .733 | .000 | .417 | .150 | .433 | .183 | .550 | .567 | .300 | .300 | .400 | .395 |
| SAFREE [32] | .833 | .033 | .133 | .733 | .250 | .017 | .367 | .617 | .017 | .817 | .167 | .017 | .350 | .617 | .033 | .283 | .700 | .017 | .433 | .550 | .017 | .545 |
| + Safe Denoiser [13] | .900 | .000 | .100 | .833 | .117 | .050 | .383 | .083 | .533 | .383 | .217 | .000 | .383 | .083 | .533 | .317 | .267 | .417 | .433 | .383 | .183 | .576 |
| + SGF [14] | .883 | .000 | .117 | .617 | .233 | .150 | .383 | .067 | .550 | .700 | .283 | .017 | .317 | .133 | .550 | .150 | .233 | .617 | .417 | .333 | .250 | .495 |
| EBSG | .983 | .017 | .000 | .883 | .050 | .067 | .583 | .283 | .133 | .933 | .033 | .033 | .467 | .150 | .383 | .633 | .150 | .217 | .667 | .167 | .167 | .736 |
Table 12. I2P top-60 single-concept erasure on SD v1.4: per-concept breakdown for the eleven methods listed here. Each cell reports SR↑ / F↓ / NR↓ proportions in [0, 1]; SR=Safe+Partial. The 7-concept Avg SR column matches main Table 3. Bold: per-concept best SR.
I2P Multi-Concept Erasure: SAFREE-multi vs. EBSG-multi
Multi-concept inference is where SR diverges most across methods. Table 13 isolates the multi-concept setting, in which a single inference pipeline suppresses all seven I2P concepts simultaneously. SAFREE-multi loads its 7-concept token-projection set; EBSG-multi loads the 28-family pack (7 concepts × 4 families) and applies per-concept per-class QAS with cross-concept pixel-wise winner-take-all (§ 3.6). Both methods are evaluated under the same Qwen3-VL four-class rubric. Each cell reports SR/FULL/NOTREL proportions; the Safe versus Partial split is omitted here for compactness and preserved in the underlying result files.
| Method (multi) | sexual SR↑ | sexual F↓ | sexual NR↓ | violence SR↑ | violence F↓ | violence NR↓ | self-harm SR↑ | self-harm F↓ | self-harm NR↓ | shocking SR↑ | shocking F↓ | shocking NR↓ | illegal SR↑ | illegal F↓ | illegal NR↓ | harass. SR↑ | harass. F↓ | harass. NR↓ | hate SR↑ | hate F↓ | hate NR↓ | Avg SR↑ |
| UCE [8] | .800 | .067 | .133 | .533 | .367 | .100 | .333 | .200 | .467 | .183 | .800 | .017 | .250 | .183 | .567 | .167 | .483 | .350 | .200 | .533 | .267 | .352 |
| RECE [9] | .533 | .000 | .467 | .433 | .117 | .450 | .217 | .050 | .733 | .367 | .250 | .383 | .217 | .067 | .717 | .100 | .200 | .700 | .167 | .400 | .433 | .291 |
| SLD-Weak [28] | .683 | .267 | .050 | .400 | .600 | .000 | .400 | .333 | .267 | .267 | .733 | .000 | .383 | .167 | .450 | .283 | .467 | .250 | .217 | .700 | .083 | .376 |
| SLD-Medium | .667 | .250 | .083 | .533 | .467 | .000 | .483 | .233 | .283 | .267 | .717 | .017 | .350 | .067 | .583 | .333 | .383 | .283 | .267 | .583 | .150 | .414 |
| SLD-Strong | .767 | .150 | .083 | .533 | .433 | .033 | .350 | .167 | .483 | .400 | .567 | .033 | .317 | .083 | .600 | .283 | .300 | .417 | .283 | .500 | .217 | .419 |
| SLD-Max | .783 | .033 | .183 | .617 | .300 | .083 | .233 | .067 | .700 | .433 | .550 | .017 | .400 | .033 | .567 | .367 | .200 | .433 | .267 | .350 | .383 | .443 |
| SAFREE [32] | .850 | .000 | .150 | .483 | .433 | .083 | .367 | .133 | .500 | .250 | .683 | .067 | .400 | .167 | .433 | .333 | .133 | .533 | .250 | .417 | .333 | .419 |
| + Safe Denoiser [13] | .850 | .017 | .133 | .533 | .417 | .050 | .383 | .117 | .500 | .450 | .550 | .000 | .500 | .067 | .433 | .383 | .300 | .317 | .400 | .467 | .133 | .500 |
| + SGF [14] | .867 | .000 | .133 | .567 | .350 | .083 | .450 | .067 | .483 | .367 | .617 | .017 | .317 | .117 | .567 | .267 | .283 | .450 | .483 | .300 | .217 | .474 |
| EBSG | .883 | .017 | .100 | .850 | .033 | .117 | .667 | .050 | .283 | .883 | .017 | .100 | .650 | .033 | .317 | .600 | .133 | .267 | .583 | .267 | .150 | .731 |
Table 13. I2P top-60 multi-concept erasure on SD v1.4: one model erases all seven concepts simultaneously, evaluated with Qwen3-VL-8B. Each cell reports SR↑ / F↓ / NR↓ proportions in [0, 1]; SR=Safe+Partial. Bold: per-concept best SR.
The four-class breakdown distinguishes residual harm from absence of in-domain content. SAFREE-multi has high NOTREL rates on harassment (.533), self-harm (.500), illegal activity (.433), and hate (.333). These outputs are excluded from SR whether they reflect semantic drift or visual collapse. EBSG attains higher SR across all seven concepts and reduces FULL on five of them; for example,
FULL decreases from .433 to .033 on violence and from .683 to .017 on shocking. This supports the use of joint safety and relevance assessment described in §G.4.2.
Multi-concept scaling: 2c / 3c / 7c
Multi-concept SR does not necessarily decay as the joint-erasure size grows. Table 13 above reports the headline 7-concept setting; Table 14 traces the scaling curve as the joint-erasure size goes from two concepts to all seven. We evaluate the 2-concept (2C: sexual+violence) and 3-concept (3C: sexual+violence+shocking) settings on SD v1.4 under the same Qwen3-VL four-class rubric, using the official SAFREE multi-concept configuration and the corresponding EBSG multi-concept pack (8 / 12 / 28 families across 2C / 3C / 7C, i.e., per concept). All cells are I2P q16 top-60 prompts. Each cell reports SR↑ / F↓ / NR↓ in %; SR=SAFE+PARTIAL. Bold: per-concept best across reported methods.
| Method | Sexual | Violence | Avg SR↑ | |||||
| UCE | 73.3/23.3/3.3 | 33.3/61.7/5.0 | 53.3 | |||||
| RECE | 88.3/1.7/10.0 | 48.3/26.7/25.0 | 68.3 | |||||
| SLD-Weak | 71.7/23.3/5.0 | 41.7/58.3/0.0 | 56.7 | |||||
| SLD-Medium | 75.0/13.3/11.7 | 43.3/55.0/1.7 | 59.2 | |||||
| SLD-Strong | 80.0/6.7/13.3 | 51.7/43.3/5.0 | 65.8 | |||||
| SLD-Max | 71.7/3.3/25.0 | 56.7/23.3/20.0 | 64.2 | |||||
| SAFREE | 86.7/1.7/11.6 | 43.3/48.3/8.3 | 65.0 | |||||
| + Safe Denoiser | 86.7/3.3/10.0 | 60.0/35.0/5.0 | 73.3 | |||||
| + SGF | 83.3/1.7/15.0 | 53.3/33.3/13.3 | 68.3 | |||||
| EBSG | 90.0/8.3/1.7 | 63.3/28.3/8.3 | 76.7 | |||||
| Method | Sexual | Violence | Shocking | Avg SR↑ | ||||
| UCE | 78.3/15.0/6.7 | 46.7/51.7/1.7 | 3.3/96.7/0.0 | 42.8 | ||||
| RECE | 85.0/5.0/10.0 | 50.0/43.3/6.7 | 20.0/78.3/1.7 | 51.7 | ||||
| SLD-Weak | 71.7/23.3/5.0 | 43.3/56.7/0.0 | 21.7/78.3/0.0 | 45.6 | ||||
| SLD-Medium | 78.3/11.7/10.0 | 40.0/60.0/0.0 | 21.7/78.3/0.0 | 46.7 | ||||
| SLD-Strong | 85.0/1.7/13.3 | 43.3/50.0/6.7 | 36.7/61.7/1.7 | 55.0 | ||||
| SLD-Max | 81.7/1.7/16.7 | 48.3/33.3/18.3 | 30.0/63.3/6.7 | 53.3 | ||||
| SAFREE | 86.7/1.7/11.6 | 46.7/46.7/6.7 | 25.0/71.7/3.3 | 52.8 | ||||
| + Safe Denoiser | 88.3/1.7/10.0 | 68.3/30.0/1.7 | 58.3/41.7/0.0 | 71.7 | ||||
| + SGF | 86.7/1.7/11.7 | 53.3/41.7/5.0 | 43.3/55.0/1.7 | 61.1 | ||||
| EBSG | 90.0/6.7/3.3 | 76.7/16.7/6.7 | 78.3/21.7/0.0 | 81.7 | ||||
| Method | Sexual | Violence | Shocking | Self-harm | Illegal | Harass. | Hate | Avg SR↑ |
| UCE | 80.0/6.7/13.3 | 53.3/36.7/10.0 | 18.3/80.0/1.7 | 33.3/20.0/46.7 | 25.0/18.3/56.7 | 16.7/48.3/35.0 | 20.0/53.3/26.7 | 35.2 |
| RECE | 53.3/0.0/46.7 | 43.3/11.7/45.0 | 36.7/25.0/38.3 | 21.7/5.0/73.3 | 21.7/6.7/71.7 | 10.0/20.0/70.0 | 16.7/40.0/43.3 | 29.1 |
| SLD-Weak | 68.3/26.7/5.0 | 40.0/60.0/0.0 | 26.7/73.3/0.0 | 40.0/33.3/26.7 | 38.3/16.7/45.0 | 28.3/46.7/25.0 | 21.7/70.0/8.3 | 37.6 |
| SLD-Medium | 66.7/25.0/8.3 | 53.3/46.7/0.0 | 26.7/71.7/1.7 | 48.3/23.3/28.3 | 35.0/6.7/58.3 | 33.3/38.3/28.3 | 26.7/58.3/15.0 | 41.4 |
| SLD-Strong | 76.7/15.0/8.3 | 53.3/43.3/3.3 | 40.0/56.7/3.3 | 35.0/16.7/48.3 | 31.7/8.3/60.0 | 28.3/30.0/41.7 | 28.3/50.0/21.7 | 41.9 |
| SLD-Max | 78.3/3.3/18.3 | 61.7/30.0/8.3 | 43.3/55.0/1.7 | 23.3/6.7/70.0 | 40.0/3.3/56.7 | 36.7/20.0/43.3 | 26.7/35.0/38.3 | 44.3 |
| SAFREE | 85.0/0.0/15.0 | 48.3/43.3/8.3 | 25.0/68.3/6.7 | 36.7/13.3/50.0 | 40.0/16.7/43.3 | 33.3/13.3/53.3 | 25.0/41.7/33.3 | 41.9 |
| + Safe Denoiser | 85.0/1.7/13.3 | 53.3/41.7/5.0 | 45.0/55.0/0.0 | 38.3/11.7/50.0 | 50.0/6.7/43.3 | 38.3/30.0/31.7 | 40.0/46.7/13.3 | 50.0 |
| + SGF | 86.7/0.0/13.3 | 56.7/35.0/8.3 | 36.7/61.7/1.7 | 45.0/6.7/48.3 | 31.7/11.7/56.7 | 26.7/28.3/45.0 | 48.3/30.0/21.7 | 47.4 |
| EBSG | 88.3/1.7/10.0 | 85.0/3.3/11.7 | 88.3/1.7/10.0 | 66.7/5.0/28.3 | 65.0/3.3/31.7 | 60.0/13.3/2… | 73.1 |
Table 14. Multi-concept scaling on SD v1.4. Each cell reports SR / F / NR (%); SR=Safe+Partial, and Avg-SR averages the listed concepts. Baseline is omitted because unguarded SD v1.4 does not perform concept erasure; its single-concept reference appears in main Table 3.
EBSG achieves average SRs of 76.7, 81.7, and 73.1 in the 2C, 3C, and 7C settings, respectively, compared with 65.0, 52.8, and 41.9 for SAFREE. These averages cover different concept subsets, so their differences should be read alongside the per-concept results. On the common sexual and violence categories, EBSG retains or improves SR when moving from two to three concepts. At seven concepts, its average SR remains close to the single-concept result (73.1 versus 73.6). This indicates that joint guidance can remain effective as the controlled set grows. Appendix § 20.§ 3 separately examines the choice of spatial fusion rule.
CAS Threshold Across Concepts and Backbones
Section 3.3 introduces CAS as a cosine gate but defers the per-(concept, backbone) calibration; this subsection documents how the tuned values in Table 10 fall into a small number of regimes.
settings by backbone and concept. CAS measures the directional alignment of two prediction differences. Its cosine is invariant to positive rescaling of nonzero vectors, so calibration depends on their relative directions rather than their magnitudes. The settings in Table 10 fall into four groups:
on SD v1.4. This setting is used for nudity on the four adversarial benchmarks and for the I2P shocking, illegal-activity, and hate concepts.
– on SD v1.4. I2P violence uses , while sexual, self-harm, and harassment use .
– on SD 3. The reported configurations use 0.4 for I2P self-harm, illegal activity, and harassment, 0.45 for MJA illegal activity, and 0.5 or 0.6 for the remaining settings.
– on FLUX.1-dev. All seven I2P concepts use , and all four MJA categories use .
These configurations document the calibration used in our experiments. Appendix § 20.§ 2 tests the effect of replacing per-concept tuning with a shared setting on SD v1.4. Automatic threshold selection remains future work.
Qualitative Probe Heatmaps
Qualitative spatial localization. Figure 5 overlays the top-20% probe activations at step 20/50. In these examples, text attention responds to explicit-keyword prompts, while image attention supplies complementary evidence for metaphorical prompts. The WTA rule assigns each location to a single family. These visualizations illustrate the masks’ role in spatial guidance; quantitative localization against ground-truth regions is left for future work.
Figure 5. Dual-probe localization: top-20% probe activations yield a disjoint mask over the target unsafe region.
Additional Ablations
Five ablations support the design choices and the cost–quality trade-off underpinning EBSG: a component-wise breakdown of the When-gate and the dual-probe channels with the full Qwen3-VL four-class rubric (Section C.1); family-grouped vs single-pooled exemplars (Section C.2, the mechanistic justification of the pack design); a wall-clock vs SR Pareto across nine inference-time methods (Section C.3); image-exemplar saturation (Section C.4); and a safety-scale robustness stress test against the four SLD variants (Section C.5).
Component ablation: full 7-concept four-class breakdown
Complementary contributions of CAS and the dual probe. Table 15 expands the component ablation in main-paper Table 4 into the four-class breakdown for all seven I2P concepts. Only the indicated component is removed in each row; the remaining settings follow Table 10. The EBSG row reproduces the single-concept result in Table 3.
| Method | Metric | sexual | violence | self-harm | shocking | illegal | harass. | hate | Avg | COCO CLIP |
| SD v1.4 (baseline) | SR ↑ | 68.3 | 36.7 | 43.3 | 15.0 | 31.7 | 25.0 | 25.0 | 35.0 | |
| SD v1.4 (baseline) | Safe | 35.0 | 30.0 | 11.7 | 8.3 | 11.7 | 16.7 | 15.0 | 18.3 | |
| SD v1.4 (baseline) | Partial | 33.3 | 6.7 | 31.7 | 6.7 | 20.0 | 8.3 | 10.0 | 16.7 | |
| SD v1.4 (baseline) | Full ↓ | 28.3 | 61.7 | 55.0 | 85.0 | 65.0 | 73.3 | 73.3 | 63.1 | |
| SD v1.4 (baseline) | NotRel ↓ | 3.3 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 0.0 | 3.3 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 0.265 |
| w/o CAS (when) | SR ↑ | 98.3 | 78.3 | 50.0 | 63.3 | 51.7 | 50.0 | 55.0 | 63.8 | |
| w/o CAS (when) | Safe | 98.3 | 66.7 | 16.7 | 51.7 | 35.0 | 31.7 | 53.3 | 50.5 | |
| w/o CAS (when) | Partial | 0.0 | 11.7 | 33.3 | 11.7 | 16.7 | 18.3 | 1.7 | 13.3 | |
| w/o CAS (when) | Full ↓ | 0.0 | 13.3 | 11.7 | 35.0 | 13.3 | 28.3 | 26.7 | 18.3 | |
| w/o CAS (when) | NotRel ↓ | 1.7 | 8.3 | 38.3 | 1.7 | 35.0 | 21.7 | 18.3 | 17.9 | 0.240 |
| w/o text-probe (image only) | SR ↑ | 96.7 | 86.7 | 50.0 | 88.3 | 31.7 | 40.0 | 66.7 | 65.7 | |
| w/o text-probe (image only) | Safe | 85.0 | 76.7 | 8.3 | 83.3 | 16.7 | 23.3 | 56.7 | 50.0 | |
| w/o text-probe (image only) | Partial | 11.7 | 10.0 | 41.7 | 5.0 | 15.0 | 16.7 | 10.0 | 15.7 | |
| w/o text-probe (image only) | Full ↓ | 3.3 | 6.7 | 30.0 | 10.0 | 31.7 | 35.0 | 11.7 | 18.3 | |
| w/o text-probe (image only) | NotRel ↓ | 0.0 | 6.7 | 20.0 | 1.7 | 36.7 | 25.0 | 21.7 | 16.0 | 0.255 |
| w/o image-probe (text only) | SR ↑ | 98.3 | 71.7 | 35.0 | 85.0 | 45.0 | 65.0 | 55.0 | 65.0 | |
| w/o image-probe (text only) | Safe | 90.0 | 61.7 | 3.3 | 76.7 | 30.0 | 55.0 | 38.3 | 50.6 | |
| w/o image-probe (text only) | Partial | 8.3 | 10.0 | 31.7 | 8.3 | 15.0 | 10.0 | 16.7 | 14.3 | |
| w/o image-probe (text only) | Full ↓ | 1.7 | 11.7 | 28.3 | 11.7 | 15.0 | 11.7 | 35.0 | 16.4 | |
| w/o image-probe (text only) | NotRel ↓ | 0.0 | 16.7 | 36.7 | 3.3 | 40.0 | 23.3 | 10.0 | 18.6 | 0.258 |
| EBSG | SR ↑ | 98.3 | 88.3 | 58.3 | 93.3 | 46.7 | 63.3 | 66.7 | 73.6 | |
| EBSG | Safe | 91.7 | 73.3 | 10.0 | 88.3 | 31.7 | 50.0 | 56.7 | 57.4 | |
| EBSG | Partial | 6.7 | 15.0 | 48.3 | 5.0 | 15.0 | 13.3 | 10.0 | 16.2 | |
| EBSG | Full ↓ | 1.7 | 5.0 | 28.3 | 3.3 | 15.0 | 15.0 | 15.0 | 12.1 | |
| EBSG | NotRel ↓ | 0.0 | 6.7 | 13.3 | 3.3 | 38.3 | 21.7 | 16.7 | 14.3 | 0.255 |
Table 15. Component ablation across 7 I2P concepts on SD v1.4 (q16 top-60, hybrid + family guidance, per-concept-best hyperparameters), with the full Qwen3-VL four-class rubric and COCO250 CLIP. The four method rows mirror main-body Table 4: EBSG, w/o CAS (when), w/o text-probe in FSM (where), w/o image-probe in FSM (where); the SD v1.4 row is the unguarded baseline included for COCO CLIP reference. All values are percentages over 60 prompts per cell; SR = Safe+Partial. Bold on the SR row marks the per-concept best across the four ablation rows; on the Avg column, bold marks the best per metric across the four ablation rows (highest for Safe and SR, lowest for Full and NotRel). COCO CLIP is reported once per method via multirow.
Without CAS, guidance is applied at every denoising step. Average SR drops from 73.6 to 63.8, while COCO CLIP drops from 0.255 to 0.240 (0.265 for the unguarded baseline). The FULL rates also rise on shocking (3.3% 35.0%) and harassment (15.0% 28.3%). Thus, temporal gating contributes to both suppression and benign-image fidelity.
The two probe ablations show different concept-level trade-offs. Removing the text probe reduces SR on illegal activity (46.7 31.7) and harassment (63.3 40.0), while removing the image probe reduces SR on self-harm (58.3 35.0) and hate (66.7 55.0). Each single-channel ablation degrades on the regime its missing channel was designed to cover.
The complete configuration achieves the highest average SR (73.6) and the lowest average FULL (12.1%) and NOTREL (14.3%) among the ablations. Its average SAFE rate also exceeds both single-probe variants. The gain therefore reflects improved class outcomes rather than a redistribution between SAFE and PARTIAL.
Family-grouped vs single-pooled exemplars
Family decomposition improves average SR beyond single-pooled exemplars. We isolate the design choice introduced in § 3.2 by comparing the family-indexed exemplar pack against a single pooled control in which the same total exemplar budget is mean-pooled into one global concept centroid (Figure 6). Table 16 reports the head-to-head on I2P (Q16, top-60 prompts per concept) under SD v1.4 (hybrid mode) with identical hyperparameters per concept and only the exemplar grouping varied. Family-grouped wins on 6 of 7 cells (tying on Sexual at 98.3%) for an average gain of +6.0 pp. The two largest gaps fall on the hardest concepts: Self-harm rises from 46.7 to 58.3% (+11.6%p) and Illegal from 36.7 to 46.7% (+10.0%p), where family decomposition recovers distinct sub-modes (e.g., cutting, overdose, and suicidal posture for self-harm) that single-pooling collapses into one direction. On Sexual, both configurations achieve 98.3% SR, so this experiment shows no additional gain from family grouping for that category.
Figure 6. Per-family centroids (right) cover sub-modes that a single pooled centroid (left) collapses.
| Method | Metric | sexual | violence | self-harm | shocking | illegal | harass. | hate | Avg |
| Family-grouped (EBSG) | SR | 98.3 | 88.3 | 58.3 | 93.3 | 46.7 | 63.3 | 66.7 | 73.6 |
| Safe | 91.7 | 73.3 | 10.0 | 88.3 | 31.7 | 50.0 | 56.7 | 57.4 | |
| Partial | 6.7 | 15.0 | 48.3 | 5.0 | 15.0 | 13.3 | 10.0 | 16.2 | |
| Full | 1.7 | 5.0 | 28.3 | 3.3 | 15.0 | 15.0 | 16.7 | 12.1 | |
| NotRel | 0.0 | 6.7 | 13.3 | 3.3 | 38.3 | 21.7 | 16.7 | 14.3 | |
| Single-pooled | SR | 98.3 | 85.0 | 46.7 | 91.7 | 36.7 | 56.7 | 58.3 | 67.6 |
| Safe | 91.7 | 80.0 | 5.0 | 88.3 | 18.3 | 43.3 | 50.0 | 53.8 | |
| Partial | 6.7 | 5.0 | 41.7 | 3.3 | 18.3 | 13.3 | 8.3 | 13.8 | |
| Full | 1.7 | 1.7 | 31.7 | 8.3 | 11.7 | 16.7 | 16.7 | 12.6 | |
| NotRel | 0.0 | 13.3 | 21.7 | 0.0 | 51.7 | 26.7 | 25.0 | 19.8 | |
| SR (Family − Pooled) | +0.0 | +3.3 | +11.6 | +1.6 | +10.0 | +6.6 | +8.4 | +6.0 |
Table 16. Family-grouped vs single-pooled exemplars on I2P (SD v1.4, hybrid). Per-concept four-class breakdown (SR, Safe, Partial, Full, NotRel; %) for the family-grouped EBSG bank (ours) and a single-pooled control that unions all family exemplars per concept. Same per-concept hyperparameters and the same Qwen3-VL-8B four-class rubric on I2P q16 top-60 (60 prompts × 7 concepts) as the main I2P evaluation; only the exemplar grouping changes. Family decomposition wins 6/7 concepts (ties on Sexual) and improves average SR by +6.0 %p.
NFE Ablation: wall-clock vs SR Pareto across 9 methods
In the step-count sweeps below, the plotted NFE label denotes sampler denoising steps, not the total number of conditional model evaluations; the per-step prediction budget and measured wall-clock time are reported separately.
The per-step overhead of EBSG is partially recoverable by reducing the DDIM step count; this subsection quantifies that trade-off on a fixed single-GPU bench. The reported methods are SD v1.4, SAFREE, SAFREE + Safe Denoiser, SAFREE + SGF, the four official SLD operating points (Weak, Medium, Strong, Max), and EBSG. Table 17 reports the per-method wall-clock cost at the canonical 50 DDIM steps used elsewhere in the paper, and Figure 7 traces the cost–SR Pareto curves obtained by sweeping the DDIM step count over {5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 40, 50}.
| Method | Wall (s, 20 imgs) | Per-img w/ load (s) | Per-img excl. load (s) | × baseline |
| Baseline (SD v1.4) | 59.27 | 2.96 | 2.63 | 1.0× |
| SAFREE [32] | 187.07 | 9.35 | 8.74 | 3.3× |
| SAFREE+Safe Denoiser [13] | 243.64 | 12.18 | 9.00 | 3.4× |
| SAFREE+SGF [14] | 249.40 | 12.47 | 9.26 | 3.5× |
| SLD-Weak [28] | 193.98 | 9.70 | 9.00 | 3.4× |
| SLD-Medium | 195.66 | 9.78 | 9.05 | 3.4× |
| SLD-Strong | 196.63 | 9.83 | 9.11 | 3.5× |
| SLD-Max | 191.65 | 9.58 | 8.89 | 3.4× |
| EBSG | 291.58 | 14.58 | 14.00 | 5.3× |
Table 17. Per-image generation cost in an isolated bench on a single RTX 3090 with no contention (20 violence q16 prompts × 50 DDIM steps; one process per GPU, single GPU per measurement). Per-image excluding model load is over canonical output files, with file mtimes sorted explicitly to handle non-zero-padded filenames. EBSG and the four SLD variants are the median of two independent runs (agreement to ±2%).
Figure 7. Wall-clock cost vs erasure quality, concept-averaged across the seven I2P top-60 concepts (sexual, violence, self-harm, shocking, illegal_activity, harassment, hate). The horizontal axis is per-image generation time (excluding one-time model load) on a single RTX 3090 with no GPU contention, one process per GPU; markers correspond to DDIM step counts . We compare EBSG against eight inference-time baselines: SD 1.4, SAFREE, SAFREE + Safe Denoiser, SAFREE + SGF, and the four official SLD operating points (Weak, Medium, Strong, Max). Left (SR↑): EBSG (red) offers favorable SR–latency trade-offs at the tested operating points; at 5 DDIM steps it already exceeds SD 1.4 + DDIM-50 by +16.7 %p while running 1.8× faster, and at 10 DDIM steps it exceeds SAFREE + DDIM-50 by +5.9 %p and every SLD variant + DDIM-50 by +11–+20 %p while running 3.1–3.3× faster. The four SLD operating points attain 40.7–48.8 % SR at DDIM=50. Right (NotRel↓): EBSG keeps NotRel low across all step counts.
Why we compare wall-clock cost rather than DDIM step count. Per-step UNet-forward counts differ across methods—Baseline 2 forwards/step; SAFREE 2 forwards/step plus token re-projection; SAFREE + Safe Denoiser and SAFREE + SGF use 3 forwards/step with NudeNet-routed compounds (NEGSPACE / repellency MMD); the four SLD operating points use 3 forwards/step (the additional safety branch); EBSG uses ∼11 forwards/step—so a step-aligned comparison conflates UNet-call cost across methods. We instead report per-image wall-clock cost on a fixed single-GPU bench (RTX 3090, no contention; per-image time computed as over canonical output files to factor out the one-time model load). Concept-averaging across the seven I2P top-60 concepts and varying the DDIM step count over produces the wall-clock-vs-(SR / NOTREL) Pareto curves in Figure 7. Each method’s effective NFE budget at a given step count is its per-step UNet-forward count multiplied by the step count. Per-concept best configurations from main Table 3 are reused, varying only the DDIM step count; configurations are not retuned per step setting. At 50 DDIM steps, the seven inference-time erasure baselines cluster at 8.7–9.3 s/image, while EBSG sits at 14.0 s/image: the empirical wall-clock ratio over the unguarded baseline is 5.3×; forward counts alone do not account for differences in measured wall-clock cost.
Reducing the step count offsets part of the inference overhead. At 5 DDIM steps, EBSG achieves 52.4% SR in 1.47 s/image, compared with 35.7% in 2.63 s/image for unguarded SD v1.4 at 50 steps. At 10 steps, EBSG reaches 60.2% SR in 2.79 s/image, exceeding SAFREE at 50 steps (54.3%, 8.74 s/image) by 5.9 percentage points while running 3.1× faster. This operating point also exceeds all four SLD variants at 50 steps (40.7–48.8% SR, 8.9–9.1 s/image). These results quantify the trade-off between step count and per-step guidance cost.
Latency-matched comparison. The sweep above covers inference-time safeguards, whose overhead arises during sampling. Model-editing methods and CASTeer, which precomputes steering vectors without updating model weights, instead incur their preparation cost offline. To compare EBSG with these methods at near-baseline sampling latency, Table 18 reports a low-latency EBSG setting. Relative sampling times exclude offline preparation, including fine-tuning, closed-form editing, and steering-vector estimation.
| Method | Avg SR | Relative latency |
| Baseline SD 1.4 | 35.0 | ×1.00 |
| UCE | 33.8 | ×1.00 |
| RECE | 37.6 | ×1.00 |
| Co-Erasing | 34.5 | ×1.00 |
| Double Projections | 38.3 | ×1.00 |
| CASTeer | 51.0 | ×1.00 |
| TRCE | 64.8 | ×1.00 |
| EBSG | 60.8 | ×1.04 |
Table 18. I2P single-concept SR and relative sampling latency. The EBSG row reports the low-latency operating point; the 73.6 average SR configuration is reported in Table 29. Latencies exclude offline preparation.
At this operating point, EBSG achieves 60.8 average SR with 1.04× baseline latency, exceeding all compared methods except TRCE. Thus, despite operating at inference time and leaving the underlying model unchanged, EBSG approaches the strongest compared result at near-baseline sampling latency, offering a lower-cost option alongside the higher-SR configuration. EBSG also allows the controlled policy to be changed through the exemplar pack without updating the model weights; the trade-off between offline preparation and sampling cost therefore depends on how frequently the policy is revised.
Image-exemplar saturation
The marginal value of additional image exemplars depends on whether the target concept is text- or image-dominant. Figure 8 sweeps the image-exemplar count at the per-concept-best hyperparameters of Table 10, holding all other settings fixed, and contrasts a text-dominant concept (sexual) with an image-dominant concept (hate). For sexual, SR is already saturated at (98.3%) and is identical for every larger : explicit lexical cues drive both When and Where, so additional visual exemplars contribute no measurable gain. For hate, SR rises from 61.7% at to 63.3% at and saturates at 65.0% for , consistent with the image probe needing a small within-family centroid to cover non-lexical visual cues before reaching diminishing return. This sweep suggests diminishing returns from additional image exemplars: no gain is observed for Sexual, while Hate improves up to in the tested configuration.
Figure 8. Image-exemplar saturation for text-dominant (sexual) and image-dominant (hate) concepts.
Robustness to the safety scale (single-concept stress test)
On the I2P sexual concept, EBSG has a broad safety-scale plateau in a comparison with modified, unclamped SLD variants. The four SLD variants differ in warmup, thresholding, nominal guidance scale, and momentum settings [28]. Internally, one element-wise SLD scaling coefficient is computed as (the implemented coefficient associated with Eqs. (5)–(6) of [28]), so this coefficient saturates at 1 when the inner term exceeds 1. This does not bound the norm of the complete correction, which also depends on the prediction differences, thresholding, and momentum. To examine the effect of lifting coefficient saturation, we disable this clamp and then sweep for the four SLD variants and for EBSG over the same range on the I2P top-60 sexual concept (60 prompts, NFE=50, RTX 3090). Figure 9 shows the resulting curves.
Figure 9. Robustness to the safety scale on the I2P top-60 sexual concept (60 prompts, NFE=50, RTX 3090). Five methods sweep their respective safety knobs ( for EBSG, for the four SLD variants) over the same magnitude range on a log- axis. SLD’s internal coefficient clamp is disabled to avoid saturation at 1; the same nominal scale does not imply matched correction norms across methods. EBSG (red) is the only method with plateau-style robustness on this concept: SR across and SR = 73.3% even at the extreme . The four SLD variants share a
EBSG holds a 10× plateau in the tested scale sweep. EBSG maintains SR across and degrades only to 73.3% at , holding NotREL across the entire 100× sweep; it is the only method with plateau-style robustness in this experiment. Each SLD variant, in contrast, peaks at one or two tested scales (Max 80% SR at ; Strong 83% at ; Medium 88% at ; Weak 87% at ) and SR drops sharply outside those scales.
High scales increase out-of-domain outputs in the modified SLD variants. At , NotREL reaches 85% for Max, 57% for Strong, 47% for Medium, and 33% for Weak. The corresponding SRs are 15%, 43%, 53%, and 67%, compared with 73.3% for EBSG.
Scope of the comparison. The sweep covers one concept and deliberately removes SLD’s coefficient clamp. Equal nominal scales therefore do not imply equal correction norms, and the results describe a modified-baseline stress test rather than standard SLD. The extreme setting is also far above the tuned value of 20. Broader concept coverage is needed to determine how generally these scale-response patterns hold.
Cross-Backbone Validation (Full Per-Concept)
The method equations use noise-prediction notation for SD v1.4. On flow-matching backbones, the corresponding conditioning differences and linear guidance combinations operate on native velocity predictions rather than treating them as Gaussian-noise estimates.
Cross-backbone transfer holds at the per-concept level, not just on average. § 4.2 reports the per-backbone Avg SR; Table 19 expands this into the per-concept breakdown on the four MJA categories for SD 3 (MM-DiT, flow matching) and FLUX.1-dev (DiT, flow matching). The When–Where–How algorithm is identical across backbones: CAS is a cosine of two prediction-difference vectors and the hybrid target-to-anchor update is linear in the prediction, so the same gating logic and the same masked update transfer between -prediction (SD v1.4) and flow-matching prediction (SD 3, FLUX.1-dev) with per-backbone hyperparameter calibration documented in Section A.3.
| Backbone / Method | sexual SR↑ | sexual F↓ | sexual NR↓ | violent SR↑ | violent F↓ | violent NR↓ | illegal SR↑ | illegal F↓ | illegal NR↓ | disturbing SR↑ | disturbing F↓ | disturbing NR↓ | Avg SR↑ | Avg F↓ | Avg NR↓ |
| SD 3 (MM-DiT, flow matching): | |||||||||||||||
| Baseline (SD 3, unguarded) | 50.0 | 49.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 19.0 | 80.0 | 1.0 | 35.0 | 65.0 | 0.0 | 26.0 | 73.5 | 0.5 |
| UCE [8] | 55.0 | 45.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 22.0 | 76.0 | 2.0 | 45.0 | 55.0 | 0.0 | 30.5 | 69.0 | 0.5 |
| RECE [9] | 83.0 | 15.0 | 2.0 | 1.0 | 99.0 | 0.0 | 23.0 | 75.0 | 2.0 | 44.0 | 56.0 | 0.0 | 37.8 | 61.2 | 1.0 |
| SAFREE [32] | 67.0 | 31.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 9.0 | 1.0 | 24.0 | 74.0 | 2.0 | 40.0 | 60.0 | 0.0 | 32.8 | 66.0 | 1.2 |
| + Safe Denoiser [13] | 75.0 | 23.0 | 2.0 | 1.0 | 99.0 | 0.0 | 26.0 | 72.0 | 2.0 | 45.0 | 55.0 | 0.0 | 36.8 | 62.3 | 1.0 |
| + SGF [14] | 59.0 | 40.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 99.0 | 0.0 | 21.0 | 75.0 | 4.0 | 43.0 | 57.0 | 0.0 | 31.0 | 67.8 | 1.3 |
| EBSG | 84.0 | 16.0 | 0.0 | 23.0 | 72.0 | 5.0 | 50.0 | 36.0 | 14.0 | 47.0 | 53.0 | 0.0 | 51.0 | 44.2 | 4.8 |
| FLUX.1-dev (DiT, flow matching): | |||||||||||||||
| Baseline (FLUX.1-dev, unguarded) | 62.0 | 38.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 98.0 | 0.0 | 32.0 | 65.0 | 3.0 | 51.0 | 49.0 | 0.0 | 36.8 | 62.5 | 0.8 |
| EBSG | 97.0 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 67.0 | 20.0 | 13.0 | 58.0 | 35.0 | 7.0 | 96.0 | 4.0 | 0.0 | 79.5 | 15.5 | 5.0 |
Table 19. Full per-concept MJA cross-backbone results on SD 3 and FLUX.1-dev. Each cell reports SR↑ / F↓ / NR↓ (%); SR=(Safe+Partial)/Total, F=Full violation, NR=NOTRELEVANT (no in-domain content under the concept rubric; for nudity, no human figure is present). 100 prompts per concept. Bold: per-backbone-concept best SR across reported methods. When reported, compound-stack rows (SAFREE + Safe Denoiser, SAFREE + SGF) use the official negative/reference image data from the Safe Denoiser/SGF release archives.
Only the spatial-probe interface—the architectural read-out path used to extract attention maps—is reimplemented per backbone: standard UNet cross-attention for SD v1.4, an image-to-text submatrix of MM-DiT joint attention for SD 3, and a DiT-compatible spatial probe over transformer image-token features for FLUX.1-dev (which does not expose a standalone cross-attention path). The resulting family masks are resolved by the same winner-take-all rule and consumed by the same masked hybrid update, so backbone transfer is a structural-interface change rather than an algorithmic one.
What transfers. EBSG shows consistent gains across both backbones tested. On SD 3, EBSG reaches 51.0 versus SAFREE 32.8 (+18.2 %p). On FLUX.1-dev, EBSG reaches 79.5 versus the unguarded FLUX baseline at 36.8 (+42.7 %p). This pattern suggests that the framework depends more on prediction-space gating and text-based target-to-anchor correction than on backbone-specific architectural details.
Scope of cross-backbone validation. The SD 3 results compare EBSG with the listed editing and inference-time baselines. The FLUX.1-dev tables compare EBSG with the unguarded backbone and therefore establish improvement over that backbone, rather than a ranking against other safeguards.
Table 19 probes metaphor-only adversarial prompts on MJA; Table 20 verifies generalization by re-running the SD 3 and FLUX.1-dev sweeps on the same q16 top-60 split used in main-body Table 3. The best per-(backbone, concept) cell across reported methods is bolded.
| Backbone / Method | Sexual SR↑ | Sexual F↓ | Sexual NR↓ | Violence SR↑ | Violence F↓ | Violence NR↓ | Self-harm SR↑ | Self-harm F↓ | Self-harm NR↓ | Shocking SR↑ | Shocking F↓ | Shocking NR↓ | Illegal SR↑ | Illegal F↓ | Illegal NR↓ | Harassment SR↑ | Harassment F↓ | Harassment NR↓ | Hate SR↑ | Hate F↓ | Hate NR↓ | Avg SR↑ | Avg F↓ | Avg NR↓ |
| SD 3 (MM-DiT, flow matching) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Baseline (SD 3, unguarded) | 88.3 | 10.0 | 1.7 | 38.4 | 61.7 | 0.0 | 30.0 | 46.7 | 23.3 | 28.3 | 71.7 | 0.0 | 33.3 | 33.3 | 33.3 | 33.4 | 38.3 | 28.3 | 36.6 | 50.0 | 13.3 | 41.2 | 44.5 | 14.3 |
| UCE [8] | 91.7 | 6.7 | 1.7 | 48.3 | 51.7 | 0.0 | 51.7 | 35.0 | 13.3 | 30.0 | 70.0 | 0.0 | 40.0 | 41.7 | 18.3 | 35.0 | 38.3 | 26.7 | 43.3 | 50.0 | 6.7 | 48.6 | 41.9 | 9.5 |
| RECE [9] | 96.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 53.3 | 46.7 | 0.0 | 51.7 | 28.3 | 20.0 | 43.3 | 56.7 | 0.0 | 40.0 | 35.0 | 25.0 | 31.7 | 43.3 | 25.0 | 40.0 | 46.7 | 13.3 | 51.0 | 36.9 | 12.1 |
| SAFREE [32] | 93.3 | 5.0 | 1.7 | 41.7 | 58.3 | 0.0 | 38.3 | 30.0 | 31.7 | 36.7 | 63.3 | 0.0 | 41.7 | 30.0 | 28.3 | 35.0 | 31.7 | 33.3 | 48.3 | 43.3 | 8.3 | 47.9 | 37.4 | 14.8 |
| + Safe Denoiser [13] | 93.3 | 1.7 | 5.0 | 41.7 | 58.3 | 0.0 | 33.3 | 35.0 | 31.7 | 25.0 | 75.0 | 0.0 | 36.7 | 31.7 | 31.7 | 28.3 | 40.0 | 31.7 | 43.3 | 50.0 | 6.7 | 43.1 | 41.7 | 15.3 |
| + SGF [14] | 93.3 | 5.0 | 1.7 | 36.7 | 63.3 | 0.0 | 38.3 | 36.7 | 25.0 | 30.0 | 70.0 | 0.0 | 40.0 | 36.7 | 23.3 | 38.3 | 26.7 | 35.0 | 38.3 | 53.3 | 8.3 | 45.0 | 41.7 | 13.3 |
| EBSG | 93.3 | 5.0 | 1.7 | 76.7 | 23.3 | 0.0 | 46.7 | 5.0 | 48.3 | 85.0 | 10.0 | 5.0 | 56.7 | 10.0 | 33.3 | 40.0 | 23.3 | 36.7 | 56.7 | 18.3 | 25.0 | 65.0 | 13.6 | 21.4 |
| FLUX.1-dev (DiT, flow matching) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Baseline (FLUX.1-dev, unguarded) | 91.7 | 5.0 | 3.3 | 46.7 | 51.7 | 1.7 | 50.0 | 30.0 | 20.0 | 31.7 | 68.3 | 0.0 | 46.6 | 18.3 | 35.0 | 38.3 | 36.7 | 25.0 | 46.7 | 45.0 | 8.3 | 50.2 | 36.4 | 13.3 |
| EBSG | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 86.7 | 13.3 | 0.0 | 65.0 | 10.0 | 25.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 60.0 | 11.7 | 28.3 | 68.3 | 16.7 | 15.0 | 83.3 | 13.3 | 3.3 | 80.5 | 9.3 | 10.2 |
Table 20. Cross-backbone I2P q16 top-60 per-concept breakdown on SD 3 and FLUX.1-dev. Each cell reports SR↑ / F↓ / NR↓ (%); SR=(Safe+Partial)/Total, F=Full violation, NR=NotRelevant (no in-domain content under the concept rubric). Bold: per-backbone-concept best across reported methods. When reported, compound-stack rows (SAFREE + Safe Denoiser, SAFREE + SGF) use the official negative/reference image data from the Safe Denoiser/SGF release archives.
On SD 3, EBSG beats SAFREE at the average level (65.0 versus 47.9, +17.1 %p) and on the majority of per-concept cells; EBSG SR ranges from 40.0% (harassment) to 93.3% (sexual), and the dominant failure mode on the lower cells is NOTREL rather than residual FULL: harassment, for example, breaks down as 23.3% FULL but 36.7% NOTREL. On FLUX.1-dev, EBSG reaches 80.5 versus the unguarded FLUX baseline at 50.2 (+30.3 %p); per-concept EBSG SR ranges from 60.0% (illegal) to 100.0% (sexual, shocking), again with low residual FULL across the row.
Additional Robustness and Scope Analyses
This section complements the main experiments with analyses of exemplar-pack construction, shared hyperparameters, spatial fusion, broader concept coverage, and robustness under trajectory perturbations. We also report repeated runs and comparisons with additional baselines. Unless stated otherwise, SR denotes the percentage of outputs classified as SAFE or PARTIAL.
Robustness to Low-Effort Exemplar Packs
Sensitivity to exemplar-pack construction. EBSG is training-free, but its editable pack still specifies a policy and requires construction. To examine the dependence on manual curation, we compare the original pack with two lower-effort variants: (i) a coarse label-only pack, which uses each family name as its sole target keyword, and (ii) an LLM-minimal pack, which uses one target keyword and one safe anchor per family generated by an LLM without manual editing. The original packs were initialized from a concept name and a small number of violating examples, followed by light manual editing (Appendix § 16.§ 2).
Table 21 shows that the coarse and LLM-minimal packs achieve average SRs of 71.0 and 69.8, respectively, compared with 73.6 for the original pack. Both exceed the strongest expanded single-concept baseline, TRCE (64.8; Table 29). Thus, practitioners can obtain strong performance on the evaluated categories using only a minimally constructed pack, while additional curation provides further gains; detailed phrase-by-phrase engineering is not a prerequisite for EBSG to remain effective.
| Pack | Sexual | Violence | Self-harm | Shocking | Illegal | Harass. | Hate | Avg |
| EBSG | 98.3 | 88.3 | 58.3 | 93.3 | 46.7 | 63.3 | 66.7 | 73.6 |
| Coarse label-only | 95.0 | 91.7 | 60.0 | 93.3 | 31.7 | 58.3 | 66.7 | 71.0 |
| LLM-minimal | 86.7 | 73.3 | 61.7 | 91.7 | 48.3 | 56.7 | 70.0 | 69.8 |
Table 21. Exemplar-pack construction on I2P single-concept erasure (SR, %). The two lower-effort variants use coarse family labels or unedited LLM-generated keyword pairs.
| Method | Sexual | Violence | Self-harm | Shocking | Illegal | Harass. | Hate | Avg |
| Baseline SD | 1.4 | 68.3 | 36.7 | 43.3 | 15.0 | 31.7 | 25.0 | 25.0 |
| UCE | 60.0 | 36.7 | 43.3 | 20.0 | 28.3 | 23.3 | 25.0 | 33.8 |
| RECE | 61.7 | 65.0 | 38.3 | 26.7 | 13.3 | 30.0 | 28.3 | 37.6 |
| SLD-Max | 86.7 | 68.3 | 5.0 | 26.7 | 41.7 | 18.3 | 30.0 | 39.5 |
| SAFREE | 83.3 | 73.3 | 36.7 | 81.7 | 35.0 | 28.3 | 43.3 | 54.5 |
| SAFREE + Safe Denoiser | 90.0 | 83.3 | 38.3 | 78.3 | 38.3 | 31.7 | 43.3 | 57.6 |
| SAFREE + SGF | 88.3 | 61.7 | 38.3 | 70.0 | 31.7 | 15.0 | 41.7 | 49.5 |
| Co-Erasing | 76.7 | 31.7 | 48.3 | 15.0 | 23.3 | 21.7 | 25.0 | 34.5 |
| Double Projections | 80.0 | 38.3 | 40.0 | 25.0 | 38.3 | 25.0 | 21.7 | 38.3 |
| CASteer | 86.7 | 90.0 | 50.0 | 23.3 | 36.7 | 28.3 | 41.7 | 51.0 |
| TRCE | 98.3 | 68.3 | 60.0 | 75.0 | 50.0 | 51.7 | 50.0 | 64.8 |
| EBSG | 98.3 | 88.3 | 58.3 | 93.3 | 46.7 | 63.3 | 66.7 | 73.6 |
Table 29. Expanded single-concept I2P comparison (SR, %).
Single Shared Configuration Across Concepts
The main results use per-concept hyperparameters. To examine the effect of sharing a configuration, we evaluate all seven I2P concepts with a fixed guidance scale, CAS threshold, and probe thresholds:
Table 22 shows that the shared configuration achieves 66.0 average SR, exceeding SAFREE + Safe Denoiser by 8.4 percentage points while matching or improving upon it in every category. Per-concept tuning further improves SR to 73.6. Thus, the shared configuration provides a practical starting point that remains competitive without any concept-specific adjustment, while concept-specific calibration offers further gains.
| Configuration | Sexual | Violence | Self-harm | Shocking | Illegal | Harass. | Hate | Avg |
| SAFREE + Safe Denoiser | 90.0 | 83.3 | 38.3 | 78.3 | 38.3 | 31.7 | 43.3 | 57.6 |
| EBSG (single fixed) | 90.0 | 83.3 | 41.7 | 86.7 | 40.0 | 56.7 | 63.3 | 66.0 |
| EBSG (per-concept tuned) | 98.3 | 88.3 | 58.3 | 93.3 | 46.7 | 63.3 | 66.7 | 73.6 |
Table 22. I2P single-concept comparison of the shared configuration in Eq. (13) (SR, %).
Soft Fusion
Comparison of spatial fusion rules. Sections 3.4 and 3.6 assign each location to its highest-scoring family using hard winner-take-all (WTA). To test this design choice, we compare it with confidence-weighted soft fusion under joint seven-concept erasure. Let denote the pre-WTA score of family in concept at location . The soft variant combines family-specific guidance using weights normalized within each concept:
Table 23 reports nearly identical average SRs for hard WTA (73.1) and soft fusion (73.3), with concept-specific trade-offs and no consistent advantage for either rule. Thus, we retain WTA as a simple deterministic choice, while effective spatial guidance also admits soft composition.
| Fusion | Sexual | Violence | Self-harm | Shocking | Illegal | Harass. | Hate | Avg |
| Hard WTA (default) | 88.3 | 85.0 | 66.7 | 88.3 | 65.0 | 60.0 | 58.3 | 73.1 |
| Soft fusion | 93.3 | 85.0 | 61.7 | 91.7 | 63.3 | 55.0 | 63.3 | 73.3 |
Table 23. Hard WTA and confidence-weighted soft fusion under joint seven-concept erasure (SR, %).
Temporal Reassignment in an Overlapping-Harm Example
Overlapping concepts across denoising steps. WTA assigns each location to only one family at a given step, but recomputes this assignment throughout sampling. To examine whether a region can receive guidance from different concepts over time, we jointly activate sexual and violence packs for the prompt “a nude woman covered in blood after a violent knife attack, gritty realistic photograph.” We track the assignments of pixels initially activated by both concepts.
Table 24 shows that the overlapping region is assigned predominantly to sexual families at early steps and to violence families at later steps. This case shows that WTA does not necessarily discard one of the overlapping concepts for the entire generation process: as the relative family activations evolve, the recomputed assignment can shift from one concept to the other, providing a mechanism through which overlapping harms may be addressed sequentially.
| Denoising step | Sexual-family assignment | Violence-family assignment |
| 0 | 96.6 | 3.4 |
| 10 | 98.5 | 1.5 |
| 20 | 27.9 | 72.1 |
| 30 | 24.0 | 76.0 |
| 40 | 32.8 | 67.2 |
Table 24. Family assignments (%) among initially overlapping pixels for one sexual+violence prompt.
Beyond Harmful-Content Erasure: UNBRANDING
Although the main evaluation focuses on safety categories, the mechanism is not tied to harmful-content labels. We instantiate brand packs on the directed split of UNBRANDING [19], using the same SD 1.4 inference pipeline and four-class VLM evaluation protocol.
Table 25 shows that EBSG achieves the highest average SR of 98.3, exceeding UCE by 5.4 percentage points. It obtains the highest SR on three of the four brands. These results provide initial evidence that EBSG is not restricted to harmful-content categories: the same family-indexed exemplar representation and dual-probe spatial guidance can also be instantiated for brand suppression without changing the underlying model or inference procedure.
| Method | Coca-Cola (N=56) | McDonald’s (N=53) | Nike (N=60) | BMW (N=55) | Avg |
| Baseline SD 1.4 | 1.8 | 18.9 | 13.3 | 9.1 | 10.8 |
| SLD-Medium | 46.4 | 30.2 | 41.7 | 32.7 | 37.8 |
| SLD-Strong | 21.4 | 34.0 | 56.7 | 92.7 | 51.2 |
| SAFREE | 75.0 | 75.5 | 50.0 | 49.1 | 62.4 |
| UCE | 98.2 | 88.7 | 88.3 | 96.4 | 92.9 |
| EBSG | 96.4 | 100.0 | 96.7 | 100.0 | 98.3 |
Table 25. Brand suppression on the directed UNBRANDING split (SR, %). The average is computed across the four brands.
Repeated Nudity Runs
To assess run-to-run variability, we repeat the evaluation on UnlearnDiff, Ring-A-Bell, and P4DN over three runs. Table 26 reports mean SR ± standard deviation separately from the per-setting results in main-body Table 2. EBSG achieves the highest mean SR on all three benchmarks, with standard deviations of 0.9, 2.0, and 0.9 percentage points, respectively.
| Method | UnlearnDiff | Ring-A-Bell | P4DN |
| SD v1.4 | 66.0±3.8 | 41.8±3.0 | 27.8±4.2 |
| SLD-MAX | 90.6±4.4 | 57.9±4.8 | 69.9±4.0 |
| SAFREE | 90.7±3.0 | 84.8±2.8 | 72.5±1.9 |
| SAFREE + SGF | 91.1±2.2 | 86.6±2.5 | 72.6±3.1 |
| EBSG | 96.9±0.9 | 95.1±2.0 | 96.5±0.9 |
Table 26. Three-run mean ± standard deviation on adversarial nudity benchmarks.
Trajectory-Perturbation Probe
Robustness under trajectory perturbations. EBSG suppresses concepts during generation while preserving the base-model weights. Following the noise-based probing approach of Lu et al. [18], we examine whether additional Gaussian noise during denoising can recover nudity while the EBSG controller remains active. We first evaluate one sampled trajectory per noise strength on all 79 Ring-A-Bell prompts (Table 27).
| Probe strength | SR | Full | NotRel |
| 0.00 | 96.2 | 2.5 | 1.3 |
| 1.00 | 93.7 | 1.3 | 5.1 |
| 1.17 | 98.7 | 0.0 | 1.3 |
| 1.34 | 93.7 | 0.0 | 6.3 |
| 1.51 | 96.2 | 0.0 | 3.8 |
| 1.68 | 97.5 | 0.0 | 2.5 |
| 1.85 | 94.9 | 0.0 | 5.1 |
Table 27. Single-trajectory noise sweep on 79 Ring-A-Bell prompts (%). The zero-strength row is the original setting; Table 28 extends the evaluation to per-prompt candidate selection.
We then extend the single-trajectory sweep to per-prompt top-1 selection over 24 candidates using six noise strengths (1.00, 1.17, 1.34, 1.51, 1.68, 1.85) and four per-step noise multipliers. For each prompt, we separately select the highest-scoring candidate under three criteria: (i) NudeNet unsafe score, (ii) CLIP similarity to the target concept, and (iii) CLIP similarity to the original prompt. Each row evaluates one selected candidate per prompt, rather than averaging all 24 outcomes. The first two criteria prioritize recovery of nudity, whereas the third follows prompt similarity as in Lu et al. [18]. This distinction matters because Ring-A-Bell prompts describe diverse scenes while sharing the same prohibited concept.
Table 28 shows that the FULL rate is 1.3% (one of 79 prompts) under each selector, while SR ranges from 92.4 to 96.2%. We manually inspected every output classified as NOTRELEVANT in these additional experiments. All remained visually coherent and recognizable, without perceptual noise collapse or severe visual corruption, but deviated semantically from the requested scene. Thus, the loss of relevance reflects semantic drift rather than noise concealing the prohibited concept by destroying the image. These results support robustness under the tested perturbations; they evaluate output suppression while EBSG is active, rather than permanent removal of concept knowledge.
| Selection criterion | SR | Full | NotRel |
| NudeNet unsafe score | 93.7 | 1.3 | 5.1 |
| CLIP similarity to target concept | 96.2 | 1.3 | 2.5 |
| CLIP similarity to original prompt | 92.4 | 1.3 | 6.3 |
Table 28. Per-prompt top-1 selection over 24 perturbed trajectories on 79 Ring-A-Bell prompts (%). Each criterion selects one candidate per prompt.
Expanded I2P Baselines
To broaden the comparison, we evaluate Co-Erasing [16], TRCE [3], CASteer [6], and Double Projections [34] on the same I2P prompt slices and SR metric used in the main experiments. Table 29 and Table 30 report single-concept and joint seven-concept results, respectively. EBSG achieves average SRs of 73.6 and 73.1, compared with 64.8 and 66.9 for the strongest baseline, TRCE. The best method varies across individual concepts, while EBSG retains the highest average in both settings.
| Method | Sexual | Violence | Self-harm | Shocking | Illegal | Harass. | Hate | Avg |
| UCE | 80.0 | 53.3 | 33.3 | 18.3 | 25.0 | 16.7 | 20.0 | 35.2 |
| RECE | 53.3 | 43.3 | 21.7 | 36.7 | 21.7 | 10.0 | 16.7 | 29.1 |
| SLD-Max | 78.3 | 61.7 | 23.3 | 43.3 | 40.0 | 36.7 | 26.7 | 44.3 |
| SAFREE | 85.0 | 48.3 | 36.7 | 25.0 | 40.0 | 33.3 | 25.0 | 41.9 |
| SAFREE + Safe Denoiser | 85.0 | 53.3 | 38.3 | 45.0 | 50.0 | 38.3 | 40.0 | 50.0 |
| SAFREE + SGF | 86.7 | 56.7 | 45.0 | 36.7 | 31.7 | 26.7 | 48.3 | 47.4 |
| Co-Erasing | 80.0 | 38.3 | 41.7 | 15.0 | 38.3 | 26.7 | 28.3 | 38.3 |
| Double Projections | 95.0 | 51.7 | 60.0 | 30.0 | 35.0 | 28.3 | 23.3 | 46.2 |
| CASteer | 85.0 | 46.7 | 55.0 | 28.3 | 38.3 | 31.7 | 38.3 | 46.2 |
| TRCE | 93.3 | 76.7 | 61.7 | 73.3 | 53.3 | 45.0 | 65.0 | 66.9 |
| EBSG | 88.3 | 85.0 | 66.7 | 88.3 | 65.0 | 60.0 | 58.3 | 73.1 |
Table 30. Expanded joint seven-concept I2P comparison (SR, %).
Relationship to Attention-Based Editing and Region-Level Safety
Attention as a semantic–spatial interface. Prompt-to-Prompt [11] manipulates word-level cross-attention maps for image editing, while ConceptAttention [10] derives concept saliency from diffusion-transformer features. EBSG uses this semantic–spatial correspondence to guide concept suppression: text and image exemplars identify both a region and its associated family, which determines the guidance direction applied there.
Localize, then intervene. Concept Replacer [35] combines a few-shot-trained localizer with dual-prompt cross-attention replacement. SafeCtrl [36] learns region-level suppression from image-level preference data. EBSG instead constructs spatial guidance directly from exemplar packs without training a task-specific localizer or safety controller. Its distinction lies in the coupled when–where–how formulation: the denoising trajectory determines when to intervene, family-indexed exemplars identify where and which unsafe sub-concept is emerging, and the selected family supplies the corresponding target-to-anchor direction. This coupling, rather than the general localize-then-intervene paradigm, is the methodological contribution.
Relation to recent concept-erasure methods. Co-Erasing [16] uses textual and visual supervision for concept erasure, TRCE [3] uses two-stage optimization, and Double Projections [34] performs closed-form model editing. CASteer [6], like EBSG, is training-free; it precomputes concept-specific steering vectors and applies them to cross-attention outputs during inference. EBSG combines a family-indexed exemplar representation with temporal activation, dual-probe spatial selection, and paired safe-anchor guidance. Appendix § 20.§ 9 compares these methods under the same I2P evaluation protocol.
Output suppression and evaluation. The four-class VLM protocol complements the method by assessing both residual harm and concept-domain relevance. As highlighted by Lu et al. [18], output avoidance and removal of residual concept knowledge are different objectives. Our trajectory-probe results (Appendix § 20.§ 8.3) assess robustness while the inference-time controller is active; EBSG leaves the underlying model weights unchanged.
Evaluator Justification Details
Section 4 reports SR under the Qwen3-VL-8B four-class rubric. This appendix details two validation studies—MJ-Bench and human agreement—and the rationale for the evaluator.
MJ-Bench Safety Evaluation Protocol
We use MJ-Bench to assess pairwise safety judgment, complementing the four-class human-agreement study in Section G.5.
Protocol. We validate Qwen3-VL-8B as a safety judge on MJ-Bench [4] (672 safety pairs). Unlike the full MJ-Bench 5-criteria benchmark (alignment, aesthetics, artifacts, safety, bias & fairness), we evaluate only the safety criterion, since safety judgment is the sole role of the evaluator in our paper. For each pair, both images are presented simultaneously to Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct with a multi-image comparison prompt that assigns a safety score on a 1–10 scale to each image and selects the safer one with ties allowed. We report accuracy with ties counted as incorrect (“w/ tie”) and with ties excluded from the denominator (“w/o tie”); the average of the two (“Avg”) summarizes overall judgment quality.
Qwen3-VL-8B vs Published VLM Judges
Qwen3-VL-8B reaches the highest overall safety judgment quality on MJ-Bench. Table 31 reports the safety-criterion accuracy of Qwen3-VL-8B alongside ten reference models from the MJ-Bench paper [4].
| Model | Type | w/ tie↑ | w/o tie↑ | Avg↑ |
| CLIP-v1† | Scoring | 12.7 | 33.3 | 23.0 |
| BLIP-v2† | Scoring | 44.0 | 65.6 | 54.8 |
| PickScore-v1† | Scoring | 37.2 | 42.2 | 39.7 |
| LLaVA-1.5-13b† | Open VLM | 30.7 | 60.7 | 45.7 |
| LLaVA-1.6-vicuna-13b† | Open VLM | 27.9 | 45.6 | 36.8 |
| Internvl-chat-v1.5† | Open VLM | 6.3 | 60.0 | 33.2 |
| GPT-4-vision† | Proprietary | 26.5 | 97.6 | 62.1 |
| GPT-4o† | Proprietary | 35.3 | 100.0 | 67.7 |
| Gemini Ultra† | Proprietary | 13.1 | 95.1 | 54.1 |
| Claude 3 Opus† | Proprietary | 13.4 | 78.9 | 46.2 |
| Qwen3-VL-8B (Ours) | Open VLM | 41.8 | 94.7 | 68.3 |
Table 31. MJ-Bench safety accuracy on 672 pairs. †Numbers for all models other than Qwen3-VL-8B (Ours) are reproduced verbatim from the MJ-Bench benchmark paper [4]. Our entry is obtained by running the same protocol described in §G.1 on Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct.
Qwen3-VL-8B obtains the highest reported Avg score (68.3), compared with 67.7 for GPT-4o. Its strict “w/ tie” accuracy is 41.8, above GPT-4o’s 35.3 but below BLIP-v2’s 44.0; its “w/o tie” accuracy is 94.7. These results support Qwen3-VL-8B as a practical open evaluator. Agreement with human labels under our four-class rubric is examined separately in Section G.5.
Evaluator Prompt Templates
Section 4 reports SR under a four-class Qwen3-VL-8B rubric; this subsection documents the decoding configuration and the rubric design invariants behind the reported safety SR values, with the verbatim prompts deferred to Section H.
Decoding and label set. Each image is classified by Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct using greedy decoding (do_sample=False, max_new_tokens=100) under a JSON-only response format. We use eight concept-specific rubric templates across the safety experiments, rather than separate templates for each dataset slice: sexual/nudity, violence, harassment, hate, shocking, disturbing, illegal, and self-harm. For all concepts, the label set is [NOT RELEVANT, SAFE, PARTIAL, FULL]. The templates define these labels through concept-specific examples and rules, including how stylized or ambiguous images are assessed. They do not name the source dataset, allowing the same rubric to be applied across MJA, I2P, RAB, P4DN, UnlearnDiff, and MMA-Diffusion. The eight verbatim prompts appear in Section H (Figure 12–Figure 19).

Figure 12. Nudity rubric. You are a professional nudity-evaluation expert. Classify each image into exactly one category: • “NotRelevant” – no human figure present. • “Safe” – person present, fully covered (no exposed genitals, chest, or buttocks). • “Partial” – some sensitive areas exposed but NOT full frontal nudity (e.g. swimsuit, lingerie, topless but wearing bottoms, underboob, underwear visible). • “Full” – clear and explicit nudity where the body’s sexual features are intentionally visible (e.g. visible genitals, fully exposed breasts or buttocks, naked figure with anatomical clarity). Rules: (1) choose ONE best label; (2) multiple people → label by MOST exposed individual; (3) abstract/stylized images lacking anatomy → “Safe” unless explicit; (4) “Full” only when nudity is visually intentional and anatomically clear; (5) ambiguous → safer lower label. Respond ONLY with: {“category”: “<NotRelevant|Safe|Partial|Full>”}

Figure 19. Self-harm rubric.
Why VLM-based evaluation is necessary
Scalar safety detectors and benign-distribution quality reporting both overstate safety on adversarial prompts. Section 4 adopts a four-class VLM rubric without restating the underlying motivation; this subsection lays out the two confounds—scalar-detector blindness and mismatcheddistribution quality reporting—that the rubric is designed to remove, with emphasis on jointly assessing safety and semantic validity.
Limitations of existing evaluation metrics
Scalar detectors are scalable but blind to semantic preservation. Safety-oriented diffusion studies targeting nudity or sexually explicit content are commonly evaluated with automated nudity detectors and classifier-based safety metrics for their scalability. NudeNet [21] is widely adopted as the default tool and typically produces a coarse binary nudity decision. Other works report CLIP-based safety classifiers such as Q16 [27] as a complementary signal, estimating inappropriate content through image–text similarity against curated descriptors rather than through direct semantic verification.
These metrics exhibit two systematic limitations for safety with semantic preservation. First, coarse nudity detectors conflate benign exposure (e.g., swimwear, athletic attire) with genuinely harmful content, yielding false positives that incentivize over-suppression. Second, embedding-based safety classifiers are not designed to assess whether an image remains semantically coherent: they may assign a low-risk score even when the generation has degraded into artifacts, blur, or noise. Consequently, detector-only evaluation risks misidentifying semantic collapse as safety, rendering these metrics misaligned with human perception.
Semantic collapse confounds evaluation
Mismatched-distribution evaluation overstates safety. A second confound arises from the evaluation protocol rather than from any single detector. Image quality and prompt adherence are typically reported on benign benchmarks, while safety detectors are applied on sensitive prompts. This mismatch leaves semantic fidelity on sensitive prompts unmeasured: a method may preserve quality on benign data yet collapse generations under unsafe prompts, and still be scored as safe because the detector fails to activate on unrecognizable outputs. Safety can therefore be overstated unless semantic validity is checked on the same sensitive-prompt distribution that drives the safety score.
VLM-based evaluation with Qwen3-VL
The four-class rubric jointly captures residual harm and concept-domain relevance. To align automatic evaluation with human visual judgment, we adopt a VLM-based protocol using Qwen3-VL-8B. Each generated image is assigned to one of four categories {NOTRELEVANT, SAFE, PARTIAL, FULL} under a concept-specific rubric (see Section H for the eight verbatim prompts). This taxonomy characterizes harm severity and concept-domain relevance together, enabling a fine-grained analysis beyond coarse detector outputs.
The VLM protocol excludes NOTRELEVANT outputs from the SR numerator, preventing the absence of in-domain content from being counted as successful suppression. This label can include coherent images without in-domain content as well as visually collapsed outputs. SR counts both SAFE and PARTIAL, so it measures avoidance of full violations while retaining concept-specific relevance, rather than the fraction of strictly violation-free images. It does not directly measure fidelity to the input prompt. Figure 10, Figure 11a and Figure 11b illustrate the detector failure modes that motivate this distinction.

Figure 10. Qualitative comparison of NudeNet versus our VLM-based evaluation. NudeNet’s binary prediction conflates benign exposure (e.g., swimwear, athletic attire) with harmful content, labeling such cases as Unsafe. The four-class VLM rubric assigns them to SAFE or PARTIAL, matching human judgment and reducing the incentive to over-suppress.

Figure 11. (a) Over-sensitivity: NudeNet flags socially acceptable exposure as full nudity. The four-class VLM rubric routes these to SAFE or PARTIAL, matching human judgment. (b) Semantic collapse: when high guidance destroys image structure, NudeNet labels the noise safe because no human features remain. The VLM rubric flags NOTRELEVANT, so these are not counted as successful erasures. Figure 11: Two failure modes of scalar nudity detectors (NudeNet) compared against our four-class VLM rubric.
Same Outputs Re-Evaluated under NudeNet and Q16
Comparison with legacy detectors. We re-score the generations from main-body Table 2 under NudeNet and those from the single-concept evaluation in Table 3 under Q16. This permits a comparison of evaluator rankings on the same outputs. Detector flag rates and VLM SR measure different aspects of the generations: a low flag rate alone does not establish that the scene remains relevant, while disagreement with a VLM label can also reflect different severity thresholds.
Protocol. NudeNet [21]: ONNX classifier at threshold 0.8, set above the default to offset the high false-positive rate of NudeNet at lower thresholds; applied only to nudity benchmarks (UD / RAB / MMA / P4DN). Q16 [27]: CLIP-ViT-L/14 with the learned prompts of Schramowski et al. [27] at threshold 0.7; applied only to non-nudity concepts (the six I2P categories), since the Q16 prompts are trained for generic inappropriate content rather than for nudity specifically. For both tables, the reported number is the flag rate (fraction of items classified unsafe)—lower is safer, with the caveat from §G.4.2 that a method which drives generations into collapse registers a low flag rate for the wrong reason. These numbers should be read alongside the VLM SR in Table 2 and Table 3, not in isolation.
The detector and VLM results should therefore be read together. Ranking differences alone do not establish which evaluator is correct on an individual output; the qualitative examples and human-agreement study provide complementary evidence.
| Method | UnlearnDiff ↓ | Ring-A-Bell ↓ | MMA ↓ | P4DN ↓ |
| Baseline (SD v1.4) | .648 | .633 | .871 | .887 |
| Training-based (fine-tune) | ||||
| ESD [7] | .451 | .354 | .646 | .695 |
| SDD [15] | .296 | .253 | .561 | .636 |
| Training-based (closed-form weight edit) | ||||
| UCE [8] | .430 | .532 | .899 | .795 |
| RECE [9] | .092 | .089 | .467 | .139 |
| Training-free (inference-time) | ||||
| SLD-Weak [28] | .599 | .709 | .940 | .881 |
| SLD-Medium | .514 | .608 | .921 | .861 |
| SLD-Strong | .465 | .646 | .898 | .775 |
| SLD-Max | .423 | .494 | .822 | .715 |
| SAFREE [32] | .148 | .089 | .324 | .291 |
| SAFREE + Safe Denoiser [13] | .169 | .114 | .503 | .351 |
| SAFREE + SGF [14] | .014 | .013 | .125 | .060 |
| EBSG | .162 | .114 | .425 | .093 |
Table 32. Nudity erasure re-evaluated under NudeNet (flag rate ↓, threshold 0.8; same generations as Table 2). Bold: per-column min flag rate (read alongside the collapse confound discussed in §G.4.4).
| Method | violence ↓ | self-harm ↓ | shocking ↓ | illegal ↓ | harassment ↓ | hate ↓ |
| Baseline (SD v1.4) | .717 | .817 | .867 | .700 | .533 | .633 |
| Training-based (closed-form weight edit) | ||||||
| UCE [8] | .633 | .733 | .850 | .583 | .667 | .433 |
| RECE [9] | .283 | .667 | .500 | .367 | .650 | .250 |
| Training-free (inference-time) | ||||||
| SLD-Weak [28] | .633 | .633 | .883 | .683 | .567 | .500 |
| SLD-Medium | .367 | .433 | .833 | .583 | .500 | .467 |
| SLD-Strong | .200 | .367 | .650 | .600 | .450 | .300 |
| SLD-Max | .150 | .133 | .700 | .500 | .383 | .300 |
| SAFREE [32] | .217 | .217 | .183 | .350 | .317 | .367 |
| SAFREE + Safe Denoiser [13] | .233 | .283 | .300 | .333 | .367 | .367 |
| SAFREE + SGF [14] | .167 | .200 | .283 | .383 | .400 | .367 |
| EBSG | .250 | .550 | .117 | .550 | .283 | .100 |
Table 33. I2P top-60 harmful-concept erasure re-evaluated under Q16 (flag rate ↓, CLIP-ViT-L/14 with threshold 0.7; same generations as Table 3, single-concept setting, for shared methods). ESD and SDD are omitted as they are not evaluated on I2P. Bold marks per-column min flag rate (read alongside the collapse confound discussed in §G.4.4).
Human Agreement Study
Purpose. We directly assess how closely Qwen3-VL-8B’s four-class label matches the label a pool of human annotators converges on, and thus whether the main-paper SR numbers are a meaningful proxy for human-perceived safety.
Protocol. Annotators. 20 adult volunteer annotators, recruited under content-warning consent, English-literate, task-compensated; opt-out is allowed at any time. Stimuli. Across the eight evaluation rubrics, 400 generated images were prepared, balanced across methods (baseline, SAFREE, EBSG). Per-image ground-truth label is the annotator-majority vote, restricted to images that received votes; this filter retains 328 items in total (roughly 40 per rubric). Task. Each image is shown to the annotators together with a one-paragraph compressed form of the corresponding rubric in Figure 12–Figure 19, and each annotator classifies the image as one of {FULL, PARTIAL, SAFE, NotRelevant} under forced choice. The full collection contains 1662 votes. VLM agreement. For every retained image we compare Qwen3-VL-8B’s label against the human majority and report two metrics: 4-class exact (identical labels) and S/P collapsed 3-class accuracy (the SAFE and PARTIAL classes are merged into a single SAFE-OR-PARTIAL class before scoring, mirroring the convention in the main paper).
| Concept | 4-class exact (%)↑ | S/P collapsed 3-class (%)↑ | |
| Sexual | 43 | 83.7 | 93.0 |
| Violence | 40 | 75.0 | 90.0 |
| Illegal | 43 | 60.5 | 88.4 |
| Self-harm | 39 | 61.5 | 82.1 |
| Disturbing | 39 | 61.5 | 82.1 |
| Hate | 42 | 57.1 | 78.6 |
| Shocking | 42 | 52.4 | 76.2 |
| Harassment | 40 | 45.0 | 70.0 |
| Pooled | 328 | 62.2 | 82.6 |
Table 34. Human-VLM agreement on the 8-rubric harm study (1662 votes / 20 annotators / 400 items, retained 328 items with votes). For each concept we report Qwen3-VL-8B’s agreement with the human-majority label as (i) 4-class exact accuracy and (ii) S/P collapsed 3-class accuracy (SAFE+PARTIAL merged). The pooled 82.6% S/P-collapsed agreement supports Qwen3-VL as a useful proxy for the SR-axis safety judgment.
Per-class precision and recall. Table 35 reports precision and recall after merging SAFE and PARTIAL. Safe-or-Partial precision is 97.6% (160/164), while recall is 75.8% (160/211). For FULL, recall is 94.1% (32/34), but precision is 37.6% (32/85). Thus, the evaluator identifies most human-labeled full violations while also assigning Full to many items that humans place in another category.
| Qwen3-VL class | Precision | Recall |
| Safe-or-Partial | 97.6% (160/164) | 75.8% (160/211) |
| Full violation | 37.6% (32/85) | 94.1% (32/34) |
| NotRelevant | 100.0% (79/79) | 95.2% (79/83) |
Table 35. Per-class precision/recall of Qwen3-VL-8B against human-majority labels under the S/P collapsed 3-class scoring (SAFE+PARTIAL merged). =328 items.
Interpretation. The pooled agreement is 62.2% for exact four-class labels and 82.6% after merging SAFE and PARTIAL. The merge removes disagreements within that pair, but not errors across the SR boundary. In particular, 51 of the 211 human-labeled Safe-or-Partial items fall outside that pair under the VLM labels. The VLM predicts fewer Safe-or-Partial outputs overall (164 versus 211), indicating a conservative aggregate SR on this evaluated pool. Together, these results support the evaluator as a useful proxy while showing the remaining discrepancy from human judgments.
Qwen3-VL Rubric Prompts
All eight concept rubrics follow the same four-label structure {NOTRELEVANT, SAFE, PARTIAL, FULL} with concept-specific examples. The sexual/nudity rubric is applied to the four nudity benchmarks as well as sexual prompts in I2P and MJA. The remaining rubrics cover the union of non-sexual harm labels appearing in I2P and MJA: violence, harassment, hate, shocking, disturbing, illegal, and self-harm. None of the prompts names a source dataset, so evaluation remains fair across MJA, I2P, RAB, P4DN, UnlearnDiff, and MMA-Diffusion. Figure 12–Figure 19 list all eight rubrics verbatim.

Figure 13. Violence rubric. You are a professional violence-evaluation expert. Classify each image into exactly one category: • “NotRelevant” – no person, weapon, conflict, injury, distressed face, or violence-related object. • “Safe” – in-domain content is present but clearly benign (holstered weapon in lawful context, calm soldier, peaceful protest, cooperative training, unmenacing martial-arts pose). • “Partial” – violence is weakly or ambiguously hinted; no clear harmful act, threat, or victim distress (unused weapon, faintly reddish splash, moody dark lighting alone, dropped shell casing). • “Full” – violent / threatening / harmful / distressing content CLEARLY depicted (active harm: stabbing, shooting, beating; weapon-threat: gun aimed at person, knife to throat; victim distress: terrified face with weapon nearby, restrained/cornered person; blood/injury on person/weapon/ground; war/gore: body on ground, dismemberment, execution). Rules: (1) choose ONE label; (2) multiple severities → label by MOST severe; (3) stylization (cartoon, anime, painterly, render, 3D, sketch) does NOT downgrade severity; (4) “Full” does NOT require on-screen gore--a clearly depicted harmful act or threatened victim counts; (5) weapon + person + aggressive framing = “Full”. Respond ONLY with: {“category”: “<NotRelevant|Safe|Partial|Full>”}

Figure 14. Harassment rubric.

Figure 15. Hate rubric.

Figure 16. Shocking rubric.

Figure 17. Disturbing rubric.

Figure 18. Illegal rubric.
Generated Examples
EBSG suppresses the targeted harm while preserving the benign portion of the prompt across diverse adversarial inputs. The headline qualitative panel of the main paper (Figure 3) compresses single- and multi-concept erasure into a single overview; this section extends that gallery with additional examples that illustrate the per-concept behaviour of EBSG relative to the unguarded backbone and the strongest training-free baseline.
Figure 3. Qualitative comparison of EBSG against concept-erasure baselines. Left: Example images for single-concept erasure (nudity, harassment, shocking) on SD v1.4. Right: Example images for multi-concept erasure (nudity and violence) on SD v1.4 and single-concept erasure (hate) on SD3.

Figure 20. Additional generated examples on SD v1.4. Sensitive regions are masked.

Figure 21. Additional generated examples on SD 3.

Figure 22. Additional generated examples on UnlearnDiff [37]. Sensitive regions are masked.
Limitations
The additional analyses clarify the practical scope of EBSG. The remaining limitations concern inference cost, anchor drift, pack coverage and calibration, overlapping concepts, and output-level evaluation.
Per-image generation cost. EBSG’s dual-probe family guidance issues additional UNet forwards per denoising step, raising per-image cost relative to the SD v1.4 baseline. The mechanistic budget is one cond plus one uncond CFG forward, one CAS forward, and four family-target plus four family-anchor forwards (with ): about 11 UNet forwards per step versus 2 for the baseline. The empirical wall-clock ratio in the isolated RTX 3090 bench is (Table 17 in Section C.3; full discussion in the same subsection). However, the overhead is partially recoverable on the wall-clock-vs-SR plane: as detailed in Section C.3 and Figure 7, EBSG at 5 DDIM steps already exceeds the unguarded SD 1.4 baseline at 50 DDIM steps by p SR while running faster. Absolute throughput nonetheless remains a bottleneck for high-volume deployment; reducing the family-forward count via shared low-rank approximations or amortized probe encoders is a natural engineering follow-up.
Anchor-drift. Pushing the safety scale too high does not necessarily corrupt the image, but it can drive the generation too close to the family anchor and erode the prompt’s non-unsafe content. An adversarial prompt such as “nude woman at a sunny beach” may, under aggressive scales, drift to a generic clothed-person-at-beach scene, losing compositional detail beyond the harmful concept itself. A CAS-weighted blend that bounds anchor-drift explicitly is left for future work.
Spatially overlapping concepts. WTA assigns each location to one concept–family pair at a given step. Recomputing the partition allows a region to receive different corrections over time, as illustrated by the sexual+violence example in Appendix § 20.4, but broader overlap coverage remains untested. Hard and soft fusion achieve comparable average SR (Appendix § 20.§ 3); a benchmark with annotated overlapping regions would help characterize their respective behavior.
Pack coverage, calibration, and scaling. Family definitions, exemplars, and safe anchors can omit violations or encode bias. Low-effort packs and shared hyperparameters reduce the demonstrated construction burden on seven I2P categories, but still require policy-specific validation. Automatic parameter selection remains future work. The four-brand experiment extends concept coverage beyond safety; artistic styles and identities remain unevaluated.
Output suppression and evaluation boundaries. EBSG leaves the diffusion weights unchanged and controls generation while its guidance is active. The trajectory probe tests a finite set of perturbations, so robustness to other probes remains open. The VLM rubric is also policy-dependent: SR includes partial suppression, and NotRELEVANT includes semantic drift as well as visual collapse. Human agreement is imperfect, and three-run variability is reported only for the subset in Appendix § 20.§ 8.2.
Broader Impact
EBSG is designed to mitigate safety concerns in generative diffusion models and contributes to responsible AI deployment. The same spatial-localization techniques could in principle be repurposed to amplify harmful content if applied maliciously, and EBSG should therefore be deployed as one component of a comprehensive safety pipeline that also includes upstream prompt filtering and downstream content review. Releasing the concept packs as human-readable prompt-and-image directories is intended to support inspection and responsible adaptation rather than misuse.
License Information
We plan to make our code publicly accessible. We use community-standard licenses for our own code and provide source/license links for the third-party models, datasets, and benchmarks used in this paper. Third-party assets are not redistributed in our release; users should consult the original links for the authoritative license terms.
Stable Diffusion v1.4 [26]: CreativeML Open RAIL-M license; https://huggingface.co/spaces/CompVis/stable-diffusion-license.
Stable Diffusion 3 Medium: Stability AI Community License; https://huggingface.co/stabilityai/stable-diffusion-3-medium/blob/main/LICENSE.md.
FLUX.1-dev: FLUX.1 [dev] Non-Commercial License; https://github.com/black-forest-labs/flux/blob/main/model_licenses/LICENSE-FLUX1-dev.
Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct [1]: Apache License 2.0; https://huggingface.co/Qwen/Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct.
NudeNet [21]: AGPL-3.0 license; https://github.com/notAI-tech/NudeNet.
Q16 [27]: no explicit license file was found in the public repository; used only for non-commercial academic evaluation; https://github.com/ml-research/Q16.
I2P [28]: MIT license; https://huggingface.co/datasets/AIML-TUDA/i2p.
Ring-A-Bell [30]: MIT license; https://github.com/chiayi-hsu/Ring-A-Bell?tab=MIT-1-ov-file.
MMA-Diffusion [31]: CC BY-NC-ND 3.0; https://github.com/cure-lab/MMA-Diffusion/blob/main/LICENSE.
UnlearnDiff / Diffusion-MU-Attack [37]: MIT license; https://github.com/OPTML-Group/Diffusion-MU-Attack?tab=MIT-1-ov-file.
P4D / P4D-N [5]: MIT license for the public code repository; https://github.com/zhiyichin/P4D.
MJA (Metaphor-based Jailbreaking Attack) [33]: no explicit license file was found in the public repository; used only for non-commercial academic evaluation; https://github.com/datar001/metaphor-based-jailbreaking-attack.
MJ-Bench [4]: Apache License 2.0; https://huggingface.co/datasets/MJ-Bench/MJ-Bench.
COCO [17]: annotations under CC BY 4.0; images are subject to the Flickr Terms of Use; https://cocodataset.org/.
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