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Locational Marginal Pricing of Compute: Co-optimizing Compute and Energy for Transparent Data Center Flexibility

Abstract

Demand from data centers and AI compute is growing rapidly and is increasing stress on the power grid. This load could be flexible through user adjustments and provide relief during energy scarcity events, yet today its flexibility is provided through utility call-ups or system-operator load shedding, and is invisible to the users whose workloads are being curtailed. In this work, we propose to quantify and couple the prices of compute and energy in a single optimization problem. The resulting compute price reflects the marginal cost of the binding constraints and decomposes into components indicating which grid, power, hardware, or service requirement causes a price surge. The economic interpretation updates the price with real-time conditions and gives users a signal for potential flexibility provision. The co-optimization ultimately connects compute and energy markets while providing a signal for relief of stress on both the grid and the compute resources.

Introduction

Data center and AI compute demand has been growing at a rapid pace. The projections forecast this demand to make up to 12% of the U.S. electricity demand by 2028 [1] and increase two-fold globally by 2030 [2]. Such substantial growth can create stress on the grid system, impacting grid infrastructure and cost allocation [3] as well as electricity prices [4].

Recently, data centers have been argued to be a flexible load, relieving the system during stress periods. A variety of works provide proposals for temporal and spatial workload shifting [5, 6, 7]. Recent work demonstrates the effectiveness of power cap management through the utility event call-up [8] and coordination between the utility and data center sides [9].

Yet, the flexibility approaches proposed are limited. In the current configuration, users are not exposed to the operational conditions of the serving infrastructure, nor have an incentive to provide demand response. The majority of the current pricing contracts can be described with the following attributes: a) constant price throughout a day with very slow movement on an interday basis; b) constrained on several compute metrics (i.e., promised deliverable time and available capacity); c) usually billed on a $/GPU-hr or $/token basis.

While the customers are shielded from the volatility of operating conditions and obtain service on promise, this prevents users from providing valuable flexibility.

Prior work on data center flexibility falls into three groups. Geographic load balancing routes requests across sites to lower the operator’s cost under exogenous electricity prices [10, 11, 12]. A second group places data centers inside the grid model and guides spatial and temporal shifting with LMPs and market clearing [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. These works price electricity and the flexibility to shift it, but not compute. A third group co-optimizes compute and power within the fleet, using DVFS, storage, replica commitment, or iteration with the system operator [19, 20, 21, 22], yet users still pay a fixed service price. Compute pricing has emerged only recently. Billimoria and Byers Billimoria and Byers [23] infer the value of compute from posted cloud prices, and Sanabria Sanabria [24] derives a shadow price of LLM queries on a single system. Closest to ours, Liu Liu [25] decomposes a dual $/token price over a token-flow network, but with exogenous electricity prices and fixed energy per token.

Table I summarizes the comparison. To our knowledge, no prior work forms the compute price as a dual of a joint clearing with an endogenous grid. Hence, our contributions are as follows: (i) we couple compute demand and data center power demand in a single clearing problem; (ii) we form the compute price transparently as the dual of the binding constraints, decomposed into components that reflect actual grid, power, hardware, and service conditions; and (iii) we extend co-optimization from electricity to joint compute and energy clearing, giving a benchmark toward which system and fleet operators could coordinate by exchanging prices and quantities.

Compute priceGrid endogenous (OPF)Network/latencyOperating modes (batch size)SLO reserve (queueing)Elastic demand
Rao et al. [10]; Liu et al. [11, 12]––✓–(✓)–
Lindberg et al. [13, 14]–✓––––
Lin et al. [15]–✓––––
Zhang et al. [16, 17]–✓–––✓
Gu and Qin [18]–✓––––
Ding et al. [21]–✓––––
Liu et al. [22](✓)✓––✓–
Liu, Shin, and Deka [19]–––✓–(✓)
Du et al. [20]––✓–(✓)–
Billimoria and Byers [23](✓)––––✓
Sanabria [24]✓––(✓)(✓)(✓)
Liu [25]✓–✓––(✓)
This work✓✓✓✓✓✓

Table 1. Comparison with the related work. ✓: addressed; (✓): partially or as an extension; –: not addressed.

Methodology

We clear compute and electricity in a single co-optimization problem. The power side is a DC optimal power flow (DC-OPF), whose duals are the locational marginal prices (LMPs) of electricity, i.e., the energy price plus a congestion component. The compute side serves requests from demand regions r∈Rr \in\mathcal{R} at data-center sites s∈Ss \in\mathcal{S}; its duals are the prices of compute. The two sides are coupled because every request served at site ss is a power withdrawal at the bus n(s)n(s) of that site. The intervals are hourly at τ=3600\tau= 3600 seconds.

Requests as the unit of demand

An LLM request consists of an input (prompt and context, processed in the prefill phase) and an output (generated in the decode phase). The two phases utilize the hardware differently: prefill is compute-bound and decode is memory-bound. However, a request has no value unless both are served. We therefore measure demand in requests and let each request consume both prefill and decode resources.

We create different request classes k∈K={conversation,agentic,offline}k \in\mathcal{K} = \{\mathrm{conversation},\mathrm{agentic},\mathrm{offline}\} that differ in their latency requirements. Each class has an average nkinn_k^{\mathrm{in}} input and nkoutn_k^{\mathrm{out}} output tokens per request and a request rate DkrtD_{krt} (requests/s) from region rr. We assume elastic demand, represented by bid segments on a demand curve. We split DkrtD_{krt} into NBN_B bid segments bb with willingness to pay pkbp_{kb} per token. The prices are spaced geometrically between the lowest and highest posted prices, pklop_k^{\mathrm{lo}} and pkhip_k^{\mathrm{hi}}, for the same model. Assuming a constant price elasticity ϵ\epsilon (1 in our case), the share of demand still buying at price pp is (p/pklo)−ϵ(p/p_k^{\mathrm{lo}})^{-\epsilon}. The segment share αkb\alpha_{kb} is the drop in this share between consecutive prices, and the top segment keeps the remainder (∑bαkb=1)(\sum_b \alpha_{kb} = 1). A request in segment bb is worth its token count times the segment price:

vkb=pkb(nkin+nkout)dˉkrtb=αkbDkrt(1)v_{kb}=p_{kb}\left(n_k^{\mathrm{in}}+n_k^{\mathrm{out}}\right) \qquad\bar{d}_{krtb}=\alpha_{kb}D_{krt} \tag*{(1)}

We also assume the bids to be identical for input and output tokens.

Resources used by one request

Prefill is modeled by one throughput θpre\theta^{\mathrm{pre}} (input tokens/s per GPU) and one energy epree^{\mathrm{pre}} per input token. Decode is modeled by operating modes m∈Mm \in\mathcal{M}, which depend on batch size BmB_m. This results in different output throughput θm\theta_m (tokens/s per GPU), an energy per output token eme_m, and a 95th-percentile inter-token latency (ITL) ℓm\ell_m. Larger batches give more tokens per GPU and less energy per token, but slow generation. Serving a class-kk request in mode mm takes akma_{km} GPU-seconds and ekme_{km} energy:

akm=akin+akmout=nkinθpre+nkoutθm(2)a_{km}=a_k^{\mathrm{in}}+a_{km}^{\mathrm{out}}=\frac{n_k^{\mathrm{in}}}{\theta^{\mathrm{pre}}}+\frac{n_k^{\mathrm{out}}}{\theta_m} \tag*{(2)}
ekm=ekin+ekmout=nkinepre+nkoutem(3)e_{km}=e_k^{\mathrm{in}}+e_{km}^{\mathrm{out}}=n_k^{\mathrm{in}}e^{\mathrm{pre}}+n_k^{\mathrm{out}}e_m \tag*{(3)}

A mode may serve class kk from region rr at site ss only if it meets the ITL target LkL_k, the network round-trip budget RkR_k, and the GPU memory limit. The memory limit comes from the proxy model of the key-value (KV) cache. A replica with MM bytes of free memory and κ\kappa bytes of cache per token holds at most Bkmax⁡B_k^{\max} sequences:

Bkmax⁡=Mκ(nkin+nkout/2)(4)B_k^{\max}=\frac{M}{\kappa\left(n_k^{\mathrm{in}}+n_k^{\mathrm{out}}/2\right)} \tag*{(4)}

We assume that each running sequence holds its input and, on average, half of its output. The admissible set is

A={(k,r,s,m):ℓm≤Lk, Bm≤Bkmax⁡, RTTrs≤Rk}(5)\mathcal{A}=\{(k,r,s,m):\ell_m\le L_k,\ B_m\le B_k^{\max},\ \mathrm{RTT}_{rs}\le R_k\} \tag*{(5)}

For each class, ρk\rho_k is the highest utilization at which ≥95%\ge95\% of requests wait less than WkW_k.

Clearing problem

The decision variables are: 1) the served request rate zkrsmt≥0z_{krsmt}\ge0 for each (k,r,s,m)∈A(k,r,s,m)\in\mathcal{A}; 2) the accepted demand dkrtb≥0d_{krtb}\ge0; 3) the powered-on GPUs yst≥0y_{st}\ge0; 4) the site power PstP_{st}; 5) the generator outputs gitg_{it}; 6) the load shedding qnt≥0q_{nt}\ge0 of other customers at bus nn.

The net injection at bus nn is:

pnt=∑i∈Gngit−Dntgrid+qnt−∑s∈SnPst(6)p_{nt}=\sum_{i\in\mathcal{G}_n}g_{it}-D_{nt}^{\mathrm{grid}}+q_{nt}-\sum_{s\in\mathcal{S}_n}P_{st} \tag*{(6)}

The problem maximizes welfare:

max⁡∑t[τ∑k,r,bvkbdkrtb−τ∑Acrsnetzkrsmt−∑iCi(git)−∑n(VOLL)qnt](7)\max\sum_t\left[\tau\sum_{k,r,b}v_{kb}d_{krtb}-\tau\sum_{\mathcal{A}}c_{rs}^{\mathrm{net}}z_{krsmt}-\sum_i C_i(g_{it})-\sum_n(\mathrm{VOLL})q_{nt}\right] \tag*{(7)}

We set VOLL = $50,000/MWh. At this value, we check that every compute bid is below VOLL per MWh, so compute can never outbid other customers’ load. The objective function is subject to, for all tt (duals in brackets):

∑s,mzkrsmt=∑bdkrtb[λkrt](8)\sum_{s,m} z_{krsmt} = \sum_b d_{krtb} \qquad[\lambda_{krt}] \tag*{(8)}
dkrtb≤dˉkrtb(9)d_{krtb} \le\bar{d}_{krtb} \tag*{(9)}
∑k,r,m(akm/ρk)zkrsmt≤yst[μston](10)\sum_{k,r,m} \left(a_{km}/\rho_k\right) z_{krsmt} \le y_{st} \qquad[\mu^{\mathrm{on}}_{st}] \tag*{(10)}
yst≤Gs[μstG](11)y_{st} \le G_s \qquad[\mu^G_{st}] \tag*{(11)}
Pst≤Pˉs[μstP](12)P_{st} \le\bar{P}_s \qquad[\mu^P_{st}] \tag*{(12)}
∑npnt=0[νtref](13)\sum_n p_{nt} = 0 \qquad[\nu^{\mathrm{ref}}_t] \tag*{(13)}
−Fl≤∑nHlnpnt≤Fl[κlt−,κlt+](14)-F_l \le\sum_n H_{ln}p_{nt} \le F_l \qquad[\kappa^-_{lt},\kappa^+_{lt}] \tag*{(14)}
g‾i≤git≤gˉi(15)\underline{g}_i \le g_{it} \le\bar{g}_i \tag*{(15)}
0≤qnt≤Dntgrid(16)0 \le q_{nt} \le D^{\mathrm{grid}}_{nt} \tag*{(16)}

The site power is the facility power of busy GPUs plus the idle power π0\pi^0 of all other powered-on GPUs:

Pst=PUEs[∑k,r,mekmzkrsmt+π0(yst−∑k,r,makmzkrsmt)](17)P_{st} = \mathrm{PUE}_s \left[\sum_{k,r,m} e_{km}z_{krsmt} + \pi^0\left(y_{st}-\sum_{k,r,m}a_{km}z_{krsmt}\right)\right] \tag*{(17)}

Power Usage Effectiveness (PUE) is chosen to be a constant multiplier. The constraints are the following:

  • (8)–(9) balance served and accepted requests.

  • (10) keeps busy GPUs plus headroom within the powered-on GPUs, while (11) limits to the installed GsG_s.

  • (12) is the site power limit.

  • (13)–(16) are standard DC-OPF constraints in the Power Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) formulation.

The rest of the load is shed according to the VOLL. The term crsnetc^{\mathrm{net}}_{rs} is the tie-breaking cost for routing.

Price of compute

The dual λkrt\lambda_{krt} ($ per request) of (8) is the marginal price of a class-kk request in region rr. The LMP at bus nn is

νnt=νtref−∑lHln(κlt+−κlt−)(18)\nu_{nt} = \nu^{\mathrm{ref}}_t - \sum_l H_{ln}\left(\kappa^+_{lt}-\kappa^-_{lt}\right) \tag*{(18)}

Consider site ss serving this request in mode mm, with nn as the site’s bus. Dropping the indices kk, ss, mm, and tt, the stationarity conditions for zz and yy give

λ=cnet+1τ[e^(νn+μP)+a^μG](19)\lambda= c^{\mathrm{net}} + \frac{1}{\tau}\left[\hat{e}\left(\nu_n+\mu^P\right)+\hat{a}\mu^G\right] \tag*{(19)}

where a^=a/ρ\hat{a}=a/\rho is the GPU time reserved for the request and e^=PUE[e+(ρ−1−1)π0a]\hat{e}=\mathrm{PUE}\left[e+\left(\rho^{-1}-1\right)\pi^0a\right] is its facility energy, including the idle power of its headroom. Thus, a request pays for energy at the local LMP, for the site power limit when it binds, and for GPU time. Sites that do not serve the request have a weakly higher cost, as with generators out of merit. tbl:II separates this price into components that identify the scarce resource.

Since aa and ee are sums of input and output parts, the price splits the same way. For j∈{in,out}j\in\{\mathrm{in},\mathrm{out}\}, the price per token is

λj=1τnj[e^j(νn+μP)+a^jμG](20)\lambda^j = \frac{1}{\tau n^j}\left[\hat{e}^j\left(\nu_n+\mu^P\right)+\hat{a}^j\mu^G\right] \tag*{(20)}
ComponentValue
Grid energyPUE e νref\mathrm{PUE}\,e\,\nu^{\mathrm{ref}}
Grid congestionPUE e (νn−νref)\mathrm{PUE}\,e\,(\nu_n-\nu^{\mathrm{ref}})
Site powerPUE e μP\mathrm{PUE}\,e\,\mu^P
GPU scarcitya μGa\,\mu^G
SLO headroom(ρ−1−1)a [μG+PUE π0(νn+μP)](\rho^{-1}-1)a\,[\mu^G+\mathrm{PUE}\,\pi^0(\nu_n+\mu^P)]

Table II. Components of the compute price, before dividing by τ\tau.

where a^j\hat{a}^j and e^j\hat{e}^j use aja^j and eje^j in place of aa and ee. The ratio of output to input prices therefore approximately follows eout/nout:ein/nine^{\mathrm{out}}/n^{\mathrm{out}}:e^{\mathrm{in}}/n^{\mathrm{in}} when energy or site power is scarce, and θpre/θm\theta^{\mathrm{pre}}/\theta_m when GPUs are scarce.

Experiments

Setup

We construct a toy example of the co-optimization problem for demonstration purposes.1

Grid. We use the IEEE 30-bus system from [26, 27] in PTDF form. We place three data center sites, DC0, DC1 and DC2, connected at buses 3, 8 and 21 respectively (Figure 1). Each has a 25 MW rating, and their PUEs are 1.2, 1.2 and 1.35. Region rr is local to site rr. For the network round-trip time (RTT), we assume 10 ms to the local site, 60 ms to a neighboring site, and 120 ms to the furthest site. The time offsets are not assumed to represent distances on the 30-bus network.

IEEE 30-bus system with the three data-center sites

Figure 1. IEEE 30-bus system with the three data-center sites. Red lines are loaded at or above 80% at the peak hour without data center.

Compute Load. The primary link between power and compute comes from ML.ENERGY [28]. We choose Llama-3.1-70B [29] on H100 GPUs with 4-way tensor parallelism. We process tables of (Bm,θm,em,ℓm)(B_m,\theta_m,e_m,\ell_m), quantifying the relationship between power and decode of output tokens, latency, and batch size, and apply a factor of 1.3 for the CPU and additional hardware overhead. We model prefill throughput at 50% model-FLOPs utilization of the dense BF16 peak, while energy also follows from [28]. We assume that an idle GPU draws 0.12 kW, and sizing for each site follows Gs=⌈Pˉs/(PUEsPGPU)⌉G_s=\lceil\bar{P}_s/(\mathrm{PUE}_sP^{\mathrm{GPU}})\rceil GPUs, where PGPUP^{\mathrm{GPU}} is the maximum GPU power draw.

Demand. Request rates and lengths come from the Azure 2024 LLM inference traces [30]: conversation for conversation and offline requests, and code for agentic requests. We take the median weekday at 5-minute resolution and average it to hours. Offline demand is flat over the day. The class mix is 50/30/20%. Regions take 50/30/20% of demand and are shifted by 0, 1, and 2 hours. Demand is scaled so that, at the peak, the GPUs needed, including headroom, fill 90% of the fleet. The latency targets enter the clearing as zkrsmt=0z_{krsmt}=0 for items outside (5).

Events. We study three representative events. At DC1 during 14:00–20:00 UTC: “GPU failure” represents 60% of GPUs offline, “power limit” represents reduced site power from 25 to 10 MW, and “grid event” limits the lines into bus 8 to 30% of their rating.

ConversationAgenticOffline
Trace for lengths nkin/nkoutn_k^{\mathrm{in}} / n_k^{\mathrm{out}} (ratio)1611416
Share of requests50%30%20%
ITL target LkL_k (ms)3050–
RTT budget RkR_k (ms)50100–
Wait target WkW_k (s)110–
Utilization ρk\rho_k0.850.980.95
Bid range ($/M tokens) | 0.40–3.00 | 0.40–3.00 | 0.20–0.45

Table III. Request classes. Bids use ϵ=1\epsilon= 1 and NB=10N_B = 10 segments.

Results

Clearing. Figure 2 shows that supply is flat at the marginal cost of energy for the base case. The events create supply scarcity. The clearing moves onto the bids: the price is set by the willingness to pay of the marginal segment, and the lowest-value segments are curtailed. Table IV summarizes the peak hour results and their clearing.

EventBaseGPU failurepower limitgrid event
LMP at DC1 ($/MWh) | 56.6 | 55.3 | 55.9 | 2,413.3
DC1 power (MW)21.87.6610.012.1
Conversation price0.0070.4000.3160.270
Agentic price0.0050.2350.2290.197
Offline price0.0060.2620.2550.219
Conversation served (%)10090.696.9100
Agentic served (%)100100100100
Offline served (%)10072.376.386.2
Welfare loss (k$/day) | 0 | 75.5 | 34.5 | 5.03

Table IV. Results at the peak hour. Prices are for region 1 in $/M-tokens; served shares are fleet-wide.

Demand bids and residual supply for region 1

Figure 2. Demand bids (black) and residual supply (colored) for region 1 at the peak hour, per event. Intersections mark the cleared quantity and price.

Prices over the day. Figure 3 shows that, outside the event window, all prices stay at the marginal cost of energy. Within the window, prices rise only in the hours when DC0 and DC2 can no longer absorb the work moved from DC1. The surge therefore lasts longest for the GPU failure, which removes the most capacity, and shortest for the grid event. The three compute prices follow nearly the same path because offline work absorbs most of the curtailment: its bid sets the value of the scarce resource, and each class pays the value in proportion to its use.

Compute prices in region 1 and the electricity LMP at the DC1 bus over the day

Figure 3. Compute prices in region 1 and the electricity LMP at the DC1 bus over the day. The shaded area is the event window.

Decomposition. Figure 4 shows which constraints bind. In the base case, every price is almost entirely energy. During the events, conversation from region 1 is still served only at DC1. Its 50 ms round-trip budget is met only by the local site, since DC0 and DC2 are 60 ms away. Its price therefore reveals the constraint that binds at DC1: GPUs in the GPU failure, site power in the power limit, and congestion in the grid event. Agentic and offline requests from region 1 move to DC0 and DC2 instead. The moved work fills the GPUs at DC0 and DC2, and once those sites are full, the lowest offline bids are curtailed and set the value of a GPU-hour there. GPU scarcity therefore dominates their prices in every event, including the grid event, where DC1 is limited by grid congestion.

Components of the input- and output-token prices in region 1 at the peak hour, per event

Figure 4. Components of the input- and output-token prices in region 1 at the peak hour, per event. Labels give the site serving most of each class.

Discussion & Conclusion

The proposed approach provides a demonstrative example of how the compute price reflects the binding constraints of both the grid and the compute infrastructure. Nevertheless, the concept poses several challenges. First, the compute price is marginal: it prices the short-run use of infrastructure and does not recover capital costs, which dominate GPU and data center economics. Capital recovery must therefore be addressed separately. Second, the approach requires transparency and collaboration between the grid operator and the compute operator. The two sides could potentially clear separately by exchanging prices and quantities rather than full models.

While we acknowledge these practical limitations, we hope to introduce a paradigm in which compute and energy are coordinated rather than disaggregated systems. By grounding the compute price in economic merit, the approach introduces the potential of a transparent way to allocate scarce infrastructure and to turn data center flexibility into a signal that users can see and act on. Moreover, without the network, the same model prices compute for off-grid or behind-the-meter sites.

Many extensions remain. On the grid side, these include AC-OPF formulations, larger fleets and realistic transmission networks, and integration with wholesale market operations at scale. Moreover, each hour is cleared independently, so the price signals when deferral is valuable, but deferral itself is not modeled. On the compute side, they include more rigorous serving constraints, finer compute–power coupling that captures latency distributions, and commitment decisions with appropriate pricing. Finally, dedicated clearing algorithms, possibly in a decentralized way, would be needed to solve the problem at scale.

Acknowledgment

The authors disclose the use of Anthropic Claude to conduct this work. The usage included assistance in writing, literature review, methodology refinement, and code generation and editing. Conceptual ideas, experimental design, implementations, analyses, and conclusions are the authors’ own. The authors take responsibility for all mistakes.

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