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WorksPhysics and Astronomy

Chip-Based Discrete-Modulated Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution with Uncertainty-Principle-Based Composable Security

Abstract

Continuous-variable quantum key distribution offers a promising platform for scalable quantum networks through its compatibility with standard telecommunications technology and photonic integration. High-order discrete modulation facilitates practical implementation while approaching the key-rate performance of ideal Gaussian modulation, but its finite-size composable security analysis entails substantial computational overhead. Here, we develop an uncertainty-principle-based security framework that enables finite-size composable key-rate evaluation against collective attacks for constellations up to 256-QAM. By introducing a heterodyne-measured ancillary mode into the entanglement-based source description, we incorporate additional source correlations into the security analysis that allow the Heisenberg uncertainty principle alone to provide a tight bound for the unknown correlations in a covariance matrix characterizing the whole system. Matrix symmetrization further reduces the key-rate optimization to a one-dimensional search, while subsequent mode reduction yields an analytical lower bound requiring no numerical search. Experimental demonstrations using 256-QAM on discrete-component and silicon-photonic-receiver platforms achieve finite-size composable secret key rates of 17.436 and 0.519 Mbps, respectively, over a 50 km fiber link. This approach facilitates the practical deployment of high-speed, real-time and compact quantum key distribution systems. Beyond quantum key distribution, the principle of tightening uncertainty-constrained bounds via source-mode expansion offers a paradigm for exploring the information-theoretic properties of complex non-Gaussian systems.

Introduction

Quantum key distribution (QKD) uses quantum mechanical principles to establish information-theoretically secure keys between remote parties [1, 2, 3]. Continuous-variable (CV) QKD protocols with coherent measurement exhibit high compatibility with standard telecommunications [4, 5, 6]. There are two typical modulation schemes for CV protocols: Gaussian modulation [7, 8, 9] and discrete modulation 10. Gaussian modulation provides a benchmark for the secret key rate (SKR) and has demonstrated strong performance in metropolitan-area links 11–13, free-space links 14, and quantum access networks 15–17. Alongside these advances, composable security has become central to practical QKD, ensuring that the generated keys remain secure when used in subsequent cryptographic applications 18. Meanwhile, integrated photonic receivers offer a route towards compact and scalable implementations 19.

Despite these advances, Gaussian-modulated systems typically operate at GHz-scale repetition frequencies, with further increases constrained by finite hardware resolution, which makes ideal continuous Gaussian modulation impossible.

Discrete modulation provides a practical alternative in high-speed systems under this hardware constraint. Higher-order constellations can approach the SKR of Gaussian modulation, but their non-Gaussian structure complicates security analysis 26. There are two major frameworks for establishing asymptotic SKR bounds for discrete-modulated (DM) CV-QKD: the linear semidefinite-programming (SDP) approach introduced by Ghorai et al. 20 and the nonlinear SDP approach developed by Lin et al. 23. Denys et al. subsequently derived explicit analytical asymptotic bounds for arbitrary modulation, substantially reducing the computational burden for large constellations 21. Practical security, however, requires finite-size composable bounds that account for statistical fluctuations, error-correction leakage and privacy amplification. Progress in this direction includes the treatment of finite-range heterodyne measurements 27, numerical security proofs incorporating energy and acceptance tests 28 and experimental demonstrations with QPSK and probability-shaped 16-QAM25,29. More recently, a QPSK experiment demonstrated finite-size composable security against general attacks with real-time post-processing30. Nevertheless, efficiently evaluating composable key rates for higher-order constellations remains challenging. As summarized in Table 1, existing composable frameworks have been demonstrated for QPSK and 16-QAM, while their computational cost hinders extension to larger constellations, limiting the practical exploitation of higher-order modulation to approach the Gaussian-modulation benchmark. This motivates an efficient analytical framework for finite-size composable SKR evaluation.

Security-analysis methodAsymptotic securityComposable security
Analytical boundGaussian-like performanceExperimental constellationAnalytical boundGaussian-like performanceExperimental constellation
SDP with a linear objective20✓21✓ (256-QAM)21256-QAM22××Not demonstrated
SDP with a nonlinear objective23××16-QAM24××16-QAM25
Uncertainty principle (This work)✓✓ (256-QAM)256-QAM✓✓ (256-QAM)256-QAM

Table 1. Table 1. Comparison of DM-CV-QKD security-analysis methods. Analytical bound denotes a key-rate lower bound requiring no numerical security optimization. Gaussian-like performance requires simulated secret-key-rate curves to nearly overlap the Gaussian-modulation benchmark throughout the practical transmission-distance and excess-noise ranges. A check mark denotes a reported demonstration, with the constellation size in parentheses; a cross denotes no such demonstration. Experimental constellation identifies the largest constellation experimentally validated in the corresponding security regime.

Alongside advances in security analysis, photonic integration has brought DM CV-QKD closer to compact, scalable implementations. Integrated silicon photonic transmitters and receivers have been demonstrated using 8-PSK modulation over 50.4 km of optical fiber 31. High-speed chip-based systems have also achieved 16 GBaud over 20 km32 and 40 GBaud over 10 km, the latter with finite-size composable security33. However, extending chip-based DM CV-QKD to longer fiber links with finite-size composable security requires further improvements in key-rate performance. Higher-order constellations offer a promising route, but realizing their potential requires an efficient composable security analysis framework.

In this work, we develop an uncertainty-principle-based framework providing analytical lower bounds on finite-size composable key rates for high-order DM CV-QKD. By introducing a heterodyne-measured ancillary mode into the entanglement-based source description, we make additional source correlations available for security analysis. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle alone bounds the unknown correlations in the system’s covariance matrix, defining a feasible set for worst-case key-rate evaluation. Exploiting the convexity of the SKR, we symmetrize this matrix and reduce the optimization to a one-dimensional search over an analytically determined interval. Further mode reduction yields an analytical lower bound requiring no numerical search. Incorporating these bounds into a finite-size composable analysis enables high-order key-rate evaluation and supports online estimation. Simulation results show that the performance of the proposed protocol approaches that of ideal Gaussian modulation with no more than 256 constellation points. Compared with the SDP-based methods in Table 1, our framework provides analytical finite-size composable SKR bounds and supports real-time SKR evaluation for arbitrary constellations, enabling the performance advantages of higher-order modulation to be assessed efficiently. We validate the framework through 256-QAM experiments on both discrete-component and chip-based CV-QKD platforms, achieving finite-size composable secret key rates of 17.436 and 0.519 Mbps, respectively, over 50 km of optical fiber. The framework provides a basis for real-time composable key-rate estimation for high-order modulation and supports compact, scalable CV-QKD implementations. Moreover, the proposed framework provides an explicit physical picture of how source correlations and measured statistics constrain estimates of an eavesdropper’s information under non-Gaussian modulation.

Results

Protocol and security framework

The prepare-and-measure (PM) scheme of the proposed protocol is illustrated in Fig. 1a. Alice prepares a coherent state ρB0\rho_{B_0}, randomly chosen from an MM-coherent-state set {α1,α2,…,αM}\{\alpha_1,\alpha_2,\ldots,\alpha_M\} with discrete probability distribution {p1,p2,…,pM}\{p_1,p_2,\ldots,p_M\}. Alice records the preparation label aa, sends the state to Bob, and records the mean of quadratures for ρB0\rho_{B_0} as (x^B0,p^B0)(\hat{x}_{B_0},\hat{p}_{B_0}). Bob receives the state ρB\rho_B and performs homodyne or heterodyne measurement, obtaining the results, bb (x^B,p^B)(\hat{x}_B,\hat{p}_B).

Building equivalent entanglement-based (EB) scheme is necessary for security analysis. While if we follow the traditional two-mode entangled source (ρAB0)(\rho_{A B_0}) modeling method, preparing mode B0B_0 in one of finite constellation of coherent states requires Alice to perform a positive-operator valued measure (POVM) with finite elements on mode AA, rather than a heterodyne measurement, leaving the quadrature correlations between Alice and Bob inaccessible to direct estimation. The uncertainty principle alone only admits a broad range of unknown correlations, potentially yielding no positive key rate under worst-case evaluation. SDP-based methods obtain tighter bounds by optimizing over quantum states consistent with the known preparation ensemble and observed statistics, but become computationally demanding for large constellations. To avoid these complex optimizations, we extend the EB source description to a multimode source on Alice’s side, whose additional correlations tighten the bound derived from the uncertainty principle.

Protocol and security framework

Figure 1. Protocol and security framework. a The prepare-and-measure scheme of the proposed DM CV-QKD protocol. A quantum random number generator (QRNG) produces qq-bit symbols, each of which is mapped to one of 2q2^q coherent states in the discrete modulation constellation. Inset plots show the probability distributions of three representative modulation formats: 16-QAM, 64-QAM, and 256-QAM. VOA, variable optical attenuator. b The entanglement-based scheme and classical post-processing of the proposed protocol. Bob calculates the syndrome s=fSY(b)\mathbf{s}=f_{\mathrm{SY}}(\mathbf{b}) and sends it to Alice. Using her data a\mathbf{a}, Alice applies the decoder fEC(s)f_{\mathrm{EC}}(\mathbf{s}) to reconstruct b^\hat{\mathbf{b}}. After correctness verification, the same privacy-amplification function produces k=fPA(b)\mathbf{k}=f_{\mathrm{PA}}(\mathbf{b}) and k^=fPA(b^)\hat{\mathbf{k}}=f_{\mathrm{PA}}(\hat{\mathbf{b}}). POVM, positive-operator valued measure. Hom/Het, homodyne/heterodyne measurement. c Covariance matrix symmetrization and mode reduction. The white boxes represent 0.

We follow the intuition of QKD security originating from the monogamy of entanglement, namely that the stronger the quantifiable correlation between Alice and Bob, the less information is leaked to Eve. Specifically, we extend the conventional two-mode EB source ρAB0\rho_{AB_0} to a three-mode source ρACB0\rho_{ACB_0} by introducing an ancillary mode C. Mode C is heterodyne measured, yielding the outcome c\mathbf{c} and enabling estimation of the correlations between modes C and B. The correlations between modes A and C are determined by the source model. Together with Bob’s measured statistics, these quantities determine all blocks of the covariance matrix γACB\gamma_{ACB} except the A–B correlation block. The additional source correlations tighten the uncertainty-principle constraints on this unknown block, allowing an upper bound χBE(γACB)\chi_{BE}(\gamma_{ACB}) on Eve’s Holevo information to be evaluated using Gaussian optimality34. γACB\gamma_{ACB} takes the form

γACB=(γAψACκABψACTγCψCBκABTψCBTγB),(1)\gamma_{ACB} = \begin{pmatrix} \gamma_A & \psi_{AC} & \kappa_{AB} \\ \psi_{AC}^{T} & \gamma_C & \psi_{CB} \\ \kappa_{AB}^{T} & \psi_{CB}^{T} & \gamma_B \end{pmatrix}, \tag*{(1)}

where each term γij:=12⟨{Δr^i,Δr^j}⟩\gamma_{ij}:=\frac{1}{2}\langle\{\Delta\hat{r}_i,\Delta\hat{r}_j\}\rangle, and Δr^i=r^i−⟨r^i⟩\Delta\hat{r}_i=\hat{r}_i-\langle\hat{r}_i\rangle, with r^=(x^A,p^A,x^C,p^C,x^B,p^B)\hat{r}=(\hat{x}_A,\hat{p}_A,\hat{x}_C,\hat{p}_C,\hat{x}_B,\hat{p}_B), ⟨r^i⟩=Tr⁡(r^iρACB)\langle\hat{r}_i\rangle=\operatorname{Tr}(\hat{r}_i\rho_{ACB}). Here, γA\gamma_A, γC\gamma_C, and ψAC\psi_{AC} can be theoretically calculated based on the entangled source. ψCB\psi_{CB} and γB\gamma_B can be estimated through the measured data. Only κAB=(κ11 κ12; κ21 κ22)\kappa_{AB}=(\kappa_{11}\ \kappa_{12};\ \kappa_{21}\ \kappa_{22}) is unknown due to the POVM measurement, rendering χBE\chi_{BE} a function of κAB\kappa_{AB}. Nevertheless,

the uncertainty principle[4] imposes a constraint on γACB\gamma_{ACB}, namely γACB+iΩ≥0\gamma_{ACB}+i\Omega\geq0, which restricts the value of κAB\kappa_{AB} within a set FκAB\mathcal{F}_{\kappa_{AB}}. Therefore, we can find the maximum information leakage χBE(κABworst)\chi_{BE}(\kappa_{AB}^{\mathrm{worst}}) by traversing FκAB\mathcal{F}_{\kappa_{AB}}, and the SKR is defined as

K=βI(a:b)−sup⁡κAB∈FκABχBEG(κAB).(2)K=\beta I(a:b)-\sup_{\kappa_{AB}\in\mathcal{F}_{\kappa_{AB}}}\chi_{BE}^{G}(\kappa_{AB}). \tag*{(2)}

References

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