WorksMathematics
Safety of layered control systems via control barrier morphisms
Abstract
Layered control architectures provide a powerful paradigm for synthesizing controllers for complex systems. Yet, translating guarantees at each layer to system-level guarantees is challenging due to the interactions between layers. To address this problem, this paper presents a categorical perspective on layered control architectures. Individual systems are represented as control coalgebras, their interactions are specified as morphisms to mediators, and system-level behaviors are obtained via composition defined categorically as a pullback. To analyze the safety of these systems, we formulate control barrier morphisms (CBMs), the categorical generalization of control barrier functions. We prove that feedback controllers satisfying a CBM condition render the associated safe subobject forward invariant. It is through CBMs that we can establish the safety of layered systems: given a CBM at each layer subject to compatibility conditions, the universal property of the pullback implies the existence of a CBM for the composed system. Safety of a full-order model being safety filtered by a reduced-order model is recovered as a specialization of the categorical framework.

Figure 1. A classic layered control architecture represented categorically, for which the closed loop system is the pullback. Each layer has an associated control barrier morphism, and the universal property of the pullback implies the existence of a control barrier morphism for the layered architecture.
Introduction
Layered control architectures allow complex systems to be controlled through simpler models [1], [2]. A canonical example is the “planner-tracker” paradigm, where a planning (or safety) layer computes a reference using a reduced-order model, while a low-level controller on the full-order model tracks this reference signal. These architectures have the advantage of decomposing control problems into simpler subproblems that are tractable, but also introduce a question that cannot be answered by analyzing either layer in isolation: when does a guarantee established on the reduced-order model remain valid on the full-order model? This question has increased in importance due to the need to establish safety guarantees for highly dynamic robotic systems.
The problem of identifying architectures has been investigated frequently over the years from a variety of perspectives, including: aggregation [3], hierarchies [4], supervision [5], behavioral interconnection [6], and symbolic abstractions [7], to name a few. More recent approaches formulate layered architectures through contracts [8], [9] and multi-rate control [10]. These complementary perspectives indicate the fundamental nature of control architectures, and the need to make guarantees for complex systems by studying constituent components and their interactions. This paper studies layered architectures from the perspective of safety utilizing the framework of category theory, enabling us to determine how the safety of layered control architectures can be established from the safety of individual layers and their interactions.
The authors are with the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena CA 91125, U.S.A. { ames, jmoeller, mdesa}@caltech.edu and UCLA, Los Angeles CA 90095-1594, [email protected].
This research is funded by the AFOSR SCHEMA CoE and MURI grant Hybrid Dynamics - Deconstruction and Aggregation (HyDDRA).
As an illustration of the results in this paper, consider Figure 2 where a Control Barrier Function (CBF)-based safety filter [11], designed for a Reduced Order Model (RoM), is implemented in a Full Order Model (FoM) via an existing tracking controller. The safety filter utilizes a CBF on the RoM to transform a desired input signal into an input signal that guarantees safety. The FoM realizes the input via a tracking controller, introducing tracking error. Prior results combine the RoM barrier with tracking guarantees on the FoM to obtain a safety guarantee for the FoM [12], [13]. This paradigm provides a starting point for building a theory of composition that yields safety guarantees.

Figure 2. A layered safety architecture: a reduced-order model is used to synthesize a safe controller, , which is fed to a full-order model as a reference that is tracked, where is the state projection. The goal is to guarantee safety on the full-order model: .
Category theory gives a natural language in which to reason about the composition. Coalgebras provide a general formulation for systems and their structure-preserving maps [14]. Pullbacks describe heterogeneous composition of tagged systems [15] and nonlinear feedback interconnection [16]. Diagrams allow for the interconnection of open dynamical systems [17], for hybrid systems to be composed [18], and for the composition of Lyapunov certificates via assume-guarantee reasoning [19]. This paper explores categorical composition through the lens of safety.
The first contribution of this paper is a categorical formulation of CBFs. To this end, we generalize control systems to a categorical setting by modeling them as coalgebras. Taking inspiration from categorical Lyapunov theory [20], [21], we formulate a control barrier morphism (CBM) as a map from a control coalgebra to a target comparison system. The collection of safe actions is represented by the admissible locus of a CBM. The existence of a feedback controller (section) of the admissible locus yields a closed loop system that is safe: it renders a subobject defined by the CBM forward invariant.
The second contribution is to frame composition as the categorical pullback. This endows composition with a universal property. Given two control systems, their interaction is framed as morphisms to a mediator, and the interconnected system is the pullback. The universal property of the pullback together with barrier morphisms enables the main result: given CBMs on each system that agree on the mediator, the result is a CBM for the composed system implying safety of a subobject. We apply this result to the motivating problem: a CBF-safety filter utilizing a RoM and tracked by a FoM, thus demonstrating that specialization of the main result leads to a CBF guaranteeing safety of the layered architecture. Importantly, the CBF for the layered system emerges as a consequence of the categorical framework, rather than from heuristic constructions, demonstrating its value.
Motivation: Layered Safety Filters
Consider a layered architecture (cf. Figure 2) consisting of a reduced-order model (RoM) and full-order model (FoM):
RoM
FoM
where the states and range over open subsets and , and the inputs and range over and , respectively. We keep separate names for the two input spaces, even though they coincide, because the safety filter in Section V treats them as distinct interfaces. The inputs to the RoM and FoM have the same dimension because we are implicitly assuming that is obtained from the “true” dynamics of the system, together with a tracking controller wherein . Based on the inputs of the RoM and the state of the FoM, the tracking controller forces the FoM to converge to the RoM’s behavior.
The RoM and FoM are coupled by a safety filter. Given the state projection and a safety function the safe set for the FoM is given by:
We assume that is a control barrier function (CBF) for the RoM, with the corresponding CBF-QP safety filter:
with (taken to be a constant for simplicity, although a function would also be possible), and are the Lie derivatives, and the normed squared term is for robustness. In the layered architecture, the safe controller is passed to the FoM via the tracking controller, i.e., setting the reference velocity to wherein:
The goal is safety of the FoM, i.e., to keep the state of the system within . To this end, consider the FoM tracking error associated with the reference :
where is the input projection. That is, the error is the difference between the “actual velocity” of the system projected to the RoM input space via and the “desired velocity” encoded by .
A tracking function quantifies the ability of the FoM to bound this error via the assumptions:
for and . These assumptions can be used to define the composite barrier function for the FoM:
The main result of [12] is that if :
where is a solution: . Therefore, starting from a reduced set of initial conditions defined by the zero superlevel set of , the state remains within and, therefore, the FoM is safe. These ideas were generalized in [22] to bounded tracking and in [13] to predictive CBFs. See [23] for a notion of robust CBF, generalizing input-to-state safety used in [12]. This paper will demonstrate in Section V that this result is a natural consequence of categorical composition theory.
Control Barrier Morphisms
Categorical Lyapunov theory [20, 21] generalized Lyapunov theory to a broad class of “systems” by leveraging coalgebras. We build upon this framework and refer the reader to these papers for the background content needed. Importantly, this paper extends categorical Lyapunov theory to “control systems” through the introduction of control coalgebras. We leverage this to generalize safety-critical control to a categorical setting: defining control barrier morphisms (generalizing CBFs categorically) that imply forward invariance of a subobject (via a categorical Nagumo theorem).
Consider a category with finite products and terminal object . A point of is a map , and denotes the unique map to the terminal object. In the remainder of the paper we will use to denote a functor and to denote a natural transformation from to the identity functor on .
Systems, inputs, and feedback
A coalgebra is a morphism . This generalizes “systems,” e.g., a smooth vector field is a -coalgebra where is the tangent bundle functor on , manifolds with boundary. Control coalgebras generalize this to include inputs.
Definition 1 (Control coalgebra). Let be a category with finite products, be an endofunctor, and a natural transformation. A control coalgebra, denoted by , consists of (i) a base object called the state space (ii) a bundle called the control bundle (iii) a bundle map , i.e., a map called the control system, such that as illustrated by the commutative diagram:
A morphism of control coalgebras consists of maps and with:
These objects and maps form the category .
A feedback controller is a section , i.e., . It produces the autonomous system as illustrated by a commutative diagram:
Autonomous systems are the control coalgebras with , i.e., , and therefore satisfy .
Example 1 (Continuous-time control systems). For and , the tangent bundle functor, the natural projection is . In the case that and , a control coalgebra is illustrated by:
In local coordinates, we recover the classical notions:
control system: for ,
feedback controller: ,
closed-loop system: .
Let be a time object in , i.e., an object equipped with a distinguished point . Following [24], consider a collection of intervals consisting of subobjects with initial point satisfying . On these intervals, a unit clock is a system with . A solution of an autonomous system is a map satisfying1:
For Example 1, , with , and (8) implies that .
Lax equalizers, barrier morphisms and safe subobjects
Definition 2 (Orders). An object is preordered if, for every object , the hom-set is equipped with a preorder, , and precomposition is order-preserving: if and , then . A preordered object is posetal if the preorder on is antisymmetric: and implies .
This notion of preordered objects allows for the formulation of lax equalizers defined via a universal property.
Definition 3 (Lax equalizers). Let be preordered. The lax equalizer of a pair of maps is an object and map satisfying:
such that for every ,
For a set with , the lax equalizer is . Thus a lax commuting diagram describes an inequality, and the lax equalizer describes the locus on which it holds. Lax equalizers always exist in Set and Top, but need not exist in Man. For instance, if is a not regular value of , then may not be an object of Man, as it may have a nonsmooth boundary. Throughout, we assume that the lax equalizers we use exist in the ambient category.
Choose a posetal measurement object with distinguished point , an autonomous comparison system , a preorder on , and write . The posetal order on and preorder on are distinct and related via the following essential assumption.
Assumption 1 (Barrier comparison lemma). The comparison system , together with the order structures on and , and the distinguished point , satisfies the following for every time domain and map :
This assumption is the categorical version of the comparison lemma [25], which is recovered when we make the choice with comparison system for . The classical comparison lemma gives for any curve with and .
Definition 4 (Barrier morphism and safe subobject). For an autonomous system , a morphism is a barrier morphism if:
Its safe subobject is .
A subobject is forward invariant if every solution starting in factors through . That is, for some implies for a (necessarily unique) .
Theorem 1 (Categorical Nagumo theorem). Under Assumption 1, a barrier morphism renders forward invariant.
Proof. Given a solution starting in , pasting the solution diagram (8) with the lax barrier diagram (11) yields:
Then satisfies (10), so . The universal property (9) gives the unique factorization of through implying that is forward invariant.
Control barrier morphisms
Barrier morphisms can be extended to a control setting yielding control barrier morphisms. Consider a control coalgebra and a target comparison system with posetal and preordered.
Definition 5 (Admissible locus). For a map , define the admissible locus of as the lax equalizer:
Definition 6 (Control barrier morphism). A morphism is a control barrier morphism (CBM) if:
(i) is an epimorphism,
(ii) is point-surjective: is surjective.
Because is point-surjective, every state admits an admissible point satisfying . In categories with an underlying set structure, this condition for a CBM recovers the classical CBF feasibility condition
where .
Theorem 2 (Safe control theorem). Let be a CBM. Under Assumption 1, any section of yields a safe controller: . That is, is a barrier morphism for the closed-loop system:
and is forward invariant for .
Proof. The diagram for given in (12) and the section paste to give the barrier inequality (11) for the closed-loop system: . It follows that is a barrier morphism for the autonomous closed-loop coalgebra . Therefore, by Theorem 1, is forward invariant.
Remark 1 (Control Lyapunov morphisms). Let be a morphism. Then the same construction as above with the inequality reversed gives the admissible locus:
Let be positive definite (as defined categorically in [20, 21]) and be a point surjective epi, then is a control Lyapunov morphism (CLM). It is straightforward to prove that any section yields a stabilizing controller . Namely, for the closed loop system the Lyapunov inequality is satisfied: . We will leverage this reverse inequality in the context of certificates for the tracking controller.
Example 2 (Continuous-time CBFs). Returning to Example 1, pick the comparison object with the canonical order and equip with the order: iff and . Define the comparison system by , for extended class .
For , the safe set is
and the admissible locus is given by:
Point-surjectivity of is the usual CBF condition:
A section is a feedback controller such that the barrier condition is satisfied:
and therefore is forward invariant for the closed-loop system: . We have thus captured the classic CBF results categorically.
Composition of Systems and Certificates
The key idea, inspired by [15, 16], is that composition can be described by a pullback. We now make this idea precise in the context of control coalgebras and CBMs.
Composition over a mediator
Consider the case of two control coalgebras and (this framework can be extended to any number of systems via the limit). The essential concept is that control systems must communicate through a mediator , resulting in a cospan of morphisms in :
The mediator specifies which state and input information must agree. The cospan defines constraints between states and inputs that are imposed by the interconnection between two systems. Composition enforces this agreement via the pullback.
Assumption 2 (Existence of pullbacks). The pullbacks:
exist, and preserves the state pullback:
For smooth manifolds, transverse pullbacks are sufficient and are preserved by . Arbitrary pullbacks need not exist.
Proposition 1 (Composition of control coalgebras). Under Assumption 2, there is a unique control coalgebra:
given by the pullback in :
with projections satisfying:
Remark 2. The universal property of the pullback is essential to understanding properties of the composed system. It is summarized by the following system-level diagrams:
Hence, for a system with compatible maps to the subsystems and , there is a unique induced map to . This map will be essential in extending certificates (e.g., barrier morphisms) from subsystems to the composed closed-loop system.
Proof. The following diagram commutes.
So the maps , , form a cone over . Since preserves the state pullback, universal property of pullback gives a unique such that the following diagram commutes:
Setting makes into a control coalgebra automatically. By standard arguments, it satisfies the universal property of the desired pullback in .
Example 3 (Continuous-time interconnection). Consider again continuous-time systems . Example 1. Namely, for , let have and dynamics in coordinates . A stateless port mediator is
where . Any map defines a morphism of control systems . Consequently,
Cascade interconnection: Take , wherein , , and for . Then , so and:
The remaining external input is , resulting in the cascade interconnection:
Feedback interconnection: Let , , and pick outputs , . With , , the pullback enforces and . Hence and the composition is autonomous:
This yields the familiar feedback interconnection diagram:
Comparison systems and compatible certificates
To compose guarantees for systems framed as certificates, e.g., control barrier morphisms, it is necessary to compose the target comparison systems for the layered system architecture: . Choose autonomous targets , (for ) and (for ), and connecting maps :
Assume exists and is preserved by . Proposition 1 gives the autonomous pullback:
with projections where . Give each , , a preorder and equip with the projection-induced preorder:
for every pair . Precomposition preserves this preorder. The two component orders need not compare the same quantities or use the same direction of scalar inequality. For example, if we are considering a control barrier function and a control Lyapunov function , the corresponding preorders on and would be and (since Lyapunov and barrier functions have flipped orders). If the target mediator is terminal, , this induces a mixed componentwise order on the composed target.
Main Result
We can now present the main result on the composition of certificates, i.e., control barrier morphisms. For this theorem, under Assumption 2, let
be the composed control system from Proposition 1 and the autonomous target system (19), respectively, where is posetal and has the projection-induced preorder (20).
Theorem 3 (Composition of control barrier morphisms). Let be the composed control system and $Q** be the autonomous target as in (21). Suppose there are CBMs , , for with admissible loci such that the diagram below commutes:
and the following pullback exists, inducing a map :
If is an epi and point-surjective, there exists a unique CBM with , , satisfying
Remark 3. This theorem can be visualized by the diagram:
where the are state maps that lax commute on the dynamics according to (22), and the remaining arrows strictly commute. Therefore, certificates (CBMs) from to each of the targets induce a unique certificate to the composed target. Additionally, if there are component CBMs associated with each of the subsystems , Theorem 3 can be applied with assuming the conditions of the theorem hold. The existence of sections of and does not imply the existence of a section of .
Proof. The compatibility of in (22) gives a unique map with . For any , strictness of the target projections and the induced preorder give:
Here, the first equivalence follows from the induced preorder (20), the identities , and strictness of the target projections . The remaining equivalences follow from the universal properties of the admissible loci and their pullback. Therefore, satisfies the universal property of the admissible locus of , and thus over and can be identified with . Taking yields (23) and is a control barrier morphism. □
Corollary 1 (Safety by certificate composition). Suppose that there is a composed target system , where is posetal with distinguished zero and *has the induced order (20), such that Assumption 1 is satisfied. Under Theorem 3, every section renders
forward invariant for .
Note that if exists, the universal property of the lax equalizer and the pullback imply that:
Indeed, satisfies exactly when factors through . Thus the standard safe subobject is the inverse image of target positivity: .
Remark 4 (General composition). Composition as the pullback extends to any number of systems. In this case, a graph describes the interconnection structure, with a system at each node and a mediator at each edge , giving the cospan
and the composed system is the limit of the resulting diagram, provided this limit exists and preserves the corresponding limit of state spaces (cf. [15] for tagged systems). For example, the classic three-layer control architecture, consisting of a planning layer, a trajectory generation layer, and a real-time control layer, composes into a single control coalgebra
We expect Theorem 3 to extend to this case: given CBMs for , one for each node, that are compatible over a diagram of target systems of the same shape, the universal property of the limit induces a CBM on the composed system, provided the joint admissible locus projects onto by a point-surjective epi.
Layered Safety for Reduced-Order Models
We return to the motivation given in Section II: layered safety architectures leveraging RoMs to guarantee safety on FoMs (see Figure 2 for an illustration of this architecture). The goal of this section is to apply the categorical results on composition to this specific case. We show that the result in (6) follows systematically as a result of the categorical framework. Throughout this section we work in .
We begin by noting that assumptions on the interface between the RoM and FoM can be understood categorically.
Assumption 3 (Projection compatibility). There are smooth maps and such that, for every , it follows that:
Equivalently, the following dynamics square commutes:
where .
Since the FoM is obtained from a tracking controller applied to the full order dynamics: , sufficient conditions [13] for (27) to hold are: and .
The safety-filter mediator and the closed-loop pullback
We can mirror the conceptual safety architecture in Figure 2 with a precise categorical representation as a cospan:
Here, the mediator has copies of and to receive control interfaces from the RoM and FoM. It is these interfaces that encode the safety filter itself, . Throughout this section, let be a smooth safety filter satisfying the constraint in (3), not necessarily its exact optimizer, which exist by [26].
The closed-loop system is obtained via the pullback.
Proposition 2 (Composition is the safety filtered FoM). Under Assumption 3, the cospan (28) has the pullback
where is given by (4).
Proof. The pullback imposes equality in the mediator:
This determines , , and uniquely. Hence the state space pullback and control bundle pullback are both , with the identity bundle projection. The FoM projection determines the dynamics of the pullback as . Assumption 3 verifies the RoM projection, completing the pullback cone. □
As in Section II, and specifically (5), we consider a smooth non-negative tracking function satisfying:
Assumption 4 (Tracking). On , for constants and , assume:
Let . To recover the barrier dynamics in (5), by Assumption 3, the RoM CBF inequality, and Assumption 4:
where here and the last inequalities follow from completing the square and (30). The end result is two certificates on the closed loop: , built from the RoM barrier , satisfying , and the tracking function , satisfying . These two certificates will form the basis for constructing the target systems, and will ultimately generate the induced certificate for .
Comparison targets and their pullback
The barrier lower bound (31) and the tracking decay assumption (30) are encoded by the comparison systems and via the cospan:
At equal base points, the preorders on and are:
The first order tests the barrier lower bound, while the second order tests the tracking upper bound.
The goal is to find a composed comparison system such that the conditions of Corollary 1 are satisfied. Set . The composed comparison system is given in -coordinates with corresponding projections and as given in the following pullback diagram (see Remark 5 for additional details on choosing ):
The fact that is the pullback of (32) follows from the observation that , given by is invertible and satisfies .
The dynamics preorder on , i.e., the preorder on , is the one induced by the projections in (34) per (20). In -coordinates at a fixed base point this is given by:
Since , this implies the ordinary componentwise preorder on . Finally, the dynamics on imply that is forward invariant verifying Assumption 1.
Remark 5 (Finding the comparison system). It is important to note that the choice of was guided by the need to satisfy Assumption 1 for the induced preorder (20) as required by Corollary 1. For example, a naive (but valid) choice for the pullback is . Yet the dynamics for this system do not satisfy Assumption 1: at , it follows that . Now, to understand how we arrived at , we can determine the largest forward invariant subset of :
Defining as above, it follows that and . Transporting the pullback through yields as defined above.
The induced certificate and full-order model safety
The goal is now to apply the main result, Theorem 3, to obtain a control barrier function for the closed-loop system representing the layered architecture. To this end, consider the barrier certificate and the tracking certificate . These are compatible since . Moreover, (31) and (30) imply that:
for the chosen target systems (by design).
The target pullback induces a unique morphism:
Moreover, the conclusion that yields:
This allows us to establish with categorical means safety of , and specifically the closed-loop FoM first considered in (4). Since is autonomous, .
Theorem 4 (Layered safety). Suppose Assumptions 3 and 4 hold, and that there exists a smooth safe controller for the RoM satisfying:
If , for closed-loop FoM (4) the set:
is forward invariant. Therefore, since , for all solutions of :
Proof. Safety of follows from Corollary 1. It only remains to verify the form of given in (37). With the componentwise order on :
since . But and , and therefore:
This implies that is given by (37) and that .
Note that the barrier morphism in this case, , takes values in . We can obtain a classical scalar barrier as well. To this end, consider the projection , where , is a strict dynamics-preserving morphism. Therefore, pasting with gives the scalar barrier :
This, again, implies that is forward invariant and the conclusions of Theorem 4 follow.
Conclusion
This paper presented a categorical framework in which to represent and analyze layered control architectures. To this end, we formulated “control systems” categorically via control coalgebras. While was considered in this paper for simplicity, the framework is general and can be applied to a wide range of system types. Composition can be understood categorically as the pullback over a mediator. The main result showed how the universal property of the pullback yields CBMs on the composed system given CBMs on each subsystem. We applied this result to a layered architecture representing safety filtering a FoM with a RoM, recapturing previous results as a specialization. Looking forward, the goal is to apply this categorical framework to more complex layered architectures with heterogeneous control systems.
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